THE MEETING of the Incorporated Law Society at Sheffield on Wednesday and Thursday week promises to be very successful. Up to the commencement of the present week 313 members of the society had signified their intention to attend, including sixty-four town members. Elaborate preparations have been made by a committee appointed many months ago by the Sheffield District Incorporated Law Society, and, with all the attractions offered, it will be hard if anyone comes away disappointed. At the same time we should like to say that more profitable use might be made of these meetings if fewer subjects were introduced; if only questions of immediate practical importance were discussed, and were discussed at greater length; and, above all, if men whose judgment and knowledge command respect could be prevailed on to open their lips more frequently. There are eminent members of the profession who go to these provincial meetings, beam on the social board, attend the concert or dance, but go away without having contributed in any way to the public discussions. This will probably always be the case until the hobby riders who are too often allowed to prance about at their free will are tethered. But there seems to be no one willing to undertake the arduous task of repressing the gambols of these persistent creatures.

IN RESPECT OF LONGEVITY, Sir Fitzroy Kelly kept up the traditions of his office. Only nine appointments of Chief Baron have been made during the last ninety years. Sir William Alexander was appointed at the age of sixty-three, resigned at seventy, and died at eighty-one. Lord Lyndhurst, who occupied the post in the interval between his first and second Chancellorships, attained the age of ninety-two. Lord Abinger was appointed at sixty-five and died at seventy-five. Sir Frederick Pollock was appointed at sixty-one, re

signed at eighty-three, and died at eighty-seven; and Sir Fitzroy Kelly was appointed at seventy, and died at eighty-four. The title of Chief Baron appears to have been first used during the reign of Edward II. Walter de Norwich was appointed a Baron of the Exchequer in 1311, and received a fresh patent in the following year on the death of Roger de Scotre, the then senior baron, and in the patent granted to his successor he is described as 66 nunc Capitalis Baro." He retired from the court during his tenure of the office of Treasurer of the Exchequer, but returned to the bench in 1317, and was then distinctly appointed as Capitalis Baro."

66

66

THERE IS, as is well known, a possibility of the abolition of the title. Section 32 of the Act of 1873 enables the Queen in Council, upon any report or recommendation of the Council of Judges of the Supreme Court, to provide for the abolition on vacancy of the distinction of the offices of any of the following judges-namely, the Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Rolls, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, which may be reduced, and of the salaries, pensions, and patronage attached to such offices from the offices of the other judges of the High Court." Any such Order in Council must be laid before each House of Parliament for thirty days on which that House shall have sat, and it is not to take effect if, within such period of thirty days, either House shall have presented an address to the Crown praying that the order may not come into operation. The order must not reduce or increase the total number of the judges of the Supreme Court; and, therefore, the only alteration now practicable would seem to be the appointment of another puisne judge of the Exchequer Division, giving Mr. Baron Pollock the rank (without increased salary) of "President of the Division."

He is re

THE OFFICE of the Clerk of Crown in Chancery, to which the Principal Secretary of the Lord Chancellor has just been appointed, was at one time a sinecure, and was abolished by 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 3, but in the following year an Act was passed providing for the appointment of a clerk to discharge the duties of Clerk of the Crown and Clerk of the Hanaper. The duties of the office are more parliamentary than legal, and are thus described by the Administrative Departments Commissioners :-" In the House of Lords he makes out and issues writs summoning peers, writs of attendance, commissions to summon and prorogue Parliament, commissions to pass Bills, and all other commissions. He attends when the Royal assent is given, and on many other occasions. He receives and takes custody of the returns of elections of Scotch peers, and certifies the same to the House. He makes out and issues writs for election of Irish representative peers, and their writs of summons. gistrar of the Lord High Steward's Court of State Trials, and issues the writs, &c., on such trials. He is also registrar of the Coronation Court of Claims. In the House of Commons he makes out and issues election writs, receives and takes custody of returns to Parliament, notifies the same in the Gazette, registers them, and issues certificates to the House. He has the custody of poll-books, registers them, and gives copies to all applicants, and proves them before election committees. He attends the table of the House to amend returns, and on various other matters. Nearly every patent passing the Great Seal is made out in his office. He makes out all patents of creation under the Great Seal." may be added that by an Act of the last session (cap. 10), it is provided that after the 1st of November next every warrant for the passing of letters patent under the Great Seal shall be prepared by the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, and not by the Attorney or SolicitorGeneral.

