The

clerk will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 28, line 10, it is proposed to strike out "$615,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$633,200,000"; on page 29, line 25, it is proposed to strike out "$3,169,862,500" and insert in lieu thereof "$3,199,062,500"; and on page 32, line 2, it is proposed to strike out "$3,300,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$3,301,720,000."

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, the object of this amendment is to increase the training of pilots from the rate of 7,200 each year to 12,000 each year. To do that the bill must be amended in three places, and for that reason I ask that the amendments be considered en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Arizona? The Chair hears none, and the amendments will be considered en bloc.

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, I wish to make it plain that I asked Maj. Gen. Manuel Asensio, the budget officer for

the Air Force, if he would advise me as to the amount of money needed in 1954 to increase annual pilot training from 7,200 to 12,000. If the Air Force is to maintain 120 wings, then training pilots at the rate of 7,200 a year, as at present, is sufficient, but if we are to build up to 143 wings, which I understand is the plan of the Department of Defense. It will require during the next 2 or 3 years the training of 12,000 pilots a year. Then the training can level off and drop back to 10,000 a year.

I asked General Asensio where the changes would have to be made in the bill, and he said that for major procurement other than aircraft, $18,200,000 would be necessary. That is the first item.

For maintenance and operations, $29,200,000. That is the second item.

Military personnel requirements, $1,720,000. The total of the three the three amendments amounts to an addition of $49,120,000 to this appropriation bill.

Then there would be necessary the construction of additional bases, which would cost $16,700,000, which would increase the total appropriations for this fiscal year to $68,820,000.

That sum cannot be provided for in this bill. It would be in a supplemental appropriation bill.

The items as set forth by General Asensio are as follows:

1. Assuming initiation as soon as possible, the input required for this program could be achieved by July 1954 with resultant production at that rate commencing in the second quarter of fiscal year 1956.

2. This program would require two additional basic single engine jet stations, one additional fighter station and two additional primary contract installations.

3. The estimated additional dollar requirements for fiscal year 1954 to finance the initiation of this increase in pilot training rate would provide for the following:

(a) The equipping of the first three stations indicated above, and the providing of additional facilities at the first three stations and other training bases.

(b) The maintenance and operation of 165 additional aircraft including an additional 41,560 of flying hours during fiscal year 1954.

(c) The maintenance and operation of the three additional bases to be operated by the

additional primary contract installations, and the expansion of operations of other training bases.

(d) Rehabilitation of two of the bases. (e) The pay and allowances of 1,681 military personnel including 1,281 students and 400 permanent party.

(f) Additional public works authorization would be required in the amount of $16,700,000 for the required public works con

struction.

(g) The total increase in number of military personnel required for this purpose including students and permanent party would be 31,469, which number would be required by the end of the third quarter of fiscal year 1956.

The services of 62,600 officers and enlisted men now are required to support listed men now are required to support the training of 7,200 pilots. To train 12,000 pilots will require 87,900 officers and enlisted men in support.

I want to be perfectly frank with the money, in addition to the training of the Senate in saying that it is going to cost pilots, because support personnel will be required at a ratio of about 6 to 1. pilots, because support personnel will

When this matter was considered by the committee, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wilson, was asked about pilot trainthe committee, the Secretary of Defense, ing. I read, now, from page 541 of the hearings:

this committee that reducing personnel, reSenator HILL. Mr. Secretary, do you tell ducing the number of pilots to be trained, eliminating the construction of new bases, eliminating the construction of new bases, and things of that kind, has not slowed down the advance, if you were advancing to 143 wings?

Secretary WILSON. I have had many reports from different sources. I have had many letters from individuals. I have had communications from Congressmen and Senators. We had Sarnoff's committee that was

just completing a survey at the time we arrived here. They all said there was a great misuse of manpower in the armed services, and great reductions in personnel could be made without interfering with the combat effectiveness of the country.

Certainly there is some basis for that kind of thinking. No one in the Defense Department said reduce the pilot training to what the first suggestion of the Air Force is, and I do not think they are going to go that low, either. It is an old military trick when the civilians put a little pressure on to get the expenses down, to pick out something essential and claim it must be eliminated. Therefore, you are sort of frustrated in getting any economies in the program.

It is ridiculous to talk about cutting the pilot training that low instead of taking it out of the band musicians and some of the other extra kinds of things you do not have to do.

