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Cases of the Week.

BANKRUPTCY-SECURED CREDITOR-JUDGMENT — RECEIVER — EQUITABLE EXECUTION - ELEGIT — BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 12, 16-27 & 28 VICT. c. 112, s. 1-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 25, SUB-SECTION 8.-On the 20th inst. the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and THESIGer, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of the Chief Judge in Ex parte Evans (27 W. R. 712, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 691). The question was whether, by the appointment of a receiver in an action in the Chancery Division, at the instance of a judgment creditor, before the commencement of the liquidation of the judgment debtor, the creditor had obtained " equitable execution" of land in which the debtor had only an equitable interest, so as to make the judgment creditor a secured creditor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, although the creditor had not, before commencing his action, issued a writ of elegit. The material facts were as follows:-On the 15th of May the creditor recovered judgment against the debtor for £80 and costs. On the 7th of August, the judgment bring unsatisfied, the creditor commenced an action in the Chancery Division against the debtor for an account of what was due on the judgment and payment, or for a sale of certain real estate of the debtor which was subject to a mortgage, and payment out of the proceeds, and for the appointment of a receiver of the rents and profits of the property and an injunction. The plaintiff had not issued a writ of elegit. On the same day he applied ex parte for the appointment of a receiver, upon an affidavit that the defendant was not, to his knowledge, entitled to any other lands or hereditaments, or any other property against which any writ of elegit, fieri facias, or other process of execution might be issued for the purpose of obtaining payment of the judgment debt, and an order was made appointing an interim receiver, without security, to receive the rents and profits of the mortgaged property until after the 14th of August, but the receiver was "not in the meantime to take possession" of the property. On the 14th of August an order was made in the action, upon notice, appointing the same person, upon his giving security, receiver of the rents and profits of the property, and directing that the tenants should attorn and pay their rents to him. The same day the debtor filed a liquidation petition, and a receiver was appointed. It did not appear whether the order absolute for the appointment of the receiver in the action was made before or after the appointment of the receiver under the petition. The receiver in the action never gave security. Under these circumstances the Chief Judge held that the appointment of the receiver operated as a delivery in execution by "other lawful authority of the land, within the meaning of section 1 of the Act 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, giving the creditor a charge or lien on the land, and making him a secured creditor at the commencement of the liquidation. In support of the appeal it was urged that, assuming that the appointment of a receiver could, under any circumstances, amount to an "equitable execution," where an elegit had not been previously issued, a mere interim appointment could not have that effect, and the absolute appointment, being an appointment upon the receiver's giving security, could not amount to an "equitable execution until the security had been given. On this point the case of Edwards v. Edwards (24 W. R. 713, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 291) was cited, in which it was held that, when a receiver of chattels had been appointed upon his giving security, an execution creditor who seized the chattels, before the receiver had given the security, had not been guilty of a contempt of court. This, it was said, showed that the appointment of the receiver had no operation at all until it was completed by the giving of the security. It was further urged that it was the settled practice of the Court of Chancery not to interfere in favour of a judgment creditor, even though the judgment debtor had no interest in land but an equitable one which an elegit could not affect, until the creditor had done all that he could to enforce his judgment at law by issuing an elegit, and it was said that the Judicacature Act has made no difference in this respect. In the recent cases of Hatton v. Haywood (22 W. R. 356, L. R. 9 Ch. 229) and The Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies (27 W. R. 3, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 275), in the latter of which it was held that the appointment of a receiver on an interlocutory motion amounted to an equitable execution of land, an elegit had been issued. The court held that the case was really con

cluded by Hatton v. Haywood and The Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies. JAMES, L.J., said that those cases had decided that the appointment of a receiver, which gave the creditor, through the receiver, the right to the possession of the land, was as much a delivery of the land in execution in the case of an equitable interest as was the return of the sheriff to the writ of elegit in the case of a legal interest. The sheriff never took actual possession of the land; the return to the writ was a mere verbal delivery in execution. In the present case there were in existence two orders for the appointment of a receiver-the interim order which covered the day on which the liquidation petition was filed; and the absolute order which, though it could not be considered as perfected till the security had been given, was, nevertheless, intended by the court as that equitable execution which the creditor had come to the court to obtain. The creditor had done all he could to obtain the equitable execution. THESIGER, L.J., said that, although the giving of security by the receiver was part of the order, it was not one of the elements necessary to make the order equivalent to a delivery in execution, but, as soon as the order was made, it bound the land, and, if the receiver afterwards perfected the order by giving the security, his appointment would relate back to the date of the order. And their lordships all agreed that the issue of a writ of elegit in the case of an equitable interest is a mere idle form, and one which is unnecessary since the Judicature Act.

