The only case in which a court of the United States has been squarely faced with the problem is United States v. Thierichens.91 As has been stated, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania completely rejected the claim that the defendant in that case could not be prosecutec. for violations of the Mann Act or for smuggling.

The rejection of the claim of absolute immunity has also been the implicit assumption of the British Court of Criminal Appeal 92 and the French Court of Cassation.93 And, in Chow Hung Ching v. The King,94 Chief Justice Latham of the High Court of Australia indicated clearly that he did not find a substantial basis for the claim of absolute immunity, at the same time that he

and the rest of the court held that the defendants were not members of visiting armed forces and thus not entitled to claim the immunity.

On the other hand, the cases which have been frequently cited 95 as standing for an absolute immunity go no further than does the instant agreement.96 Several involved offenses occurring in the obvious line of duty. Several have turned on the provisions of an agreement between the countries.98 Another involved the assault by one member of the visiting force upon another member aboard a war vessel, where the asserted jurisdiction of the country whose ves

90 See supra.

91 See supra; cf. In re Lo Dolce (106 F. Suup. 455 (W. D. N. Y., 1952). And see the discussion of The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, supra.

92 Rex v. Aughet (34 T. L. R. 302); see also the same case, Rex v. Garrett, Ex parte de Dryver (34 T. L. R. 13), where the jurisdiction of the British courts over an assault by one Belgian soldier upon another Belgian soldier in London in a private quarrel, was even more clearly assumed.

93 French State v. Pratt (Ann. Dig., 1919– 22, p. 332).

94 56 Argus Law Reports 29 (1949). 95 E. g., King I, II.

96 In re A. F., decided by the Tribunal Correctionel of the Isle of Chios, Greece, in 1945, Ann. Dig., 1943-45, p. 163, appears to be one case where the claim was sustained for an off-duty offense in the absence of domestic legislation or an agreement. However, the truncated report of that lower court case indicates that the prosecuting officer urged upon the court that the offending British sailors were immune from prosecution. Further, the offense took place in time of war.

97 (1) Amrane c. John (Civil Tribunal of Alexandria), Ann. Dig., 1931-32, p. 174, id., 1933-34, p. 187 (Civil suit for damages against British commanding officer for damages incurred by the hitting of the plaintiff by a soldier driving a lorry in the course of his duty).

(2) Republic of Panama v. Schwartzfiger (21 Am. J. Int. L. 182 (1927) (Supreme Court of Panama)). (Immunity of American soldier from prosecution for manslaughter by local authorities, where the killing had taken place while the soldier was driving a wounded workman from France Field to Colon Hospital through the city of Colon, Panama. The soldier had been ordered by his commanding officer to "hurry" the workman to the hospital.)

(3) In re Gilbert (Brazil, 1945), Ann. Dig., 1946, p. 86 (Brazilian civilian attempted to enter an American naval base, refused to stop at the sentry's orders, shot and killed by sentry.)

98 Amrane c. John, Panama v. Schwartzfiger, n. 97, supra.

remainder do not apply at all.100

In sum, those cases which have been decided in the absence of an agreement have rejected the claim of immunity in all situations, with the exception of a few, where the claims which have been granted have been for the most part for offenses which were committed in the line of duty. The instant agreement, which not only expressly reserves primary jurisdiction over line-of-duty offenses to the sending state, but also extends such jurisdiction to other situations, grants the visiting forces more extensive jurisdiction than they would receive in the absence of an agreement.

C. Practice among the nations There is convincing evidence that in actual practice the nations of Europe recognize no principle that United States troops stationed therein are immune from their local criminal jurisdiction. Statistics furnished by the Department of Defense show that a substantial number of American servicemen have been tried for local offenses in local courts. 101 At least France, England, Italy, Bermuda, and Turkey have reported trials of such a nature. It is significant, however, for comparative purposes, that the sentences imposed upon the servicemen were almost uniformly lighter than those they would have received from a court-martial for the same offense, that the vast majority of sentences of confinement were suspended, and that in only 2 instances were sentences of 3-year confinements, the maximum imposed, reported, one for rape and the other for black marketing.