It

THE CORRESPONDENCE in the Times on the subject of juvenile offenders has shown a practical unanimity of opinion that the punishment of imprisonment is unsuitable for a child's offence. It is shocking to most people to think that in a single year 6,090 children between the ages of sixteen and twelve, and 720 children under twelve years of age are sent to gaol. It is not only deplorable but expensive; and this will probably be a sufficient reason for a change even for people like Mr. Baker, who are convinced that "the most desirable system would be that nearly every boy who committed an offence should be sent to prison for a very short term, but that if he relapsed he should be sent to a reformatory." There seems to be no alternative but whipping, and it is admitted by Mr. Baker that a first whipping is "generally efficacious"; and, if so, we fail to understand how the effect of a second should be "doubtful, and a third and fourth will probably only harden the boy and do harm." If the first is "efficacious," how do the second, third, and fourth become necessary? We are not at all sure, however, that the current of opinion which is setting in in favour of whipping children by policemen may not result in consequences nearly as serious to the child as imprisonment. Whipping by a public functionary will have to be very carefully guarded, or it may affix a lasting stigma to the child and give rise to a justifiable outcry on the score of cruelty.

WE CANNOT HELP regretting that so little public attention was directed to the recent meeting of the Institute of International Law at Oxford. To a certain extent the indifference with which it has been regarded may be due to our weariness of talking assemblies. But the characteristic of this meeting was that it was not a mere talking assembly, but an assembly which will exercise an important influence on the affairs of the world, not directly perhaps, but certainly indirectly. For although it is perfectly true, as the Lord Chief Justice said in the Franconia case, that writers on international law, however valuable their labours may be in elucidating and ascertaining the principles and rules of law, cannot make the law; which to be binding must have received the assent, express or implied, of the nations who are to be bound by it; it is not less true (as a greater authority has said) that "in cases where the principal jurists agree, the presumption will be very great in favour of the solidity of their maxims; and no civilized nation that does not arrogantly set all ordinary law and justice at defiance will venture to disregard the uniform sense of the established writers of international law" (1 Kents' Commentaries, 19). The members of the Institute comprise the greatest living authorities on International Law, and its proceedings are conducted with a deliberation and thoroughness of discussion which entitle its resolutions to the highest consideration.

The Manchester Guardian says that a petition in bankruptcy was presented on Saturday in the Salford County Court against George Raynor, the late chief clerk of that court, and on the hearing of the petition an order was made adjudging him a bankrupt. An examination of the accounts kept by Mr. Raynor at the county court has revealed deficiencies to a considerable amount.

We heard, says an American legal journal, several lawyers discussing an order of court, recently made in this State, a few days ago, which was in substance as follows:"Ordered that hereafter this court will in its opinions in citing cases decided by the Supreme Court not yet reported, cite them as published in, &c., &c." This is an order of the court, ordering the court itself in its judgment to do a particular thing. One of the lawyers remarked that the court might just as well make an order that the court "would only write its opinions on the best kind of legal cap, with Arnold's imported writing fluid, with a gold pen, and that the judges should appear in velvet gowns and slippers."

THE GROUND GAME ACT.

I.

Most of our readers will be called upon, sooner or later, to advise clients upon the provisions of this Act. It was not to be expected that a measure which was so vigorously debated and so frequently amended in the House of Commons would emerge from Parliament a clear-cut piece of legislation. The Act is one which requires careful study to understand, and leads to more than oneunexpected result, which must give rise to litigation. We propose, first of all, to state, as concisely as we can, the practical effect of the measure, and then to go through it critically section by section.

