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payment of the proper charges for this service? What will the trustees say to the trouble of being formally served with frequent notices of incumbrances?

THE TRUSTEES SOLICITOR.

I.

THE Master of the Rolls said, not long ago, that the principle that a trustee shall not make any profit from his office is rigidly enforced by the court, and the principle that while a trustee acts in the due discharge of his duty he is to be indemnified against all loss ought to be enforced with equal strictness (Walters v. Woodbridge, 26 W. R. 469, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 510). Lord Cottenham was not less strenuous in asserting the right of the trustee to be repaid his proper outlay. The first object of a trust, he declared, is to indemnify those who administer it against any costs properly incurred in its administration, and trustees are entitled, without any express provision for the purpose, to make the payments required to meet the necessary expenses incurred in the execution of the trust out of the funds in their hands belonging to the trust (see Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Cl. & F. 515; Attorney-General v. Mayor of Norwich, 2 My. & Cr. 424). The principle is clear enough, but its application is attended with considerable difficulty. What are costs properly incurred and necessary expenses in the execution of the trust? When may the trustee's solicitor advise his client that he may safely incur legal and other expenses on behalf of the trust? We cannot pretend to supply anything like a complete answer to these questions, but it may be useful to notice the principles which have been laid down in the numerous cases on this subject.

In the first place, it is of course clearly settled that, although a trustee, being himself a solicitor, and transacting the legal business of the trust, will not (in the absence of express authority in the instrument creating the trust, or of a bargain made before the acceptance of the office) be allowed to charge for his services, he may appoint another solicitor to transact such business, who will be entitled to make the usual legal charges (Macnamara v. Jones, 2 Dick. 587: see Stanes v. Parker, 9 Beav., at p. 389). That is to say, the trustee is not bound to afford the cestui que trust gratuitous legal assistance. But in saying that the trustee may appoint a solicitor it is not to be understood that he can make him the solicitor of the trust estate in the sense of making the trust estate his client. The client of the solicitor is the trustee, and his claim for costs will be against the trustee personally, and not against the trust estate (Worrall v. Harford, 8 Ves. 1, 8). The trustee employs and pays his solicitor, and then has to see whether he can get the amount he has paid allowed out of the trust funds. No principle is more clearly settled than that a trustee will not be allowed without question whatever sum he thinks fit to pay to his solicitor. If he chooses to pay the solicitor's bill without taxation, and afterwards goes to his cestui que trust and says, "I have allowed so much for costs; now pay me," by the established rules of the court the cestui que trust is entitled to have the reasonableness and propriety of the charges in the bill ascertained (see the remarks of Sugden, L.C., Ir., in Langford v. Mahony, 2 Con. & L. at p. 327). The steps which he may take for this purpose we shall hereafter consider.

The class of business which a trustee or executor may safely employ a solicitor to transact is ascertained by the general rule that a trustee or executor is not allowed to employ an agent to perform duties which by accepting his office he has taken upon himself (Weiss v. Dill, 3 My. & K., at p. 27). Speaking generally, therefore, a trustee or executor is not, in strictness, justified in leaving the whole conduct of the trust or executorship in the hands of a solicitor. He may resort to the solicitor for professional advice on legal questions arising in the

business of the trust, but he is not justified in employing the solicitor to transact non-legal business. For instance, an executor will not be allowed the fees of a solicitor for attending to pay premiums on policies, or attending at the bank to make transfers, or for attendances on proctors, auctioneers, legatees, and creditors (Harben v. Darby (No. 1), 28 Beav. 325). In this case the solicitor who made the charges was an executor entitled under the will to charge for his professional services, but it is apprehended that the principle is generally applicable. If necessary for the due execution of the trust, the trustee or executor will be allowed the costs of taking the opinion of counsel (Fearns v. Young, 10 Ves. 184; Poole v. Pass, 1 Beav., at p. 605).