These statistics make it quite clear that the nations of Europe in practice assume and exercise criminal jurisdiction forces.

over our

IV. THE EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED RESERVATION It has been shown that the nations of the world recognize no principle of international law that visiting forces are immune from local criminal jurisdiction and that Congress, in the Friendly Service Courts Act of 1944, unequivocally rejected such a principle.

Yet the proposed reservation imposes an obligation upon the United States to grant exclusive jurisdiction over the visiting forces in this country to the military authorities of those forces. It is true that this reservation is operative in the United States only upon the request of the visiting nation. But it would seem quite improbable that such a request would not be made by every nation which is party to the agreement, inasmuch as the United States would have insisted upon such immunity for its local forces abroad. This would mean that no State in the United States could try any foreign serviceman for any offense he committed here, be it rape, murder, burglary, or assault, regardless of the fact that an American citizen was the victim. Indeed, under the reservation a visiting serviceman

99 Ching Chi Cheung v. the King [1939] A. C. 160.

100 E. g., Casablanca arbitration award, May 22, 1909, 3 Am. J. Int. L. 755 (1909), which involved the conflicting jurisdictional claims of the French as a force of occupation and as the force to whom certain deserters belonged and of the Germans as the result of an agreement with Morocco giving them jurisdiction over all German nationals; In re Polimeni (Military Court of Rome), Ann. Dig., 1935-37, p. 248, see Barton II, p. 220. (Question of whether Italian military court in Italy had jurisdiction over member of Italian armed forces for assault upon a British corporal while stationed in the Saar Territory during an international plebiscite.)

101 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 7, 1953, pp. 4669-4670.

could not be tried in the Federal courts for espionage, sabotage, or assassination of the President. This reservation seems completely inconsistent with the constitutional amendment which has been proposed by Senator BRICKER. Section 2 of that proposed amendment provides: 102

* *

"No treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power * * * to supervise, control, or adjudicate * any *** matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States."

Jurisdiction over crimes such as espionage, sabotage, and assassination committed by foreign forces, stationed in this Nation would appear to be, in the absence of an agreement, a "matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States," as that phrase is used in the amendment. Senator BRICKER's proposed reservation would require the United States to grant to visiting forces exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by their forces in this country, and would deprive both State and Federal courts of their jurisdiction over those offenses. Senator BRICKER's proposed reservation, consequently, would appear to be illegal under Senator BRICKER'S proposed constitutional amendment.

V. CONCLUSION

This

Even

It has been claimed that under international law friendly foreign forces are immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the host state for crimes committed therein. contention is without foundation. where there is no express agreement among the nations, claims of immunity have been generally rejected except in a few cases where the offenses occurred in the line of duty. As the instant agreement makes provision for such offenses, as well as for others, it is clear that under that agreement the sending state acquires more jurisdiction over its forces than it would have without an agreement.

No principle of international law can be deduced from the provisions of the various international agreements upon the subject. Such agreements, which have obtained in both peace and war, contain widely different jurisdictional provisions, and no uniform practice appears from their terms. There is, of course, no restriction in international law upon the terms of any agreement upon the subject, as the receiving state need not permit the ingress of the forces, and the sending state need not send them, if the conditions are not respectively satisfactory. In point of comparison, however, the instant agreement measures very favorably from the standpoint of the sending state-with the immediately parallel agreements.

The adoption of the proposed reservation would deprive both the Federal Government and the States of their jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by the foreign forces stationed in this country, no matter what the nature, location, or victim of the offense might be. Such a deprivation is inconsistent with the constitutional amendment proposed by Senator BRICKER himself. In considering a similar problem in 1944, Congress clearly refused to grant exclusive jurisdiction to foreign service courts over offenses committed by foreign forces in this country.

There is no basis for the contention that the proposed agreement violates any rule of international law.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I have also had prepared a brief memorandum of my own observations with respect to the Bricker reservation. I ask unanimous consent that this memorandum be printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

102 S. J. Res. 1, 83d Cong.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MEMORANDUM ON BRICKER RESERVATION BY

SENATOR H. ALEXANDER SMITH

1. The reservation makes an important substantive change in the status of forces agreement, and its adoption would mean that the agreement would have to be renegotiated with each of the 13 other signatories.

2. In view of the known attitudes of the countries concerned and their reluctance to

grant exclusive jurisdiction to a foreign power in their territory, it is extremely doubtful that the agreement could be renegotiated on the conditions set forth in the reservation.

