not to have been pressed against the defendants at the trial. There the case made against them was based on the theory that they were trustees for the plaintiff, qua directors of the corporation. But, as Lord Justice Brett pointed out, the doctrine that directors of a company are, as such, trustees for persons dealing with the company is, or ought to be, exploded. On the application for the new trial it was argued (although apparently not put forward in the pleadings) that the defendants were liable to the plaintiff because they knew of, and derived personal benefit from, a breach of trust by the corporation. The first step in such an argument was, of course, to establish that the corporation were trustees for the plaintiff. The plaintiff paid £1,000 to the corporation for investment upon certain terms which had to be gathered, according to Lord Justice Brett, "from a mass of inconsistent phraseology in almost senseless documents." His Lordship considered that these terms constituted a contract and did not create a trust. Lord Justice Bramwell declined to decide whether a trust was created or not, although he felt it difficult to say there was not a trust. Lord Justice Baggallay held that a trust was created. We gather from a portion of Lord Justice Bramwell's judgment that he considered Lord Justice Brett as

THE FIRST VACATION SITTING in the Chancery Division was held on Wednesday, when Mr. Baron Pollock disposed of fifty-three motions. The proceedings were apparently not of very great interest. In one case the learned Baron discharged a writ of ne exeat regno, but most of the cases were ordinary applications for injunctions or for the winding up of companies. On an application for a return of a parliamentary deposit his lordship expressed an opinion that such orders ought to be treated as vacation business, and he directed that in all cases where the Bill had been passed or thrown out after the last motion day in the Trinity Sittings the motion for the return of the deposit should be placed in the paper without special

leave.

THE RESULT IN THE COURT OF APPEAL of the application for a new trial in the case of Wilson v. Lord Bury, a short report of which was given last week, although probably correct, is nevertheless, in some respects, both curious and unsatisfactory. Nominally the point for decision was whether certain evidence was improperly rejected by the Lord Chief Justice at the trial; really the questions were, whether the relation of trustee and cestui que trust existed under the circumstances between the Colonial Trusts Corporation and the plaintiff, whether there had been a breach of trust, and whether the defendants, the directors of the corporation, were liable for that breach of trust as having knowingly derived personal benefit from it. This ground of liability seems

one.

plaintiff and the corporation, therefore, there was no trust. It is obvious that Lord Justice Brett could never have intended to lay down any such proposition as a general What lies at the root of his judgment on this point is that he considered that, as soon as the £1,000 was paid by the plaintiff to the company, it ceased in equity as well as at law to be the money of the plaintiff. If this were so, according to the terms of dealing between the parties, then Lord Justice Brett's proposition was true as applied to the particular case. Lord Justice Bramwell agreed with Lord Justice Brett in holding that, even assuming a trust to have been created, and a breach thereof to have been committed, neither the evidence admitted nor that rejected showed that the defendants had derived any such personal benefit in the transaction as to render them liable to the plaintiff, and that, on this ground, there ought not to be a new trial. Lord Justice Baggallay disagreed with the majority of the court in this respect, and was in favour of a new trial.

THE RECENT DECISION of the Court of Appeal in Harnett v. Vise will probably cause some surprise in the profession on account of the wide view taken by the court as to the extent of the discretion vested in the judge and court by order 55, in depriving a successful plaintiff of his costs "for good cause shown." The action was for libel, and, after several days' trial before Mr. Baron Huddleston and a special jury, a verdict was found for the plaintiff, with £10 damages. The defendant's counsel applied to Mr. Baron Huddleston to deprive the plaintiff of his costs, and his lordship, after some discussion, acceded to the application, on the "the ground that plaintiff had, by his conduct, brought the whole thing upon himself," and he observed that the verdict was, to his mind, "inexplicable." The Exchequer Division (the court being composed of Mr. Baron Huddleston and Mr. Justice Stephen) refused to vary this decision, and the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal, his counsel arguing that the words "for good cause shown," in order 55, could refer only to some part of the conduct of the successful party which had increased the costs payable by his opponent, and that since the jury had found that the letter written by the defendant was a libel, and had negatived the justification, the judge had no right to take a course by which he had virtually set aside the verdict. The Lords Justices, however, dismissed the appeal, Lord Justice James observing that it was not consistent with the language or spirit of order 55 to construe it as if it had contained the words, "provided that in all cases in which, in an action for slander or libel, a jury shall give a verdict for