Before, however, we consider the provisions of the recent Act, it may be well to point out how the law stood before it came into operation. As Mr. Justice Mellor pithily put it in Coleman v. Bathurst (see the report in 40 L. J. M. C.), at common law, "the right of killing game is prima facie in the tenant, unless there is something to take it out of him." The Game Act (1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32), which included hares in the definition of "game," but not rabbits, did not, of course, interfere with this rule. It imposed restrictions as regards season, annual game certificates, &c.; and provided against anything therein contained authorizing any person holding any land to kill or take the game on such land where by any contract a right of entry upon such land for the purpose of killing or taking the game should be reserved by or given to any grantor, lessor, or other person; it enabled the landlord to whom the game was reserved to authorize other persons who had obtained a game certificate to pursue and kill it; and where the game had been reserved or granted to the landlord or any other person, it subjected the occupier to penalties for pursuing or killing it.

In 1848, a step was taken in the direction of the recent measure. By the Hares Act (11 & 12 Vict. c. 29) it is recited that "it has been found that much damage has been and is continually done by hares to the produce of inclosed lands, and that great losses have thereby accrued and do accrue to the occupiers of such lands; and it is expedient that persons in the actual occupation of such inclosed lands, or the owners thereof, who have the right of killing game thereon, should be allowed to take, kill, and destroy hares thereon without the payment of the said duties of assessed taxes, and without the incurring of any of the penalties above mentioned"; and the Act provides that it shall be lawful for any person, being in the actual occupation of any inclosed lands, or for any owner thereof who has the right of killing game thereon, by himself or by any person directed or authorized by him in writing, according to the form in the schedule to the Act annexed, so to do, to take, kill, or destroy any hare then being in or upon any such inclosed lands, without the obtaining of an annual game certificate. But no owner or occupier is to grant authority under the Act to more than one person, at one and the same time, to kill hares upon his land within any one parish, and the authority is to be delivered to the justices' clerk. And tenants who are bound by any agreements not to kill game are not authorized by

the Act to kill hares.

The law before the recent Act was, therefore, that the right to kill rabbits and hares was in the tenant unlessit had been expressly reserved to the landlord or granted to some one else. If it had not been so reserved or granted, the tenant might (subject to certain restrictions) kill hares without obtaining a game certificate. It need hardly be said that in comparatively few cases landlords omitted to reserve this right; and the decision in Jefferies v. Evans (19 C. B. N. S. 246), that under the ordinary reservation of the exclusive right of hunting, shooting, fishing, and sporting over the demised land, the tenant was not entitled to shoot rabbits, contributed not a little to the evil which the recent Act is intended to remedy.

Coming now to the Ground Game Act, 1880, we shall consider its effect-(1) where the right to kill hares and rabbits is in the occupier; (2) where it has been granted by the occupier to another person; and (3) where it has been reserved to the landlord.

(1) Where the right is in the occupier.-In this case the Act prohibits (section 6), under a penalty not exceeding £2-(a) the occupier from using firearms for the purpose of killing hares and rabbits between the expiration of the first hour after sunset and the commencement of the last hour before sunrise ; and (b) from employing spring traps except in rabbit holes, and (c) from employing poison. The Act apparently relieves the occupier from the necessity of obtaining a licence to kill game for the purpose of killing and taking hares and rabbits on the land in his occupation (section 4); but this is not free from doubt having regard to the words of section 2, which provides that "the occupier may exercise any other or more extensive right which he may possess in respect of ground game or other game, in the same manner and to the same extent as if this Act had not passed."

(2) Where the right has been granted by the occupier to another person.-If the grant was made before the 7th of September, 1880, for valuable consideration, the Act will not affect the position of the occupier until after the term for which the grant was made has expired (section 5). Where the grant was not for valuable consideration, or was made after September 7, 1880, the occupier, notwithstanding his grant, will" retain and have, as incident to and inseparable from such occupation," a right by himself and certain persons, duly authorized by him in writing, to kill and take the hares and rabbits on the land in his occupation concurrently with his grantee (section 2). We shall hereafter explain, under the third head, the restrictions imposed on the authorizing of persons to kill hares and rabbits. this case the occupier and the persons authorized by him will be relieved from the necessity of taking out a licence to kill game (section 4).

The third head will be considered next week.