3. The reservation is not an appropriate means to attain the end which is soughtnamely, exclusive jurisdiction over American troops in NATO countries. The reservation is apparently based on the premise that exclusive jurisdiction is relinquished under the treaty. That is not the case. We do not now have exclusive jurisdiction in any NATO country, except the United Kingdom, and we are not going to have it there much longer. We will not have it if the treaty comes into force; nor will we have it if the treaty does not come into force.

4. There are many cases in which American servicemen have been tried in foreign courts in the last 2 years. There have been few sentences of imprisonment which have not been suspended. The longest sentence was 3 years in a black marketing case. The evidence does not indicate that American troops have been discriminated against or unfairly treated in foreign courts.

5. American troops abroad will have more firm rights under the treaty than they now have, and more than they will have if the treaty does not come into force. It can be stated that the Bricker reservation will prevent the treaty from coming into force.

6. American troops who are now tried in foreign courts have only the rights which a citizen of the country in question has. Under the treaty, American military personnel must specifically be accorded the rights to a prompt and speedy trial; to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charges; to be confronted with hostile witnesses; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in their favor; to have legal representation; to have an interpreter; and to communicate with their government.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I shall be very brief, because this subject has been amply discussed.

When I first listened to the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] I was much impressed with his point of view. As chairman of the Armed Services Committee I tried to study the subject and to obtain, in particular, the points of view of those charged with direct responsibility for the command of our forces abroad.

In that connection, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks a letter dated July 13, 1953, which I have received from the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, emphasizing the importance of these agreements; also a letter which I have received from the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, to the same effect.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1953. Hon. LEVERETT SALTONSTALL,

Chairman, Armed Services Committee,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR SALTONSTALL: Since your committee is directly concerned with the United States military position throughout the world, I thought you would be interested in a matter which has an important bearing on our position in Europe, namely, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. The effective

ness of our forces stationed in the NATO

countries and the effectiveness of the entire NATO military organization is closely related to this treaty, which is designed, as you know, to solve many of the difficult status problems which would otherwise prevent the development of a successful cooperative defense organization.

I discussed this matter with the three service chiefs just last week and they were unanimous in the opinion that is is very important that this agreement be approved at an early date. Failure to approve it would not only be a blow to our own defense effort and the NATO defense effort, but would seri

ously hamper our negotiations for operating rights in the NATO countries and would be a setback in our efforts to provide for both the operating effectiveness and the wellbeing of American forces in Europe.

We all believe that this agreement is eminently satisfactory and is the best arrangement we can make with our allies when you consider the important issues of sovereignty which are involved, the reciprocal effect of the agreement in the United States, and the very satisfactory working relationships which have been developed concerning these problems and for which this treaty would serve as the foundation. We believe that if it became necessary to substitute bilateral agreements for this multilateral agreement, the net result would be confusion and fewer essential rights for the United States.

All these factors convince us that ratification of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement at this session of Congress is of great importance to our national defense.

Sincerely yours,

OMAR N. BRADLEY.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, July 14, 1953.

Hon. LEVERETT SALTONSTALL,

United States Senate. DEAR SENATOR SALTONSTALL: I understand that the NATO status of forces agreement will shortly come before the Senate for ratification. I would like to add my views to those which you have already received on the military importance of ratification at this session.

This agreement is essential to the welfare of United States military personnel stationed in the NATO countries. Furthermore, it plays a very important part in the development of our military plans, for it eliminates many of the barriers to the build

ing of an effective defense organization.

In my judgment, this agreement represents a sensible and practical balancing of the various interests involved. Any serious modification of its principles would create a grave risk that the agreement would fail. Such failure could have serious effects on both the United States military position and the United States military personnel in Europe.

Sincerely yours,

A. W. RADFORD.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I have a cable from General Norstad, the head of the Air Forces in Germany, as well as a communication from Admiral Carney, who was in charge of the NATO

forces in Italy. I ask unanimous consent to have have these communications printed in the RECORD at this point, as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the messages were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

From CINCAAFCE, Fontainebleau, France. To COFS, USAF, Washington, D. C. Information USMMR, SHAPE, Paris, France.

L 1130. Please pass to Secretary Defense as matter of urgency. For Secretary Defense from Norstad. Ref. DA 940812, June 6, 1953. My comments on the proposed NATO status of forces agreement follow.