ACT OF BANKRUPTCY-BILL OF SALE-ASSIGNMENT OF WHOLE PROPERTY TO SECURE ANTECEDENT DEBT-PRIOR AGREEMENT TO GIVE BILL OF SALE "IF REQUIRED"-ONUS PROBANDI. In a case of Ex parte Kilner, before the Court of Appeal on the 20th inst., the question was whether an assignment of the whole of a trader's property to secure a loan made to him ten months previously, the assignment being executed about three weeks before he filed a liquidation petition, he being at the time of its execution practically insolvent, could be supported by an agreement, entered into when the loan was made, to give a bill of sale "if required" by the lender. The Chief Judge had held the bill of sale valid against the trustee in the liquidation. In support of the appeal reliance was placed on Ex parte Fisher (20 W. R. 849, L. R. 7 Ch. 636). On behalf of the bill of sale holder it was urged that Ex parte Fisher is not a decision that an agreement to give a bill of sale "if or when required" by a creditor is necessarily a fraudulent one, and one that cannot support a bill of sale of all the debtor's property subsequently given to secure the debt. Such a construction of the decision in Ex parte Fisher would, it was said, be contrary, not only to a series of pricr anthorities, such as Mercer v. Peterson (15 W. R. 1179, 16 W. R. 486, L. R. 2 Ex. 304, 3 Ex. 104) and Harris v. Rickett (4 H. & N. 1), which the Court of Appeal recognized in Ex parte Fisher, but would be inconsistent with later decisions of the same court, such as Ex parte Izard (22 W. R. 342, L. R. 9 Ch. 271), and Ex parte King (24 W. R. 559, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 256). BAGGALLAY, L.J., said that the principle laid down in Ex parte Fisher was that, "where the giving of the bill of sale is purposely postponed until the trader is in a state of insolvency, in order to prevent the destruction of his credit, which would result from registering a bill of sale, such a postponement is evidence of an intention to commit an actual fraud against the general creditors," and it was clear from the way in which that principle was enunciated by Mellish, L.J., that it was for the court in each case to take into consideration all the surrounding circumstances, and judge whether there was an actual intention to commit a fraud on the general creditors. Ex parte Izard and Ex parte King were decided on their special circumstances, and in neither of them was there any expression of dissent from the principle laid down in Ex parte Fisher. On the evidence in the present case his lordship came to the conclusion that it was intended that the giving of the bill of sale should be postponed until the debtor should be in difficulties, and it should be necessary for the creditor's protection that it should be given. The case was therefore entirely covered by Ex parte Fisher, and the bill of sale was void as against the trustee in the liquidation. THESIGER, L.J., said that the principles of Mercer v. Peterson, and similar cases, were undoubtedly binding on the court; but those principles must be applied with very great caution, for otherwise they

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would open the door to great frauds. The court must require very clear evidence that the agreement set up to validate the bill of sale was a bond fide agreement, that it was not, to use the language of Mellish, L.J., in Ex parte Fisher, an agreement that the giving of the bill of sale should be delayed until the debtor should be in difficulties, with the view of avoiding the injury to his credit which would result from the registration of a bill of sale. parte Fisher supplied a very wholesome correction to Mercer v. Peterson and that class of cases. The court ought to require a very clear explanation of the reason why the execution of such a bill of sale had been delayed. In the present case no explanation whatever had been given of the delay, and his lordship inferred that the intention of the parties at the date of the agreement was that no bill of sale should be given until the debtor should be in insolvent circumstances. JAMES, L.J., added that in such cases the onus probandi was always on the person who set up the prior agreement to validate the bill of sale, to show, not only that there was such an agreement, but that it was a bona fide agreement.