Senator HILL. Then you do not favor cutting down the pilot training?

Secretary WILSON. Not to any such figure as that, sir, and it is not going to be done, either.

Senator HILL. To cut from 12,000 to 7,200 would be a pretty precipitate cut.

Secretary WILSON. It certainly would have been a very foolish one.

I now read from page 553 of the committee hearings:

Senator HILL. Mr. Secretary, in the matter of training of personnel and pilots, is that not a military matter?

is going to train the right number of pilots and can do it within the personnel limitations we have suggested. We only asked the Air Force to plan on 5,000 less people than they had March 1, 1953. The opportunity to make such savings is apparent from the fact that we have been criticized by committees of the Senate and everybody else because we were not efficient in the use of manpower. I want more pilots trained and not so many people for miscellaneous funny kinds of purposes.

When asked about pilot training, Secretary Wilson clearly indicated that he was sure the Air Force would train the right number of pilots. I take it from the testimony of the Secretary of Defense that he was not in favor of

cutting down the pilot training, but,

rather, keeping it at a scale which would build it up along the lines I have suggested

Mr. President, I should like to make reference to an article which appeared in the August number of the Reader's Digest, entitled "On Guard! The Day and Night Vigil of Our Atom Bomber Combat Crews," by Francis V. Drake. It is said to be the first account ever published about a Strategic Air Command B-47 atom-bombing flight under graphically simulated war conditions. The article describes the hardships the men had to suffer for long hours in carrying out a simulated combat mission. I ask the attention of the Senate while I read from the Reader's Digest, because it goes to the very heart of the problem:

But a sleep of a day or a night cannot restore this crew to working efficiency, although the bomber will be ready for another mission within a few hours. Even the strongest man cannot endure the tremendous and unnatural strain of repeated highaltitude missions without a chance to restore his nervous system. This crew must be grounded at least 4 days.

Here we have an illustration of the alarming deficiency in our Government's scheme for preventing the outbreak of war: there are no duplicate atom-bomber crews.

Should the United States ever come under attack, this deficiency would be appalling. The Red air force is already much larger than our own. It has ample trained manpower. It could maintain continuous bombardment. Yet at a time when every hour might be beyond price, when millions of our people might be under devastating attack, this bomber-and dozens like it-would have to remain grounded, subject to enemy destruction at any minute.

The men would be willing to fly again, of course, to force their bodies back to the rigors of the stratosphere; but they would not be able to manage the split-second timing of their complex equipment. The Air Force believes that it would only sacrifice plane and crew to try.

In a belated effort to catch up with the Red air force, we have more bombers on order. We need these badly. But still more, we need crews to fly them. Commercial airlines average over four crews per plane. SAC is allowed only one. The reason? Lack of appropriations. It costs $50,000 per man to train an atom-bomber crew. SAC hasn't got the money.

So far, the peace has been kept not by machines alone but by the skillful and de

Senator HILL. I asked whether that was not a military matter.

Secretary WILSON. They are trained ahead of their requirements. That is why we have the paper wings. The Air Force, I am sure,

Command respected by every nation-including the Soviet Union. The men who fly our atom bombers are an elite corps. To be of their number is an honor. Their patriotism is so unwavering that they consistently refuse better-paying jobs in industry, in order

men, although selected and trained as officers.

It may also be necessary for many of the 9,000 ROTC graduates to serve as enlisted men since they cannot serve as officers in the cutback program.

In addition to these reductions, which will be very destructive to morale in the Air Force, 1,900 out of 2,000 specialists will not be commissioned as planned. The loss of these specialists will greatly reduce the ability of the Air Force to handle new types of equipment now being produced.

I know that the average age of pilots has been increasing since I left the service more than 3 years ago, but I was astounded to hear that it was as high as 29 years.

Air Force ROTC enrollment for college juniors has been cut more than half. These drastic changes are already causing confusion and hardship among the young men who have prepared to serve their country as officers in the Air Force.

The word "confusion" is appropriate. There has been much criticism of the confusion in the Air Force. If anyone will look at the directives of the Department of Defense since January 20, he will find plenty of reason for confusion.

The effect of these actions is to dry up the sources of young officers for the Air Force, which has no academy of its own. It has no source of its own for officers, as the Army and Navy have.

