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1 In case of gold clause, principal to be calculated on dollar clause basis. Mar. 1, 1953.

Mr. WILEY. There is another table which shows the exact amount, in percentage form, with respect to what the other countries have done. That table is found on page 12. This table shows United States postwar aid, other than surplus property, to various European countries from 1945 to 1951. The amount with respect to Germany is $3,014,000,000. The relation of loans, in percentage of total aid, in the case of Germany is 33.2 percent. For Belgium-Luxembourg the percentage is 28.9 percent; for France 8.1 percent; for Italy 12 percent;

for the Netherlands 38 percent; and for
the United Kingdom 13.2 percent.

If the Senator from Iowa wants the
United States Government to insist that
it be paid back in full for its postwar
economic assistance to Germany, I as-
sume he would advocate also that we
seek full repayment for the assistance
we have given to France, to the United
Kingdom, and to Italy.

If, on the other hand, he simply wants to charge Germany in full for the postwar assistance we have given her, and make no collections from France and the

United Kingdom, I assume he is willing
to bear the responsibility for such ac-
tion. But as for myself, I do not believe
now is the time for us to take a Ver-
sailles Treaty
sailles Treaty type of approach to
Germany.

One sure way to weaken the resistance of Germany to the pressures from the Soviet Union would be to demand our pound of flesh, to make Germany pay in full and forget the consequences. One sure way to assure the defeat of democracy in Germany at the September elections would be to demand that Germany

repay this country in full for postwar assistance, whether she has the money or not. I point out that it was clearly established during the hearings that the total claims against Germany are absolutely beyond its capacity to pay. I am not in favor of demanding the impossible.

A second objection of the Senator from Iowa during his eloquent statement last Thursday relates to the point that these agreements provide for full payment of private prewar investors but write down our Government claim for postwar economic assistance to Germany. He read from the committee report which in all candor recognized that the writedown of postwar economic assistance makes it possible for private American creditors to collect upon their prewar debts. He did not, however, read in full the paragraph from which he quoted. On page 11 of the committee report, despite the fact that writing down the claim of the United States makes it possible to service prewar private loans, the report points out that the position of our representatives was that

buy foreign bonds under such circumstances?

Let us suppose for a moment that we accept the line of reasoning offered by accept the line of reasoning offered by the Senator from Iowa and let us suppose that we write down the private prewar debts of Germany by 50 percent. What would that mean? It would mean that of the estimated $546 million now owed by Germany to private holders of dollar bonds, we would be able to recoup for the United States Treasury about $260 million. I am not averse to having some money come into the United States Treasury, but I submit that if we write down these private debts by 50 percent we will make it impossible for Germany to get credit abroad within the foreseeable future. If that happens, as surely as I stand here, the United States Treasury will be pouring out additional economic assistance to Germany to keep her economically strong enough to remain

free.

Finally, there was one last objection to these agreements put with vigor by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE]. He asked time after time "Who holds these bonds which are covered by the agreement now before us?" He implies, but he does not assert, that they are held for the most part by large banking or financial interests in this country. He does not know who owns the bonds

Total claims against Germany were clearly beyond its capacity to pay; that the German Government should not be expected to repay a substantially larger proportion of its postwar debts to the United States than other European countries which had received American assistance and which, incidentally, continued to service their debts to private today, but he suspects that they are

American creditors; and that reduction in these postwar claims was in accordance with the procedures and standards of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended. Moreover, the executive branch noted that it would have been impossible to induce the German Government to approve any approach to settlement of prewar debts unless and until it knew the size of its postwar debt and was able to determine its capacity to make payments on both the prewar and postwar debt. The agreement relating to postwar economic assistance states the policy of the United States to adjust claims for postwar assistance to the Federal Republic so that they might be reduced and placed on a basis generally similar to that established for the other free nations of Europe. The committee report does not seek to hide any facts. It does its best within a limited space to set forth all of the relevant information that influenced the Committee on Foreign Relations in its decision to recommend approval of the pending agreements and the committee found these facts compelling.

