The Senator from South Carolina may regard his amendment as no more than a proviso imposing a condition in regard to these expenditures. In reality, it is a far-reaching proposal tacked onto a provision of the bill to which it bears not the slightest relation. The amended provision deals with purchases of food, clothing, cotton, and wool at home. The amendment itself deals, by nullifying them, with efforts to correct or preing them, with efforts to correct or prevent economic dislocation.

Mr. President, the emphasis of the rider of the Senator from South Carolina on preventing any use of Government

de la Cruz Hernandez;

S. 486. An act for the relief of Che Kil Bok;

S. 556. An act for the relief of Marinella Taletti;

S. 615. An act for the relief of Altoon Saprichian;

S. 669. An act for the relief of Helene Olga Iwasenko; and

S. 2399. An act to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1954

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 5969) making appropriations for the Department of Defense and related independent agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], to strike out the committee amendment on page 58, between lines 15 and 20. The amendment to which the motion relates will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows: Provided further, That none of the funds appropriated by this act shall be available for expenditure under any contract without regard to the provisions of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, and modification of contracts, for the purpose of correcting or preventing economic dislocations.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, the amendment proposed by my good friend, the senior Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] is-and I say this both sincerely and respectfully-an unfortunate one.

The Senator from South Carolina may regard his amendment as aimed merely at striking down what seem to him undue preferences for other parts of the country. In reality, it would strike down every effort by the administration to take into account manpower and unemploy

dislocations raises serious questions as to the applicability of the amendment to other important laws.

The Walsh-Healey Act, for example, was designed to use the leverage of Government contracts to raise the wage level ernment contracts to raise the wage level of substandard industries. Are not such industries instances of economic disloindustries instances of economic dislocation? If so, does not this rider deny effect, under defense contracts obligating funds appropriated by H. R. 5969, to orders of the Secretary of Labor fixing minimum wages payable by a tractor?

Under section 2 (c) (16) of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, contracting officers not infrequently take into account the desirability of locating a new plant in an area remote from the threat of atomic attack. Is the concentration of industrial plants in congested areas of the East an "economic dislocation"?

What of the decision by a contracting officer that the award of a contract to a particular low bidder might so burden that bidder as to prevent fulfillment of the contract? Under section 2 (c) (1) of the Armed Services Procurement Act, there is no doubt that a contracting officer has authority to turn down such a bid and to award the contract, instead, to a higher bidder whose staying power is better established. Would not this rider cast doubt upon the authority of the contracting officer to take such a step in order to avoid the "economic dislocation" of the first bidder?

Section 714 (f) (2) of the Defense Production Act, as recently extended, authorizes special treatment of smallbusiness firms in the award of defense contracts. It is the tendency of big business to grow bigger and of small business to become submerged. Is not the purpose of this section to correct a tendency toward "economic dislocation"? would certainly seem to be so; no fundamental distinction between the economic decline of the textile industry, the eco

It

How many other serious questions the amendment of the Senator from South Carolina may raise it is impossible at this time to foretell. But the ones I have

suggested will at least serve to indicate how damaging its effect may be.

In all fairness, Mr. President, I am bound to say that I know the Senator from South Carolina does not mean to strike so broadly at established contracting procedures. He aims only at curbing the power of the President under existing law so to direct defense spending in such a way as to relieve manpower shortages and to alleviate unemployment. But not even this lesser aim is insignificant or negligible in its harmful effects.

It happens that I come from a State which suffers from the most serious area of unemployment anywhere in the Union. I refer to the city of Lawrence, where today nearly 20 percent of the total labor force is unemployed. When speaking at Lawrence on October 21, 1952, Presidential Candidate Eisenhower pledged the use of defense contracts as a means of alleviating unemployment. On April 1 of this year the President personally conferred with a Lawrence delegation, representing both management and labor, and renewed that pledge in clear and unequivocal terms.

