eign Operations Administration and the Director of the International Information Agency must at all times hold themselves subordinate to the Secretary of State. This plan cannot work without the utmost cooperation between those people.

The President of the United States has said that he will not appoint anyone to these positions unless they are fully compatible with the desires of the Secretary of State.

The other thing we should make a record on today is the assurances that have been given to us by the people who will head these new agencies that they will be able to cut down the number of personnel employed today to carry out these functions. We have as a matter of record in the hearings the number of personnel that are currently employed in carrying out these functions. I call the attention of the Committee on Appropriations to those records in the hope that next year when we are considering appropriations for these operations we will be able to cut down the number of personnel now engaged in carrying out these missions, as is the announced objective of both this plan and Reorganization Plan 8. We in the minority hope this plan will work, and in any event we intend to stand by the President, who is the one man we must follow, especially today, in the field of foreign policy. We also want to give him the tools he thinks he needs in order to formulate and implement a successful foreign policy.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. MEADER).

Mr. MEADER. Mr. Chairman, I am under no delusions about the effectiveness of the opposition to this plan. I am fully confident that the House of Representatives will not muster a constitutional majority in favor of House Joint Resolution 261 disapproving Reorganization Plan No. 7.

In my judgment, however, it was necessary to make a record, to issue a caveat so that the departments and agencies concerned would be aware that the Congress has an interest in the subject of foreign affairs and the organization of agencies which will be responsible for the discharge of our foreign policy.

I would not oppose this plan, recommended by the administration, except for my deep conviction that it holds grave danger for the conduct of our foreign affairs.

My service in the Congress has been marked by two long-range major objectives. First, the strengthening of the Congress and the recapture of the policy making authority vested in this legislative body by our Constitution, and secondly, the strengthening of the State Department so that our enormous responsibility in the world today can be more effectively discharged.

In my judgment, plan No. 7 is bad because it tends to weaken rather than to strengthen the State Department. The agency through which we express and effectuate our policy and conduct our relationships with the other countries of the world, the agency through which we must advocate the cause of freedom among the nations of the world and op

It is my contention that today the most important area of our national affairs, is that which deals with our relationships with other countries. It is likewise the most delicate and most complex area of our national activities. I say that we should enter this field with the greatest of caution and care. Farreaching reorganizations should be undertaken only after complete and thorough study.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count. [After counting.] One hundred and twenty-two Members are present, a quorum. The point of order is overruled, and the gentleman from Michigan will proceed.

Mr. MEADER. Mr. Chairman, I have set forth these views in an additional statement which unfortunately was not sent to the Government Printing Office so that it could appear as a part of the committee's report, but it is available at the desk. The point I have just made as to the importance of our foreign affairs and the importance of strengthening our State Department so that it can discharge our responsibilities more effectively, I expressed during the hearings when we had before us the head of the Information Service, Dr. Johnson. On page 196 of the hearings of the committee, I said:

In my opinion, the State Department and its activities are today, in the condition that world affairs are in today, the most important activity of the Federal Government. I believe that the Department should be strengthened. I think there have been inadequacies, and the delays that you cite in the answering of adverse news stories cannot be more important than the need to arrive at a prompt and intelligent decision on our foreign policy. What bothers me about this removal from the State Department is that because of the inadequacies of the past we say this job must be taken out, and every time you take a responsibility away from an organization that is not doing it well, it seems to me you have a tendency to weaken that organization. To me, the most important thing we can do today, with one possible exception, and I would put them on the same level, that is the strengthening of Congress, is to strengthen the State Department. I think that if they have a responsibility and are not.doing it properly the course we should follow is not to take that responsibility away from them but to find out why they aren't discharging that responsibility effectively and to help strengthen them so that they will discharge it effectively. That is what bothers me about these plans which take away from the State Department the responsibility of carrying out our relation

ships with other countries.

You heard the discussion of my colleague on the committee, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. LANTAFF] concerning the unsoundness of separating policy from operations. I think this was well expressed in the hearings. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. LANTAFF] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BROWNSON] were discussing that matter continuously during the hearings. I draw attention particularly to the passage to be found on pages 72 and 73. Both indicated doubt concerning the advisability of separating policy from operations.

The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BROWNSON] said:

I am worried that you are going to wind up with an organization in the future with a Secretary of State and sitting right beside him a Secretary for Foreign Operations, and have a completely split open-foreign-policy group. That is what concerns me, and then you are going to have a continual jockeying; whichever 1 of the 2 has the more aggressive personality at a particular time is going to take the ball and run with it.