If we are to take seriously the suggestion that prewar bonds issued by the German Government should be written down so that more of Germany's foreign exchange would be available to pay for postwar Government assistance, then it would be logical to propose that the French and British Governments default in their payments to American citizens who happen to be holding bonds issued in those countries. Thus, the French and British Governments could pay back a larger proportion of the assistance we have given them since the war.

Mr. President, this would be a strange argument. It would put this Senate of the United States in the position of using the economic power of this Government to destroy private credit. It would dry up private American overseas investment and substitute a Government monopoly on investment. What American would

owned by "bad" Americans instead of "good" Americans. He would, appar

ently, want us to delay the pending settlement until he has personally been able to examine all the holders of defaulted German bonds. It seems to me that if any American holds one of these bonds he ought to be paid.

I ask my colleagues to look carefully at the statement on page 13 of the committee report which shows the distribution of German dollar bonds in the United States as of 1943.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a factual question on that point?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Is it not true that the report of the Treasury Department from which the Senator quotes was made in 1943, upon the basis of only $78 million worth of bonds, or only about 6 percent of the total issue?

Mr. WILEY. There has been no trading in these bonds since 1941, when it was made illegal to trade in them. Again, there is merely the supposition that someone manipulated these bonds. I have some information here which will show that some of the citizens of Illinois held these bonds.

I ask my colleagues to look carefully at the statement on page 13 of the committee report, which shows the distribution of German dollar bonds in the United States as of 1943. I grant that the census at that time was not complete, but it does cover some 25,000 separate reports from holders of these bonds, including bonds with a par value of $83 million. It is not a complete record by any means, but it is a more representative cross sampling than those used by the Gallup polls. Permit me to read a paragraph from this report:

In 1943 the Treasury Department conducted a census of American-owned foreign

assets, including dollar bonds. This census was not complete, and only $83.4 million par value of German dollar bonds were reported. filed, averaging $3,700. There were, however, 25,409 separate reports Of these reports, 21,366 were submitted by individuals, for a total of $56.6 million; 2,575 by estates and trusts, for a total of $9 million; 1,457 by business concerns, for a total of $17.7 million; and 11 by nonprofit organizations, for a total of $45,000.

It is implied that somehow since these figures were prepared in 1943 that they are terribly out of date at this time. I invite attention to the fact that, however, according to the Securities and Exchange Commission, trading in these securities has been suspended since 1941. Moreover, I would like to insert in the RECORD at this point a paragraph from a letter of the former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission reading as follows:

On the outbreak of the war in December 1941, our national securities exchanges suspended dealings in all bonds of German and other Axis origin and this Commission, after consulting with the State and Treasury Departments, requested the cooperation of brokers and dealers in refraining from effecting transactions in these securities. The financial community has cooperated with us and there has, therefore, been no market for German dollar bonds in the United States since December 1941.

The list which I have has been taken from correspondence with the Securities and Exchange Commission from the year 1933 to April 16, 1952. It shows the name, city, and State of persons who have communicated with the Commission during that period with respect to these holdings of German bonds. The entire list was prepared by the SEC. It shows that the correspondence has been coming in from 1933 to April 1952. I cannot put all these letters into the RECORD. I can, however, supply a few names.

I read the names of John B. Menghin,
Chicago, Ill.; John Michel, Chicago, Ill;
Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago, Ill.
S. G. Havighorst, Chicago, Ill.; Harris

I could take a few sample letters. Mr. MCCARRAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. MCCARRAN. Would the Senator

from Wisconsin tell us the date of the record from which he read? What I should like to know is whether the bonds are being held by those parties at this time. Is there anything to indicate by whom they are held at the present time? Mr. WILEY. The list was made up on April 15, 1952. The correspondence was received from 1933 to April 15, 1952. A number of letters are dated in 1951 and 1952.

Mr. MCCARRAN. The order stopping trading did not end trading between private individuals, did it? In other words, if I held bonds in 1952, I could have sold them to the Senator from Wisconsin, John Smith, or Bill Jones, so long as the sale did not go through the exchange?