Mr. President, the Senator from South Carolina would make it impossible for President Eisenhower to carry out that pledge. His amendment would eliminate policies now in effect which give bidmatching privileges to business firms in areas of serious unemployment, such as Lawrence and Lowell, Mass.; Providence, R. I.; the Crab Orchard area of Illinois; the Iron Mountain area of Michigan; the Terre Haute and Vincennes areas of Indiana; and a number of areas in Pennsylvanian and West Virginia. There are now in all 26 such areas in 11 Statesareas certified by the Secretary of Labor as having 6 percent or more of the labor force unemployed. Because of improved employment, in some cases hastened by the bid-matching privilege which this amendment would destroy, 28 other areas, including 6 States other than the 11 mentioned a moment ago, have recently been dropped from their eligible classification.

Mr. President, at this point in my remarks, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the RECORD a tabulation of these areas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Policy No. 4

Area

Date of certi- Approved by fication ODM

Notification No.

Altoona, Pa. (Blair County).......

Asheville, N. C. (Buncombe County).

Gloversville, N. Y. (Fulton County).

do... Mar. 21, 1952 Feb. 21, 1952

5

36

15

31

7

12

That is the statement of the Office of Defense Mobilization, explaining the objectives that have just been set forth.

DMP No. 4, as carried out by Munitions Board directives and regulations, provides essentially, as I have already indicated, for bid-matching procedures. In the case of areas having more than 6 percent of their labor force unemployed-called by the Labor Department "Group IV areas" or "labor surplus areas"-two types of situations are covered.

In negotiated procurements over $25,000, DMP No. 4 gives business firms in surplus labor areas the privilege of matching the bid of any firm in an area not classified as a surplus labor area. If the surplus labor area firm is able to match the lowest bid by any other firm, it is awarded the contract. An exception however, is made for the benefit of firms, large or small, in areas too small or remote to be classified by the Department of Labor. Since the loss of a contract by such a firm may cause serious unemployment in its entire area, surplus labor area firms are not permitted to match its bid.

In other words, in small areas where there is one factory, so to speak, not classified by the Department of Labor, this provision for matching bids by surplus labor area firms is not permitted.

The second type of bid-matching procedure employs the use of partial setasides in connection with procurements which are subject to formal advertising for bids. Instead of awarding the entire procurement on an advertised-bid basis, part of the procurement is set aside for distressed area firms and small firms which submitted bids within 20 percent of the lowest bid. These firms are then given the opportunity to match the low bid on the publicly advertised portion of the procurement; if more than one award is made under the publicly advertised portion, it is the weighted average amount of the successful bids which must be matched. Any firm which thus matches the low bid becomes entitled to participate in the set-aside portion.

I emphasize at that point that the firm, in order to get into that classification and to qualify for a bid, must be within 20 percent of the low bidder, before he is allowed to participate.

The Office of Defense Mobilization has not found it possible, however, in the case of certain industries, to carry out the DMP No. 4 purpose of conserving essential skills and maintaining productive resources on a surplus labor area basis. Some industries have accordingly been exempted from DMP No. 4. In the case of the textile industry, a panel of the Surplus Manpower Committee established by DMP No. 4 found that

Some action is in the public interest in order to mitigate the serious production and employment problems in the textile industry as a whole. To the extent that procurement policies can help to stabilize conditions in the textile industry, the panel finds that such assistance to stabilization within the industry will help to maintain the productive facilities and the skilled labor force of the industry in the interest of future contingent needs of the Nation for maximum production of textiles.

As a result of this finding, the Department of Defense issued a directive which authorizes procurement officers to set aside a portion of a textile procurement for textile mills operating not more than 80 hours a week-two 40-hour shifts. Such mills are entitled to participate in the set-aside portion if they meet the average amount of the prices at which the formerly advertised parts of the procurement went to other firms. This, I wish to emphasize, is not a regional privilege, but applies to all textile mills, wherever located, operating not more than 80 hours a week.