I should like to associate myself with the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], who said—and I am sure he is right, because of his vast experience that inasmuch as the word has come down from on high, we shall do nothing about these officers and enlisted men; but in my opinion, if this program goes through, they will be betrayed by their Government. Nevertheless, I hope that some day, even if it requires some practical efforts in the way of defending the free world, there will be a realization of what we have been doing to the Air Force during the past few days.

I thank my distinguished colleague from Arizona for yielding to me.

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, in conclusion, let me say that there is no Senator present from any State in the Union who does not know that what I am about to say has happened, and has been brought to his attention.

Between the close of the Second World War and the outbreak in Korea we did not train pilots and officers in the Air Force to any great extent. The failure to train young men to take up those duties resulted-in what? It resulted in calling men back into the service who had served their full time in the Second World War, young men who thought they were free to marry and to raise families, as they did, or to make a start in business. In every State of the Union those young men were called to the air service and compelled to pilot airplanes and to engage in the fighting in Korea. I predict that unless we train an adequate number of men, the same distressing situation will occur in the future. To whom will it happen? It will happen to the pilots who have rendered full

service in Korea, who thought they were through, who thought they had rendered all that was requested by their Government, just as the veterans of the Second World War did. They will be called back again, because there will be no one to take their places. To me that will be a crime which the Nation should be ashamed to commit.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arizona yield for a question?

Mr. HAYDEN. I yield.

Mr. HILL. Does the Senator feel that it is fair to these young men to put them in modern bombers, with all the technological equipment they must be familiar with, and the tremendous speed of the bombers and other types of planes, such as fighters and jet planes, and planes of all kinds, without properly and adequately training them?

Mr. HAYDEN. Certainly they must be trained.

Mr. HILL. It is not fair to them to ask them to fly those planes without proper training, is it?

Mr. HAYDEN. If we have an adequate number of pilots in training, we can be sure that when we do send a man up in the air he will possess the knowledge which will enable him to carry on in the plane. Furthermore, as pointed out in the article which I read, when he comes back exhausted there should be another man ready to take his place.

Mr. HILL. It is not fair to send him back into the air until he has had time and opportunity properly to rest and get himself into proper condition to go back into the air. Is not that true?

Mr. HAYDEN. That is absolutely true.

Mr. HILL. Furthermore, is it not also true that the better prepared and better trained these men are the better chance they will have for their lives, and also the better chance they will have to preserve the planes, which cost so many hundreds of millions of dollars?

Mr. HAYDEN. I agree entirely with the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one further observation?

Mr. HAYDEN. Certainly.

Mr. SYMINGTON. We have heard a great deal about desk jobs. We are not talking about the fliers. They are great. We are very proud of their achievements. We are talking about those in desk jobs. We are talking about the confusion which exists in the Pentagon, on the part of those who do not fly.

It is an interesting fact that of the 32 jet aces in Korea all but 7 fairly recently had desk jobs in the Air Force.

The

PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments offered by the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN].

Mr. HAYDEN. I ask for the yeas and

nays.

that the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT] is necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. COOPER in the chair). A quorum is present.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I should like to reply very briefly to the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], and to state that I hope his amendment will not be accepted. On the subject of pilot training I should like to refer on page 1341, in the second volume of the Senate hearings, to the colloquy between myself and General Picher, who was the official representative of the Air Force.

This subject worried me perhaps more than others in the whole Air Force program. The sum and substance of the situation is that we are at the present time contemplating an interim program of 120 air wings, ultimately to be built to 143 wings, perhaps, and we hope, by 1957. The present manpower of approximately 970,000 will permit a trainer program of 7,200 men, as opposed to 12,000 men. General Picher pointed out that 7,200 pilot trainees are sufficient to take care of a 120-wing interim Air Force. He also pointed out in a colloquy at page 1342 of the hearings that if we attain a 143-wing Air Force by 1957-that is between 1955 and 1957we will be in a position by that time to build up to 12,000 pilot trainees, if we have to do it, and we can expand the training and have 12,000 trainees a year by the time we get the 143-wing Air Force, and in that way provide a sufficient number of trained pilots to man all the airplanes we will then have.

