Germany and of Japan, with the result that now we find a serious threat existing in Western Germany and even in Asia at the present time.

However, Mr. President, we do not solve that problem simply by laying down that premise, because it does not follow that when we sheathe the sword-and I believe this implication is inherent as a result of the position taken by the Senator from Georgia-then we should treat a former enemy and a former ally on the same basis. If we begin to follow that principle, we provide no deterrent to making war.

To illustrate my point of view in that respect, I point out-and, of course in this connection I am exaggerating, although we certainly need to give consideration to the suggestion-that the attitude we are taking regarding the entire question of the financial settlements in connection with the war is such that many persons in the United States believe that, after all, the taxpayers of the United States are paying almost the entire bill. Of course, that is an exaggeration, but it illustrates the point.

Mr. President, the American people have a right to expect their Government to take the position that a former enemy should be expected to discover the reality that war is very costly to the country that wages war. Certainly it should be more costly to Germany than to the taxpayers of the United States. Sometimes I question whether that is the case, in view of the financial policy we are following in the field of foreign relations.

So I say that when we laid down the sword, we had the right to look to Germany and to other enemies-from the standpoint of the reparations aspect, so far as concerns paying part of the billto relieve the taxpayers of the United States from some of the large load which I think the taxpayers of the United States are assuming.

In my opinion that question is not answered by a statement, "Well, we are letting Britain get off with approximately 13 percent, and France with 8 percent, and Russia with 10 percent." Such a statement does not answer the question, because that attitude also involves the consideration of how much Britain is collecting from Germany and how much France and other European nations are collecting from Germany, by way of various financial adjustments or arrangements which, after all, amount to a form of reparations. There again we find the United States taxpayers at a disadvantage.

I say the entire question of this agreement or treaty should be considered primarily from the point of view of whether it is fair to the United States taxpayers.

The Senator from Georgia has not submitted from the State Department anything which in any way modifies what the Senator from Iowa said about what was under consideration when the first governmental settlement was negotiated, before the settlement of the private investments was negotiated. I say that I say that when we come to consider the total settlement under the proposed agreement, I believe the taxpayers of the United States are to be given the short end of

the deal, in comparison with the treatment proposed to be given to United States investors.

If we wish to proceed on the assumption that the United States investors should receive some assistance from the should receive some assistance from the Federal Government, through the treatymaking process, then let us examine the interest adjustment about which we have heard this afternoon, namely, the reduction of the interest from 72 percent to 52 percent. 52 percent. Even with the reduced amount, that interest payment is almost twice what United States taxpayers receive from their Government in connection with investments in United States bonds. So the proposed treaty arrangement would give the private investors about twice that amount, for German wallpaper bonds. I cannot reconcile that wallpaper bonds. I cannot reconcile that with fairness, either. I understand that most of the bonds are 20-year bonds. If they are paid off at 52 percent, the investors in them or those who hold them will make an economic killing.

Nothing was done by way of negotiation, or by any proposal of the State Department in connection with payment from the German fund, as it is made from the German fund, as it is made available, in paying off United States available, in paying off United States investors, to see that the payments to them are made on the basis of the original investment they made.

The Senator from Georgia says he does not know who holds these bonds now, not know who holds these bonds now, what proportion of them is held in the United States, what proportion of them is held in South America, and what proportion really is held by former German Nazi financial houses, who, it is said, to some extent have been picking up the bonds for a song, with the result that under the proposed arrangement, the United States taxpayers really would be making payments to those who continue to hold the Nazi philosophy. As a matter of fact, no one seems to know the present status of the bonds, so far as the holdings are concerned. That point was brought out in the debate this after

noon.

Mr. President, I make the point that there is no substitute for a full disclosure in connection with that matter. I do not in connection with that matter. I do not believe we should approve the proposed agreement until a full disclosure is made as to who holds the bonds and what was paid for them. Then we can proceed to negotiate, even within our own Government, an equitable payment arrangement on the basis of the original investment.