Mr. President, the Comptroller General has squarely ruled that the bidmatching procedures which I have just summarized have ample authority in law, namely, section 2 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 and section 2 (c) (1) of the Armed Services Procurement Act, 1947.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks a letter from the Comptroller General to this effect.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMPTROLLER GENERAL

OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, June 18, 1953.
Hon. HOMER E. CAPEHART,
Chairman, Joint Committee on De-
States
fense Production, United
Senate.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to your letter of June 4, 1953, calling to my attention a motion passed by your committee, as reported on page 33 of Defense Production Act Progress Report No. 26, dated

May 4, 1953, to request the Comptroller Gen

eral to check certain contracts and to furnish you with a report thereon. I was not aware of the action of the committee until receipt of your letter.

It appears that your committee desires to be advised whether, in my opinion, the socalled set-aside textile contracts discussed in the subject report are authorized by law or constitute an improper exercise of the authority referred to in my decision of January 14, 1952 (31 Comp. Gen. 279), to the Director of Defense Mobilization.

The "set aside" method of procurement consists of an arrangement whereby only a portion of any specific procurement is advertised in the regular manner and the contracts awarded to the lowest bidder or bid

ders. Contracts to supply the remaining portion (the "set aside" portion) of the procurement are then negotiated with firms in surplus-labor areas who had submitted bids which did not exceed by more than 20 percent the highest bid accepted on the advertised portion. With respect to "set aside" textile contracts, mills operating on an 80-hour week basis, or less, are given first opportunity to negotiate contracts at fair and reasonable prices, preferably the weighted average of the related bid prices, but in no event higher than the highest price of an award made under the related invitation for bids, regardless of whether or not such mills are located in a surpluslabor area.

It is explained that mills located in surplus-labor areas are not given preference as such with respect to textile contracts for the reason that the industry would be seriously affected since the Government buys a substantial amount of its products and a significant number of firms are conConsecentrated in surplus-labor areas. quently, the Director, Office of Defense Mo

bilization, testified that in order to apply the area approach equitably, it would have. been necessary to certify many small, onemill towns as being eligible for preference under such policy, which would not have been feasible.

The matter is closely related to that considered in the decision of January 14, 1952, referred to above. In such decision, the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, was advised that in view of the intent of the Congress as set forth in section 2 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, and the authority contained in section 2 (c) (1) of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, to negotiate contracts when determined to be necessary in the public interest, this Office would not object to otherwise proper payments under contracts awarded through negotiation to concerns located in distress-labor areas. The determination that it is in the public interest to award contracts on such basis is primarily the responsibility of the contracting agency and ordinarily is not for questioning by this Office in the absence of a clear abuse of authority. Nothing has been called to my attention indicating any general abuse of the authority up to this time. However, this Office will continue to examine contracts of the type discussed herein, and appropriate action will be taken when indicated by the circumstances involved. Sincerely yours,

LINDSAY C. WARREN, Comptroller General of the United States. Mr. SALTONSTALL. What I have already said, Mr. President, should make clear that DMP No. 4 does not cost the Government one single penny. In fact, as I shall show, it more than pays for itself.

In every case where set-asides are used, the portion of the procurement reserved for formal advertisement is that quantity of the total needed which is most likely to result in the lowest possible bid. Only that amount of the procurement over and above this portion is set aside.

Since the successful bid or bids on the advertised portion have to be matched by the firms entitled to participate in the set-aside, the awards made under the set-aside cannot cost the Government any additional money. In the case of multiple awards, in fact, the set-aside can and often does result in a saving to the Government.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the RECORD at this point in my remarks a summary which conclusively establishes this fact.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SAVINGS ON TEXTILE PROCUREMENTS UNDER DMP No. 4

If a whole procurement for, say, 600,000 yards of cotton duck were publicly advertised the bids might look like this:

procurement had been set aside, the highest price of any successful award would have been $2.06.

A firm working not more than 80 hours per week, in order to participate in the setaside 200,000 yards, would have to submit

a bid of not more than $2.03.