In

que trust who chooses to take the actual profits? The doctrine that the cestui que trust cannot elect to take profits for one part of the trading and interest for another can hardly be supported on the reasons given by Sir T. Plumer, and until a court of appeal has considered the subject, the general rule he laid down must be accepted with caution.

In Heathcote v. Hulme, however, it was admitted that there may be circumstances which would be sufficient to break the period during which the trade was carried on; for instance, if the trust property was withdrawn by the trustee from one trade and embarked in a new one, or in one carried on at a different place (1 J. & W., at p. 133). In that case the trade which had been carried on by an intestate was continued after his death, in 1799, by his administratrix, in conjunction with several other persons, who were nominally partners, but had no interest in the stock-in-trade. In 1801 a notice of dissolution of the partnership was published. merely, however, in order to get rid of one of the nominal partners; there was no winding up of the business, which was afterwards carried on by the other partners, with the capital belonging to the estate of the intestate. The question arose whether cestui que trust could obtain profits for one part of the time and interest for the other. Sir T. Plumer, M.R., held that there had not been a sufficient break in the business, and that the cestui que trust must elect to have the account taken in the same way for the whole period of the trading.

A trustee or executor who lends trust money to a firm in which he is a partner, to be used in their business (Vyse v. Foster, 21 W. R. 207, L. R. 8 Ch., at p. 333; see Townend v. Townend, 1 Giff. 201); or allows money which he ought to have called in to remain on loan to his firm (Jones v. Foxall, 15 Beav. 388), will, apparently, be charged with interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum on the whole of the money, if the cestui que trust elects to take interest. But if the cestui que trust elects to claim profits, he cannot obtain more than the trustee's share of the profits of the business in which the trust moneys were employed (Jones v. Foxall); for, on the principle referred to at the commencement of these articles, the trustee is only to be charged on the ground that he either has or ought to have made profit

INTEREST. III.

The

THE question, to which we referred last week, whether a cestui que trust whose money has been employed in trade by the trustee can elect to take profits for one part of the trading and interest for another, seems to have been first discussed in the case of Heathcote v. Hulme (1 Jac. & W. 122), where Sir T. Plumer, M.R., said that where the business in which the trust money has been engaged has been carried on without any break, the cestui que trust proceeding against the trustee must make his clection which mode of account he will adopt for the whole period of employment of the trust money. He must consider which mode will be the most advantageous to him, and to the mode he selects he must adhere. grounds on which the learned judge based this doctrine are not very satisfactory. To hold otherwise, he thought, "would be contrary to the principle on which the option is given; the cestui que trust elects whether he will ratify the employment of his capital in the trade; if so he takes the profit," and if not, the interest. It is difficult to see how the cestui que trust can be said to "ratify" the employment of the money more by electing to take the profits than by electing to take interest in lieu of profits. The interest is only a rough way of ascertaining the probable return for capital employed in trade, five per cent. being the rate supposed by the courts to be ordinarily paid on such capital. How can the cestui que trust who takes interest on the footing of the trust fund being employed as capital in the trade carried on by the trustee be said to "ratify" such employment any less than the cestui

ness.

more than a share of the profits of the partnership busiAs regards interest, however (although there seems to have been no decision on the point) he would be presumed to have obtained ordinary trade interest on all the trust money invested in the business.

'Trust money which a trustee who is a trader keeps at his banker's in his own name, will be presumed to be employed by him in trade, since he obtains in his business the advantage of the additional credit arising from increased balances in his favour (Sutton v. Sharpe, 1 Russ., at p. 151; Treves v. Townshend, 1 Bro. C. C., at p. 385; In re Hilliard, 1 Ves. jun., at p. 50; Young v. Combe, 4 Ves., at p. 104; Rocke v. Hart, 11 Ves.. at p. 61; Williams v. Powell, 15 Beav. 461, 463). It is not very clearly settled whether this presumption is capable of being rebutted by the trustee, or, if so, what evidence will suffice to rebut it. The remark of Romilly, M.R., in Williams v. Powell (15 Beav., at p. 469), that "the burden lies on the executor to show that, in fact, he has not had benefit in his trade from this increased balance at his bankers'," taken in connection with the fact that the executor in that case had mixed the assets with his own moneys at his bankers', seems to point to a general right to rebut the presumption, but it is conceived that this is inconsistent with the rule as laid down in the other cases cited above. Where the trustee trader has mixed the trust money with his own money in his bankers' account, the court, it is apprehended, will conclude that he must have obtained bencfit from increased credit. Where, however, he has "set apart the trust money to a separate account, so as to have no direct use of it, though he might with regard to other accounts have had