I do not favor approving an arrangement which would give a bonanza to some clever speculators and also to the clients of law firms which have been at work on this matter for a long time. I do not favor the ratification of an agreement, following negotiations by the State Department, which would bring State Department, which would bring such unearned benefits to such clients. I do not believe that would be fair and right. In fact, I do not think it is proper to mix private financial matters with arrangements in the nature of a financial rangements in the nature of a financial treaty between the United States and Germany.

Furthermore, I do not believe it is fair to ask the present German Government really to assume the obligations of private financial arrangements between a

pre-Hitler German government and the United States investors.

One of the hardest arguments to answer is the one we hear made so often on the floor of the Senate in the course of many of the debates on foreign policy, namely, that if we do not ratify the proposed agreement or treaty, we might just as well write off Western Germany. The appeal on which that argument is based is most emotional, in view of the perfectly natural and understandable patriotic response of each one of us to appeals based on the welfare of our country. However, I say that any statement to the effect that a failure to ratify the proposed agreement will mean that we might just as well write off Western Germany is only an assumption, and it does not necessarily follow at all that that will be the result if the proposed agreement is not ratified.

On the contrary, I believe our action in regard to the proposed agreement will be a fairly good demonstration to Western Germany of the working of the democratic process. I hope we never come to the time when the negotiation of a proposed treaty will mean that it is automatically ratified by the Senate of the United States.

Mr. President, the argument of the Senator from Iowa has brought out so many shortcomings of the proposed treaty, and so many questions have been raised in other ways, and there are so many doubts about who owns the bonds and how they come to possess them, that I believe the proposed agreement should be recommitted, with a request that it be considered further by the committee, and that a full disclosure of these matters be made.

Mr. President, on the basis of a cooperative arrangement between American investors and the American Government, I shall support an enlightened point 4 program of the American flag backing up investments as a result of arrangements in advance. ments in advance. But, Mr. President, I am not in favor doing it as an afterthought. I am not willing to have the American flag follow this kind of investment when there was no understanding between the American Government and the investors at the time the investment was made.

Mr. MORSE. I yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. GEORGE. The Senator has twice repeated that statement. Does the Senator recall the Dawes plan, the Young plan, and the bonds which were issued in connection with those plans? The bonds may not have had any express approval by the United States, but they certainly had the color of approval, and those bonds are among the very securities now in question.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I respect the Senator's opinion about it, but I do not at all share his opinion. I do not think that there was any obligation on the part of the American Government, under the Young plan, or the Dawes plan, or any of the other plans, to have the flag follow the collection of those bonds in connection with pre-Hitler Germany; not at all. I say, if that obliga

tion is ever to exist, it ought to be created under the kind of international agreement to which I have just referred, namely, a point 4 program, whereby we work out with the country to which the loan is to be made an understanding in regard to the payment of the bonds, or the investments made by American capitalists who are bringing the capitalistic know-how to those countries. If there was ever anything ex post facto, it is the proposal that our State Department negotiate a treaty, apparently for the first time in our history-at least, no one has been able to cite a precedentwhereby we are now in effect using the force of our Government to collect 100 cents on the dollar, plus 52 percent accumulated interest, which will pay out, apparently, at least on a 20-year bond, double the face value of the bond. I say, Mr. President, it is unjustified, it is unwise; and I think we ought to demonstrate to Germany and to the other countries of the world that we will not ratify a treaty of that kind.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. The inequity that exists between the United States Government and private bondholders disturbs me; but I am more concerned with the precedent about to be set by the United States Senate this evening. I have made inquiry and am informed that never before in the history of our country have private and public debts become so confused and interrelated in treatment as to be the subject of treaty. Never before has the treaty-making power of the United States Government, I am advised, been used to persuade-I may say to overpersuade-another government to recognize and pay obligations to private investors, who made investments with their eyes open.

Let me go a little further, if the Senator will yield. Let us examine for a moment the precedent. The United States of America, the strongest, the wealthiest, the most powerful nation on the earth, by a conference report approved only a few moments ago, involving more than $5 billion, as an example, shows that we are distributing billions of dollars of aid, of assistance. A government so powerful, a government extending such great benefits and assistance, is in an incomparable position to exact from other nations, particularly smaller nations, favorable treatment for a special purpose, by the use of treaty power and the extension of aid.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Tennessee. He has expressed views which I share.