Mr. WILEY. That is correct. The fact is that holders have been writing in from 1949 to 1952. I have before me a letter from Milwaukee. It is dated March 10, 1953, and it reads:

Back in the early 1920's I bought quite a few German municipal bonds, which I am still holding. A few weeks back there was

an article in the local papers that an agreement had been signed where these bonds would be paid with interest. Would you kindly give any information you have on this and also how to go about redeeming the money I have invested.

That letter was written to the SEC.

I have a letter before me from Nebraska. I also have a letter from St. Louis. These were written in 1953. Another letter comes from Inglewood, Fla. Another one is dated March 30, 1953, and comes from San Angelo, Tex. Another one, dated May 9, 1953, comes from Lock Springs, Mo. Another one comes from New York City. It is dated July 1, 1953. Another letter is dated April 27, 1953. None of the letters seems to be from a bank. I have a letter from a lawyer in Newark, N. J., which reads:

This is to advise you that we represent Mrs. Mary T. Smith

And so forth. Mr. President, it seems to me that the opposition to the pending agreements has no reasonable alternative to offer. It has been suggested that the agreement be recommitted to the committee. If they are recommitIf they are recommitted, are we to become another investigating committee, to find if some of the holders of the bonds sold them to other

people, and to try to determine whether the sale was legal? As was brought out by the distinguished Senator from Nevada [Mr. MCCARRAN], people can deal in the bonds, even though trading in them is prohibited by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

I may say that I held a few South
Of course many of

'American bonds.
them have defaulted. I remember that
I sold them and I realized about 10 per-
cent of their value, or something like
that. I did sell the bonds. I thought it
best to take my loss and get it over with.
I have no doubt that some of the
original holders of the German bonds
sold them. I held two German munici-
pal bonds. Something told me to sell
the bonds, and I did, fortunately with-
out sustaining a loss.

It is not our job to determine those questions. We evaluate the question of whether we shall approve the treaties, 'which have been negotiated by a Democratic administration and which were entered into with the German Republic and other nations. These treaties have already been agreed to by other nations. No one has suggested that any fraud has been committed. There is some suspicion that some holders who bought the bonds will get 100 cents on the dollar, whereas they bought them for less than 100 cents on the dollar. Is that any reason why we should refuse to ratify the agreement?

Mr. President, the Senator from Iowa seems willing to throw the present agreements out of the window and then see what will happen. He seems to have scant regard for the effect that such action would have upon Germany, upon bondholders in this country including not only banks, but estates and private holders, and upon the 18 other parties to the agreement.

Those who oppose the pending agree ments seem to lack confidence in the Government officials who negotiated

them in 1952; they seem to lack confidence in the representatives of American bondholders who attended the conference in London in 1952; they seem to lack confidence in the present Secretary of State who recommended to the President that the agreements be approved; they seem to lack confidence in the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has recommended the approval of the agreements; they seem to lack confidence in ments; they seem to lack confidence in the Secretary of the Treasury, who urges their approval.

Yet it is a fact, Mr. President, that no one appeared before the committee in opposition to the agreements as a whole. Every opportunity was given to anyone who might wish to testify against them. If they are so bad, why have not the American people spoken? So far I have not heard a whisper except from the floor

of the Senate.

In view of the very critical world situation and the vital role of Western Germany in maintaining stability and peace, this is one place where we cannot afford to be pennywise and pound foolish. We must not lose sight of the great forest because we happen to be intrigued by a few relatively unimportant trees.

Mr. President, as I pointed out the other day, the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate have consistently underlined the significance of Western Germany in the development of the collective defense of the free world. We want to see a strong, healthy, democratic Germany. We ought to proceed without further delay to approve the agreements before us.

Mr. President, will the

Mr. LONG.
Senator yield?
Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Are we to understand that in the agreement the United States Government gives up its right to repayment of approximately two-thirds of the value of the money owed the United States Government?

Mr. WILEY. As I stated previously, the money is on the books of our Government as money we paid for the purpose of resuscitating Germany, including the maintenance of armed forces, and so forth, and was carried on the books not as a loan, but as money expended by us. We have liquidated that claim on the basis of a 333-percent return.