FOR

COMPANY-VOLUNTARY WINDING UP-AGREEMENT SALE OF BUSINESS AND ASSETS TO ANOTHER COMPANYVALIDITY AS AGAINST CREDITORS-COMPANIES ACT, 1862, s. 161.-In a case of In re The City and County Investment Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 19th inst., the important question was raised how far an agreement under Section 161 of the Companies Act, 1862, entered into by a company about to be wound up voluntarily, for the sale of its business and property to another company, is binding upon the creditors of the transferor company. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and BAGGALLAY, L.JJ.) held that such an agreement was valid as against the creditors of the transferor company, no application having been made to the court for a winding-up order within a year from the passing of the special resolution approving of the agreement. Section 161 contains the following provision :-" If an order be made within a year for winding up the company by or subject to the supervision of the court, such resolution shall not be of any validity, unless it is sanctioned by the court." JESSEL, M. R., said that if the agreement was an actually fraudulent one, the case could be easily dealt with at law or in equity, and if it amounted to a fraudulent preference, section 164 would provide a remedy. If a mistake had been made, and the parties honestly, though erroneously, supposed that they had provided funds for the payment of the company's debts, then the remedy was to be found in the above-mentioned provision of section 161. If a creditor could not obtain payment of his debt he could apply within a year to the court for a winding-up order, and the court would not sanction the arrangement if it interfered with the payment of the creditors. This view of section 161 was consistent with the general scheme of the Act. Shareholders might transfer their shares to a pauper, and, by virtue of section 38, they would not be liable to the creditors of the company after the expiration of a year, and the above provision of section 161 placed shareholders who accepted shares in the transferee company in the same position as shareholders who transferred their shares in the ordinary way. The agreement was binding on all the shareholders by virtue of section 161, and it became binding on the creditors by lapse of the time mentioned in that section.

PRACTICE-WRIT OF NE EXEAT-LEGAL DEBT-DEBTORS ACT, 1869, s. 6.—In a case of Drover v. Beyer, an application was, on the 15th inst., made to the Court of Appeal for a writ of ne exeat, the application having been previously refused by Jessel, M.R. (ante, p. 66). The action was brought upon a mortgagee's covenant to pay the mortgage debt, the mortgage being of a foreign ship, and some policies of insurance upon her granted by some foreign insurance companies. The defendant was a foreigner resident abroad, having property abroad, but having no property in England. He happened to be temporarily in England, but had stated his intention of leaving almost immediately. The court (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) refused the application. JAMES, L.J., said that a writ of ne exeat was granted by the old Court of Chancery only in the case 0

an equitable debt. The writ was a species of mesne process, analogous to the power of arrest under mesne process at common law in the case of a legal debt. Before the Judicature Act, a writ of ne exeat could not have been granted in such a case as the present, and the Judicature Act had made no difference. It was then urged on behalf of the applicant that an order of arrest might be made under the exception contained in section 6 of the Debtors Act, 1869, on the ground that the defendant's absence from England would “"materially prejudice the plaintiff in the prosecution of his action," inasmuch as the plaintiff would be entitled to obtain discovery from the defendant in relation to the foreign insurances. Section 6, it was said, could have no meaning if it did not refer to something of this kind, for otherwise the absence of a defendant abroad would be an advantage to a plaintiff, as it would enable him to obtain judgment by default. The court, however, held that section 6 did not apply. JAMES, L.J., said that the discovery suggested would not be a step in the prosecution of the action. And THESIGER, L.J., said that the argument must go to this extent, that whenever a defendant to an action was a foreigner without property in this country, but having property abroad, he could be arrested if he was in this country and was about to leave it.

PRACTICE-UNAUTHORIZED USER OF NAME AS PLAINTIFF -COSTS-MOTION TO DISMISS-LIABILITY OF SOLICITORFORM OF ORDER.-In the case of Nurse v. Durnjord, before the Master of the Rolls on the 21st inst., motions were made by the defendants to dismiss for want of prosecution. The action was one by country solicitors for an account against their London agents, and it appeared that one of the plaintiffs, James Nurse, had instructed his then London agents, Messrs. Eyre & Co., to commence the action, making himself and also the two co-executors (James Walker and Ann Nurse) of a deceased son, formerly a partner with him, plaintiffs. James Nurse and Ann Nurse were both dead, and their estates were believed to be insolvent. On the motion to dismiss being served on James Walker, he served a counter-notice on the defendants, asking that his name might be struck out as plaintiff, as having been inserted without his authority. On the 14th inst., when the motion was mentioned, the Master of the Rolls directed that the notice of motion should be amended by asking that the solicitors should pay the costs occasioned by improperly joining James Walker. The solicitors were served with notice of motion, and all three motions came on to be heard together. The form of order suggested by the defendants was that originally adopted in Dundos v. Dutems (1 Ves. jun. 200), and since followed in numerous cases under the old chancery practice-namely, of directing the costs to be paid by the plaintiff, in the first instance, leaving him to obtain indemnity from the solicitors. JESSEL, M. R., said he could not agree with the principle on which the rule had been established, that, if an agent professed to act without authority on behalf of his principal, the rule was to make him liable to the persons deceived, and also to his assumed principal for any damage sustained by him. The common law rule had always followed the principles of the agency cases, and the courts had made the solicitor liable in the first instance. He thought the common law rule more correct in principle, and he said he should follow it in preference to that in use in equity. He should make one order in all three motions, staying all further proceedings in the action, and directing the solicitors, Messrs. Eyre & Co., to pay the plaintiff Walker's costs as between solicitor and client, and the defendants' costs as between party and party. He also intimated that the solicitors would have a right to prove against the estate of the plaintiff James Nurse, who had caused the misjoinder, for all the costs they would have to pay.