We must remember that it takes approximately 62,000 men to train 7,200 trainee pilots. In other words it takes almost 6 men to train 1 trainee. It also takes bases and it also takes planes. So when I came out of the hearings of The the Appropriations Committee I felt confident that in training 7,200 trainee

The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. KNOWLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. clerk will call the roll.

pilots a year we were training a sufficient number of pilots to man a 120wing interim Air Force, and that there would be sufficient time in the fiscal years 1955 and 1956 to take care of building up the training program so as to accommodate 12,000 trainee pilots, if we have to do it, in order to supply a 143wing Air Force by 1957.

Therefore, taking into account the number of planes we have and contemplate having, and the number of wings we have and contemplate having, in my opinion it is not necessary to train at the present time more than 7,200 pilots a year.

I say it is one of the most difficult questions in the whole Air Force program, and we must face it realistically. We must have trained pilots and an adequate number of them coming along, and we want to have them so trained that they will not injure themselves or kill themselves, or damage the planes in which they are flying as pilots.

I am thoroughly convinced, on the basis of the number of men contemplated by the budget, to wit, 970,000, and the number of planes contemplated this year and to be built up to the next year, and the number of bases we have, that 7,200 trainee pilots each year are sufficient to take care of our present needs and our needs in the next fiscal year. After that we can have another look at the program and decide whether, with the number of planes we are building up to, we need to augment the trainee program. ThereIfore I hope the amendment of the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN] will be defeated.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. HUNT. The distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, in his opening remarks, quoted from testimony before the committee. May I ask to which testimony he was referring?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I was referring to the testimony of General Picher, who was one of the official representatives of the Air Force, at the time the general testified before the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. The colloquy I had, and which I quoted, was with him.

Mr. HUNT. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield at this point?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does the Senator from Massachusetts know whether the decision of the Department of Defense is to go to 143 wings or 120 wings or groups?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is my understanding, from listening to testimony before the Appropriations Committee, that there is to be an interim Air Force of 123 wings, with an ultimate goal, determined problematically for 1957, of a greater number, presumably 143 wings. The testimony is not clear whether that goal will be reached in 1956, 1957, or 1958.

Mr. SYMINGTON. There has been testimony that up to 10 years are required for the training of a jet bomber pilot. There is an article by an authority on this subject and the article was

written after discussions with members of the Strategic Air Command-to the of the Strategic Air Command-to the effect that today the special training required for a jet bomber pilot in the regular service-this article has no relation to the pilot reserve-must be continued for as long as 10 years; in other words, training for that length of time is required before a pilot is qualified to fly a B-47. Even though a pilot has been flying P-51's, he will still require some years of additional training before he years of additional training before he will be qualified to fly a B-47.

Of course, let me say in passing that these airplanes cost millions of dollars each, but as a general rule they are out of use 70 percent of the time.

Based on the indecision in the Department of Defense as to the number of wings needed, and the decision to postpone the training of the necessary personnel, although not to postpone the sonnel, although not to postpone the procurement of the necessary number of aircraft-and in that connection let me state that we are told that all combat aircraft required for 143 wings will be available in sufficient time-does the Senator from Massachusetts feel we should limit the program for the training of pilots to one sufficient for the training of the number of pilots required for a 120-wing Air Force-with the result that if it is decided to have a larger number of wings, there will not be sufficient pilots?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I disagree with my friend, the Senator from Missouri, on that point, because it is my understanding that we shall not have 143 wings before 1957. In the meantime the pilot training can be increased.

As the Senator from Missouri knowsand he knows it better than I do the more experienced pilots will handle the planes which are more difficult to fly, and the new pilots will gradually fill in.

I base what I am saying on the testi

mony and the colloquy between General

Picher and myself. As I have said, this subject was the most difficult one, in my opinion, on which to make up our minds. After listening to him and after the colloquy with him, I became convinced that the training of pilots would be sufficiently advanced under this program. Thereafter if additional pilots are needed, we can provide for the training of an additional number. I understand that 6 soldiers are required for the train

ing of 1 pilot. So it is my understanding

that it will be possible to increase the number of trained pilots in time to meet the goal for the total number of aircraft to be available, and to have those two programs come together or match in 1957 or 1958.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield for another question?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Certainly.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I did not hear the Secretary of Defense testify at the executive sessions of the Appropriations Committee, although I wish I could have been there. I did hear his testimony before the Armed Services Committee, of which the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts is chairman. At that time the Secretary of Defense was very definite in saying that he did not know how many

wings he would decide would be the necessary number in order to protect the United States.

