This document shall be in the language of the sending State and in the English and French languages.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I rise at this time to present to the Senate three treaties relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Technically speaking, they are not treaties-there are two agreements and one protocol-but inasmuch as they have been submitted

for the advice and consent of the Senate, the term treaty in its broader sense would seem entirely appropriate.

For the past 32 years, the foreign policy of the United States has been inseparably linked to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1948, by a vote of 64 to 4, the Senate approved the Vandenberg resolution, which advised the President to associate the United States with regional and other collective defense arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations. A year later, we gave our resounding approval to the Atlantic Pact. Since that time we have taken many steps to implement the treaty and to strengthen our ties with our North Atlantic neighbors.

SUPPORT FOR NATO

In view of the discouraging obstacles which we faced in 1949, remarkable progress has been made in injecting strength and vitality into the North Atlantic sys

tem. Where fear and despair existed before, there is now faith and hope for a better tomorrow. Where there was disunity, there is now coordination and teamwork among the 14 member nations. Where there was a dangerous power vacuum, there now stands sufficient military strength to serve as a serious deterrent to any possible totalitarian aggression against the free nations.

In view of conditions on the European Continent, in East Berlin, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary, and in view of the apparently imminent liquidation of Beria and the upset conditions beyond and behind the Iron Curtain, I think there is every reason to believe that if we keep our powder dry and coordinate our forces and do that which is necessary under the circumstances, we shall extricate ourselves from the world mess in which we find ourselves.

In my strong support for NATO, I find myself in complete agreement with President Eisenhower. In his message to the North Atlantic Council on April 23, the President stated:

As you know, I have long held the deep conviction that the success of NATO's prógram was essential to world peace and to the security and well-being of all Atlantic nations. My subsequent experience has reinforced and strengthened this belief. NATO has become a mighty force for peace and an instrument of enduring cooperation among the Atlantic peoples.

It is, of course, a tragic thing that the free nations should be compelled to divert so much of our productive capacity to the buildup of our defensive strength. But it might prove far more tragic, Mr. President, if we were to relax our efforts before we are convinced that the basic conditions for peace have been met.

SOVIET PEACE OVERTURES

Therein lies the real danger of the peace overtures made by the Soviet Government. If they cause us to drop our guard now, who knows what the results might be?

I would be the last, Mr. President, to reject any honest, sincere proposal toward peace that the Soviet Union has to offer. Moreover, I would not want to say anything provocative at this juncture that might deter the Soviet Union or give them pause if they really want to coooperate with us. There is the rub. Do they want to cooperate? But before we in the free world grasp the olive branch that is proffered us, let us make sure it is not full of thorns.

Meanwhile, in our relations with the Soviet bloc, we have no alternative but to act with firmness and determination. It is imperative that we move on, with unabated vigor, with plans to build a common defense adequate to deter any possible aggression.

PURPOSE OF AGREEMENTS

The three treaties before the Senate are significant steps in that direction. In broad terms, the chief purpose of the treaties is to define the legal status of the military forces of one NATO power stationed in the territory of another, as well as the status of the military headquarters and civilian organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The first is the agreement on the status of forces. This deals with such matters as passport and visa regulations, immigration inspections, the carrying of arms, the settlement of claims, and import and customs regulations. Senators will readily recognize that many questions in each of these areas must be resolved in connection with the stationing of American forces abroad.

The second agreement is the protocol to the status of forces agreement. This protocol defines the status of the military headquarters of NATO, and sets forth the various rights, responsibilities, and privileges necessary for the effective operation of such headquarters in NATO

countries.

The third agreement gives legal personality to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and confers upon it those privileges and immunities which are normally bestowed upon international organizations. It also defines the privileges and immunities of the national representatives to NATO and of the international staff.

Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on these agreements and, so far as I am aware, there is no substantial opposition to any of them, although a question has been raised about one article of the status of forces agreement. The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Justice, and the Treasury Department, in one of those inspiring displays of unity,

have all agreed that it would be helpful to NATO and in the national interest of the United States to push ahead with ratification of all these treaties at the earliest practicable time.

NEED FOR AGREEMENTS

The need for these agreements arises out of the integrated defense system that has been developed under the North Atlantic Treaty. Obviously, when large numbers of armed forces are stationed in other countries all sorts of problems inevitably arise. Suppose, for example, a soldier off duty commits a crime? Or suppose a NATO plane crashes into a farmer's home? Or the troops stationed abroad wish to import goods and commodities from other countries? Or a division of ground forces must be shifted rapidly to another country?