PRACTICE-LEAVE TO SIGN JUDGMENT UNDER ORD. 14, R. 3-AFFIDAVIT IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ANSWER. -In a case of Grugin v. Grepe, before the Master of the Rolls on the 22nd inst., a question arose whether a plaintiff on an application to sign judgment under ord. 14, r. 3, could file and use an affidavit in reply to the case made by the defendant in his affidavit for leave to defend. It appears that there have been conflicting decisions in the common law divisions on the point. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that there would be no difficulty in allow ing

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such a practice. What the judge had to do was to determine whether the defendant could make out a prima facie case showing a defence, and there was no more difficulty in doing this by having the affidavit in reply than without such an affidavit. The equity courts were quite familiar with the practice of determining whether a prima facie case was made on affidavits, as they had to decide this very question on every application for an interlocutory injunction. As there were conflicting decisions on the point, he was not bound by either. He considered that under the words of the order the practice might be adopted, and, in his opinion the right course was to allow the affidavit in reply to be read.

CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LEASE-UNDERLEASE-MISENFORCING CONTRACT. In a case of DESCRIPTION Camberwell Building Society v. Holloway, before the Master of the Rolls on the 20th inst., a question arose whether the court would enforce the sale of a leasehold property under the following circumstances:-In the particulars of sale it was described as a "leasehold residence," held at a low ground rent. The next house was stated to be" underleased at an apportioned rent." By the conditions of sale the vendors were to deliver an abstract commencing with an indenture of lease, under which the lot was held, and the lease was to be produced at the time of sale, and the purchaser was to be taken to have notice of all indentures therein contained. An abstract of tile was delivered commencing with the lease, which on its face purported to be an underlease, and on this the purchaser ultimately declined to complete. JESSEL, M.R., after commenting unfavourably on the decisions in Madeley v. Borth (2 De G. and Sm. 718) and Darlington v. Hamilton (Kay, 550), came to the conclusion that in the present case there was no misdescription, that there was nothing to show that an underlease was not intended to be sold, and, moreover, that the purchaser was put upon ample notice that the property he was buying was in fact held under an underlease. He therefore gave judgment for specific performance, with costs.

RECTIFICATION OF SETTLEMENT-MISTAKE

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In an action of Edwards v. Bingham, heard on the 21st inst., before Malins, V.C., his lordship rectified a settlement made on the marriage of Mrs. Edwards to her late husband, upon her unsupported evidence, under the following circumstances:-She swore that she had not intended, and had not instructed her solicitor to prepare, the settlement, which comprised her property only, in such a way as to limit her power of disposing of any of her property in the event of her surviving her husband. The settlement, how. ever, gave her a power of appointment by deed as to a sum of £600, and, subject thereto, and to her life interest in the property, a power of appointment by will only over the whole of her property; and, in default of appointment, there was a trust for the benefit of her children by any marriage, and, subject to the preceding trusts, there were trusts, in the event of her husband surviving her, for his benefit, and for the benefit of a stranger, and in the event of her surviving her husband for the benefit of her next of kin. husband pre-deceased her, and there were no children of the marriage, and she had not married again. MALINS, V.C., was of opinion that the settlement ought to be rectified, having regard to the events which had happened, by giving Mrs. Edwards a power of appointment by deed over the whole property.

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PRACTICE-DEFENDANT IN PERSON.-In an action of Cusel v. Bashford, brought to trial before Malins, V.C., on the 25th inst., while the plaintiff's case was being opened, the defendant repudiated in person both the solicitors appearing on the record for him and the counsel instructed by them. MALINS, V.C., said that, under the circumstances, he could only hear the defendant in person, and that in so doing he was following a precedent laid down by Knight Bruce, L.J., who himself had followed Lord Eldon. He, however, allowed the action to stand over for a week for the parties to consider their position.