I close by making two very brief points. Eventually we shall have to ascertain who the bondholders are. Why not do it now? They must come forward to make their ownership known eventually in order to get the money, and it seems to me that at least a procedure, before the fact, ought to have been worked out whereby we would have the opportunity to pass judgment on whether they ought to be allowed to use the prestige of this Government to collect private debts for them. They should not

be given that advantage if they are speculators, whether Americans or aliens. They are going to collect debts finally after disclosure; and it is no answer to me for the State Department to say it does not have any adequate records to indicate who the bondholders are. I daresay, Mr. President, that there are adequate records at least of the law firms and of the clients of the law firms who have been so anxious to have a collection of this kind included in the treaty, and who have been exercising a great deal of influence in behalf of the principle we find embodied in this treaty.

I make that comment, Mr. President, because of the great concern I have, as I said earlier this afternoon, as the result of certain practices which were followed in connection with the Argentine loan last year by the Export-Import loan last year by the Export-Import Bank. After all, it was the American taxpayers who, in my judgment, were the losers, since the loan, which was only a paper transaction, in fact, was made in order to pay off certain private creditors of the Argentine Government.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I will yield in a moment. I knew of nothing connected with the situation, Mr. President, to cause me to ask for a Senate investigation of it at the time. I still say it would be a healthful thing to find out all the facts as to what went on behind the scenes in that transaction.

I also happen to know of certain manipulations and negotiations behind the scenes on the part of the State Department in connection with certain Mexican debts, or certain alleged obligations of the Mexican Government to private investors in the United States.

We ought to call a halt on a policy whereby the State Department is used as an instrumentality for collecting the private debts of American investors who were not sanctioned by the Government in advance of the debt obligations' being

incurred. Frankly, I do not like the implications of the collection phases of the private-loan features in this treaty. The

The

Senator from Tennessee is correct. precedent is a dangerous one, and I think we ought to recommit the treaty for further negotiations.

I now yield to the Senator from Louisiana.

discussion, it seems the point is clear Mr. LONG. Mr. President, from the it could otherwise obtain, because it is that this Nation is accepting less than felt that we should help Germany pay off the debt that was owed prior to World

War II.

Mr. MORSE. I think that is clear from the record.

Mr. LONG. The arguments which have been made here have been to the effect that we should first see to it that Germany has enough to pay off all the other debts, and then we ought to consider how much the American people are entitled to, and in that case it ought to be well for America to consider how much of that we decide to pay. In other words, if a man has invested 10 cents on the dollar, and if we are taking a loss of $1 in order that he may get 100 cents on the dollar, it might be well for us to see how much that man had invested. if

we are to take a loss in order that he may get more.

Mr. MORSE.

I may suggest it would at least be fair and equitable if we were to insist on setting up some kind of American commission that would go into the question, first, as to how the present claimant got his bond, and get an answer to the question, "What did he pay for his bond?" Indeed, I would even go so far, if it were a case of taking advantage of the former owners of bonds, as to work out some sort of equitable arrangement whereby, if we were really trying to protect the people who made the original investment, they would get something. But I do not agree with that basic principle. I do not believe that it is right for the American Government to be used, by way of treaty, for the collection of a private debt.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. LONG. I am sure the Senator would agree that at least those who represented the bondholders in working out this arrangement, such as Mr. Rogers, of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, acquired information from those they represented to find out how much the people who urged this arrangement had invested.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Louisiana think that Mr. Rogers and lawyers who represented many of these bondholders would be very slow in coming forward with their demands, once the treaty is ratified? They will not wait 48 hours for a disclosure.

Mr. LONG. Does the Senator agree that it would be better for us to know, before we go into this undertaking, exactly what we are getting into, then at a later date to have things come up in the Senate that we might wish we had known about at the time?