"Where a trustee," said Lord Eldon in the former case, "in the fair execution of his trust has expended money by reasonably and properly taking opinions and procuring directions that are necessary for the due execution of his trust, he is entitled, not only to his costs, but also to his charges and expenses, under the head of just allowances."

It is of course a necessary condition of reimbursement that these costs should have been properly incurred. Thus, where trustees for sale attempted a sale at a time when they were not authorized to sell the property, they were held not to have any lien for the costs of the abortive sale, or of proceedings taken against them by a purchaser in reference thereto (Leedham v. Chawner, 4 K. & J. 458). In this case the sale had been attempted by the direction of all the persons beneficially interested, some of whom, however, being married women, with their shares settled to their separate use without power of anticipation, were unable effectually to direct a sale. These ladies, Vice-Chancellor Wood observed, had "taken advantage of that facility which trustees so often exhibit in consenting, at the solicitation of their cestuis que trust, to do acts which the latter have no power to authorize, notwithstanding the certainty that if there be the slightest irregularity in the acts so done upon such solicitation, the very persons who have led them astray will be the first to turn against them and indemnify themselves at their expense.'

"

Where an action is brought against a trustee in respect of the trust estate, whether it be an action of ejectment, trespass, or of any other description, and it is defended by the trustee, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of the trust estate, he is entitled (in the absence of misconduct on his part) to indemnity (Walters v. Woodbridge, 26 W. R., at p. 470, L. R. 7 Ch. D., at p. 509). The fact that in defending the action the trustee also defends his own character will not make the defence less a defence of the trust estate; it is impossible to split the defence and say that because the trustee at the same time defended his own character, he is only to have a part of the costs (Ib.). A trustee or executor who is ordered to pay costs in an action relating to the trust estate, which he has defended, is entitled to recover from the estate. which he has defended, not only the costs which he has incurred to the adversary, but also the costs which he has paid to his own solicitor (Lovat v. Fraser, L. R. 1 Sc., at p. 37: see also Ramsden v. Langley, 2 Vern. 536, as to a mortgagee).

With regard to litigation undertaken by a trustee as plaintiff on behalf of the trust estate, there is some authority for the proposition that a trustee, before undertaking an action for the benefit of the cestuis que trust ought to ask them to sanction it (see Peers v. Ceeley, 15 Beav., at p. 211, as to a mortgagee). On the other hand, it has been said in an Irish case, that if the cestuis que trust disapprove of litigation undertaken by the trustee they ought to inform him of their disapproval. If, instead of doing so, they allow the matter to proceed, and lead the trustee plaintiff to suppose that they do not disapprove of what he is doing, they cannot afterwards turn round on the trustee, who was acting bona fide for their interest, and repudiate all liability to costs (Courtney v. Rumley, I. R. 6 Eq., at p. 112).

The mere fact of the trustee having been unsuccessful in litigation, either as plaintiff or defendant, will not, in the absence of misconduct, disentitle him to be reimbursed his costs (I. R. 6 Eq., at p. 106). The question to be considered is, was the litigation reasonable and bona fide undertaken for the interest of the trust estate ? If not, or if it was rendered necessary by the negligence or misconduct of the trustee, he will not be allowed his costs (see Caffrey v. Darby, 6 Ves., at p. 497; Courtney v. Rumley, I. R. 6 Eq., at p. 106).

We have now to consider the remedies of the cestui que trust who complains of the amount of the bill of the trustee's solicitor. If the trustee chooses to have the bill taxed before paying it, he can thereby, of course, bind the cestui que trust as regards the reasonableness and propriety of the items (Langford v. Mahony, 2 Con. & L., at p. 327). But if the trustee chooses to pay his solicitor's bill without taxation, the cestui que trust

has

(1) A right to have the solicitor's bill referred, not to be taxed, but moderated; and on that reference the taxing master will revise the items in a way similar to taxation, and if not proper, will disallow them to the trustee, and he may get back these sums from the solicitor as he can (see the remarks of Sugden, L.C., Ir., in Langford v. Mahony, 2 Con. & L., at p. 327; Johnson v. Telford, 3 Russ. 478). In more recent times, the reference to the taxing master has taken the form of an inquiry, on the application of the persons beneficially interested, to ascertain whether, as regards any particular items which may be complained of, the bill which the trustee has paid his solicitor is a fair and proper bill or not (see Allen v. Jarvis, L. R. 4 Ch. 616, 621).