During World War II, the United States entered most European countries as a conquering or liberating power. As such, we made our own laws to deal with such problems. Often very stern measures were applied.

But wartime arrangements cannot be applied in time of peace. So after World War II, we negotiated interim arrangements with various countries covering the status of our forces there. These executive agreements varied considerably from country to country, however, and difficulties arose in their application.

When NATO came into existence, it became apparent that we needed a more substantial basis for our NATO relationships. We needed something permanent. And because of the close teamwork required in an integrated defense system, we needed uniform regulations for both the headquarters and the Armed Forces. That is why these agreements were concluded.

Mr. President, it is not my intention to impose upon the Senate a long and detailed description of the agreements. That is done in the committee report. I should like to comment briefly, however, on certain aspects of the status of forces agreement. Then my colleague the distinguished senior Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] will discuss the other two.

In this connection, we should never lose sight of the fact that the United States has a dual interest in the agreement; we have an interest as a sending state, with large numbers of our armed forces stationed in other NATO countries, and as a receiving state, with some NATO forces stationed here.

As a result, we have had to reconcile our desire to secure the maximum rights for our troops abroad with our rather natural tendency to limit the rights and privileges of other NATO troops coming to our shores. Clearly we cannot have our cake and eat it too. We have had to make some concessions. But I think the result is a reasonable compromise which protects our interests both as a receiving and a sending state.

Those who may be dissastisfied with certain aspects of the agreement should remember these two simple facts: (1) we cannot expect other countries to grant treaty rights and privileges to our Armed Forces which we will not in turn grant to theirs; and (2) since we have a relatively large number of troops

abroad in comparison to the number of foreign troops stationed here, we have a very special interest in establishing our relationship on a firm and equitable basis.

IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES

I can assure the Senate that the agreement does not run counter to the internal security interests of the United States. To be sure, arrangements had to be made which would permit the ready movement of armed forces from

one country to another in peacetime. To that end members of NATO military forces are to be exempt from passport and visa regulations, from immigration inspection, and from regulations on the registration and control of aliens. They are required, however, to have personal identity cards and individual or collective military movement orders. Moreover, any individual may be removed from the receiving state at any time if the situation requires.

I am sure the Senate will understand the common sense that is back of these arrangements. If it becomes necessary to move a body of troops from one NATO country to another, we certainly do not want to be hampered by all the red tape that is involved in the normal immigration procedures.

It seems to me that the agreement is entirely consistent with our national security interests. In order to remove any possible doubt on this score, the committee has approved language which will be incorporated in the resolution of ratification and which will make crystal clear that nothing in the agreement diminishes or changes the right of the United States to exclude or remove persons whose presence here is deemed prej

udicial to its safety or security. The executive branch has also informed us that adequate screening procedures are being established to prevent the entry of undesirable people.

I desire to make one additional comment in this connection. I am completely sympathetic with those who wish to be ever on guard against the infiltration of spies and saboteurs into this great country of ours. But I would remind my colleagues in the Senate that NATO is quite unlike other international organizations in this respect. It does not include any Communist countries. All its members are firmly dedicated, as we are, to the joint task of preserving freedom in the North Atlantic area. I am confident, therefore, that we can expect full cooperation from them in preventing the entry of individuals who might be security risks.

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Mr. President, the committee also gave careful consideration to the provisions of the agreement dealing with criminal jurisdiction. On the one hand, we want to make sure that our boys who commit offenses in foreign lands receive a fair trial with due regard for proper legal safeguards and the rights of the individual. On the other hand, we in the United States do not wish to give up our rights with respect to criminal jurisdiction over the members of foreign armed forces stationed on our soil.

The compromise which the agreement provides is, I think, quite satisfactory.

In general, foreign courts will have jurisdiction over Americans who commit offenses while off duty against the laws of the country where they are stationed. Our own military authorities will retain jurisdiction over offenses committed in performance of duty, as well as offenses against the property or security of the United States, and the person or property of another member of our Armed Forces or civilian component.

Moreover, an American on trial in a foreign country will have all those rights to which a citizen of the country is entitled. Specifically, he must be accorded the right of counsel, the right to a fair and speedy trial, the right to procure witnesses in his behalf, the right to be confronted with the charges and witnesses against him, the right to have an interpreter, and the right to communicate with his Government.