CO-PLAIN

SPECIAL EXAMINER EXAMINATION OF TIFFS RESIDENT ABROAD-ORD. 37, RR. 1, 4.-Ia a case of The Banque Franco-Egyptienne v. Lutscher, before FRY, J., on the 24th inst., the action was brought by a foreign corporation, and four foreigners resident abroad as co-plaintiffs. The bank sued in respect of a very large debt; the co-plaintiffs sued in respect of a very much smaller debt arising out of the same transactions. The co-plaintiffs were joined as plaintiffs, instead of being made defendants, because it was feared that if they were made defendants they would become hostile to the bank. The bank desired to have the evidence of the co-plaintiffs in support of their case, but the co-plaintiffs refused to come to England to be examined. Under these circumstances the bank moved for the appointment of a special examiner to take the evidence of the co-plaintiffs abroad. FRY, J., made the order, appointing a special to take the evidence of the four co-plaintiffs (naming them), and providing that this was not to delay the trial. The costs to be costs in the action.

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COSTS DISCRETION COURT- UNNECESSARY ACTION TO EXECUTE TRUSTS OF SETTLEMENT.-In a case of Fane v. Fane, before Fry, J., on the 25th inst., the action was brought by one of two tenants for life under a settlement of a money fund to have the trusts of the settlement carried into execution by the court. There were originally two trustees, one of them died, and the defendants to the action were the surviving trustee and the other tenant for life. The alleged that the surviving trustee was permanently resident abroad, and that he ought to be removed from bis office, and that two new trustees ought to be appointed, and he asked that this might be done. The settlement contained a power of appointment by the tenants for life. plaintiff also alleged that the defendant trustee had committed a breach of trust, and asked that certain bonds, in which the trust funds were invested, might be deposited in a bank in the names of the new trustees. At the trial the

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plaintiff abandoned the charges against the defendant trustee, and admitted that there was no ground whatever for his removal. Under these circumstances the only question was whether the plaintiff ought to pay the whole of the costs of the action. FRY, J., said that the action was really brought, not to have the trusts executed, but for the other purposes which had been abandoned. The plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the execution of the trusts, but the trust funds had never been in danger, and there was no ground for coming to the court. The court had a discretion as to the costs, and it would be properly exercised in this case by ordering the plaintiff to pay all the costs of the action up to and including the trial.

PRACTICE-BANKRUPTCY OF DEFENDANT AFTER ACTION AGAINST TRIAL-ORDER OF REVIVOR SET DOWN FOR TRUSTEE-SERVICE-DEFAULT OF APPEARANCE-FILING PLEADINGS AND NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENTNON-APPEARANCE OF DEFENDANT AT TRIAL-AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF NOTICE OF TRIAL-ORD. 50, RR. 2, 4, 5ORD. 16, R. 13-ORD. 19, R. 6-ORD. 36, R. 20.-In a case of Chorlton v. Dickie, before Fry, J., on the 21st inst., the action was brought by one of three trustees against his co-trustees, Dickie and McLachlan, to compel them to make good a breach of trust. The pleadings having been closed, notice of trial was given by the plaintiff, and was served on the solicitors on the record, who appeared for both the defendants, and they accepted service for both defendants. The action was set down for trial, but, before it came on to be tried, the defendant Dickie was adjudicated a bankrupt, and a trustee of his property was appointed. The common order of course was obtained by the plaintiff that the action and the proceedings therein should be carried on and prosecuted against the trustee, in like manner as if he had been originally a defendant thereto.

This order was served upon him, but he did not enter an appearance. The action had been marked in the list as standing over by reason of the bankruptcy, but, after the order of revivor had been made, it was restored to the paper for trial. Notice of this was served on the trustee. When the action came on for trial the defendant McLachlan appeared, but neither Dickie nor his trustee appeared. Judgment was given for the plaintiff. The registrar declined to draw up the judgment on two grounds-(1) that, as the trustee had not entered an appearance, the pleadings and notice of motion for judgment

ought, in accordance with rule 6 of order 19, to have been filed as against him; (2) that, as Dickie did not appear at the trial, an affidavit of service of the notice of trial upon him ought to have been filed before the trial. FRY, J., held that, as notice of trial had been duly served on the defendant, Dickie, and the effect of the order of revivor was to place the trustee in the shoes of Dickie, it was unnecessary that the pleadings and notice of motion for judgment should be filed. His lordship also held that an affidavit of service of notice of trial was unnecessary, on the ground that the defendant wes sufficiently protected by the power of setting aside the judgment, given to the court by rule 20 of order 36. He said that when he held in Cockshott v. The London General Cab Company (26 W. R. 31) that an affidavit of service of notice of trial ought to be produced at the trial when the defendant did not appear, he did so because he was told by the registrar that it was the practice always to require this to be done. But it now appeared that this was not the practice in the common law divisions.

Obituary.

MR. SERJEANT COX.

MR. JOHN PEARSE.