The Government is thus saved an average of 6 cents per yard on the 200,000 yards under the set-aside. Nor is there any additional overhead cost: although textile contracts cost the Government, on the average, $557 each to administer, the set-aside, by itself, does not increase the number of contracts involved.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, the money-saving aspect of DMP No. 4 is also evident in the case of negotiated procurements. In such procurements the bid-matching privilege of surplus labor area firms forces firms not located in such an area to shave their profit margins in order to avoid the possible loss of the contract to a firm entitled to the bid-matching privilege.

Another aspect of DMP No. 4, Mr. President, which should also be made very clear is its close connection with procedures designed to assist small business. Under the surplus labor area setaside procedure that I tried to describe a few minutes ago, small business firms are entitled to second priority after surplus labor area firms. If no firm in the latter category is able to match the successful bid or bids on the publicly advertised part of the procurement, small firms outside surplus labor areas are given next crack at the contract. The result is that 76 percent of all set-aside contracts thus far awarded under DMP No. 4 have gone to small firms.

As crowning proof of the undesirability of attempting by an appropriations rider to restrict the power of the administration to control the tremendous impact of defense spending, I should like to remind the Senate that the Joint Defense Production Committee has held full and detailed hearings on the operation of DMP No. 4. That committee has not yet submitted any findings to the Senate. It would be premature and unwise to anticipate its findings by the adoption of a rider to an appropriations bill which has not had the benefit of any hearings or any study by the Government agencies that would be most directly affected.

Mr. President, I was one of those who testified before the committee. The committee has not rendered a report, and yet, on an appropriation bill, without any hearing of any kind, we go forward to adopt the rider.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield? Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. MAYBANK. When the Banking and Currency Committee rewrote the National Production Act this year, provision was made for a Joint Committee on Production. We thought so well of it that it was adopted. The Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN] is a member of the committee, and he knows about it. Now the function is turned back to the military.

I deeply appreciate the Senator's attitude, and I deeply appreciate the situation in Massachusetts. It is a question of free enterprise, and it is also a ques

tion of whether we are going to appropriate billions of dollars.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator permit me to finish my statement? If the Senator says the committee made a report, I will take his word for it.

Mr. MAYBANK. I will not say it made a report. The Banking and Currency Committee, under the able leadership of the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], in rewriting the law in connection with controls, eliminated that section of the law which applies to what the Senator has been speaking about.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I was referring to the report of the Committee on Defense Production.

Mr. President, I have a letter dated July 20, 1953, from the Secretary of Labor, Mr. Martin P. Durkin, which I shall read, as follows:

JULY 20, 1953. The Honorable LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR SALTONSTALL: I am responding to your inquiry regarding the views of ing to your inquiry regarding the views of this Department concerning the objectives and experience with defense manpower policy No. 4. The success of the mobilization program, in the development of our capacity to defend the Nation, requires efficient use of all of our resources including manpower as well as facilities. In keeping with the objectives of full utilization of productive capacity and plant facilities, we must take every reasonable step to make the most efficient use of our manpower resources.

Our manpower policy is primarily concerned with bringing defense work to the workers in preference to moving them. The movement of large numbers of workers to already tight areas creates serious burdens on community facilities such as schools, hospitals, housing, transportation, and utilities. Utilization of available labor supply, on the other hand, reduces unemployment, costs of unemployment compensation and permits use of idle plants and tools.

Locating work where needed workers are available will

(a) Contribute greatly to the utilization of the Nation's total manpower potential by making full use of each area's manpower resources;

(b) Conserve manpower by (1) minimizing the need for migration, and (2) reducing labor turnover and absenteeism caused by inadequate housing and community facilities;

from other areas. In fact in some cases goods were purchased at lower prices. Yours very truly, MARTIN P. DURKIN, Secretary of Labor.

Mr. President, there are other letters addressed to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee by Mr. Arthur S. Flemming, Director of Defense Mobilization, and, I think, from the Secretary of Defense, and I would ask the acting chairman of the Appropriations Committee to read those letters when he makes his remarks.