Mr. MORSE. There is no substitute for full disclosure of the public business.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. President, I think we are deeply indebted to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and to the acting majority leader for giving us this opportunity to look at the record. After looking at the record and hearing the discussion today, I am more convinced than ever that this treaty should not be ratified before further study is given to it. It was stated a moment ago that we were establishing a precedent whereby private debt settlement negotiations may be carried on alongside of negotiations affecting Government obligations, and may be determined in the form of treaties.

Mr. President, I find that the houses issuing the bonds in America have contributed to the funds for the purpose of carrying on these activities by the bondholders committee. They were supported and contributed to in very large amount by the big bankers in New York and also by the German Government itself.

I understand that the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council received donations from Germany amounting to $30,209; from Brazil, amounting to $16,230; from the Dominican Republic, $20,000; from Costa Rica, $8,166; from Argentina, $20,000.

Basically, the issue before us is a simple one. We are asked to scale down the amount of money the German Government owes the taxpayers of the United States by some $2 billion. In return for our generosity, the German Government agrees to repay in full and with accrued interest at 52 percent some $500 billion in bonds held by private individuals or corporations in this country.

Despite the fact that the repayment of Germany's postwar debt to the American taxpayer was supposed to have the highest priority recognized by Germany, our State Department is asking us to relinquish that priority in favor of the holders of Germany's prewar debts. We are not only asked to relinquish the priority held by American taxpayers, but we are asked to force the taxpayer in our own country to accept $1 instead of $3 in order that private speculators may not only be paid 100 percent on the dollar for bonds, which most of them bought for 20 or 30 cents, but may also receive interest going back more than 20 years at a rate higher than patriotic Americans, who invest in our own bonds, can hope to get from their own Government.

In this case, Mr. President, I think it important to point out that during the hearings conducted by the Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Riddleberger, representing the Department of State, stated:

Of course, the persons who bought those bonds would probably have a certain confidence in the outcome of the Hitler regime. (Hearings, p. 48.)

In other words, Mr. President, the bondholders whom we are now asked to protect at the expense of the American public, were people who put their faith not in the Government of the United States but in the Hitler regime which was to wage war against the United States.

Apparently it is for such purpose that we are now asked to sell the American taxpayer down the river.

I find in reading the hearings, Mr. President, that our State Department apparently went to great pains in its éfforts to see to it that these private holders of prewar German bonds were protected. I notice that the State Department apparently feels that these private creditors are delighted with the arrangements that we are asked to ratify. When the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin asked whether any substantial group of creditors objected to the terms of these agreements, the answer he received was "No." The answer should not have been surprising because apparently the State Department was thinking only of the private bondholders when it talked of creditors. Amazingly

enough, apparently no one in the State Department recognized the fact that every single taxpayer of this country was and is a creditor of the German Government. Apparently no one in the State Department felt obliged to represent the interests of all the taxpayers. Instead, so as to advance the interests of a handful of unknown private individuals or corporations or banks, the State Department blithely agreed in the name of the American taxpayer to slash

I find this incredible.

I had thought that the banking institutions of Wall Street existed to protect their clients, and that our State Department was expected to represent all our people.

Mr. President, in its efforts to represent these unknown private individuals, the State Department, as I have said, went to great pains. The hearings make it clear that it received marked assistance in its efforts from a group called the Foreign Bondholders Protective Committee. Strangely enough, in the course of the hearings, it became apparent that this organization, supposedly representing American bondholders interests, had its expenses paid by banks and in part by the German Government. I wondered at this strange relationship until I recalled an incident which occurred in the early thirties, one which I think should be recalled to the attention of the Nation.

Apparently this so-called Bondholders Protective Committee was either the Protective Committee was either the creature of, or at the very least, is greatly influenced by the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell. It was this same firm which, in the early thirties, shortly after the German Government defaulted on its bond payments, appeared as representatives of the American bondholders. sentatives of the American bondholders. Apparently these people were making every effort to get the Nazis to recognize their obligations. Apparently, however, one bondholder was not content to rely on the representation of Sullivan & Cromwell and brought an individual suit against the North German Lloyd Company to recover the value of her bonds. Then, and only then, was it discovered that this same firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, presumably bending all its efforts to assist American bondholders, was at the same time the law firm for the German concern.