And then the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK], our minority whip, a member of the committee, offered the observation:

Or whoever is closest.

Then the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BROWNSON] continued:

Or whoever is closest to the President. And then this significant summing up of the whole thinking of our committee, it seems to me, is a gem that our acting chairman delivered:

It is entirely possible that the Secretary of State might go up in his ivory tower some night and find the marble stairway stolen the next morning when he was ready to come down.

Mr. Chairman, these plans are premature.

Mr.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MEADER. I am glad to yield. Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Perhaps it is due to my deficiency, but do I understand the gentleman to say that these gentlemen during the hearings were opposed to the plan?

Mr. MEADER. I shall let their language speak for itself.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Did the gentleman consult the President to ascertain whether he was for it?

Mr. MEADER. I might say to my chairman, as I did in the committee, that I did have a conference with the President on this subject. We both expressed our views.

Second, plans 7 and 8 are premature. Third, the burden of proof on those advocating the changes contained in these plans has not been met.

Fourth, plans 7 and 8 are permanent. Fifth, disastrous consequences will result to our foreign policy and programs. Let me point out that the reading of the majority report leads almost any per

or some reason advanced by the President.

Mr. MEADER. That is, of course, entirely possible.

Mr. BROWNSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MEADER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman, the able chairman of our Subcommittee on International Operations.

Mr. BROWNSON. I think that our tactics to develop this testimony during the hearings were efforts to probe deeply into a very real danger without thought

to what the probing might develop. The gentleman may well be right and we may be wrong, but the colloquies which he quotes resulted from an attempt on my part to draw out the greatest possible amount of information on the subject. All I can say in answer to the last quotation by the gentleman is that Governor Stassen promised not to steal the stairway.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MEADER. I am glad to yield. Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Further, in view of the attitude taken by Mr. Stassen during the campaign for the nomination for the Presidency in which he said his purpose was to defeat TAFT, I would not question his intention, but he might forget that promise.

Mr. LANTAFF. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MEADER. I yield to my distinguished colleague on the Subcommittee on International Operations.

Mr. LANTAFF. I want to commend the gentleman from Michigan for the ability that he has and for the very fine way that he is pointing out to the House the possible defects in this plan. I think his analysis of it is very sound. If the gentleman will recall, I have those same reservations, but because of the fact that the President is the recognized leader in the field of foreign policy, and because the President has himself personally taken an interest in this plan and has been asked to withdraw it, I think by the gentleman from Michigan, and has refused to do so, it seems to me that we in Congress should place in the hands of the President the tools that he says he needs in order effectively to carry out our foreign policy.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I renew my point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count. [After counting.] One hundred One hundred and one Members are present, a quorum. The gentleman from Michigan will proceed.

Mr. MEADER. I think there is an illuminating passage in the majority report which bears upon the observation made by my colleague from Indiana [Mr. BROWNSON] a few moments ago that he had been reassured by Mr. Stassen that he would not steal the marble staircase. I quote from page 6 of the majority report:

The extent to which FOA will reach into foreign economic affairs generally is not clear. Heretofore, the State Department has been considered the focus for the coordination of foreign economic policy as a wholeincluding, among others, such component policies as those governing cartels, the shipment of strategic materials, and tariffs. It is not clear to what extent the FOA will affect this role of the State Department. At one point in the hearings, Mr. Stassen stated:

"I do not represent the economic side * * * we bring together the total economic picture into one responsibility." In reference to the role of heads of FOA missions in United States Embassy organization, Director Stassen said: "The hope is that you gradually would move so that [the head of the FOA mission] would also be the economic coun

selor to the Ambassador." It is clear that some foreign economic functions apart from assistance operations will gravitate to the

FOA.

The appointment to those positions would be by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate with no limit to the term, and there are 2 officers

Is he going to steal the marble stair- at $16,000 and 4 at the rate of $15,000. case or not?

Responsibilities in this field have been widely scattered among executive agencies

and Executive Office staffs. In fact, the defense-support and economic-grant programs raise as many questions of foreign policy and economic and financial policy as of operations. How far the FOA will tend to become a foreign economic agency is not clear from the record. It appears obvious, however, that it will have a profound impact on the economic side of the State Department and the Foreign Service.

That is quoted from the majority report.