Mr. John Pearse, solicitor, of Hatherleigh, died recently at his residence at that place, after a long illness. Mr. Pearse was born in 1818, was admitted a solicitor in 1842, and had ever since practised at Hatherleigh. He was a commissioner to administer oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature, and a perpetual commissioner for Devonshire, and he had a large private practice, having been for many years the only solicitor in the town. Mr. Pearse had been for many years clerk to the Commissioners of Taxes for the Hatherleigh Division of the county, and he was also clerk to the Hatherley Highway Board and School Board. He was in partnership with his son, Mr. George Pearse, who was admitted a solicitor in 1874.

MR. GEORGE ALLISON.

Mr. George Allison, solicitor and proctor (the head of the firm of Allison, Son, & Willan), the oldest practising solicitor at Darlington, died at his residence at that place on the 12th inst., after a somewhat short illness. Mr. Allison was admitted a solicitor in 1820, and originally practised at Richmond, but a few years later removed to Darlington, where he carried on business until his death. Nesham, afterwards with his son, Mr. George Thomas He was at one period in partnership with Mr. Robert Allison, and more recently with Mr. Richard Willan. He was a commissioner to administer oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature, and a perpetual commissioner for the County Palatine of Durham, and the North Riding of York

Mr. Edward William Cox, serjeant-at-law, deputy-assistant judge of the Middlesex Sessions, died suddenly from apoplexy at his residence, The Moat Mount, Highwood-hill, Middlesex, on Monday, the 24th inst., at the age of seventy. On Monday morning he took his seat at Clerkenwell, in the second court, and discharged his judicial duties without any appearance of ill-health. He returned home in the after-shire, and his private practice was very extensive. He was

BOOD, and in the evening he took part in a penny reading at Mill-hill. On returning home he went to his library, where shortly afterwards he was found dead by his daughter. Mr. Serjeant Cox was the eldest son of Mr. William Cox, of Taunton, and he was born in 1809. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Easter Term, 1843, and practised for many years on the Western Circuit, and at the Devonshire, Exeter, Plymouth, and Devonport Sessions, and he had for many years a good criminal business. He was well known as a legal writer, being the founder, and for many years the editor of the Law Times. He was also the author (in conjunction with Mr. Thomas William Saunders) of a work on the Criminal Law Consolidation Acts, and (in conjunction with Mr. Standish Grove Grady) of a treatise upon the Law of Registrations and Elections. He also published (among other works) a Digest of Criminal Cases, "The Law of Joint Stock Companies," and "The Arts of Writing, Reading, and Speaking," and he was editor of the wellknown reports known as "Cox's Criminal Cases." He was recorder of the boroughs of Helston and Falmouth from 1857 till 1868, when he was appointed recorder of Portsmouth. In the same year he was created a serjeant-at-law, at the same time as Serjeants Sargood and Sleigh, this being the latest creation of serjeants, except in the case of newlyappointed judges. Mr. Serjeant Cox was a Conservative, and unsuccessfully contested Tewkesbury in 1854, and Taunton in 1865. He again stood for the latter borough in 1868, when he was returned in conjunction with Mr. Barclay, defeating the present Sir Henry James by a few votes, but he was unseated on petition, and the seat was awarded to the latter. He was a magistrate and deputylieutenant for Middlesex, and chairman of petty sessions for the Edgware Division, and in 1870 (on the death of Mr. Joseph Payne) he became deputy-assistant judge, and discharged the duties of that office until his death. Mr. Serjeant Cox had devoted much attention to psychological studies, and he was president of the Psychological Society, and author of "The Mechanism of Man," and other philosophical works. It may be remembered that he became the purchaser of the site of Serjeant's-inn on its recent sale by the former members. Mr. Serjeant Cox was twice married, first, in 1836, to the daughter of Mr. William Harris, and secondly, in 1845, to the daughter of Mr. John William Martin Fonblanque, many years a commissioner of the Court of Bankruptcy.

for many years solicitor to the Darlington District Bank. Mr. Allison had formerly a good practice as a proctor in the local ecclesiastical courts. His death is much regretted at Darlington.

MR. BENJAMIN WORKMAN.

Mr. Benjamin Workman, solicitor, died at his residence, Hampton House, Evesham, on the 8th inst., at the age of eighty-six. He was the son of Mr. Joseph Workman, and was born in 1793. He was admitted a solicitor in 1819, and practised for about thirty years at Evesham. He had a large business, and was in partnership with his brother, Mr. Henry Workman, and with Mr. Herbert New, the present registrar of the Tewkesbury County Court. Mr. Workman retired from practice about thirty years ago, and was shortly afterwards placed in the commission of the peace for Worcestershire and Gloucestershire, as well as for the borough of Evesham. He commanded the Tewkesbury Rifle Volunteers for several years after the formation of the corps. He had for some years devoted his attention to artistic pursuits, and his collection of paintings had obtained some celebrity. Mr. Workman was a bachelor.