Mr. LONG. Was there not evidence available to the committee to the effect that the German economy is thriving and that Germany is perhaps in better shape than almost any other nation in the world, with the exception of the United States and Canada? Has there not been an amazing recovery in Germany and is not Germany in good financial condition?

Mr. WILEY. I will agree that the German people have gone to work and have done a tremendous job. I myself witnessed its results. However, it must also be stated that the people who negotiated the treaties, the new administration which checked over the questions with the other governments and with the parties interested in the various series of bonds, have all come to the conclusion that for the benefit of all concerned, including the German Government, it

is better to go ahead with the treaties. Perhaps the Senator from Louisiana did not hear me say it, but if he will look at the report he will find that we are getting more money back from Germany than we have received from any other nation to whom we have made loans.

Mr. LONG. Of course that is to the credit of Germany. However, if Germany had ever made a loan to the United States I am sure she would have received a great deal more back than we are getting back from Germany.

Mr. WILEY. I will ask the Senator, "What is the alternative? What do you want to do?"

Mr. LONG. I will ask the Senator whether it might not be wise to wait and see if Germany will relieve us of the expense of protecting and defending her, and if she will be willing to participate in her own defense, before we relieve her of the obligation, at a time when it is still our armed services that are defend

ing and protecting Germany and preventing her from having to bear the burden of defending herself.

Mr. WILEY. I have before me a letter which comes from Mr. Thruston B. Mor

ton, Assistant Secretary of State, from which I quote the following paragraphs:

Failure to ratify the agreements at this time for this reason would have extremely unfortunate results. It will take several

years before the validation of bonds has been debt agreements to await validation of the bonds would be regarded in Germany and elsewhere as tantamount to rejection of the

completed. Postponement of action on the

agreements by the United States.

There is apparently a suspicion that the benefits under the agreements might accrue in some degree to speculators who acquire German bonds at reduced prices from the original holders. This problem, if indeed such a problem exists, is a wholly domestic one, and can be resolved, not by negotiation with other governments but under our doThe other governments that mestic law. are parties to the agreement would be injured if Germany is prevented from settling its obligations with them because this Government has held up to the agreements to inquire into possible speculation that might have taken place in this country.

He goes on to say:

This action would be particularly unfortunate as regards our relations with the German Federal Government. The German Government has taken the action necessary to correct the condition of default in which it is now situated and to reestablish its credit position so that it can return to normal commercial relations with its trading partners. Failure on the part of this Government to approve the agreements will place the German Government in an extremely awkward position.

The immediate result would be that the holders of German bonds would not collect sums of money which the German Government is now willing to pay or permit to be paid. An uncertainty would thus be created which would afford opportunities for speculation which would be highly disadvantageous to bondholders who have retained the bonds up to the present time.

The Department believes that prompt ratification of the agreements is desirable in the interest of our foreign relations and for the protection of American investors. There has been no evidence that speculation in German securities on a serious scale has as yet occurred. If such evidence should

later be disclosed, remedial legislation of an gations on the basis of nondiscrimination gations on the basis of nondiscrimination representatives of 17 other governappropriate character can be adopted. would be seriously impaired.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter be printed in the RECORD at this point, as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, July 13, 1953.

The Honorable ALEXANDER WILEY,

Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR WILEY: In the course of the debate on the German debt agreements, as reported in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for July 9, 1953, the suggestion was made (at p. 8637) that action on the agreements should be deferred until validation of German bonds under the agreement of February 27, 1953, has been carried out. The purpose of this delay would be to ascertain the ownership of the bonds now outstanding, and to determine whether sizable blocks of such bonds have been gathered into the hands of speculators.

Failure to ratify the agreements at this time for this reason would have extremely unfortunate results. It will take several years before the validation of bonds has been completed. Postponement of action on the debt agreements to await validation of the bonds would be regarded in Germany and elsewhere as tantamount to rejection of the agreements by the United States.

Negotiations looking toward the settlement of the German external debt began in the summer of 1951. In the intervening 2 years, representatives of all of the principal creditor countries have met with their German debtors to work out a settlement which is equitable to all concerned and has a reasonable prospect of fulfillment. The settlement cannot enter into effect without the approval of this Government. It has not been suggested that this Government withhold its consent because the German offer is inadequate or because the terms are inequitable to our interests as compared to those of other countries.