Mr. BROWNSON. Mr. will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MEADER. I yield.

Chairman, Chairman,

Mr. BROWNSON. That statement was included in the report especially in order to emphasize what would happen when MSA moved into FOA. That is the exact reason we pointed it out so clearly, as the gentleman has just shown.

I would certainly like to thank the gentleman from Michigan for his very constructive work during the hearings. It was a fine example of how one opposed to the plan could still be constructive and detached in his questioning. Mr. MEADER'S questioning has been a very significant contribution in developvery significant contribution in developing this whole case.

Mr. Chairman, will the Mr. Chairman, will the

Mr. GROSS. I may say to the gentleman that I thought we were in the business, as I have said before on the floor of the House, of getting rid of highly placed officials in Government rather than creating more such jobs.

Mr. MEADER. Let me say to the gentleman that, in my judgment, a change in this delicate field of foreign affairs should be made only after a case has been proved showing that the change is necessary. I continually asked throughout these hearings that the witnesses sustain their burden of proof. I asked them to point out examples where there were deficiencies which had harmed these programs up to the present time. I could not get that evidence in the record even though I sought to draw it out of the witnesses who came up here to advocate this plan. Affirmative proof has not been brought before us.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired. Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 5 addi

tional minutes.

Mr. MEADER. Mr. Chairman, this is the point which seems to me to be the most cogent against adoption of these plans at this time. They are premature.

We recently debated the Mutual Se

Mr. MEADER. I thank the gen- curity Act. The gentleman from Illitleman. Mr. GROSS. gentleman yield? Mr. MEADER. man from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. top-brass jobs, top-brass jobs, if any?

I yield to the gentle

How many new jobs, How many new jobs, does this bill create, does this bill create,

Mr. MEADER. Reorganization Plan No. 7 sets up a director at $22,500 a year No. 7 sets up a director at $22,500 a year to be appointed by the President. I want to point out one thing in connection with that, if the gentleman will permit.

First

of all, there is no limit on his term. Once he has been approved by the Senate in the first place, he never need to account to it again in connection with reappointment.

Let me point out another thing. The Congress has just recently taken action Congress has just recently taken action to limit the life of the mutual-security to limit the life of the mutual-security program. By far the greatest number of people and the greatest amount of money in the new Foreign Operations Adminin the new Foreign Operations Administration will be in the foreign-aid program. There are lumped with this temporary huge operation of foreign aid certain permanent agencies, such as the Institute of American Affairs, the point 4 program, and other minor programs. If the mutual-security program stops, at least 60 to 75 percent of the functions of this new agency will cease, yet we will have a director permanently appointed at $22,500 a year to carry on some very minor programs that would not justify such a salary.

Mr. GROSS. How many assistants?

Mr. MEADER. There is a deputy director at $17,500, and the plan also creates certain additional new offices. Those are not determined by the Congress or the President but by the Director.

nois [Mr. CHIPERFIELD], chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and I believe the gentleman from Ohio also, and the President have recognized that 11 foreign aid statues are a hodge-podge of legislation that need overhauling. The promise has been made they will be restudied.

The able gentleman from Indiana, chairman of the International Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations of the House [Mr. BROWNSON], has undertaken an intensive study of the procedures, the organizational structure, the personnel and the performance of the State Department. That investigation is only in its initial stages.

By legislation now pending in conference we create a 17-man Foreign Economic Policy Commission, a move which I have advocated on this floor for 2 years. Now it is coming to fruition. That study will encompass the entire gamut of our foreign economic policy.

The Congress has recently recreated the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, popularly known as the Hoover Commission. This Commission undoubtedly will study the organizational structure of the Department of State.

Let me point out in addition to that that there are other committees of the Congress, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, the Government Operations Committees of both Houses, the Appropriations Committees engaged in studying our foreign programs, and agencies under new leadership after two decades of control by the other party.

This Congress created a new Assistant Secretary of State to study and rec

ommend improvements in State Department organizational structure. He has not been on the job very long.

It seems to me we ought to have the benefit of those studies before we make a far-reaching permanent change in the structure of agencies which will carry out those policies and those programs now under study. This plan is premature. The results of these studies should be before us prior to the time we are called upon to exercise judgment in such a far-reaching matter.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MEADER. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. I heartily agree with the gentleman and want to commend him for the stand he is taking against this proposition. Certainly Mutual Security activities need to be overhauled, but we do not have to engage in empire building within the Government when we do this overhauling.