Or (2) the cestui que trust may avail himself of the provision in the Solicitors Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 39), that "it shall be lawful in any case in which a trustee, executor, or administrator, has become chargeable with any bill as aforesaid, for the Lord High Chancellor or the Master of the Rolls, if in his discretion he shall think fit, upon the application of a party interested in the property out of which such trustee, executor, or administrator may have paid, or be entitled to pay, such bill, to refer the same, and such solicitor's, or executor's, or administrator's, or assignee's demand thereupon, to be taxed and settled by the proper officer of the High Court of Chancery, with such directions and subject to such conditions as such judge shall think fit, and to make such order as such judge shall think fit, for the payment of what may be found due, and of the costs of such reference, to or by such solicitor, or the executor, administrator, or assignee of such solicitor, by or to the party making such application, having regard to the provisions herein contained relative to applications for the like purpose by the party chargeable with such bill, so far as the same shall be applicable to such cases; and in exercising such discretion as aforesaid, the said judge may take into consideration the extent and nature of the interest of the party making the application." It will be observed that there is no mention in this section of "special circumstances" as necessary to enable the court to order taxation after payment of the bill; and it was said by the late Master of the Rolls that a taxation is almost a matter of course, assuming that items of overcharge are proved, and it is not necessary that the overcharges should be such as to amount to fraud (In re Drake, 22 Beav., at p. 443: see In re Blackmore, 13 Beav., at p. 161). On the other hand, Lord Justice Turner laid it down that, under the section, special circumstances would have to be shown in order to justify the order for taxation of a bill paid by trustees or executors. There must be either pressure or overcharge amounting to fraud. It seems that if the bill contains charges which no solicitor, dealing properly with his client, would have made, this has always been considered to be fraud within the meaning of the cases on this subject parte Dickson, 8 D. M. & G., at pp. 660, 661).

General Correspondence.

THE HACKNEY CARRIAGE ACTS.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] ultimo, before the magistrate of the Westminster PoliceSir, In a case, reported in the Times of the 29th court, the magistrate decided, in conformity with Case v. Storey (17 W. R. 802, L. R. 4 Ex. 319), that a cabman plying for hire at the Victoria Railway Station was not subject to a penalty for refusing to be hired.

In 13 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 1003, commenting on Case v. Storey, you expressed dissatisfaction with the state of things revealed by it.

It would seem from Skinner v. Usher (20 W. R. 659, L. R. 7 Q. B. 423), which did not, however, turn on this question, that Case v. Storey was regarded as still law, notwithstanding the later Hackney Carriage Act (32 & 33 Vict. c. 115). But it may be worth while to consider whether this is a sound view. To arrive at a satisfactory result on this question it is necessary to go into the matter in some detail.

In Case v. Storey, which arose on a case stated by a metropolitan police magistrate, on a complaint preferred by appellant against respondent, the driver of a cab, for having, at the Great Northern Railway Station, refused to drive to a certain place, within six miles, to which he was required to drive the appellant, the question was treated by the court as resting on the proper construction of 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 22, s. 35, which enacts that "every hackney carriage standing in any street or place, and having thereon any of the numbered plates required by this Act,

. shall, unless actually hired, be deemed

to be plying for hire; ... and the driver of every such hackney carriage which is not actually hired, shall be compellable to go with any person desirous of hiring such hackney carriage," and subjects the driver to a penalty for refusal; and the late Lord Chief Baron considered, first, that the carriage was not “plying for hire"; and, secondly, reading the expression, "in any street or place," as controlled by the language used in the definition of a hackney carriage in section 4 of the same Act, which defines it as a carriage "used for the purpose of standing or plying for hire in any public street or road," he considered the expression in section 35 as not applicable to the premises of a railway company. Lord Justice Bramwell (then Baron Bramwell) considered that the section could be meant to apply only to a place to which the public have right of access.