I confess, Mr. President, that I cannot think of any other adequate solution to this thorny problem. Clearly, exclusive American jurisdiction-which amounts to extraterritoriality-is not the answer. That would set our forces apart as a privileged class and would serve as a constant irritant to the local population. More than that, it would be an infringement of the sovereignty of the other countries.

We must keep in mind that the systems of law and justice which prevail in the other NATO countries are very well advanced. Indeed, most of them are older than our own. Thus far, our experience with these countries with respect to this problem has been good. Under the new agreements I am confident it will be even better.

The committee naturally was anxious

to insure, so far as possible, that American servicemen who may be tried in foreign courts are accorded all the essential rights which they would receive under the Constitution of the United States. As, I have indicated, a number of these rights are spelled out in the treaty itself. Others are provided for in the laws of the other NATO countries.

As an additional step, the committee is recommending that the Senate attach to the resolution of ratification a statement that

First. The criminal jurisdiction provisions do not constitute a precedent for future agreements.

Second. Whenever an American serviceman is to be tried in a foreign court under this agreement, the commanding officer of the American Armed Forces in that country will examine its laws with particular reference to the safeguards contained in the United States Constitution.

Third. If, in the commanding officer's opinion, there is danger that the person tried would not be protected in the constitutional rights he would enjoy in the United States, the commanding officer shall request the authorities of the receiving state to waive jurisdiction. I point out that paragraph 3 (c) of article VII requests the receiving state to give sympathetic consideration to such requests. If the authorities refuse the request, however, then the commanding officer is directed to request diplomatic intervention by the Department of State.

Fourth. A representative of the United States Government will attend any trial of an American serviceman under the treaty and report any failure to accord the defendant the rights to which he is entitled. In these cases, the commanding officer is again directed to request diplomatic intervention by the Department of State.

Mr. President, it seems to me that this is as far as the Senate can effectively go. It has been suggested that we should insist upon exclusive criminal jurisdiction over our troops abroad. Aside from the merits of exclusive jurisdiction—and it is by no means an unmixed blessing—the suggestion is wholly impractical, because the other countries simply will not agree to it.

That fact is that under this treaty we shall have a larger measure of jurisdiction than we now have or than we shall have if we fail to ratify the treaty. The treaty does not turn over American servicemen to foreign courts. American servicemen are already being tried by foreign courts. The treaty will give them more rights than they now have.

SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS

Let us now turn to a third problemthe matter of settling claims. Obviously, if American troops on maneuvers tramp over a farmer's crops, or if an American jeep collides with a French automobile, arrangements must be made to take care of the resulting damages.

Here again, the suggested procedure is a compromise emerging from long experience with such matters by the Armed Forces. In the event a tort is committed in the performance of duty, the person injured will take action against his own government, exactly as though the in

jury had been inflicted by the armed forces of his own country. The claim will be settled by the injured person's government, which will pay 25 percent of the damages. The remaining 75 percent will be paid by the sending state whose national is at fault. In the event of an injury arising out of an act not performed in line of duty, the person damaged will be able to bring suit directly against the person responsible. Additional remedies will be available in case of inability to pay.

Mr. President, I do not wish to become involved in the intricacies of claims settlements at this point, but it does seem to me that the procedures outlined in the agreement are fair and equitable, taking into account the rights of the citizens, as well as the interests of the States concerned. Moreover, the United States as a sending State will probably save considerable money by having local officials handle the claims, since they normally take a more moderate view of monetary damages than do American claims officials.

OTHER PROBLEMS

The agreement contains a number of other provisions relating to such things as customs duties and other taxes, driving licenses, military uniforms, the carrying of arms, and so on. But these matters are explained in the committee report, and I shall not deal with them here.

THE OTHER AGREEMENTS

But before closing, Mr. President, I should like to say a few words about the two other treaties before us. It is, of course, essential that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the military headquarters, be given juridical personality, with the right to make contracts, acquire and dispose of property, and to sue and be sued. It is also essential, it seems to me, that NATO's archives and other official documents should be inviolable, and that it have the privileges and immunities normally granted to international agencies. In brief, that is what the treaties before us would do.