Mr. MEADER. May I say to the gentleman that I believe that this plan will not result in economy; it will not result in efficiency, and those are the only basis upon which a reorganization plan under the law can be sent to the Congress.

Let me say to the gentleman-and I am talking about plan 8 for the moment-when you take the Information Service out of the State Department and put it in an independent agency, that agency will have to establish administrative support positions now supplied by the State Department. Those administrative services will no longer be rendered by the State Department. There will be a whole array of new levels of administrative personnel set up at the top of this new agency.

These independent operations overseas in our neighboring countries will develop all kinds of friction and disharmony resulting from the fact that they are not operating under one head. The ambassador is the titular head of all United States agencies in a particular country but it does not do him any good to have that title without the power to go with it.

When you have separate pay scales for the economic administration and separate pay scales and personnel procedures for the Information Service, there is bound to be resentment on the part of the old-line State Department people who are kept at a lower pay scale.

You will have United States officials overseas acting in three different directions. Presumably our people in the diplomatic missions are our spokesmen in our dealings in foreign countries. But they are not, in fact. You may have the money man of the aid program handing out money not necessarily in consonance with the policy of the diplomatic people. You may have the propaganda people taking a different line

than the people officially representing our country. These clashes and disagreements are bound to confuse our foreign friends and will cause incalculable damage to our foreign policy and our foreign programs. This separation of functions cannot help but result in friction and disharmony.

It is argued that if we do not like the plan we can change it. The trouble with that argument is that the change should be made now in the direction of centralization, of clarification, responsibility and simplification of procedures and straightening the channels of command so that we know who is responsible for a program. We are moving in exactly the opposite direction from which we ought to be moving. Time will be lost, there will be upheavals when we cannot afford to lose time. Poor morale and poor performance in these transition periods and great damage will result in the execution of our foreign policy.

Naturally I hope these plans will not be as disastrous in practice as they appear in principle. I know people can get along if they want to even though organizational structure is faulty. But we are adopting legislation which may outlast the congeniality of particular personalities. We must judge on considerations of sound principles of administration. We cannot rely on the cordiality between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stassen and whoever may become the new Director of the Information Agency. I shall do all in my power to help these plans work out. I hope it will never be in order for me to say to my colleagues, "I told you so." But I cannot bring myself either by my vote or my silence to approve a proposal which seems to hold such grave likelihood of harm to the effective and successful conduct of our foreign relations.

I hope the House will adopt House Resolution 261.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. ROONEY].

Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to speak out of order

and to revise and extend my remarks.

Mr. CHAIRMAN, Is there objection to the request of the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Chairman, the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of Tuesday, July 7, contained an address by Secretary Hobby, of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, at the dedication of the Truman administration's newly completed Clinical Center at the National Institutes of Health at Bethesda, Md. In her speech, Mrs. Hobby took occasion to pay tribute by name to three Members of the House and Senate, all Republicans, and gave them credit for the establishment and progress of the Clinical Center, and for the research activities of the Institutes of Public Health.

Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Hobby made a singular omission in her speech which I am sure was due only to her startling lack of knowledge of the facts. In her recitation of the development of the Clinical Center and the public health program she failed to mention the name of our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. FOGARTY], whose work in behalf of public health on the Appropriations Committee for many years and on the floor of this House for the 13 years in which

he has been a Member of the Congress, is well known to all of us. Ironically enough, at the time the address was made, JOHN FOGARTY was in the Bethesda Naval Hospital just across the road from the new Clinical Center being treated for an ailment brought on by the vigorous efforts he made this year and in previous years for the health and welfare of the American people. happy to report that our respected colleague is well along the road to recovery and was discharged from the hospital the day before yesterday. It is expected that he will be able to resume work on a full scale in September of this year, according to his doctor.

I am

Several years ago and for a period of 4 years I served as a member of the Labor-Federal Security Appropriations Subcommittee and I well know its problems. As a matter of fact, I served on that subcommittee with JOHN FOGARTY and Frank Keefe when the first funds for plans and acquisition of land for the Clinical Center were appropriated. I well know the herculean efforts which had to be made by Congressman FOGARTY during the years he was chairman of the subcommittee in connection with funds for purposes of research to find the cause and cure of cancer, heart disease, mental health, and crippling diseases such as arthritis, rheumatism, the neurological diseases, and blindness. During this years' hearings on health, education, and welfare appropriations requests Congressman FOGARTY at page 1196 of the printed hearings said to the Secretary of the Department:

Now. Mrs. Hobby, you said in your opening statement that you were going to cut every cent not producing results, and avoid waste and duplication and inadequate management. Where these cuts in the categorical programs in public health were made, was that because some of these programs were not producing results or because there was a lot of waste or inadequate management in any of these programs?