an indirect benefit from the trust balance lying with his bankers'," yet according to a dictum of Knight-Bruce, V.C., in Melland v. Gray (2 Coll., at p. 300), the trustee might not be charged with interest upon it." This is <clearly a mistake (probably on the part of the reporter). The trustee would, of course, be liable to interest if he kept the money uninvested, although placed to a separate account at his bankers (Ashburnham v. Thompson, 13 Ves. 402); the question is whether he would be liable to interest at the rate of five per cent. It is to be regretted that the reporter of Ashburnham v. Thompson has omitted to state the rate of interest with which the executors in that case (who appear to have used the assets in trafficking in stocks) were charged. There seems to be little doubt on principle that if a trustee trader can prove that he has kept the trust money to a separate account at his bankers, and especially if he has caused such account to be entitled "trust account," he will not be charged with more than four per cent. terest.

(4) It has been held that where an executor has retained in his own hands moneys belonging to the testator's estate which ought to have been applied in payment of debts of the testator, bearing interest at a higher rate than four per cent. per annum, the executor will be charged with the same rate as he has paid on such debts (Hall v. Hallett, 1 Cox. 134, 138; Turner v. Turner, 1 Jac. & W. 39, 43). As in the case considered above, under the head (2), the executor has "done damage to the estate," and, according to the decisions above cited, he must make good such damage. It is to be observed, however, that in Hall v. Hallett the executor who retained the balances was engaged in trade (see p. 138).

was

the

(5) Some rather unguarded observations of the judges in Burdick v. Garrick (18 W. R. 288, L. R. 5 Ch. 233) have tended to throw this subject into confusion. Lord Hatherley, C., said (L. R. 5 Ch. 241), "The Vice-Chancellor has directed interest to be charged at the rate of five per cent., which appears to me to be perfectly right, and for this reason, that the money retained in the defendants' own hands, and was made use of by them. That being so, the court presumes the rate of interest made upon money to be the ordinary rate of interest-namely, five per cent." Taken by themselves, these observations would imply that the rate with which trustees or executors were to be charged, in the absence of special circumstances, was the current rate of interest, and that, at the present time, that rate was five per cent. But it seems obvious that the learned judge was referring 'to the case before him, in which the fiduciaries had employed the money in their business (see p. 237); and Lord Hatherley (whose attention was obviously mainly directed to the question of compound interest) no doubt meant, in the observations above quoted, to refer to interest upon trust money employed in trade, in which case his remarks would have been strictly accurate. In the same way Lord Justice Giffard's statement (p. 243), that "the question of interest clearly depends upon the amount which the person who has improperly applied the money may be fairly presumed to have made. If he has applied it to his own use, I think it is quite right to say that he ought never to be heard to say that he has made less than five per cent., and that that is a fair presumption to make," is explainable on the supposition that he was speaking with reference to the case before him, of the employment of trust money in trade, although it must be confessed that the next sentence"if you seek to go further than that, and to charge him with more than five per cent., you must make out a case for that purpose "-is inconsistent with this view. When, however, we turn to the WEEKLY REPORTER (which so often corrects the errors of the so-called authorized reports), we find at once that the reporter must have blundered. In 18 W. R. 288, Lord Justice Giffard is (without any doubt correctly) reported to have said that "if an executor has made use of the money