I now come to 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115. This Act (with the order of the Secretary of State under it) is now the principal Act regulating hackney carriages in the metropolis. Section 4 defines "hackney carriage" to mean "any carriage for the conveyance of passengers which plies for hire within the limits of this Act, and is not a stage carriage." Section 7 enacts that "if any unlicensed hackney. . . carriage plies for hire, the owner of such carriage shall be liable to a penalty," &c.; and section 15 enacts that "all the provisions of the Acts relating to hackney carriages. . . in force at the time of the commencement of this Act, shall, subject to any alteration made therein by this Act, or by any order or regulation of the said Secretary of State made in pursuance of this Act, continue in force, and all such provisions of the said Acts as relate to licences granted under those Acts, or any of them, shall, subject to any alteration as aforesaid, apply to licences granted under this Act."

Clarke v. Stanford (19 W. R. 846, L. R. 6 Q. B. 357) decided that section 7 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115 applied to an unlicensed brougham or fly waiting for hire on the premises of a railway company. This case was fol(Exlowed, apparently with reluctance, in Allen v. Tunbridge (19 W. R. 849, L. R. 6 C. P. 481).

We have, then, two clear decisions that carriages can

"ply for hire" at a railway station. Thus one of the grounds of the decision in Case v. Storey is got rid of.

It remains to say a few words upon the meaning put by the court in that case on the expression in section 35 of 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 22, "standing in any street or place"; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115 being, as above noticed, the principal Act now regulating hackney carriages, the older Acts would probably be at an end were they not made applicable by section 15 of that Act. That part of section 4 of the Act of Will. 4, on which so much stress

was put by the court in Case v. Storey, which defines hackney carriage, can be no longer in force, the existing definition of a hackney carriage being in the enactment above-mentioned of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115; and it seems to me, therefore, that, reading section 35 of the Act of Will. 4 as it applies to the latest Act, the expression "standing in any street or place" ought to have its natural meaning; and the word place, looked at in this view, seems to me as unrestricted a word as could

well be used, and to apply to any place (e.g., a railway station) in which it would be unlawful for an unlicensed carriage to ply for hire.

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It seems right to say a word or two with reference to Skinner v. Usher, above referred to. It was decided in that case that 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, s. 33, imposing a penalty on the driver of a hackney carriage plying for hire "elsewhere than at some standing or place appointed for that purpose," meant some public street or place, not any private ground (such as a railway station). In that case the definition of hackney carriage contained in the last-mentioned Act which (section 2) defines hackney carriage to include "every carriage which shall stand on hire or ply for a passenger for hire at any place," &c., was read by the court as having the same meaning, within the extended limits there mentioned, as the words used in the 4th section of the Act of Will. 4, and conseqently as meaning "any public street or road at any place" within the extended area mentioned in the later Act. The court was pressed with the case of Clarke v. Stanford as an authority against this construction, and was content to say, "That case is quite consistent with our present decision, and was quite right on the construction of the Act there in question."

The result arrived at in the last-mentioned case, it will probably be thought, was satisfactory; but I certainly am not quite clear that the mode in which it was reached was equally so. Although that decision is in the direction, perhaps, of supporting Case v. Storey, I do not see that this is a sufficient reason for considering Skinner v. Usher as in any way conclusive as to the authority of Case v. Storey.

Before parting with this letter, I would just observe that I am at some loss to see why in Case v. Storey the court quite passed over, without mention, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 33, s. 7, 17-see particularly in the second paragraph of section 17 the words "or intending to hire such carriage." This is the more remarkable, because the complaint in that case seems to have been framed on section 7 of that Act. Temple, October.

A. J. WOOD.

The Commissioners of the Board of Works have removed the offices of the Director of Public Prosecutions from Craig's-court, Charing-cross, to 4, New-street, Springgardens.