Mr. HAYDEN. It is quite evident that an excellent argument can be made for a proposal that takes work to the worker. But when Congress enacts a statute dependence must be placed on how it operates. Instead of taking work to the worker, in the instance I am familiar with, it takes work away from workers who are skilled and moves it to another place at greater cost to the Government. Does the Senator say that is the fault of the law, or the fault of the administration of the law?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Would the Senator repeat his question briefly please?

Mr. HAYDEN. If an instance can be pointed out under this very law where the cost to the Government was greater and work was taken away from skilled workers in one area, in order to provide work in another area for persons not so skilled, would the Senator say that was the fault of the law, or the fault of the way in which the law was administered?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If the Senator's facts are correct, I would say the law was administered in a poor way.

Mr. HAYDEN. Let me give the Senator the facts. At the request of the armed services, in order to disperse the parachute industry, a factory was established in Phoenix, Ariz., which employed some 250 seamstresses making parachutes. The time came for bidding and the Phoenix company made a lower bid than any other bidder. What happened? A Brooklyn concern, not in a labor scarcity area, agreed to take over the job at a higher price, and opened its manufacturing establishment in Massachusetts, the Senator's State. What was the efThe skilled workers, the seamstresses, who knew how to do the work, were displaced. They lost their jobs. Workers had to be reassembled in Massachusetts and had to acquire skills. In the end the transfer cost the Government more money.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Arizona mentioned that before the committee the other night, and I would reply to him by saying that we have made inquiries of the Office of Defense Mobilization. The company to which the Senator has referred is the Phoenix Parachute Co. Am I correct?

Mr. HAYDEN. That is correct.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I quote from an informal report of the Office of Defense Mobilization concerning that incident. This is not firsthand information; it is information that was submitted to me. This firm lost part of a $4 million parachute procurement to a New York firm intending to move to Lowell, Mass.

On the original bids the procurement was split four ways, with the Arizona firm being the fourth lowest.

In other words, they were fourth up from the bottom. I am informed there were other bids above that.

This was a bona fide case of losing a contract in the normal way under DMP No. 4, but it remains true that the Lowell firm would not have had a chance at the contract if it had not submitted a bid lower than the Phoenix Co., that is, a bid corresponding to the weighted average of the four lowest bids, of which the Phoenix Co.'s was the highest.

In other words, in that case the Government actually saved money, because the firm did the work at a lower price than that for which it would have been done in Phoenix, Ariz.

Mr. HAYDEN. The only way the bid could have been made lower was for the Brooklyn company to have been made aware of the bid submitted by the Phoenix Parachute Co. I think my colleague can confirm that.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I think that is true. That is the only advantage that an area of unemployment or distress is given by the DMP No. 4 procedure. Under that procedure, after the bids are in, if the company in the distressed area is within 120 percent of the lowest bid, it can rebid and get a part of the contract at the weighted average prices of the awards to the companies which got contracts under the formally advertised part of the procurement.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I wish to add a brief statement to what my colleague, the senior Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], has mentioned in this connection.

ODM policy No. 4 seems to be a fine example of robbing Peter to pay Paul. It is completely contrary to the free enterprise system, under which we should be operating. I shall mention one more point in connection with the matter. I point out the danger that exists under this system.

The firm that took the bid away from the Phoenix Parachute Co., up to the time the letter was written, which was May 16, 1953, had never manufactured any parachutes on its own premises. Evidently what it did-and I say this without full knowledge of the facts, but it is quite evident that the firm operated in this way-was to take advantage of ODM policy No. 4, and, being located in New York, it made a lower bid, and then went into a distress area and established a factory.

I understand from the president of the Phoenix Parachute Co. that up to a month ago the Brooklyn concern had not established a factory in Lowell, Mass. Again, I may be in error, but that was the statement of the president of the Phoenix Parachute Co., which, by the way, is now out of business.