Mr. President, it will be recalled that from the time of the approval of the first military-assistance program, the Congress has insisted that NATO should be built upon an integrated defense system. This is truly an epoch-making venture; never before in peacetime have nations taken such a step. But we who insist upon an integrated defense for the North Atlantic area should approve these treaties without delay, for without them a truly effective integration of NATO'S armed forces would not be be possible.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE AGREEMENTS

By way of summary, Mr. President, I am convinced that the agreements before the Senate are in the national interest of the United States, for the following

reasons:

First. They will replace the present hodgepodge of bilateral arrangements, which are temporary in nature, with a permanent, uniform system in which rights and duties are clearly defined. This should do much to eliminate some of the existing causes of friction, and help build good will among the 14 NATO countries.

Second. They will insure the mobility of NATO forces in Europe. It is perfectly obvious that no satisfactory system of collective defense can be developed unless adequate arrangements are made for armed forces to cross national frontiers without administrative complications and crippling delays.

Third. By introducing an orderly system of rights, responsibilities, and procedures with respect to the stationing of foreign forces in NATO countries, they I will reduce considerably the paper work and the administrative detail which now fall on American commanders in Europe. Fourth. As a receiving state, the United States will give up no rights which we do not acquire as a sending state. Moreover, in view of the relatively large number of American forces abroad, the advantages accruing to us as a sending state far outweigh the disadvantages to which we might be subject as a receiving state.

Finally, Mr. President, not only will the treaties improve the position of our troops in Europe, but they will also strengthen the fabric of NATO cooperation. They will demonstrate once more the determination of the NATO nations to move forward together in the desperately important task of building our joint defenses.

I sincerely hope, Mr. President, that the Senate will approve these treaties

without delay, so that President Eisenhower can move on to implement them in the very near future.

Mr. President, at this time I send to the desk the amendment to which I referred, and I ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUSH in the chair). The amendment is not in order at this time. It will not be in order until the resolution of ratification is before the Senate.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield for a question?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. In connection with the amendment submitted by the Senator from Wisconsin, which is in the form of a memorandum, I call his attention to paragraph 4, which states that a representative of the United States will attend the trial. However, the amendment does not state who shall appoint the representative.

For the sake of clarity, will the Senator from Wisconsin tell us who will appoint the representative? If the responsibility for making the appointment is not definitely stated in the amendment, would not it be wise to make that ment, would not it be wise to make that matter clear by means of a modification of the amendment?

Mr. WILEY. It would depend entirely upon the situation, of course. I suppose a military man would be involved. Probably the military commander of the district would make the appointment, or it might be that the Government would ask our Ambassador to make the appointment. In any event, we would have a representative there.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Would not it be wise to specify the responsibility for making the appointment-for instance, simply by stating that the United States representative shall be appointed by the commanding officer?

Mr. WILEY. As I suggested, it might be decided to have someone from the diplomatic group, instead of someone from the military group, make the appointment.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. However, if the responsibility for making the appointment is not specified, it might be that no one would take the responsibility, and thus the appointment would not be made. That is the point I have in mind.

As the matter now stands, under sections 2 and 3, the commanding officer has certain definite responsibilities.

Mr. WILEY. I shall give the matter consideration, and I shall consult with the other members of the committee. I have no objection to the suggestion the Senator from Massachusetts has made. My only thought is that this is an arrangement between 14 nations, and we have a great many troops abroad; and in one area it might be beneficial to have our representative appointed by our civil authorities, whereas in another area it might be desirable to have our representative appointed by our military authorities.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I agree entirely. I am simply trying to have the provision made sufficiently specific, so that the responsibility for making the appointment will be clear, rather than to have the situation be such that, be

cause of a lack of a definite designation, there might be hesitation as between the military authorities and the diplomatic authorities, with the result that neither would take action to appoint our representative.

Mr. WILEY. I shall give consideration to the point the Senator from Massachusetts has made.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I suggest that it be cleared up.

Mr. WILEY. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. MCCARRAN. Mr. President, Executive T, as the first on the Executive Calendar treaty is known, raises some compelling questions upon which I feel it is my duty to comment.

With purposes and motives, I cannot deal; for I do not know all the purposes or all the motives of those who have negotiated this treaty and who have brought it here, seeking ratification by the Senate of the United States. So, at the outset, I wish to make it clear that nothing I may say is intended to impugn the motives of anyone; and when I shall speak, a little later, of certain results which the ratification of this treaty would inevitably bring about, I do not

mean to assert that the achievement of those results was a purpose of any particular person or group of persons. It is enough that the results which would flow from this treaty, if it should be ratified, shall be clearly presented to this body before it votes on ratification.