Secretary Hobby replied:

No, sir; I do not think that was the determining factor. We were trying to cut, as you know. In going through this with public health and trying to find where we could cut to hurt the least, these were the things we came up with.

The gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. FOGARTY] then inquired:

How do you make a decision, let us say, as to whether or not a cut in a State grant program is going to hurt, help, or do a lot of harm?

Secretary Hobby's reply was:

Well, it is very difficult to do, as you well know, sir. You have to play by ear a lot.

Further on in the hearings, at page 1206 the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. FOGARTY] said:

It was only a couple of years ago that Congress passed, by unanimous vote, a bill establishing two new institutes, one in neurology and blindness and the other in arthritis and metabolic diseases, and yet the biggest cuts you made in this revised budget come in those two new activities. They are only small activities; yet two of the largest

cuts that were made were made in those two new institutes that we established by unanimous vote of Congress, and their activities affect millions of people.

Summing up at page 1208 of the hearings the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. FOGARTY] said:

Mrs. Hobby, I do not want to prolong this hearing, but I am a little disappointed this morning in the budget you have presented on the Public Health Service. I believe the welfare of the people is going to be set back by it. I have always thought, and the committee has too, since I have been on it, that the Public Health Service program was one of the most important functions of the Federal Government, because it affected so many people. And I think we are taking something away from the people if this reduction is allowed to stand.

Fortunately, Mr. Chairman, those cuts in public health activities proposed by Mrs. Hobby were not allowed to stand. The budget reported by the House Committee on Appropriations and voted by the House restored funds over the resistance of the Secretary, largely due to the unremitting efforts of JOHN FOGARTY.

In conclusion, permit me to say that we hardly need to consult the record of the proceedings of the committees of Congress to acquaint ourselves with JOHN FOGARTY'S Work in behalf of public

health. We know it from the vigorous position he has taken on this floor year after year. I venture to say that since the passing of our late friend the distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin, Frank B. Keefe, the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. FOGARTY] has been the outstanding congressional leader in the field of public health. It gives me a great deal of personal satisfaction to correct the record in this respect today and I know you join me in that correction as well as in wishing JOHN FOGARTY a speedy, complete recovery.

proposals, Reorganization Plans No. 7 and No. 8 are not at all sensible proposals for better reorganization of these executive departments. They are administrative monstrosities. I think it is very much to be regretted that we have not had more time to go into this problem.

The speeches which were made here about 2 weeks ago on behalf of plan No. 6 were filled with references to the fact that it was necessary to centralize power in the Defense Department and under the Secretary of Defense, and that clearer channels of authority were necessary, and that authority and responsibility ought to be united-that it was sibility ought to be united-that it was not fair to give responsibility to a man and withhold authority from him, and vice versa. I thought those were compelling and persuasive arguments when they were made for that plan, although for other reasons I was opposed to it. But do you realize that today in these plans we are confronted with an exact switch, and the reasons that were advanced for adopting reorganization plan 6 are now completely abandoned? The people who favored plan 6, reorganizing the Defense Department, made that clear in the RECORD. During the hearing on plan 7, on page 173 of the record, you will find these words:

Mr. MEADER. You do not believe in the

separation of policymaking from the execution of the policy decided?

Mr. ROONEY. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. MARSHALL. I am certain that every Member of this body is glad to hear that JOHN FOGARTY has been released from the hospital. We have missed him on this floor since he has been absent, because of the outstanding work he has always done in connection with public health. While I regret exceedingly that Mrs. Hobby did not see fit to make mention of him in her talk, we who have served in the Congress with JOHN FOGARTY know the record he has made in connection with the programs of public health and Federal security will stand much longer and mean much more than some idle words that someone may have said, while unthinkingly and perhaps discourteously neglecting to mention the gentleman from Rhode Island.

Mr. ROONEY. I thank the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. DODD].

Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with the remarks made by my colleague the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. MEADER). I share his view that there is little doubt but what this resolution will be rejected. But I feel that it is important that we make a record today because I am confident, my colleagues, that these two

tions.