Although the Incorporated Law Society accepts the Cambridge local as a substitute for its own examination, yet it is stated for the information of candidates for the former, in the rules before referred to, that the hitherto published regulations of the Law Society state no special subjects, so that it would seem to be quite possible that a candidate may have obtained a certificate, which I presume is accepted by the Law Society as evidence of having passed, and yet not have been examined in all or half of the branches of knowledge required for the solicitors' Preliminary. In order to secure in the Cambridge local examinations an honour or ordinary certificate, it is requisite that the candidate should have satisfied the examiners in group A., and in elementary arithmetic, and in any two of the remaining groups (R., B., C., D., E., and F.) that the candidate may select at his pleasure. Group A. includes English history and the English language, but three of the subjects of the solicitors' preliminary-viz., writing from dictation, writing a short English composition, and modern geography-are not included in any of the groups; so that if a candidate passed in group A., and afterwards obtained his certificate by passing in two other groups, say group D. (political economy, logic, and constitutional history), and group E. (botany, geology, zoology, chemistry, &c.), out of the seven subjects (reckoning geography as one) of the solicitors' Preliminary, he would only have been examined in three.

The questions set at the Cambridge local examinations are undoubtedly as stiff as those of the law Preliminary, yet the certificates can so easily be obtained, either by fair means or foul, and without any, or with but little, labour on the part of the candidate, that they neither are nor can be, in many cases, any criterion of knowledge or any real test of merit. Under the present rules of the Cambridge local, candidates are only required to take group A., and part I. in elementary arithmetic in the year in which they first enter, and may take the other groups in which they may wish to be examined subsequently at any period they please entirely at their own leisure; so that if they postpone doing so, as many do, until five or six years afterwards, they may have forgotten every scrap of what they read on the subjects in group A., but may, nevertheless, obtain a certificate. Surely, it cannot be to the credit of the legal profession if one of this latter class, desiring afterwards to enter into articles of clerkship with a solicitor, is allowed to escape the Preliminary. If it is so, this

cannot be very well calculated, I should imagine, to keep up the dignity of the profession, or to guard against the admission into its ranks of "black" or unworthy members. Those who have passed the Cambridge local examinations should only be excused from the law Preliminary if they have passed in the groups containing the same subjects, and not exempted from the other subjects in which they have not so passed, or already been examined in; and some limit, I would suggest, should be fixed to the time that has elapsed between their passing in group A. and in elementary arithmetic, and in the other groups, respectively.

It seems strange that no regulations with regard to this should have yet been made by the Law Society, and I think the sooner they are framed the better. So many dishonourable or questionable practices in connection with the University local examinations, both on the part of masters and candidates, have recently been brought to light, that a strong prejudice exists against them in some quarters, and they have fallen into much discredit. Sept. 20. R. H. GAMSON.

Cases of the Week.

INJUNCTION AGREEMENT TO ACT-ABSENCE- NEGATIVE CLAUSE-EXCLUSIVE NATURE OF AGREEMENT-CONSTRUCTION.-In a case of Robertson v. Bellew, before Lindley, J., sitting for the Vacation Judge, on the 16th inst., an important question was argued as to the right of the plaintiffs to restrain the defendant from acting for any other persons except themselves, there being no negative clause to that effect in the agreement. By the agreement made between the plaintiffs and the defendant, dated the 17th of April, 1880, the defendant bound himself to act for them during the year 1880 for ten months certain out of the twelve, and for six performances a week. The agreement contained provisions for a continuance of the engagement during 1881 and 1882, on the plaintiffs giving two months' notice before the close of the year. If required by the plaintiffs to play cut of London, his travelling expenses were to be paid by them. In the agreement there were provisions for an increase of salary in November, 1880, and during each renewed year. The defendant had recently been in ill-health, but was now able to act again, and had been requested to perform by the plaintiffs for two weeks at Liverpool, and three weeks subsequently at Glasgow. The defendant was about to accept an engagement with other parties, contending that the plaintiffs had broken their agreement with him. The defendant's contention was that the agreement had been intended only to apply to a particular theatre in London then leased by the plaintiffs, but which had recently been given up by them. Also that he was not bound to go anywhere when the plaintiffs required, and that he was only bound to act out of London during what is known as the short summer season, and which was now over. He further contended on the construction of the agreement that it would come to an end on the 1st of November, that being the end of the theatrical year, and that this was shown by the fact of his increased salary beginning at that date. He further argued that the notice of renewal was required to be given two months before November 1, and could not now be given. The plaintiffs relied on the dicta in Lumley v. Wagner (1 D. M. & G. 604), that although there were no negative words, still that the agreement was exclusive, and also on the authority of Montague. Stockton (L. R. 16 Eq. 189). The defendant