With that premise, let me say it is also known that the old Joint Chiefs of Staff-sometimes characterized by some persons as "the bad old Joint Chiefs of Staff" and I refer to General Vandenberg, General Bradley, General Collins, and Admiral Fechteler-said that as of June 1, 1954, and, they felt, for years afterward, the Soviets would be in a position to attack the United States with an adequate number of bombers and an adequate number of bombs.

As I listened to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, it was my impression that he said we are to reach a total of 143 groups in 1957.

My question is this: What are we going to do in the 4 years between now and then, if we do not have sufficient pilots?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is my understanding that we shall increase the number of pilots, so that the plane-procurement program and the pilot-training program will match or come together as of that time, with the result that then we shall have sufficient pilots and sufficient planes. In other words, there will be sufficient time a year from now, at least, to decide whether to train 12,000 pilots a year or to have 12,000 trainees a year, so that we shall be able to have a sufficient number of pilots when we reach the goal of 143 wings.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I think the Senate is being given a perfect illustration of the application of a slogan that has been used with considerable success to the detriment of the Air Force. That slogan is "paper wings." The trick has been to attempt to make the people of the United States believe that the number of wings which has been stated is based on a considerable number of socalled paper wings, and thus to make the people satisfied to have the number

of planes in the procurement program

reduced and the number of pilots in the training program reduced, because of a belief that the number of wings stated as the program includes a certain number of so-called paper wings.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I do not wish to enter into a discussion of that matter with my colleague. I simply say at this time, with a smile, and pleasantly, that it is my feeling, after listening to the testimony, that after this year there will be more actual planes with engines in them, and ready to fly, than there have been heretofore.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If that is correct, they will be planes that were purchased years ago, by the previous administration.

We shall still be faced with the question-and the answer to it will remain cloudy; in fact, if it had not been cloudy, in my opinion the decision would have been different-what will be the situation regarding the number of planes available 3 years or 4 years from now? If we have an adequate number of planes in 1953, that will not be as a result of what is done on appropriations in 1953. The building of aircraft requires far more time than that.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I agree.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I also say, with a smile on my face, and pleasantly, that yesterday the Senate took action to reduce the number of planes, because of the opinion of many Senators that the number of wings stated included a certain number of "paper" wings. Today it is proposed that the number of pilots be reduced, also because of the so-called "paper" wings.

The trouble is that sufficient consideration is not given to the testimony of the military experts. We began to ignore their testimony a few weeks ago, although for years they were the only ones upon whom we relied. This situation is another illustration of procedure purely on the basis of promises with respect to the appropriation of funds.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I reply by stating that I shall be delighted to debate this subject with my colleague at another time. I assume that at this time we are discussing the trainees program. My colleague and I simply agree to disagree on that subject.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, it has been very rare, and I believe this is the first time in my life, that I have disagreed with my old and distinguished friend, the senior Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], and I am most reluctant to do it. At the same time I would feel I was not doing my duty toward my colleagues if I did not supply a little information in answer to some of the statements which have been made on the floor of the Senate regarding the training of pilots.

We have heard much during the discussion in the past few days about not being able to make an air force by putting feathers on dollars, and, likewise, about not being able to make pilots by putting goggles on dollars.

I should like to demonstrate what I mean by that statement by referring back to 1951, when money was plentiful. Under Public Law 43, passed on May 31, 1951, the Air Force got $283 million; by Public Law 911, dated January 6, 1951, it got $88.6 million; and under Public Law 254, of January 11, 1951, it got $236.6 million. That money went directly to the Air Force for training purposes. It represents a total of $515 million for training-almost a blank check. Those sums were not used immediately, as there were no plans for their proper utilization.

I repeat, that was what happened in 1951. In that year, when the Air Force announced a pilot-training program, it said there would be 10,000 in training by June 1952, and that the rate would be 12,000 a year by June 1954.

In August 1952, in testimony given before the Appropriations Committee in connection with 1954 budget, it was announced that the 10,000 rate would be reached by October, and the 12,000 rate by March 1954. Yet in the March testimony the Appropriations Committee was told the 10,000 rate would be reached by July 1954, and the 12,000 rate would not be reached until the middle of 1955. Actually, we are today on a pilottraining rate of about 7,200; and, I may add, we have attained that goal.