As Commander in Chief of Allied Air Forces Central Europe and of the United States Air Forces in Europe, I cannot overemphasize the_importance of favorable action on the NATO status of forces agreement during the current sessions. By resolving the legal status of the NATO forces deployed in foreign territory, such an agreement is a prerequisite to the establishment of further arrangements governing the interrelationship of the national forces and the various governments of NATO nations. It is therefore the keystone in the structure which will facilitate the utilization of NATO forces. It is my considered view that failure to approve the agreement at this time would not only arrest our progress in this area, but would, in fact, set us back considerably in providing for our operating effectiveness and for the well-being of American forces

overseas.

From: Chief JUSMAG (Greece), Athens,
Greece, from Admiral Carney.
To: Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.
Information: CINCSOUTH and HAFSE, Na-
ples, Italy, Attorney General Byers,
SACEUR, Paris, France.

Personal for Wilson and Information to Mr.
Nash and General Ridgway.

I am informed that ratification of the Status of Forces Agreement is in jeopardy. I fully agree with Ridgway that ratification is urgently needed in the interest of the NATO project, and I am convinced that failure to ratify will produce reactions in this area which will hamper the NATO effort, undermine existing good interim arrangements, and seriously impair the effectiveness of American leadership in the Southern Command.

The Navy Department can furnish detailed information concerning the great number of legal and administrative problems of the Southern Command involving such matters as immigration controls, criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction, claims, taxes, duties and customs inspections, foreign exchange regulations, similar questions which arise with respect to the status of a headquarters as an entity and the status of foreign personnel attached to such headquarters.

The operation of my headquarters and its supporting elements are carried on under interim arrangements negotiated with the Italian Government; these arrangements are workable but lack legal status, and their abrogation could create intolerable situations which would strike at the very effectiveness of the entire task. If the United States fails to ratify the Status of Forces Agreement, the NATO and United States positions will be most difficult, particularly so in the light of election results in Italy. It is my understanding that there is an objection by certain Members of the Congress concerning the question of criminal jurisdiction of United States forces in foreign countries. I respectfully submit that this should not be a major bone of contention. This problem is one with which the Navy has mental policy being that individuals in andealt with since the Revolution, the fundaother country must abide by the laws and

customs of that country and that extradition or release from foreign jurisdiction is a matter of arbitration in each individual case. This policy has been the basis of my dealings with the local authorities in Naples and I believe that Embassy Rome will bear me out when I say that the results have been satisfactory to both sides with few serious adverse public relations implications.

Aside from purely military aspects and the vexatious little problems involved, it appears to me that there is a far more important point: The stature and effectiveness of American leadership in southern Europe (and I presume in other parts of Europe). I very much feel that failure to ratify by the United States would arouse resentments and countereffects which would seriously impair the United States position in the NATO structure.

The foregoing is submitted to you in confidential classification but has been intentionally so drafted as to exclude any facts of confidential nature and from my viewpoint could be released in its entirety for publication or such use as you wish to make of it.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I believe the acting majority leader has placed in the RECORD a letter from Mr. C. E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, as well as a cablegram from General Ridgway, so I will not encumber the RECORD by having them printed again.

Let me discuss the situation very

briefly from a somewhat slightly different point of view than it has been discussed. There are, as I see it, four issues involved.

The first issue involves the effect of the Uniform Code of Military Justice on

the jurisdiction of other systems of justice. Although offenses committed by American servicemen, wherever they may be stationed, are covered by the uniform code, the coverage of the code is definitely not exclusive, and the code is clearly not intended to affect the jurisdiction of local civilian courts either in the United States or in foreign countries. We have had a recent example of that in connection with the case of a man who was discharged from the armed services and under the code went back to Japan to stand trial for murder. He is now on his way back, as I understand, by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus from

a civilian court in the United States.

The second issue involves the extent to which United States forces in foreign countries enjoy privileges and immunities as a matter of right. On this issue the following statement of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of schooner Exchange against McFaddon is pertinent:

The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nations as an independent sovereign power. The juris

diction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation not imposed

by itself.

necessary to consider the extent to which this doctrine is accepted under international law, since in general those countries in which it has been necessary to obtain agreements on the subject of jurisdiction have given sufficiently clear indications to refute any such an implied agreement. Accordingly, in order to obtain a status for United States forces which they would not otherwise have, it has been necessary to negotiate express agreements spelling out those rights which the foreign countries are willing to grant.