Remembering this, and remembering, too, that the Foreign Bondholders Protective Association was initially financed tective Association was initially financed by contributors such as Dillon Read, by contributors such as Dillon Read, Kuhn Loeb, the Chase National Bank, Kuhn Loeb, the Chase National Bank, J. P. Morgan, and the National City Bank, all of whom were identified with foisting these bonds on the American people in the first instance, it should come as no surprise to find that despite the sizable funds in its own accounts, the association had its expenses paid in connection with the formulation of these nection with the formulation of these agreements by the Government of Germany.

This fact alone should be enough to put the Senate on its guard. There is no question that the story of the flotation of German bonds in this country is one of the blackest chapters in the history of American investment banking.

It is not necessary for me to review it again. The Senator from Iowa put much detail about it in the RECORD last Friday. The story in all its sordid deFriday. The story in all its sordid detail is available in the records of the investigation conducted under the direcvestigation conducted under the direction of Senator Hiram Johnson in 1932. Senator Johnson told us:

The record of the activities of investment bankers in the flotation of foreign securities is one of the scandalous chapters in American

issues was characterized by practices and abuses which were violative of the most ele

mentary principles of business ethics.

At that time, there were more than 130 foreign bond issues, which had been sold to the American people by our investment bankers, in default. There immediately sprang up numerous bondholders' protective committees, many of them administered by the very bankers who had sold the defaulted bonds.

The Johnson committee recommended and Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933, which authorized the establishment of a corporation of foreign bondholders which was to be entirely free of these investment bankers.

This corporation never came into existence. Instead, there was established, as a Maryland corporation, the private Foreign Bondholders Protective Committee, which immediately sought funds from the banks, bankers, and houses of issue because, as they put it, "these parties will benefit most from its work."

There appeared to be recognition at that time that these financial houses had a large stake in the matter.

In the 20 years that have intervened, the value of the German bonds has been practically nil. The record shows that the Hitler government, after defaulting on them, was able to buy many of them for 30 cents on the dollar. Presumably their agents in this country and others were able to buy up bonds for little or nothing and make a profit selling them to Hitler at this tremendous discount.

Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations made repeated attempts during the hearings, June 17 and 18, to determine if speculators had assembled quantities of these bonds and were set to make a killing as a result of the agreements now before the Senate.

Evidence was submitted indicating that at one time there was a wide distribution of these bonds, but there is nothing whatever to indicate what percentage are in the hands of the original purchasers across America, or what percentage may have been accumulated in the very banks and houses of issue whose conduct was described as scandalous by Senator Johnson.

There is evidence that the Securities and Exchange Commission suspended trading in these bonds in 1941, and that the Commission has issued warnings that bondholders should not dispose of their bonds before a market is reestablished. But there is no clue as to whether or not the warnings actually received wide publicity. Also, there is nothing whatever in the record to indicate whether or not avaricious financiers have gone ahead and accumulated these issues for a few pennies on the dollar and now stand to make tremendous sums by obtaining their payment by the present German Government at par plus interest at a rate higher than is paid on United States Government securities.

In view of the tawdry history of these bond issues, the conduct of the houses of issue and the minimum of information which is before the Senate, it is to me unthinkable that American taxpayers should now be asked to scale down the present German Government's debt so

Certainly it is unthinkable that Congress should do so without first ascertaining exactly who does hold these bonds and in what amounts.

I understand that in 1937 the Nazi government refunded part of these debts by issuing $65 million worth of bonds in lieu of past interest due on some $640 million of securities held by bondholders. I understand further that the new issues were floated in the United States, at a very good fee, by the same investment houses that had sold the first bonds to a gullible American public during the frantic twenties. We know they sold them. We do not know to what extent they have repurchased them. We know too, Mr. President, that an unknown number of bonds with which we are concerned were looted by the Government of Soviet Russia. We know there is a distinct possibility that many stolen bonds may have been placed in the hands of residents of the United States who, if this treaty is signed, will attempt to redeem them in the interest of the Soviets and at the expense of the American taxpayer.