A special sessions of the Sheffield licensing justices was held on Tuesday to consider the decisions arrived at by the Licensing Committee at the several sittings they have recently held. At one sitting the magistrates present had granted wine licences to several beerhouses, and the confirming justices now refused to indorse those decisions. The solicitor who appeared for the applicants contended that the duties of that court were merely ministerial, and that they had no power to reverse the decisions arrived at by the committee. The justices ruled that they had the power to practically rehear the applications, and adjourned the court for the production of further evidence in support of them.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

ANNUAL PROVINCIAL MEETING.

The seventh annual provincial meeting of the Incorporated Law Society was held at the Cutlers' Hall, Sheffield, on Wednesday and Thursday, the 6th and 7th inst. The visitors were officially welcomed to the town by the mayor (Alderman Tozer) and the master cutler (W. Chesterman, Esq.), who wore their chains of office.

THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS.

THE PRESIDENT (Mr. Clabon), who was loudly applauded on taking the chair, then proceeded to deliver the opening address. He said :

Gentlemen,-A practice of forty-three years, of a varied kind, in country and in London, has led me to, and maintained me in, the belief that we occupy a high position among our fellow-men in every point of view. Their property, their honour, their character, is constantly placed, to a great extent, in our hands. We are the depositaries of family secrets; we are consulted in the most delicate affairs, into many of which law hardly enters. To our discretion, to our uprightness, to our honour, clients submit themselves, without doubt. Ours is the direct contact with them. It is to us that they look for help at the moment when something of pressing importance has occurred relating to their property, or their families, or themselves. I say, because I know, that, speaking generally, we are worthy of the confidence placed in us. There are exceptions; but they are few, and serve to prove the truth. The great body of solicitors are men of high honour and honesty, anxious to do Gentlemen, we have ourselves, since the institution of and doing unselfish duty to those for whom they act. this society some fifty years ago, striven most strenuously for the improvement of our branch of the profession. The tone of our proceedings for our clients is higher than it was of old. In tracing the path of the student to his admission, and of the solicitor when admitted, I shall endeavour to make observations and give hints which may tend to further and still further improvement. Let me address a few words to solicitors, as to their duty to their articled clerks. I fear that this is not suffi ciently thought of or attended to. The clerk is but too often turned adrift into the office, allowed to keep his own hours, to read and work as much or as little as he

to

pleases. So that with every opportunity of learning, if he does so please, he but too often arrives at the end of the term with but a smattering of knowledge, and is obliged to resort to a crammer gain the information necessary for a pass. As to tuition, in theory I hold that the solicitor ought to direct the reading of the clerk; to provide him proper books in due succession; to see that he reads enough every day to insure his reading the whole in time, and reads the most useful of them twice at least; to counsel him to make notes as he goes on; and to see that he has a sufficient time at the end of his articles, which should be three months at the least, to pass in review all that he has read. My own plan was, in reading the very useful books the first time, to set down questions on the left side of a notebook, and on the second reading to write the answer opposite the question on the right side. These questions and answers formed the principal subject of study during the period of review. As to quantity, the student should read at least twenty pages every day. Having adverted to the mode of study in my own case, I must add that I do not remember to have heard of crammers in those days. The system of cramming is a baneful one, not so much in itself, but because it leads the articled clerk to depend on it, and to be lazy during his articles, thus acquiring bad habits. I assert, most emphatically, that no student who has read properly the common treatises, and attended diligently to the work of an ordinary office, ought to require help

from a crammer, whether he goes in for a pass only, or from which definite rules of duty may be inferred, if not for honours.