Appointments, Etc.

Mr. BRUCE LOCKHART BURNSIDE, Q.C., Attorney-General Island of Ceylon, in succession to Mr. Richard Cayley, appointed of the Bahamas, has been appointed Queen's Advocate for the Chief Justice of Ceylon. Mr. Burnside was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Easter Term, 1866. He was for several years Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of the Bahamas, 1874, and Attorney-General in 1875. and he was appointed a Queen's Counsel for the colony in

Mr. MONTAGU HAWKINS, solicitor, of 115, Leadenhallstreet, E.C., has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women in and for the Cities of London and Westminster and County of Middlesex.

Mr. GEORGE WADHAM, solicitor (of the firm of Guscotte, Wadham, & Daw), of 19, Essex-street, Strand, has been appointed Under-Sheriff of the City and County of Bristol for the ensuing year. Mr. Wadham was admitted a solicitor in 1862, and has been under-sheriff of Bristol since the year 1871.

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP. WILLIAM REED and WILLIAM JOLLIFFE, 86, Howardstreet, North Shields, and 25, Side, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, solicitors. (Reed & Jolliffe.) November 12. (Gazette, November 25.)

Companies.

WINDING-UP NOTICES.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

PARIS HANSOM CAB COMPANY, LIMITED.-The M.R. has by an order dated Oct 14, appointed Mr. W. Williams, King st, Cheapside, to be official liquidator. Creditors are required, on or before Dec 30, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims to the above. Jan 15 at 11 is appointed for adjudicating upon the debts and c'aims

TOWYN PIER COMPANY, LIMITED-By an order made by V.C. Hall, dated Nov 11, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Steele, College hill, solicitor for the petitioner

[Gazette, Nov 21.] LLYNVI, TONDU, AND OGMORE COAL AND IRON COMPANY, LIMITED.Creditors are required, on or before Dec 31, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Joseph Smith, Cannon st. Jan 9 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudiesting upon the debts and clains

MIDLAND HOTEL, BIRMINGHAM, LIMITED.-By an order made by the M R., dated Nov 15, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the hotel be continued. Pearce and Sons, Giltspur st, for Wilkinson and Gillespie, Walsall, solicitors for the petitioners

[Gazette, Nov. 25.] UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY. MUTUAL SOCIETY.-The M.R. has fixed Dec 4 at 11 for the appointment of an official liquidator [Gazette, Nov. 21.] SALTBURN-BY-THE-SEA PIER COMPANY.-Petition for winding up, presented Nov 20, directed to be heard before V.C. Malins, on Dec 5. Iliffe and Co, Bedford row, for Thompson, jun, Middlesborough, solicitor for the petitioners

SLATE COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by the M.R., dated Nov 15, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Ellis and Co, St Swithin's lane, Folic tors for the petitioners

TYNEMOUTH AQUARIUM AND WINTER GARDEN COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by V.C. Hall, dated Nov. 14, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Hemsley and Hemsley, Court yard, Albany, solicitors for the petitioners [Gazette, Nov 25.]

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED. FRIENDLY SOCIETY OF FARINGDON, Faringdo", Berks. Nov 19 WEST KENT AGRICULTURAL LABOURERS' UNION FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Grasshopper Inn, Westerham, Kent. Nov 19 [Gazette, Nov 21.1 BUCKINGHAM LODGE FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Nottingham Ancient Imperial United Order of Odd Fellows, Albion Tavern, Little Sheffield, York. Nov 22 [Gazette, Nov 25.]

New Orders, Etc.

COUNTY COURTS.

I, the Right Honourable Hugh MacCalmont, Earl Cairns, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do, under the powers vested in me by the County Court Rules, hereby order that the offices of the county courts may be closed on the 26th, the 27th, and 29th days of December, 1879. Given under my hand this 3rd day of November, 1879. CAIRNS, C.

On Saturday, Mr. Collier held an inquiry at the Wade's Arms, Jeremiah-street, Poplar, touching the death of Alfred Holder, aged twenty-six, a solicitor. The body was identified by Mr. John Holder, a solicitor, of Malvern-road, Dalston, who stated that he last saw his brother alive on the 16th, when he appeared in his usual health. He had suffered from his heart, and on Thursday, from information he (witness) received, he went to the Islander's beerhouse, in the West Ferry-road, and there saw his brother dead. Maurice John Sexton, the landlord of the house in question, said that the deceased was at his house on Thursday arranging for the transfer of the premises. He was sitting quietly in a chair negotiating the necessary business, when he suddenly fell backwards, and before medical aid could be summoned he expired. Medical evidence showed that death arose from aneurism in the aorta, accelerated by the severe weather, and a verdict was returned accordingly.