There is apparently a suspicion that the benefits under the agreement might accrue in some degree to speculators who acquire German bonds at reduced prices from the original holders. This problem, if indeed such a problem exists, is a wholly domestic one, and can be resolved, not by negotiation with other governments but under our domestic law. The other governments that are parties to the agreement would be injured if Germany is prevented from settling its obligations with them because this Government has held up the agreements to inquire into possible speculation that might have taken place in this country.

This action would be particularly unfortunate as regards our relations with the German Federal Government.

The German Government has taken the action necessary to correct the condition of defaut in which it is now situated and to reestablish its credit position so that it can return to normal commerical relations with its trading partners. Failure on the part of this Government to approved the agreements will place the German Government in an extremely awkward position.

It is difficult to see how it will be possible to prevent a serious deterioration of the position, particularly from the point of view of American interests, if action on the agreements by this Government is indefinitely postponed. There will be a constant pressure on the part of debtors and creditors to work out settlements, either within the framework of the arrangements now before the Senate, or possibly outside the framework. The prospects for working out an orderly settlement of German external obli

Delay in ratification of the agreements would militate against the interests of bondholders, and would defeat the very purpose it was intended to serve. The immediate result would be that the holders of German bonds would not collect sums of money which the German Government is now willing to pay or permit to be paid. An uncertainty

would thus be created which would afford opportunities for speculation which would be highly disadvantageous to bondholders who have retained the bonds up to the present time.

If provision is not made for prompt payment on the bonds, the chief incentive for accomplishing validation on the part of the bondholders would be removed. The process of validation would be retarded and disrupted. The initial stages of the validation operation would not disclose the type of information desired, and the risk that looted Soviet held bonds might be introduced into circulation in this country would be greatly increased.

The Department believes that prompt ratification of the agreements is desirable in the interest of our foreign relations and for the protection of American investors. There has been no evidence that speculation in German securities on a serious scale has as yet occurred. If such evidence should later be disclosed, remedial legislation of an appropriate character can be adopted. Postponement of action on the agreements now, however, would serve unjustly to penalize innocent creditors, and would throw into confusion the entire problem of the German external debt.

Sincerely yours,

THRUSTON B. MORTON,
Assistant Secretary.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield to me? Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Is not the Government of the United States also in an embarrassing position? Our Government has a debt of $267 billion. We are told that Germany owes us approximately $3 billion of obligations honestly incurred. The United States Government has not required reparations from the German government. Some day we hope to pay off our own debt, do we not?

Mr. WILEY. Certainly. However, if we go through with the agreement, we shall get back $1 billion which otherwise we shall not have. At the present time all that we have is an unliquidated debt, which is not collectible.

To refuse at this time to ratify the agreement would be tantamount to kicking Germany in the teeth.

Mr. LONG. Was it not understood that we would have priority in connection with such collections from Germany?

Mr. WILEY. I am informed by a member of the committee staff that we have priority to collect as much as we can.

Under several administrations it has been agreed that a settlement of approximately 37 percent was a fairly a fairly good one, in view of the existing conditions.

Mr. LONG. We shall not have agreed until we finally ratify the proposal; is not that true?

Mr. WILEY. Of course. I meant to say that the executive branch of the Government has negotiated with other governments-in one instance, with instance, with

ments; and Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and other countries have agreed.

Mr. MCCARRAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield to me? Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. MCCARRAN. From the explanation made by the Senator from Wisconsin it seems to me that the matter resolves itself into the following: It is proposed that we reduce the obligation of Germany to the United States, in order to provide that United States investors may be paid in full. Is not that really the kernel of the nut?

Mr. WILEY. I believe that is correct, with the addition that the prior indebtedness-much of which is individual indebtedness-was incurred in the 1920's and 1930's, before we entered the Second World War. At the end of that war, Germany was more or less out of business, and we occupied a part of that country. So far as I know, we spent the $3,200,000,000 in conjunction with the efforts of Germany to revitalize her economy.