Dr. JOHNSON. Well, Mr. Dulles favors it. Apparently every man I've talked to-General Gruenther, Mr. Draper, Mr. McCloy-I could mention

Mr. LANTAFF. That is what-
Dr. JOHNSON. Tracy Voorhees-

Mr. LANTAFF. That is what I can't get through my head-why these same people do not favor it for the Department of Defense and yet favor it for the Department of State.

Dr. JOHNSON. Well, I can't speak for them.

Yet these plans, 7 and 8, call for separation of responsibility and authority. I am not able to understand this sort of thing, and I wonder that it does not shock some of the older and more experienced Members of this body to be confronted with this kind of a situation.

The best argument against the adoption of these plans is the reports of the committee, and if you have the timeand I fear we do not now-to read those reports you would not be in favor of the adoption of these proposals, because all that the majority reports say is "We feel this is really pretty bad business," and the only argument that I have heard offered that has any sense to it at all if I may use that expression is the argument, "Well, the Executive wants it; think it is going to work." so let him try it, even though we do not Now, I do not think that is the way to run this Government. We ought to require that plans be carefully thought out and that they be reasonably proposed to this Congress, and that they at least appear to

be workable before we favor their adoption.

The

Let me observe parenthetically, as has been stated on this floor earlier today, that the only real basis for reorganization is economy and efficiency. only evidence before our committee appears to me to demonstrate that these plans will make more expensive the operations of these departments and will make them much more inefficient.

Now we have not been able to find out who thought up this idea, this plan of separating authority from responsibility and policy from operation. You will find that there was some effort made to discover whose idea this was, but the record does not so reveal. As far as we can learn and some of us have tried to find out-there is some reason for believing that with respect to plan No. 8, anyway, this proposal was brought forth only as a device for getting Dr. Johnson to take the job in charge of the Voice program at the time he was asked to come down here. Dr. Johnson seemed to feel-and, of course, he had a right to so feel— that he would not take this job unless he got an independent agency. I think that is the only reason this proposal was ever submitted to us. It is about as poor a reason as I can think of for offering a reorganization plan for an executive department.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute so that I may ask him a question.

Is it not true, in relation to what the gentleman said, that Dr. Johnson has presented his resignation and at the present time there is no appointee to accept the leadership of this activity?

Mr. DODD. I know that. My point is that I think, from what I have been able to learn and from the record itself, that Dr. Johnson said he was called down here by Mr. Dulles. Mr. Dulles said, "I want you to come down here, I need you."

Dr. Johnson said:

I do not want to come down unless this Voice agency is separated from the State Department.

Mr. Dulles said-of course, I am not quoting him exactly on this-“All right, that is what we will do."

Of course, I know he has retired because of the state of his health; but I think that is why this program was set up. And when you count back 60 days, you will find that it was just about June 1. Look at your diaries and see about what time it was when Dr. Johnson was being solicited to come down here, and you will find that soon after his appointment this so-called reorganization plan These plans 7 and 8 was suggested. should be rejected and much more careful study given to this problem. We need to strengthen these agencies and we must not weaken them.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, as most of the membership knows, I was chairman of the Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government during the past 4 years and had the responsibility of studying

and analyzing and in most instances presenting arguments on the floor of the House for the passage of those plans. I did this conscientiously, because I believed that many of the recommendations of the so-called Hoover Commission could only be put into effect by the utilization of the President's reorganization plans, along with Presidential directives and, of course, some basic legislation.

I am being consistent in following the same line of philosophy and line of belief under the present administration. I believe it is the responsibility of the President of the United States to have as much leeway as possible within the executive branch, particularly in the field of policymaking, and in carrying out policies in the executive agencies. Therefore, I intend to support the Reorganization Plan No. 7 and also Reorganization Plan No. 8, which will be considered after the adoption of Reorganization Plan No. 7.

I want to say that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BROWNSON] and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. MEADER], in my opinion, gave a tremendous amount of thought to these plans. I am not excluding others when I say that. But particularly I know of these two gentlemen's interest in this matter. They studied it sincerely and honestly and they came to opposite opinions. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BROWNSON] in his speech on the floor today advocated the acceptance of the plan. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. MEADER), with equal earnestness and and with what I concede to be a great many forceful arguments, came out against the plan and asked for its rejection.