So that there may be no doubt about my position on this treaty, Mr. President, let me say now, as a frame of reference for all that I shall say hereafter, that I oppose this treaty in its present form, and that I intend to support the reservation sponsored by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER).

Certain features of this treaty, Mr. President, were familiar to me long before the treaty itself had been negotiated. Representatives of the Department of State and of the Department of Defense came to me more than 2 years ago, to discuss with me certain proposals which were then under discussion for inclusion in this treaty. I do not know why they came to me, except that they sought my approval of the particular proposals which they presented to me at that time. I do not know why they wanted my approval of those proposals, unless it was because they had some feeling that if I approved, and would publicly state my approval, it might facilitate either the negotiation of the treaty-a possibility which I find it hard to believe-or might evenutally facilitate ratification of the treaty after it had been negotiated. Certainly, those who came to me knew as well as I did that I was not a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. However, the particular points which they presented to me did not deal with matters primarily of foreign relations, but dealt with matters of law and jurisprudence; with questions of jurisdiction for the punishment of offenses by American nationals in foreign nations. I was at that time chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, and it may be that those who came to me were honestly and in good faith seeking my advice with respect to the provisions in question. At

any event, they came to me, and laid those provisions before me, and sought my approval of them. I made a careful study of the proposals which they brought to me, and concluded that I could not approve them. I told those who had come to me that I could not approve the proposals, and I told them why: Briefly, because the proposals, in my opinion, were violative of the rights of American nationals. The matter was dropped at that point. I was assured that my views would be taken into consideration and that there would be an effort to redraft the particular proposals in question. Whether any such effort was made, I do not know. The matter next came to my attention after the treaty had been negotiated and had been submitted to the Senate for ratification. I then found, upon examination of the treaty, that some of the proposals, in the nature of provisions, which had been submitted to me 2 years ago, had in fact found their way into the treaty, in substantially the same form in which I had felt constrained to disapprove them when they were first submitted to

me.

I desire to assure my colleagues that there is no thought in my mind that these matters should have been submitted to me, or that, having been submitted to me, there should have been any changes made merely because I disapproved. I am speaking on this subject today not because there are certain provisions in this treaty which were submitted to me long ago, and which I disapproved; but because there are provisions in this treaty which I consider clearly violative of the rights of American nationals. I should oppose these provisions just as strongly today if they had never been submitted to me at any time previously. Those whose rights will be violated, by these treaty provisions, are primarily the young men of this Nation who have been or will be drafted into the Armed Forces, and ordered abroad. Under this treaty, these men will be denied the protection of such traditional American constitutional safeguards as public trial, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to have imposed upon them no cruel and unusual punishments.

This treaty provides, Mr. President, in article VII, that whenever units of our Armed Forces are in a foreign country, to which the provisions of this treaty are applicable, even though our Armed Forces are in that country with the consent of its Government, and for the accomplishment of its adequate defense, nevertheless our boys in uniform shall be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of that country, and to punishment under its laws, after trial in accordance with the laws which are in force there.

There are some exceptions to this general provision; and there are some provisions with respect to which country shall have the primary right to exercise ju

risdiction when there is concurrent jurisdiction in a particular case. But, Mr. President, there is one provision of this article which is absolute. Subsection 2 (b) of article VII provides:

The authorities of the receiving state shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdic

tion over members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of that state, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending state.

For the moment, Mr. President, let us set aside the clause with regard to security offenses, and note that the provision I have quoted is absolute with respect to "offenses punishable by its law," that is, by the law of the receiving state, "but not by the law of the sending state."

This means, Mr. President, that under this treaty every act which is an offense by one of the laws of one of the countries party to the treaty, even though such act is not any offense at all under the laws of the United States, will be punishable strictly in accordance with the foreign law, after a trial in a foreign court.

Now, let me refer back to the clause with regard to "offenses relating to the security" of the foreign state. Such of fenses are defined to include

(i) Treason against the state;

(ii) Sabotage, espionage, or violation of any law relating to official secrets of that state, or secrets relating to the national de

fense of that state.

That means, Mr. President, that if a foreign state has a law making it a security offense to make a public statement critical of the government of that country, any American boy drafted into our armed services and ordered to that country would be punishable under the laws of that country, after a trial in the courts of that country, if he should be caught making a statement derogatory to the government of that country.