In view of the entire situation, including the indebtedness which was incurred by Germany in the 1920's-and of course we had nothing to do with that matterunder the Dawes loan and the Young loan, and including the corporate bond indcbtedness, standstill debts, and miscellaneous and commercial debts, the negotiators for the various countries which were represented arrived at this settlement, the purpose of which was to permit Germany to reenter the markets of the world, to borrow money, and really to begin to revive herself economically and commercially, so that she could again be an active member of the family of nations.

In view of the fact that the executive branch of our Government under two administrations has definitely stated that we should proceed to ratify the agreement, I believe we should at least recognize that the executive branch of our Government, in negotiating the agreement, first under a Democratic administration, and subsequently under a Republican administration, has developed prima facie evidence to the effect that there is no "Ethiopian in the woodpile" in this case, and that it is to the advantage of all that the agreement be consummated.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. President, I understand the Senator from Wisconsin to say that "We"-meaning the United States, I assume went into Germany and spent this money, in the amount of $3,200,000,000. Is that so?

Mr. WILEY. Yes.

Mr. MURRAY. I think the Senator from Wisconsin is mistaken. We advanced the money to the German Government, and it is an obligation on the part of the Government of Germany to the United States, and is recorded on paper. We did not spend the money because of a charitable motive to help rebuild the German economy. We advanced Germany the money to help restore its industry. Today Germany is one of the prosperous countries of the world, and is able to pay this debt.

Mr. WILEY. Of course, we advanced We the money to other nations, too. were not making those advances in the nature of loans.

Section 111 (c) (1) of the ECA Act of 1948 reads as follows:

In determining whether such assistance shall be through grants or upon terms of payment, and in determining the terms of payment, he shall be in consultation with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, and the determination of whether or not a participating country shall be required to make payment for any assistance furnished to such country in furtherance of the purposes of this title, and the terms of such payment, if required, shall depend upon the character and purpose of the assistance and upon whether there is a reasonable assurance of repayment, considering the capacity of such country to make such payments without jeopardizing the accomplishment of the purposes of this title.

That provision simply means that it has now been agreed that the money which was advanced-whether in the nature of a grant or whether in the nature of occupation expenses or whether in the nature of assistance-constitutes a debt which, under the proposed agree

percentage, namely, 37 percent, which I repeat is better than the settlement proposed in any other agreement or payment, in the case of any other nation to which we have loaned money.

Mr. WILEY. Just a moment. It is a reflection upon the committee when the Senator refers to giving the committee an opportunity to investigate the matter as it should be investigated. It is not the function of the Committtee on Foreign Relations to conduct inquiries from place to place throughout the country in order to ascertain the ownership of the bonds. We have, as a result of the questioning of witnesses, obtained a part of the information. But if the matter is to be investigated in the manner the Senator has described it, it would be necessary to appoint a special committee to conduct the investigation with respect to the present ownership of the bonds and the extent of the holdings.

The Senator wants information on a subject about which I am unable to inform him. I repeat, it has not been within the scope of the work of the Foreign Relations Committee to go deeply into that field.

The situation involves the question whether we are to accept a treaty which was negotiated by a Democratic administration and subsequently approved by a Republican administration.

Mr. MURRAY. I think the Senator ment, shall be liquidated at the proposed from Wisconsin is in error in saying that agreement was negotiated by a Democratic administration. I have observed nothing in the record to indicate anything of the kind. The Senator has called attention to no evidence to support his statement that the settlement was negotiated by a Democratic administration. We do not know who the negotiators were. The Senator from Wisconsin has not presented the name of a single person who participated in the negotiations. We do not know who are members of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc.

Mr. MURRAY. It seems to me that answer is irrelevant. It makes no difference what other countries have done. In this case we are talking about Germany.

I believe it is acknowledged-it is conceded in the record-that this is an obligation owed by the German Government, and recorded on paper. So it cannot be questioned.

It appears to me that whoever negotiated this arrangement or proposed agreement seems to have been influenced by the notion that it would help the bondholders. Who are the bondholders who will be helped? No one knows. There is no record of them, and today no one can say who owns these bonds.