MONEY SAVED BY ADOPTING CHAPPUIS' DAYLIGHT REFLECTORS They supersede gas in daytime and improve natural daylight. They are in use in all Government offices, on board ships, and in private houses-from the nobleman's mansion to the artizan's workshop. For prospectus address two stamps to S. J. CHAPPUIs, Patentee and Manufacturer, 69, Fleet-etreet, London.—[ADVT.]

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Societies.

HULL INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. The annual meeting of the members of this Society was held on the evening of the 12th inst. Mr. Henry Birks (vice-president) occupied the chair. This was the last meeting of the old Hull Law Society, founded in the year 1818, and a resolution having been passed transferring its assets and property to the new Hall Incorporated Law Society, the first annual meeting of the Incorporated Law Society was held. The following were elected officers for the ensuing year:-President, Mr. Henry Birks; vice-president, Mr. E. Laverack; hon. secretary and treasurer, Mr. J. T. Woodhouse; council, Mr. F. Lowe, Mr. J. J. Thorney, Mr. C. S. Wake, Mr. J. L. Jacobs, Mr. J. Gething, and Mr. J. Cook; hon. auditors, Messrs. Pearce and Sibree. After the meeting the annual dinner was held, and there was a large attendance of members. Mr. Birks (president-elect) occupied the chair, and there were also present as guests - the mayor (Alderman King, M.D.), the sheriff (R. M. Craven, Esq., J.P.), Mr. Bedwell (judge of the Hull County Court). Letters were received from the recorder (W. Beasley, Esq.), and deputy-stipendiary of Hull (E. C. Twiss, Esq.), regretting their inability to be present owing to pressing engagements in London. After dinner, the usual loyal toasts having been proposed from the chair, the chairman proposed Her Majesty's Judges," and said that the reputation of the learned judges of the Supreme Court for learning, ability, and impartiality was never greater than at present; and amongst our intellectual athletes and distinguished statesmen and scholars the names of Lord Chancellor Cairns and Lord Chief Justice Cockburn stood preeminent; but, whilst expressing their feelings of pride and admiration for the judges generally, he was sure the members would join with him most heartily in giving expression to the sentiments of respect and esteem in which they held Mr. Bedwell in particular. Mr. Bedwell, who was received with loud applause, returned thanks, and after alluding to the talents of the judges-many of whom he had the pleasure of knowing personally-spoke of the pleasure it always gave him to meet his brother lawyers at Hull, and said that he should not soon forget the kind reception they gave him when he first came amongst them about five years ago. They were all engaged in a noble profession, and it was amongst their chief duties and privileges to teach and show what authority meant and what respect meant. Mr. Lowe, in felicitous terms, next proposed "The Mayor and Corporation," which was acknowledged by the mayor (Dr. King)▼ Mr. Middlemiss then submitted the health of the sheriff, which was enthusiastically received and responded to by Incorporated Law Society," remarking that he regarded a Mr. Craven, after which Mr. Bedwell proposed "The Hull honour of the profession, and encouraging esprit de corps society like this most useful, particularly in protecting the amongst its members, and it had his very best wishes for its prosperity. The president-elect (Mr. Birks), who was loudly applauded, said: In the absence, through serious indisposition, of the retiring president, which we all deplore, it becomes my duty to respond to the toast so kindly and heartily proposed by Mr. Bedwell, and honoured by our other guests, of success and prosperity to the Hull Incorporated Law Society. This society is the successor of one established in the town of Hull for upwards of sixty years, and which has to-night ceased to exist. By incorporation we hope to obtain certain advantages more appreciable by lawyers than the general public, and we have taken the opportunity of incorporation to revise our rules; but our objects remain the same as before. In one respect, I hope we shall differ considerably from the late society. In its old age it had become somewhat languid and indifferent. I trust our re-constituted society will exhibit more of the energy and enthusiasm of youth. We may possibly lose the grand court hitherto held after our annual dinner. fear the charter under which we held it is not embodied in our articles, or otherwise confirmed to us. But the days of "high jinks" are passing away, and, as the humour of the court sometimes verged on the frolicsome, the loss even of the grand court may not be a cause for unmixed regret. The objects we have in view are to uphold and improve the status of the profession, to call the members together from time to time for social intercourse, and

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