As to tuition in practice, the master should, by himself or his managing clerks, take care that the student sees something of every kind of practice, drafting and copying deeds and willa, attending at the offices and chambers, and in court, reading the letters, bill books and ledgers, and making himself acquainted with everything that goes on in the office. If the articled clerk is❘ wise he will not disdain to copy; he will thus imprint the forms of deeds on his memory, and become more habituated to work generally; and he should not, as many seem to do, associate gentility with bad writing. To write a good hand-nay, a clerk-like hand-will be found useful at all times, and especially when documents have to be framed for signature in a hurry. But there is more than all this. The articled clerk is to be educated into being an honest man. He should be taught, and should learn from the practice of the office, that when a solicitor receives other people's money, he is to keep it sacred, and that the best way to do this is not to mix it with his own. He should be taught that the solicitor ought not to have any source of profit than that known to aud approved by his client. He should be taught that promoters and directors, in dealing with their shareholders and the public, must have no secret reserve of profits for themselves, and that the solicitor acting for the company has a duty to the shareholder as well as to the director. He should, in fine, be taught that a solicitor must do nothing which he would fear to reveal to his client or to the world, and that it is the line of the highest morality which best marks the line of duty. There are those who desire to lessen the period of service under articles. The five years is limited to three or four on the assumption that the graduate or classman is fitted, by his superior education, to learn all that is necessary in the shorter period. This may possibly be so as to the theory of law; I doubt whether it is so as to its practice. There is so much to learn in the latter that it can hardly be learned properly in the shortened period. I do not go so far as to advocate the return to a five years' service in all cases; but I object to any further shortening of either of the periods now fixed. After referring to the proposed school of law or university the president came to the admitted solicitor. He will always be wise, if a partnership be not ready for him, to take a clerkship for some time, working under an experienced practitioner; and he had better think more about the character of the office, and the class of work He will see there, than about salary. It is better that a young man should gain experience in a good office than that he should go to the chambers of a conveyancer or pleader for experience in practice will now stand him in much better stead than experience in theory. He wants to have his judgment exercised and his strength of mind increased, rather than to pass his time in framing answers to cases and drawing deeds and pleadings. He will have, by-and-by, to deal with clients of varying character and different standards of temper and morality, and in acting for them to deal with others possessing similar variations. The raw youth, fresh from his articles, is not fitted to be always a wise guide. He will learn wisdom by experience, as the work of an office surrounds him, and he is guided by the older lawyer at the head of it. And now, the young solicitor is to start for himself. It would be presumptuous in me, in the presence of so many who have had greater or equal experience than myself, to lay down rules for general guidance. We shall join in desiring to be ourselves, and to see every one of the 12,500 solicitors of England and Wales (not forgetting our fellows of Scotland and Ireland) upright, honest gentlemen-using the word in its truest and highest sense. Our duty to our clients is based on all that these words include. But you will not, I think, find fault with me if, in addressing you, and through you our members who are not here, and the rest of our body who ought to be members, I select instances

directly laid down, and by them the young practitioner at least, if not the older ones, may learn something that something tending, I hope, to a higher line of duty, to a more strict construction of right, in practice.