I knew some persons in Montana who bought German bonds during that period; but today they are dead and buried, and no one can tell where the bonds they once owned are now. Perhaps they may have been considered worthless, and may have been destroyed.

So it seems to me there should be a more accurate understanding of what this proposed settlement means and who will be benefited by it. We should ascertain who negotiated it, who the persons were who represented the United States, and who came to the conclusion that we should scale down the debts of a country that is able to pay, and to scale them down to the extent of $2 billion, when this country is in great need of money, and when it is saddled with a tremendous national debt which it will take years and years to pay off.

Mr. WILEY. Again I ask the Senator, what would he do?

Mr. MURRAY. I would send the agreement back to the committee for further study, in order to give the committee an opportunity to investigate the matter as it should be investigated.

Mr. WILEY. The Senator will find the hearings available. If he will examine them, he will find that the information which he seeks is specifically set forth. The agreement was negotiated in 1952, and was signed in 1953. It was therefore tration. If the Senator would like to negotiated by the Democratic adminisIf the Senator would like to know who some of the persons were who participated in the London conference participated in the London conference on German external debts on behalf of the United States creditors, he will find a list of them on page 87 of the hearings conducted on June 17 and 18, 1953. First on the list is Ambassador Warren Lee Pierson, United States member of Tripartite Commission on German Debts. Minister J. W. Gunter was an alternate. Mr. W. Breswick was financial assistant. Mr. J. Cattier, Mr. P. Dickens, and Mr. R. Eisenberg, were advisers-Mr. Eisenberg having been the financial adviser.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this

point in my remarks the list of United States members of the Tripartite Commission.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMERICAN MEMBERS ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE ON GERMAN DEBTS, LONDON, FEBRUARY-AUGUST 1952

Ambassador Warren Lee Pierson, United States member of the Tripartite Commission on German Debts.

Minister J. W. Gunter, alternate.

Mr. W. Breswick, financial assistant.
Mr. J. Cattier, adviser.
Mr. P. Dickens, adviser.

Mr. R. Eisenberg, financial adviser.
Miss J. Jerolaman, administrative officer.
Mr. R. Kearney, general counsel.
Mrs. A. Madden, financial assistant.
Mr. J. Reinstein, adviser.

Mr. R. D. Scott, financial adviser.
Mr. R. Shaw, assistant to Ambassador
Pierson.

Mr. S. Sherman, legal assistant.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. MURRAY. Who are the persons whose names the Senator has mentioned? Were they representatives of the administration in power at the time?

Mr. WILEY. I may ask the Senator from Montana, Who was in power in 1952? Has the Senator forgotten?

Mr. MURRAY. That is no answer. Mr. LONG and Mr. MALONE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Wisconsin yield: and if so, to whom?

Mr. WILEY. I will yield in a moment. If the Senator from Montana wishes to know the names of the unofficial representatives, I shall be glad to put them in

the RECORD. I have before me a list of persons who participated in the London Conference on German External Debts on behalf of United States creditors. First on the list is Hon. James Grafton Rogers.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a list of the members of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1. FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS PROTECTIVE COUNCIL Hon. James Grafton Rogers, president, Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Georgetown, Colo.

Hon. Harvey H. Bundy, member of the board of directors, Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, 30 State Street, Boston, Mass.

Mr. Kenneth M. Spang, vice president, Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, 90 Broad Street, New York City.

Mr. Dudley B. Bonsal, counsel, Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, partner of the law firm of Curtis, Mallet-Prévost, Colt & Mosle, 63 Wall Street, New York City.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, there will also be found on page 86 of the hearings the names of the persons who made up the United States Committee for Gerlist of members of the American Comman Corporate Dollar Bonds, and also a mittee for Standstill Creditors of Germany. I ask unanimous consent that these two lists may be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as There being no objection, the lists were

follows:

2. UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR GERMAN CORPORATE DOLLAR BONDS

Mr. Herbert F. Boynton, former chairman, National Association of Security Dealers, South Duxbury, Mass.

Mr. Ganson Purcell, member of the law firm of Purcell & Nelson, former Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D. C.

Mr. Ladd Thurston, associate in the law firm of Purcell & Nelson, 910 17th Street NW., Washington, D. C.

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