This is an indication to me that the plan itself is lacking in clarity and that there is some confusion in it. I believe that some points of the plan such as those melding some of these foreign agencies, eliminating some of the duplication of the authority, and centralizing in the Department of State your policymaking-I think these are good points in the plan.

Mr. LANTAFF. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I yield.

Mr. LANTAFF. I think all of us join in the hope, do we not, that when committees of this Congress are trying to pinpoint responsibilities for operations overseas that there will not be a lot of buck-passing between the State Department, the Foreign Operations Administration, and the International Information Agency, and that the State Department will assume the responsibility that they said they would assume in coordinating and controlling joint overseas activities.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is true. I thank the gentleman for his comment.

The senior Senator from Ohio recently made this statement after confessing to certain misgivings about the number of businessmen who are filling high places in Government:

You know, I am not sure how all these businessmen are going to work out. I do not know of any reason why success in busiress should mean success in public affairs;

they are very different fields, and anyone who thinks he can just transfer business methods to Government is going to have to learn that it just is not so.

We have had the Director of the Budget and we have had other men who have been drawn into the State Department from fields of business appear before the committee and advocate this plan. In my opinion, the responsibility of making these plans work is on the present administration. The President has asked for this plan; the Director of the Budget has asked for it, the Secretary of State, through his assistants, have appeared and asked for the adoption of this plan. The American people last November gave to the Republican administration the great responsibility of carrying out our functions of government, and this applies to that part of the function of government which is very important-the conduct of foreign affairs, economic aid, military assistance, and all of the other complicated foreign affairs problems.

I am not going to deny to the President of the United States in the face of that vote of confidence last November the right to have the tools to make the policy and the tools to carry out that policy. I am going to vote to give him that power in the field of administration, and I am going to watch carefully the policy formulated and also how that policy is administered. I am going to reserve judgment because I do have misgivings on some of the factors in these plans, particularly along the line expressed by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. MEADER). But I am not going to substitute my judgment at this time in the field of policymaking and in the field of operating and carrying out that policy by the people at the head of these departments who were chosen by the American people in last November's election; I am going to give them that power and then we will see what will happen.

I want to point out that this is a resolution of disapproval. Therefore, if the membership is in favor of plans either 7 or 8—and we are now considering plan No. 7-then a vote of "no" on the resolution of disapproval is a vote for the plan. If any of the Members wish to oppose the plan, then they should vote "yes" on the resolution. We are presented with this complicated form of handling this legislation as a result of the fact that we have before us a resolution of disapproval under the Reorganization Act of 1946. Therefore, a "no" ization Act of 1946. Therefore, a "no" vote is for the plan; a "yes" vote is against the plan. I shall cast a "no" vote in order to give the President the plan which he has requested.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time on this side.

Mr. Chairman, when from the well a statement is made, in the last analysis it is nothing more than the expression of an opinion. I hope all will keep that in mind.

Perhaps you have wondered as to why I have filed disapproving resolutions when these plans came down. One reason is: I think it is desirable for the Members of the House to have an oppor

tunity, if they wish, to express their views on all of these measures..

Another reason is that it is my purpose to call attention to the unworkability, of this reorganization legislation which enables an Executive to send down plans of this kind in lieu of bills or resolutions.

I have read the hearings on plan No. 7 which were conducted by a member of our committee, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BROWNSON], I have listened to the debate here today very, very carefully and throughout its entire length. About all I can get out of it—and the same thing I heard in conversations between members of the committee when the plan was under discussion is that the State Department was in a very, very bad way, that this plan would not necessarily accomplish anything but it could not make the situation worse; but, because the President wanted it we should vote for it.

All those who have spoken in support of the plan apparently have no conviction that the situation will be any better, but they hope that it will. I want to associate myself with them in that hope.

One statement has been made which might appear to be an argument for the plan and that is that the President is charged with formulating and carrying out our foreign policy. That is true. It does not follow, however, that that authority given him takes away the duty or the responsibility of the Congress to provide the ways and means. That is a question for us and we should handle it in the usual and regular way.

Mr. Chairman, I think that is all I care to say except to add that the plan creates a new agency with a director at $22,500, an assistant at $17,500, two at $16,000 each, and four at $15,000 each.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance

of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN].

Mr.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise and report the resolution dation that it be not agreed to. back to the House with the recommen

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. FORD, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the

Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration House Resolution 261 had directed him to re

port the same back to the House with

the recommendation that it be not agreed to.