I am happy to report that the information available to me indicates that

the pilot-training program is picking up rapidly. That is important. At the outset of the Korean war the average age of the regular pilot was 32.3 years. The average of the nonregular was 28.9 years, giving an average age for the two of from 29 to 30 years at the start of the Korean war. The average age on November 15, 1952, was, for regular pilots, 34.2 years, for nonregular, 30.5 years; an average of between 31.5 and 32.5 years.

Mr. President, I have been out of the training program since the war, but I have kept in close touch with it through the Air National Guard program, in connection with which there is pretty much the same problem the regular Air Forces have. For some inexplicable reasonand I cannot explain it—the interest of the young men of this country in becoming air pilots has declined. I remember when I was a small boy, after seeing my first airplane, I could not wait until I was old enough to get into one. Men of my present age and younger flocked to the recruiting office by the tens of thousands at the outbreak of World War II, to become pilots. But something has happened. I have read studies on the subject, trying to find out why the young men of this country are not continuing their original interest in becoming pilots. It is not a problem of dollars. I do not care if we appropriated ten times the amount of money being asked in this budget for pilot training, we would not increase the rate of pilot recruitment over what we have today.

I cite one example. In the Air National Guard program, about a year and a half ago, I believe, some restrictions which had always been placed upon pilot material were removed. Students out of high school and over 18 or 181⁄2 years of age would be taken into the National Guard training program. They would receive regular Air Force training, a second lieutenant's commission in the National Guard, and be allowed to return to their home community or home State for 3 years of service. We finally reached a quota of 20, and after an intensive campaign, going around through the high schools and talking to young men, we finally succeeded in getting five young men who were interested in joining. I have tried to increase my knowledge of what young men think about the Air Force, but I cannot come up with any answers. I wish I could.

I think one of the things which may be contributing to the lack of interest among young men is that every year, when the budget is drawn up, we hear talk about cutting out flying pay. Flying pay is an incentive to getting young men to come into the service. Flying pay should never be withheld from young pilots in the Air Force. I am very hopeful that no amendment will be offered on the floor which would cut out any portion of the flight pay.

I maintain that the Air Force itself, through the proper observation of Air Force Regulation 60-2, can police their older pilots so that those who are no longer interested in flying can be dropped from the rolls. But we should stop the talk about cutting out flight pay, because it makes the profession of pilot a little less interesting to these boys. I

hope someone will come up with the answer, but the answer is definitely not in terms of dollars.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, I desire to say a few words on this subject. It was before the committee, and the committee felt that we should not increase the amount provided for in this particular amendment.

I should like to invite attention to the fact that the House reduced the first item, on page 28, line 10, $15 million. The committee put that amount back and gave to the Air Force the exact amount requested.

On the next item, page 29, line 25, the House had stricken out $120 million. The Senate committee restored $119,865,000. It may seem strange that we restored a little less. The reason for do

ing so was that we took out a small amount for public relations.

House committee took out $30 million, On the next item, page 32, line 2, the full $30 million. and the Senate committee put back the

In other words, Mr. President, we put back into the bill and brought before the Senate the amount which the Air Force is requesting.

I am glad the junior Senator from Arizona has mentioned the question of flight pay. The House greatly restricted flight pay, reducing the number of hours to 48 hours a year. The Senate did not agree. The Senate believed that was a mistake, and we adjusted the language so that the minimum would be 100 hours.

Mr. President, we have the promise of the Air Secretary that if he is permitted to do something by regulation on the question of flight pay, he will be able to save approximately $15 million. We feel that we should at this session of Congress give to the new Secretary of Defense-and this applies to all the services-supervision of the question of flight pay. It is a very troublesome question. When a man is receiving flight pay we often hear the question asked, "Why is he being given flight pay?" If we force the Department to put more young men into the Air Force we are not going to solve the problem of flight pay. Some of our best pilots are older men. If we take in younger men to be trained, it will be said that the older men should not be flying, and why should Congress provide flight pay for them.

The same thing is true with the new pilots. There is no need, merely because Congress wants to raise this issue, to compel the Air Force to train more pilots. We have been after them to train more pilots. What have we found? They thought they could train more pilots, and up to now they have trained only 6,000 annually. The bill will provide enough money, if they properly supervise the extra flying, to train approximately 8,300 or 8,400 pilots a year. Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Michigan yield?

Mr. FERGUSON. I yield.

Mr. LONG. With the money available they can train approximately 8,300 pilots a year; is that correct?

Mr. FERGUSON. That is correct,