The third issue involves the method by which this status is achieved. Whenever United States forces have visited foreign countries it has been the custom of the commanding officer, in carrying out his responsibilities, to work out arrangements with the local authorities involving the many administrative problems arising out of the visit. These arrangements have ordinarily included matters such as policing, arrest of members of the force, and jurisdiction. Where larger forces or longer visits were involved, it has been necessary to work out these arrangements at a higher level. In some cases they have taken on the status of governmental agreements.

Mr. CASE. Even within a NATO country?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Even within a NATO country.

Mr. CASE. If that country wanted to make further modification?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Exactly.

The fourth issue involves the treatment which members of the United States forces have received under foreign systems of justice. This issue was given extensive consideration in the hearings on the NATO Status of Forces Treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Information concerning the administration of criminal justice in the NATO countries is set forth in those hearings beginning on pages 43 and 57. Further information concerning the number of trials for American servicemen in local civilian courts, and sentences imposed, in the NATO countries was inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD On May 7 by the senior Senator from Michigan. These statistics indicate that of approximately 182 military personnel of the United States tried in the civilian courts of the NATO countries since January 1, 1951, 21 were acquitted. Approximately 58 received sentences involving confinement and of

these approximately 40 were suspended. of the remaining 18 sentences to con

inhibit the movement of United States

military personnel engaged upon the

business of national defense.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield? Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. CASE. Is it the understanding of the Senator from Massachusetts that there is nothing in the agreement which would prevent an officer in command of United States troops from making such an agreement with the host country?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. What I tried to point out was that in this instance the agreements are made on a higher level because of the number of troops involved, as compared with, for example, the visit of the battleship Missouri to Turkey shortly after World War II. mately 2,000 men from the ship visited Turkey at that time, but only for a few days. Therefore, it was the responsibility of the commanding officer or of our diplomatic mission in Turkey to make arrangements for the visit with respect to any of our men arrested for violation of Turkish law.

Mr. CASE. There is nothing in the proposed treaty which would in any way modify the power of a commanding officer to make a special arrangement; is

there?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Not in countries outside NATO countries. These agreements would be in force in NATO counties.

Mr. CASE. I mean in NATO countries.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would assume that a country could consent to a further or supplementary arrangement with a commanding officer in a locality if it so desired.

finement all but 3 were sentences of less than 1 year.

The Defense Department has indicated

are presently serving sentences in the prisons of other countries all over the world. Its records do not reveal any instances of cruel or unusual punishment inflicted upon an American serviceman as the result of a sentence imposed by a court of a country with which ar

rangements respecting the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction have been en

tered into. There have been no reports to responsible American authorities of imprisoned by such a country. mistreatment of any American prisoner

Mr. President, for these reasons, briefly stated, supplementing the argu

ments which have been made today, I believe that the treaty, with the interpretation offered by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY], should be ratified.

It should be ratified because at the present time in NATO countries we either have no agreements, or the agreements are expiring, and it is necessary to come to a satisfactory understanding

with these countries. Such an understanding is an essential first step to progress in forming a European army and in removing obstacles to the movement of troops in and through NATO

countries, and from one country to another. I hope the treaties will be rati

fied.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BARRETT in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the call of the roll be rescinded and

that the further proceedings under the call be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CARLSON in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, I may say that some days ago I submitted to the treaty a reservation which has been printed, and which I had fully intended to offer. However, there is a reason why I shall not offer it, and that is that I do not wish it to conflict with the purposes of the Bricker amendment and the possibility that that amendment will be acted upon before the 1st session of the 83d Congress adjourns. For that reason alone, Mr. President, I shall not submit the reservation.

I wish to make a few general observations regarding the reservation which has been submitted by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], and also with respect to the general subject matter before the Senate.

Mr. President, 2 months hence we shall be observing the 166th anniversary of the signing of the Constitution of the United States. I suppose the Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate and a great many other persons will then be gracing the rostrums of the country and will be declaiming and waxing eloquent in regard to the virtues of the document which is referred to as "the charter of our liberties." I think it is very fine, indeed, that everywhere in the country public statements will then be made in recognition of the value of the Constitution and its meaning to the development of our country and the safeguarding of the freedoms and liberties of our people.