The president then referred to particular classes of cases relating to joint-stock companies, simoniacal contracts, and elections, and continued:—Let me now make some observations of a more general character. It is our duty to give advice to our clients, having taken the best means to prepare ourselves to advise well; either by the exercise of our judgment, after full consideration, or by consulting law books, or obtaining the opinion of a barrister versed in the particular kind of law which is required. The advice is generally received as coming from one competent to give it, and we are instructed to act on it. But it may happen that the client doubts, and shows indisposition to be guided by our advice. Ex. planations will follow, and the solicitor will probably take increased pains to assure himself that he has been told or has learnt the whole story. Time will thus be occupied, in which the opinion may undergo change, and the advice be varied. But let it be assumed, after all, that the matured advice is still unacceptable to the client. It is, of course, for him or for her to decide what course is to be adopted. And if this course is opposed to the solicitor's advice, delicate and difficult questions will arise on his mind. Shall he carry out the instructions, which are contrary to his own views, with a protest, or shall he decline to act further in the matter? It is impossible to lay down any rule. The duty to the client must be considered as well as the duty to self. It may be consistent with duty to self to take the former course; it may be consistent with duty to the client to take the atter. But of this I am sure, that the higher we cause ourselves to stand in the estimation of the public, the more likely will it be that our clients will follow our advice-the less likely that we shall ever be placed in a position in which duty to ourselves forces us to consider whether we must cease to act for a client. It may sometimes happen that a client desires to do, and instructs his solicitor to carry out, something which is not consistent with what is morally right. A client may desire to make dispositions by will or otherwise of an unjust or cruel kind. A trustee may desire to abuse his trust. One in a position of authority or influence may desire to exercise it to the manifest prejudice of those whom it is his duty to protect. The first duty of the solicitor, in these and similar cases, will be, without fear of consequences, to set forth quietly the law, the duty, and the right-the conclusion showing clearly what is the wrong about to be committed. There will be many degrees of this wrong. Every variety of circumstance will surround the matter. Self-interest will call on a solicitor not to lose a client-perhaps a good one. He will be tempted to consider that, after remonstrance and advice, he may do as he is instructed. But if the client persist, and the wrong intended be clear, the solicitor must rise superior to all considerations of self-interest, and determine without fear to have nothing to do with what is contrary to right. One clear duty will be to discourage litigation. The client is generally more keen to begin an action than the solicitor. It is for the latter to represent the probable and possible results, to calm the excitement, to see that judgment predominates over feeling. The action for recovering a just debt or enforcing a just right, or for establishing doubtful points of important law, are on one side the suing for doubt. ful damages, the raising of great issues, where the sum or point in dispute is trifling, are on the other. The solicitor of highest standing will be he who has least to do with litigation, and whoses cases, where actions are necessary, are among the class first mentioned.

So much about duties. Let me now deal with some matters in which our rights require to be amended, and as to which the society now proposes to seek legislative

action, with a more determined effort than has hitherto been made.

The remuneration of solicitors imperatively demands reform. Why should we alone of all who labour for others be subject to a tribunal which is bound by an old scale of charge, fixed in times when money was more valuable, and when practitioners were of a lower class; and which scale the authorities say they have not power to change, though it would be nearer the truth to say that they could amend it but for their groundless fears. This tribunal would hardly have stood its ground but that it is necessary to have some authority to determine how much the litigant who is condemned in costs shall pay to his successful adversary, or how much shall be taken for costs out of a fund which is under administration. But as between the solicitor and his client, why should not he be placed in the same position as others who devote their time and their ability to the benefit of those who are to pay for it? The barrister, virtually, fixes his own fees. There is no irreversible, ancient, cheeseparing rule for the bills of the doctor, the surveyor, the accountant, the tradesman. These regulate their charges by the value of money at the time-by custom always founded on reason-by what is fair between man and man. And if such charges are improper or excessive, and the amount is disputed, a jury and not a taxing master decides the matter. The society, as you know, has long been labouring for justice. In 1871 we put forth a tentative scale for charges in conveyancing matters. We made some slight alterations, as the result of experience, in 1873, and the amended scale of that year has to a great extent, and particularly as to mortgages, been acted upon. These scales were submitted to the Lord Chancellor, and he was often addressed on the subject, but with no result. At last we were told that neither he alone, nor acting with the judges, had any power to sanction a scale; that in order to do this there must be legislation. We were preparing ourselves during this period with 8 proper scale. The committee to whom the duty was delegated met the nominees of the Associated Provincial Societies, and the conclusions arrived at were sanctioned by the country lawyers as well as by those of the metropolis. The council adopted the joint report, which is set forth in full as an appendix to the annual report of 1879-80. We not only framed scales for sales and purchases, loans, leases, and settlements, but we laid down this general principle as the true one-viz., that the solicitor should be remunerated according to the skill, knowledge, and exertion which he employs in the business, and according to its importance and his consequent responsibility, and not according to the time employed, the length of documents prepared, or the number of letters or conferences; adding that the able and experienced man would do more and better work in a short time than the incompetent man could accomplish in a long time. If we must have the taxing master still, let him at least be freed from old and pedantic rules, and be empowered to decide upon the reasonableness of the charge made, having regard to the importance of the business, the skill and labour employed, and the responsibility involved. The council, after long consideration, came to the conclusion that the only legislation for which they could hope was an Act appointing a strong body to make rules as to remuneration, to whom the council could submit proposals, and who should ask for the views of the council before they acted. They prepared an Act to this effect, and submitted it to Lord Chancellor Cairns, prior to the first session of 1880. A deputation of the council, compris ing members from the country, saw him thereon; but he would not do more than consent to the appointment of the tribunal, leaving it to this body to consult the council or no, as they thought fit. His Bill to this effect was brought in, simultaneously with his Land Bills, just before the change of Ministry. When the new Parliament assembled, Lord Chancellor Selborne refused to