relied on Fechter v. Montgomery (33 Beav. 22), as showing that the agreement was non-exclusive. LINDLEY, J., was of opinion, although the construction was not very clear, still, on the whole, that the agreement was exclusive, and that during its continuance the defendant could not act for any other persons than the plaintiffs. He also considered that the defendant was bound to act wherever required by the plaintiffs. He did not say what might happen if the defendant were required to do anything unreasonable, but at present the plaintiffs only asked him to act for a very short time out of London, and he could see nothing unreasonable in their so doing. He could also not acquiesce in the defendant's contention that the agreement would come to an end on the 1st of November, or that the word "year" was to be

TRESPASS-INJUNCTION-BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE.-In a case of Willis v. Mayor of Leamington, before Lord Coleridge, Vacation Judge, on the 22nd inst., a motion was made by the plaintiff, the alleged owner of certain land at Leamington, to restrain the defendants, the Corporation of Leamington, and others from erecting an obelisk on the piece of ground to the memory of a deceased tradesman, on the ground that his consent had not been obtained, and that the erection would interfere with a right of view, and also obstruct a public footpath. The corporation admitted that there interim injunction to be continued. The other defendants on was a question of title to be tried, and submitted to allow the the cases contended they were entitled to make the erection, but they also offered, if necessary, to give an undertaking to pull down the obelisk if found in the wrong at the trial, and they submitted that on the balance of convenience the erection should be allowed to be completed. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., although on the law he was inclined to think the defendants were right, yet on the balance of convenience thought things should be kept in statu quo. He therefore continued the interim injunction over the second motion day in November. -SOLICITORS, Keane & Marsland; Milne & Co.

ATTACHMENT-DELAY-VACATION BUSINESS.-In a case of In re East Pant Du Lead Mining Company, also before the Vacation Judge on the 22nd inst., an application was made for an attachment for not bringing in certain accounts against a respondent now in gaol for another offence. An application for the motion to stand over for a week was made by the respondent's counsel, but this was objected to by the applicant unless an undertaking for the production of the prisoner on the 29th, when he would be released, were given. This was refused, and the motion was heard on the applicant's affidavit only. The facts appeared to be that the order to bring in the account was made in January last, and that no step to enforce the order was taken until September, when notice was given that, unless the account was left, a motion to commit would be made. The order not having been obeyed, notice of motion for this day was given on the 18th inst. An objection to the motion, as not being vacation business, was taken by the respondent's counsel, inasmuch as the order had not been attempted to be enforced from January until September. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., was of opinion that the motion was vacation business, and said he should make the order asked for, but would give the respondent leave to move to discharge the same on the 29th inst.—SOLICITORS, Chappell, Son, & Griffin; E. Warriner.

COMPANY-VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION-RESTRAINING EXE. CUTION-COSTS OF SHERIFF.-In the case of In re Chepstow Steamboat Carrying Company (Limited), also before the Vacation Judge on the 22nd inst., a motion was made by the voluntary liquidator of the company to continue an interim order restraining a creditor from proceeding with execution on a judgment in the Exchequer Division. An extraordinary resolution for a voluntary winding up had been passed on the 5th of July, and the creditor had obtained his judgment on the 25th of July, and the sheriff had seized a steamer, the property of the company, on the 7th inst. An interim injunction had been granted, and it was alleged that the creditors had notice of the voluntary

winding up when they obtained their judgment. It was

submitted that under section 133 of the Companies Act, 1862, the assets were to be divided pari passu, and therefore that the liquidator was entitled to the injunction asked for, and also that the creditors ought to pay the costs of the motion, they having proceeded after notice of the winding up. For them it was not contended that they could object to the injunction, but they submitted that the same should be granted without costs. The sheriff had been served with the notice of motion, and appeared and asked that his costs might be provided for, either by the creditore, if the court had jurisdiction to make such an order, or by the liquidator, he adding the sheriff's