But, Mr. President, in another September, 2 years after the Constitution was formulated and submitted to the Continental Congress for approval, that Congress submitted 12 resolutions in the nature of amendments to the Constitution, to be submitted to the legislatures of the various States for ratification. The number was ultimately reduced to 10. They included 2 other proposed amendments to the Constitution, 1 dealing with representation on a population basis in the House of Representatives, and the other, strangely enough, dealing with the compensation of Senators and Representatives before an intervening election. However, in its wisdom the First Congress put those 2 resolutions to one side. The other 10 were then submitted. They were ratified in 1790, and became known affectionately and familiarly as the Bill of Rights and the charter of our liberties. Mr. President, we constantly recall that event, because it is very important to the people of the United States and the general well-being of our Nation.

One thing intrigued me a great deal in connection with the resolution under which those amendments were first submitted. The resolution stated, among other things, that it was desired "to extend the ground of public confidence in the general government."

At that time there was a belief, which was expressed by Jefferson and some of his associates, that something in the nature of a Bill of Rights should be at

tached to the Constitution. As a result of that prevailing anxiety and concern, the first 10 amendments were offered and adopted. Of course, I think that had considerable to do with the acceptance of the Constitution even after it was ratified, because those 10 amendments did, in the words of the resolution, "extend the ground of public confidence in the general government."

Mr. President, our entire constitutional scheme is, after all, based upon the will of the people; and of course it is designed to safeguard and protect the individual.

Some cases come to my mind. I recall very vividly when the so-called Scottsboro case was very much on the front pages of the newspapers and in the public eye. That case involved a charge made against a young man in Alabama, the allegation being that he had committed a henious sin against the womanhood of that State. Without having an adequate trial, he was sentenced to condign punishment. Through the instrumentality of his counsel, he presented himself to the Supreme Court of the United States, and there said, in effect, "Can they do this to me?" That humble "Can they do this to me?" That humble citizen found sympathy there for his cause, because the Supreme Court said to the State of Alabama, in effect, "Do not take his life unless you give him a fair trial in accordance with the constitutional guaranties." So in that case was an exemplification of the meaning of the Bill of Rights to the humblest citizen of the land.

Of course, Mr. President, even legislatures can do stupid things at times. I think it occurred during World War I, on one occasion, that the Nebraska Legislature passed a statute prohibiting the teaching of German in the public schools of that State. Some reasonable and sensible persons then said, in effect, "If the teaching of German can be restricted in the public schools, the teaching of biology or music or botany or Latin or Greek or any other subject can be restricted." So interested citizens came across the country and presented the case to the Supreme Court of the United States. They said to that Court, in effect, "Can the Legislature of our State place such a prohibition upon the people and upon the public schools?" The Supreme Court, in its wisdom, found that restriction to be a violation of the fundamental charter of the people's rightsrights to which all of use are accustomed.

I recall another case which was brought across the country, a good many years ago, and submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States. That case arose as a result of action taken by the Oregon Legislature. At one time the Oregon Legislature passed a measure to the effect that all the children of that State must be educated in the public schools of the State. What is wrong with that, Mr. President? Simply that with that, Mr. President? Simply that such a measure transfers complete custody of the education of the child from the parents to the State, saying, in effect, to Catholic fathers and mothers and to Methodist fathers and mothers and to Baptist fathers and mothers and to Jewish fathers and mothers that even though they were willing to sus

tain and contribute to the maintenance of parochial schools where their children might be educated in the ancient faith, they must send their children to the public schools. So the Society of Sisters came from Oregon to Washington, D. C., and presented their case before the Supreme Court of the United States. That Court said, in effect, in striking down that legislative enactment of the Oregon Legislature, "You are invading certain rights the people have, so your statute is null and void."

Mr. President, I may allude, perhaps, to another case, one which arose in the great Commonwealth of Georgia. Many years ago a young man was apprehended at the city square in Atlanta. His pockets were bulging with Communist literature. His name was Angelo Herndon. He was given a quick trial, and was sentenced to a long term with the chain gang. Through his attorney he came before the Supreme Court of the United States, and there said, in effect, "Can they do this to me, although they have not given me a fair trial under the guaranties provided by the supreme law of the land?" The Supreme Court simply said, "Do not put a ball-and-chain around his ankle until you give him a fair trial."