Mr. President, I do not mean for a moment to imply that I favor loose talk moment to imply that I favor loose talk by members of our Armed Forces, in the nature of criticism of our allies within whose boundaries they may be stationed; but, Mr. President, I think the constitutional guaranties should follow our boys in uniform wherever they are sent under the American flag, even in the territory of a friendly country, and I oppose this treaty because it would deny them those constitutional guaranties.

There is a provision in this treaty, designed to guarantee certain rights to an American national who is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a foreign country. If you read this list of "guaranteed rights" rapidly, Mr. President, it looks like a pretty good list. But as soon as you start to analyze it, it becomes apparent that some of the most important guarantees under our own Bill of Rights have been omitted from this list.

For instance, it is provided-and the list to which I refer is in paragraph 9 of article VII-that

Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving state

And that means whenever one of our

boys is prosecuted under the laws of a foreign country where he happens to be

stationed

and farther down in the list, there is tacit recognition of the fact that frequently, under the laws of a foreign nation, no public trial is permitted; for the last of the enumerated rights is to have a representative of his own Government present at his trial "when the rules of the court permit." That makes it perfectly clear, Mr. President, that it is contemplated that in some instances, at least, the rules of the court in the foreign nation will not even permit a representative of our Government to be present when one of our boys is tried; and the treaty specifically provides that when the rules of the foreign court do not permit that, we are not going to insist upon it. We are just going to let our boy go to trial without anyone from home to appear even as an observer.

There is nothing in this list of enumerated rights, Mr. President, which would protect the right to be tried in the jurisdiction where the offense was committed. There is nothing to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. We think so much of that privilege in this country, that we permit subversives, Communists, and even spies and murderers, to claim their right not to testify against themselves; but we are do-. ing nothing in this treaty to preserve that right for American boys who may be brought to trial in a foreign country for some offense against the laws of that country.

There is nothing in this list of rights, Mr. President, to protect against cruel and unusual punishments.

There is nothing in this list of rights, Mr. President, which will guarantee the right to appeal a decision, or to have any review of a decision in any other way.

There is nothing in this list of rights, Mr. President, to protect an American soldier against a foreign law which concerns the establishment or the exercise of religion. There is nothing to protect an American soldier against a foreign law which abridges freedom of speech or freedom of the press. There is nothing to protect an American soldier against a foreign law which abridges the right of free assembly and petition. There is nothing in this treaty to protect an American soldier against unreasonable searches and seizures. There is nothing in this treaty to protect an American soldier against double jeopardy, where that may be permitted under the law of a foreign country. There is nothing in this treaty which preserves the right of trial by jury for an American soldier prosecuted under the law of a foreign nation.

There is nothing in this treaty which protects an American soldier against the requirement for excessive bail, under some foreign law; or which would protect an American soldier against excessive fines. All of those rights, Mr. President, are rights enumerated and protected in the first 10 amendments of our Constitution; but every one of them is being waived, under the terms of this treaty, with respect to American soldiers who may find themselves charged with an offense under the laws of a foreign country.

Mr. President, it might be well to point out that there are many possibilities,

under the laws of foreign countries, for convictions of offenses which carry in some cases extreme penalties. For instance, in France a person convicted of manslaughter-not murder, but manslaughter-can be put to death or sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for life. It would not be too difficult to imagine a conviction for manslaughter, under French law, on the basis of circumstances which in the United States would not give rise to a conviction even for involuntary homicide. Furthermore, it must be remember that under French law-and, in fact, under the laws of other European nations-while it is technically true that there is a presumption of innocence, this is only a technicality, for there is no requirement that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In this country that is the requirement; every judge must instruct the jury in a criminal case that, in order to convict, the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. But in France and some other European countries it is only necessary to establish guilt by a preponderance of the evidence. It need not be conclusively shown that a man is guilty. It is only necessary to show that he could be guilty, and then if the court believes that he probably committed the crime charged against him, there can be a conviction, even though there is a showing of clear possibility that someone else might just as well have committed the crime.

In France it would be possible for a man to be convicted of rape and sentenced to hard labor for 20 years on the basis of conduct which might be held only adultery, at worst, in a court of the United States. In France a man can be sentenced to 5 years in prison for petty larceny.

In Portugal a man can be sentenced to a term of from 2 to 8 years in a penal colony for the theft of property valued at $175. If the theft is termed robberythat is, if it is from the person—a similar sentence to the penal colony can be given if the value of the property taken exceeds $35.