To summarize this point, Mr. President, what we are being asked to do is to sacrifice the American taxpayer in the interest of a small group of American banking houses and individuals. We are asked to do this despite the fact that, by so doing, we shall be following the leadership of an organization financed by investment banking houses which gained an extremely unsavory reputation in this field during the frantic twenties.

I insist that the United States Senate should not and must not confirm

these treaties until it is first advised as to exactly who holds these bonds, in what amounts they are held, and under what circumstances they were purchased.

I realize we are told it is urgent that we approve the treaties promptly in order to aid in the reestablishment of the credit of the new German Government. I maintain, on the contrary, that if we do approve these treaties so precipitously we shall not be aiding the reestablishment of Germany's credit. I further maintain that by withholding our approval until the facts requested by the junior Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE] are available, we shall, in fact, not be occasioning any real delay at all. I think the testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee makes this obvious.

In the first place, we are advised that the German Government has passed a law requiring that these bonds be validated before any payments can be made thereon. If this is true, I would ask why we cannot require the presentation and validation of all such bonds held by American interests before we consider entering into such a treaty. Certainly the Government of Germany would accept our validation, and hence no delay would be entailed. Again, when we were told that an unknown number of the bonds have admittedly been looted by the Soviets, we were also advised that

that the stolen bonds would not be paid for. If this is true, it can only mean that a procedure has been devised which will require tracing the history of ownership of each individual bond. If such a procedure has been devised, then I must ask why we do not invoke it now. Why do we not insist that the history of ownership of the bonds be established, their number determined, and the amount of money involved in payment for those we are willing to validate be determined before the Senate is asked to act on this measure? According to the testimony of the Securities and Exchange Commission, appearing on page 34 of the committee's hearings, a procedure has been established whereby the holders of German dollar bonds will present them for validation to a board having its headquarters in New York. Mr. Donald Cook, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in a letter to the committee, stated:

The public interest, as well as the interest of holders of German dollar bonds, surely justifies the taking of measures to prevent so far as possible looted bonds from finding a market place in the United States and from being unloaded upon unwary and innocent purchasers who might be induced directly or indirectly by Soviet agents to buy them.

However, having stressed the danger inherent in the present situation, Mr. Cook apparently was willing to subscribe to the belief that it might be averted through the procedure for bond validation which would be put into operation after these treaties are approved.

Again, I must ask, Why not invoke these procedures before we are asked to ratify the treaties?

If the Treasury Department and the Department of State were to announce that no bonds would be covered by the treaties save those which had been presented and validated by a certain date, there is no question that we would very soon know exactly who held the bonds and exactly how they were acquired.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the legislative clerk called the roll.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT GERMAN DEBT TREATIES

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BUSH], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. DUFF], the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS], the Senator from New York [Mr. IVES], the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. MILLIKIN], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. TAFT), the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER], and the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] are necessarily absent.

If present and voting, the Senator from New York [Mr. IVES] and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. MCCARTHY] would each vote "nay."

Mr. CLEMENTS. I announce that the Senators from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON and Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNINGS], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY), the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Texas [Mr. DANIEL), the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE], and the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] are absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Minnesota [Mr.

HUMPHREY], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] are absent on official business.

I announce further that if present and voting, the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] would vote "yea."

Mr. MAGNUSON (after having voted in the affirmative). I have a pair with the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS]. If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay"; if I were permitted to vote, I would vote "yea." I withdraw my vote.

The result was announced-yeas 16, nays 51, as follows:

Dworshak
Gillette
Gore
Green
Hendrickson

Aiken
Barrett
Beall
Bennett
Bricker
Bridges
Butler, Md.
Butler, Nebr.
Capehart
Carlson
Case

Clements
Cordon
Dirksen

Eastland
Ellender

Ferguson

Anderson Bush Byrd

Chavez