That is the way the Bill of Rights shows up in the history of our country. That is the way this fundamental charter of liberties manifests itself throughout the whole of American life; and because we have it, because there has been an opportunity for the talent and the spirit and the ability of America and of Americans to unfold in that climate of freedom, we have gotten where we are, and it has also been possible, Mr. President, to do much for the world, because ours is a free country.

Thirty-six years ago this spring, I was a member of the American Expeditionary Force that went to Europe. I was not anxious to get into uniform, but it was the sovereign will of the country that an army should go for the purpose of staying the rough and ruthless hand of Prussian autocracy. Next December, it will be 12 years since we got into another conflict, and once more some seventeen or eighteen million young Americans were sent into all the far corners of the earth in the pursuit of a great American ideal, an ideal that rests upon the foundation of the Constitution, and the assertion of our freedoms. To be sure, we may not have expected much, or we may have expected much; but if we expected too much, it did not come to anything.

When I think of it, I recall the assertion by the minor prophet of the Old Testament, Haggai, who was admonishing his own people about putting roofs over their own houses while they were forgetting to complete the tabernacle of the Lord; and so, on the sacred parchments long ago, he penned this rather significant line:

Ye have sown much, and bring in little.

Mr. President, we have engaged in two great crusades for freedom over a period of one generation, and perhaps it has come to but little. But today our soldiers are in the far corners of the earth.

I saw them in Korea a few months ago. I saw them in the Far East. I have seen them everywhere. They had come from America to stem the Red tide, in order to do what they could to preserve the freedom of the world and to make a beachhead from which humble people might operate in order to retrieve their own freedom.

To carry on in that way requires munitions, it requires money, it requires materials; and above all, it requires manpower. That is the thing with which we are concerned today.

This afternoon I sat in the Appropriations Committee as we listened to the off-the-record testimony of Admiral Radford, a great soldier and a great sailor, if you please, Mr. President, with whom I had the pleasure of visiting in Formosa only a few months ago, and with whom I discussed informally the situations in Korea, Japan, and Indochina, when the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] and I were on a mission for the Appropriations Committee. As I listened to the discussion, I thought of the diffusion of American troops into all the far corners of the earth in connection with the crusade that is still going on at the present time, not only as an integral part of NATO, but of the other organizations to which we belong, and to which we have committed young Americans and sent them abroad.

Mr. President, when we send a soldier abroad, we send with him the sovereign power of this country. I think a soldier or a citizen is a symbol of the sovereign power. I listened this afternoon to the colloquy as to whether our soldiers are invitees within a foreign country. I do not know what they are, other than that, notwithstanding the purpose for which they may be there. An American soldier could not set foot on French soil unless by permission implied or expressed, he and the unit to which he belonged had been invited there; and so he is a sovereign representative of this country. I think of him as a symbol of sovereignty.

Certainly if there is anything to the doctrine spelled out long ago by John Marshall, then, of course, I have but one recourse, and that is to support the Bricker reservation to the treaty. If it is not adopted, then, according to the dictates of my conscience, I must simply vote against ratification and assent to the treaty. I say that, Mr. President, on the theory enunciated by a great American jurist a long time ago, when Marshall spelled it out, and when he said in substance, "When a sovereign goes into the domain of another sovereign, he is there by invitation, and by invitation only; and, when he is there, he does not dare to degrade his own sovereignty by ever permitting himself to be brought within the jurisdiction of a court in the country of which he is a guest."

Mr. President, if that is a good rule for the sovereign, it is a good rule for the symbol of the sovereign. Every American citizen and every American soldier is a symbol of American sovereignty when we send him abroad; and, unless we protect him, we demean and degrade the very sovereignty he represents. Cer

tainly, I would not embrace a doctrine of tainly, I would not embrace a doctrine of that kind.

He is something more than an American; he is something more than a mere soldier. He is no less an American when serving in France than he is when he is on the soil of his native or of his adopted country. He remains a representative, then, of the American sovereignty. That, to me, seems to follow logically from the doctrine which was spelled out by John Marshall long ago; and so he is entitled to the same protection abroad that he gets at home.