So in order to satisfy the so-called distress labor area of Massachusetts, we now have a distress situation in Phoenix, Ariz. What we have is the dog chasing his tail. We are robbing Peter to pay Paul. Where will it end? I do not beXCIX-597

lieve the Senator from Massachusetts agrees with the fundamental policy behind this practice.

As the distinguished Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] has said the entire $38 million can eventually work around into so-called distressed areas. Sooner or later we can create distressed areas in every State of the Union.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I wish to be absolutely fair to my two colleagues from Arizona. When we inquired into the Parachute case, the ODM said that it was thinking of making a careful investigation of the parachute industry under paragraph 8 of ODM policy No. 4, which I have here, if Senators care to see it-in order to assist parachute-manufacturing companies in meeting clothing-company competition. In other words, the question arose in the minds of officials of ODM as to whether the competition of the clothing industry is not harmful to the parachute industry.

In this instance, from the Government's point of view, money actually was saved. Employment was provided in a distressed labor area in which at the time, I believe, at least 20 percent of the labor force was unemployed.

I do not stand here for a moment and say that I believe that if the other area was left completely without industry or without work for people in the industry, this ought to have been done. I do not say that. As the junior Senator from Arizona has said, that would be robbing Peter to pay Paul. However, I do say that the principle involved in the Executive order has been of some help, although not a great deal. It is intended to try to carry Government business into areas where there is skilled labor, rather than to move labor out.

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. GEORGE. How much money appropriated in the bill could be used for the purposes indicated by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Speaking quickly from memory, after reading the hearings, although I do not say this is accurate, I would say that to date approximately $52 million in contracts have been awarded. In the case of textiles, approximately $5 million has been awarded to mills operating not more than 80 hours a week.

Mr. GEORGE. How much of the appropriation, which I thought was for national defense, could be used?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I believe the proper answer to the Senator's question is that any amount that procurement decided should be used. The provision affects a policy of procurement.

Mr. GEORGE. Any amount that is appropriated for procurement could be used?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It could be used, provided these four qualifications are met:

First, if it is a negotiated contract, it can be directed to a distressed labor

area.

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. GEORGE. Will the Senator permit me to ask him if I am laboring under a misapprehension when I say that I thought this was a bill for the national defense?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is.

- Mr. GEORGE. These appropriations are taken from the money of the taxpayers all over the country.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is correct.

Mr. GEORGE. This is not a bill for the relief of any particular section

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It certa not, Mr. President; and I would say Mr. GEORGE. I should like to ask another question. It is not a labor regulation bill, is it?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. No. What the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] is doing is endeavoring to place in the bill an amendment which would deny effect to an Executive order, based upon other laws, which helps to make it possible for the Government to fulfill its contracts without causing dislocation by making it necessary for unemployed people, capable of doing defense work, to move away from their homes into already crowded areas.

Mr. GEORGE. I have listened patiently to the Senator. His remarks seem to me to be in favor of some sort of regulation of labor, or of relief. I am not laboring under the apprehension that this defense program was instituted for any such purpose as that.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It certainly was not; and I do not for one minute admit to my friend from Georgia that what I am advocating is relief.

Mr. GEORGE. I respectfully suggest to the Senator that he ought to resurrect Harry Hopkins and get him to administer this program. I think he could do a magnificent job, and he could relieve distressed people in various areas of the country where he wanted to grant relief. We would go back to personal government. I thought the present administration said it was against personal government.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. This is not personal government. The regulations are based upon laws which are very strict. The extent to which the Executive order has been used is comparatively slight; and where it has been used it has been in an effort to get Government procurement at no increased expense at least, and at the same time to relieve unemployment.

Mr. GEORGE. I understand; but if we are to rely on Executive orders, we can get one in behalf of steel, cement, or anything else. What we are getting back to is personal government. Under this sort of procedure, we are leaving to the discretion of someone who wants to change labor laws or someone who wants to grant relief in a particular area of the country, to do just that. I say now, as I said during a Democratic administration, that personal government always leads to favoritism, and favoritism always leads to corruption and abuse. That is precisely what is being undertaken in this kind of program.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?