adopt the Bills, but did not oppose their passage through the House of Lords. The Government, however, would not give them facilities in the House of Commons, and they dropped. The council have now prepared a Bill on their principle, adding to it other matters presently to be mentioned, and they intend to do their utmost to get it passed into law during the session of 1881. In the meantime, and until an Act is obtained, I earnestly counsel the members of the society, and solicitors, generally, to adopt our scale, as appended to the report of 1879-80. The power of making an agreement with clients exists, though it is seldom acted on. Let us all, in dealing with our clients, refer them to this scale, and inform them that we mean, in acting for them, to adopt it. The scale of 1873, which, as to mortgages, is the same as that of 1880, has already been acted upon very generally. If no tribunal is appointed, and matters remain as they are, this course of action must tend to bring about the practical adoption of the scale of 1880-or at least point out its defects, so that we can remedy them. If a tribunal is appointed and finds a scale which has been acted on without objection, it will probably adopt it, at all events as a basis. I shall move the council to publish this scale in their calendar, and to make it public in every possible way.

The next matter which is comprised in the Bill which the council have resolved to promote in Parliament next session, being one of those submitted to Lord Chancellor Cairns in February, 1880, is for removing the restriction on the call of solicitors to the bar. It proposes to enact that a solicitor of five years' standing who has procured his name to be struck off the rolls with a view of being called to the bar, shall be entitled to be admitted as a student of any of the Inns of Court without examination; and shall immediately afterwards be entitled to enter for the bar final examination. and on passing that examination shall be qualified to be called to the bar.

The restriction in question is not a parliamentary one. It arises out of the regulations of the Inns of Court. The present restrictive provision is No. 7 of the Consolidated Regulations of the Societies of Lincoln'sinn, the Middle Temple, the Inner Temple, and Gray'sinn of 1872, and provides that no solicitor, proctor, notary, parliamentary agent, or other person therein named shall be admitted as a student in any Inn of Court, until he shall have actually and bonâ fide ceased to act or practise in any such capacity. The consequence of this regulation is that a solicitor, before he is qualified to be called to the bar, must be struck off the rolls, and then, having entered as a student, eat his dinners during twelve terms of three years, as other students do. In other words, there must be an interval of three years between his ceasing to practise as a solicitor and beginning to practise as a barrister. No one but a person of substance can afford to give up bread-winning for three years, and few solicitors, therefore, are able to get to the bar. After detailing the steps which had been taken by the council, the president said:-My conclusion is that if the Inns of Court persist in their refusal to repeal the restrictive regulations, and to pass one under which the solicitor of standing who has been struck off the roll can at once present himself for the bar final examination, we shall have no difficulty in getting this enacted by Parliament.

Another question which has arisen, and is to be dealt with in our Bill, is the right of solicitors to be heard at quarter sessions, which is sometimes conceded and sometimes refused. The general practice is to deny audience to a solicitor when there is a sufficient bar in attendance. The right of the bar to the monopoly of advocacy is not founded on legislation. It has been the rule of the superior courts during the time of legal memory. In courts inferior it does not prevail. In courts of petty sessions, in county courts, the solicitor is heard whether or no a bar be present. In the Court of Bankruptcy, which may

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