Would he get that protection under this proposal? I do not believe so. I have examined it. I find that he shall have a speedy trial; he shall be confronted with the charges; he shall be confronted by witnesses; there shall be compulsory process for witness; there may be the right of counsel; he shall be entitled to have an interpreter and the presence of a representative of his country; and any court will be agreeable if the rules of the court permit. That is what the document which is before us at the present time says.

But there are other things in the proposal that do not so readily meet the eye. In the first place, it is one of the cardinal principles of American jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence until a person is proved guilty. There is no presumption of that kind that goes along with him under the document which is before the Senate. There is no assurance of the right to a trial by jury. Yet, if one will examine the first 10 amendments to the Constitution of the United States he will find set forth therein, in the sixth amendment, that there shall be the right of trial by jury in a criminal case, and a right to have compulsory process for witnesses, as well as representation by counsel. Nothing like that is guaranteed to our troops abroad by this instrument. So the effect of it is to subject an American sovereign, in the person of an American soldier, to the mercies and to the limitations of a foreign court. As I say, and as I assert over and over again, he may be in Indochina, he may be in Japan, in France, or in Korea; but while he is in uniform, he is still an American; and if he has a guaranty here, how can we, under the organic law upon which this country is founded, barter away that guaranty, that right? I, for one, will not do so. There is no guaranty here against excessive bail, there is no guaranty against cruel and unusual punishment.

That is the situation before us. Does an American, when we send him abroad, lose his American attributes in a foreign country, where he may be tried by 4 or 5 magistrates instead of by a jury, if that happens to be the procedure of the country? I do not think so.

So I approve, and I shall vote for the reservation which will be offered by the Senator from Ohio. If I did not vote for it, I would find it pretty difficult on the 17th of September, 1953, to go on a platform somewhere in the country and there proclaim the virtues of the Constitution of the United States and to elaborate upon what the Bill of Rights has meant to us, having upon my heart

and upon my conscience constantly the recollection that the Bill of Rights does not apply to an American soldier abroad, since, in my capacity as a Senator, I took those rights away from him.

Mr. President, I shall not leave our American soldiers who are abroad to the mercies of any country. I think the time is at hand now to make sure that those rights shall be safeguarded.

It was pointed out by my distinguished and learned friend from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] a moment ago that only 15 persons were languishing somewhere in foreign countries. I think I am correct in saying it was 15. Mr. President, if there were but 1, and he did not get a fair trial and was not treated in consonance with the first 10 amendments to the Constitution of the United States, that would be 1 too many. It is not a question of numbers. It is not a question of whether it is 1 or 10 or 1,000 or 10,000. It is a question of an ideal. It is a question of what is right. So, in proportion as it attaches to or impairs the right of a single American, that is just one too much.

So, Mr. President, I want to be sure that his sovereignty is asserted when a young man goes abroad because of the compulsion of his own country that places him in a uniform and sends him as an invited guest to a foreign country to carry on his military duty. I want to be sure that his American attributes, his American character, and his American rights are fully preserved wherever he may be.

If the foreign nation's jurisprudence is such that it is in conformity with the guaranties provided in the United States, then no one could object to his being tried in a court in that country. If there is no cruel or unusual punishment, if there is the necessary process, if there is a jury, if he can get the witnesses he wants, if there is no selfincrimination, if there is no double jeopardy, if he is appropriately indicted or a presentment is made, then, all right, because that is what the Constitution provides for; that is what we would do for him at home, and I would do no less for him as we send him off to the far corners of the earth as a crusader in the cause of liberty and freedom.

Mr. President, it would be pretty difficult for me to reconcile any action approving the agreement without a reservation when I think of the young Americans abroad. After all, are they not crusaders for liberty? Are they not defenders of the cause of freedom? That is one idea we have asserted in nearly every document, in nearly every official paper of which I have any recollection. It was recited and emphasized in the Atlantic Charter. It is recited in the preamble of the United Nations Charter, in all the documents, in all the correspondence we have officially carried on Over and over with many countries. again we have been asserting this cause of freedom.

With me, Mr. President, that cause is almost synonymous with the safeguards which have been written into the first 10 amendments 10 amendments of the Constiution; and when the next Constitution Day comes, I want to be pretty sure that I