Mr. President, I have been dealing with the question of what this treaty does and what it does not do. I desire now to deal briefly with what I consider the indefensible fact that this treaty appears to ignore settled international law; and that, in fact, representatives of the Department of State who testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations with regard to this treaty explicitly misstated the law to the committee.

The legal adviser of the Department of State came before the Committee on

Foreign Relations, and was questioned about this treaty. He made a number of misstatements. For instance, he

stated that

The only area in which the foreign country will have jurisdiction criminally of an offense committed by a member of our force is when he is not engaged in official duty.

Mr. President, that statement may have been the result of a misunderstanding by the legal adviser of the Department of State of the true effect of the treaty; but it is no less inaccurate and

misleading for that reason. The provision giving "the primary right to exercise jurisdiction" to our own military authorities in the case of "offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty" is found in paragraph 3 of article VII, and applies only to cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent; that is, where there is jurisdiction both in the foreign nation and in the United States. In the classes of cases which I have already discussed, in which there is no concurrent jurisdiction, but in which the authorities of the foreign state have absolute jurisdiction, this question of offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance act or omission done in the performance of official duty does not apply at all. The legal adviser of the Department of State should have known that, whether he did or not.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nevada yield? Mr. MCCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. A few moments ago the distinguished Senator from Nevada referred to the testimony of the legal adviser of the Department of State. Was the Senator referring to the testimony of Mr. Phleger, at page 25 of the hearings?

Mr. McCARRAN. I have not the page in mind, but I take it that was the place.

Mr. HENDRICKSON. But it was the testimony of Mr. Phleger?

Mr. MCCARRAN. I think so. Mr. HENDRICKSON. I thank the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. MCCARRAN. However that may be, Mr. President, the greatest fault which I find with the testimony of the legal adviser of the Department of State is that he made the following statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which I quote from page 49 of the printed hearings, on April 7 and 8,

1953:

Individuals wearing our uniform and part of our military force do not have sovereign immunity, and there is no doctrine which says that a nation which has on its soil representatives of a foreign nation must give immunity to those persons. Immunity is restricted to those which the receiving nation chooses in the handling of its diplomatic affairs to give immunity to, such as Ambassadors, and so forth.

Mr. President, that statement is absolutely contrary to international law as it has been declared uniformly by the Supreme Court of the United States, as the legal adviser of the Department of State should well know.

John Marshall, in the famous Exchange case, which will be found in 7 Cranch 116, at pages 137 and 139 said:

This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns, nor their sovereign rights, as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belong

ing to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.

This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.

First. One of these is admitted to be the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory. If he enters that territory, with the knowledge and license of its sovereign, that license, although cctaining no stipulation exempting his person from arrest, is universally understood to imply such stipulation. Why has the whole civilized world concurred in this construction? The answer cannot be mistaken. A foreign sovereign is not understood as intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity, and the dignity of his nation, and it is to avoid this subjection, that the license has been obtained. The character to whom it is given, and the object for which it is granted equally require that it should be construed to impart full security to the person who has obtained it. This security, however, need not be expressed; it is implied from the circumstances of the case.

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Third. A third case in which a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction is, where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions. In such case, without any express declaration waiving jurisdiction over the army to which this right of passage has been granted, the sovereign who should attempt to exercise it, would certainly be considered as violating his faith. By exercising it, the purpose for which the free passage was granted would be defeated, and a portion of the military force of a foreign independent nation would be diverted from those national objects and duties to which it was applicable, and would be withdrawn from the control of the sovereign whose power and whose safety might greatly depend on retaining the exclusive command and disposition of this force. The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops, during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline, and to inflict those punishments which the government of his army may require.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nevada yield?

Mr. MCCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I am certain the distinguished Senator from Nevada recognizes there is a great difference in the case of free passage of troops through a country. The troops would be in the country either as invaders or by permission, for some reason such as occurred in, I think, the Coolidge administration, when troops of the National Government of the Republic of Mexico were permitted to pass through American territory in order to reach Lower California, to quell a rebellion. In that instance, the troops were in passage, in military formation, under the control of their commanders. The situation with respect to NATO, in Europe, is quite different. There it is not a question of an organized unit of American forces passing from France through Belgium into Germany. It is an unprecedented situation, occurring not in war time, but in peace time. The troops are not in