the plaintiff, with damages to the amount of £10, the judge shall be bound to accept such verdict, as conclusively showing that the plaintiff is entitled to costs." Although the verdict was conclusive that there had been a libel, and a publication of a libel, and that some part of it, at least, was not justified, and the amount of damages did not conclusively establish any remaining matter in issue, he thought that such amount should be taken into consideration in deciding whether the jurisdiction conferred by order 55 ought to be exercised or not. That jurisdiction did not confine the consideration of the judge to the conduct of the parties in the litigation itself, but he ought to take into account anything which might have conduced to the libel, anything in the conduct of the parties, and anything showing that the action was not properly brought. His lordship added that the libel complained of "almost came within the protection afforded to privileged communications," being only technically" outside it, and that he was satisfied that it never could have done the least harm to the plaintiff. Seeing that the plaintiff had been successful upon all the issues submitted to the jury, and had recovered such an amount of damages as would, before the passing of the Judicature Acts, have entitled him, as a matter of right, to his costs, it appears somewhat hard that he should remain the loser by the litigation, and it may be doubted whether the framers of the rule contemplated such a liberal interpretation of the words "for good cause shown."

64

THE GRANT of a separate Court of Quarter Sessions for the borough of Sheffield has caused an addition to the limited number of lucrative Recorderships, and the selection of Mr. Alfred Wills, Q.C., will give satisfaction both to the members of the North-Eastern Circuit and to the profession generally. Comparatively few of these appointments are worth the acceptance of a leading Queen's Counsel, while the rule that any member of Parliament appointed to a Recordership must offer himself for re-election limits still further the field of selection. Several of the present judges have, however, obtained their first judicial experience as recorders of boroughs. The Lord Chief Justice of England was recorder of Southampton, and afterwards of Bristol; Lord Coleridge has been Recorder of Portsmouth, Mr. Justice Stephen of Newark, Mr. Justice Bowen of Penzance, and Mr. Justice Lopes of Exeter. Among retired judges, Sir John Byles has been Recorder of Buckingham, and Sir John Mellor has been Recorder, first of Warwick and afterwards of Leicester. We may add that the Recordership of Carlisle has just been resigned by the SolicitorGeneral.

WE PRINT this week a new order relative to the scale of fees payable for searches in certain registers and indexes at the Royal Courts of Justice, and also for copies of certificates, and on giving notices as to stock under ord. 46, r. 4.

The town clerkship of the city of Bristol has become vacant by the resignation of Mr. William Brice, who has

held the office since December, 1874.

The Western Jurist says:-There is a venerable and benevolent judge in Paris, who, at the moment of passing sentence on a prisoner, consults his associates on each side of him as to the penalty proper to be inflicted. "What ought we to give this rascal, brother?" he says, bending over to the associate on the right. "I should say three years." "What is your opinion, brother ?" to the associate on the left. "I should say give him about four years." The judge, with benevolence: "Prisoner, not desiring to give you a long and severe term of imprisonment, as I should have done if left to myself, I have consulted my learned brothers, and shall take their advice. Seven years,"

DISCHARGE OF SURETY BY SURRENDER OF SECURITY.

In the case of Rainbow v. Juggins (L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 422) the Court of Appeal expressed an opinion on a point of very considerable importance with regard to the law of suretyship. It seems that, under the circumstances of the case, it was hardly necessary to decide the point, but the court, nevertheless, seem to have done so. The facts were these. The defendant became surety for the re-payment of a sum of money advanced by the plaintiff to P. Under the terms of the contract of suretyship, P. deposited with the plaintiff a policy of insurance on his life, by way of collateral security. P. failed to pay the premiums on the policy, which in consequence lapsed. Subsequently to the lapse of the policy P. became bankrupt, and the plaintiff proved against P.'s estate for the whole amount of the debt due to her, without putting any value on the policy, which was, consequently, ordered by the Court of Bankruptcy to be delivered up to the trustees. The insurance office had agreed, subsequently to the plaintiff's proving for the whole debt, to reinstate the policy. The question was whether the plaintiff had, by the course she pursued, discharged the defendant from all liability as surety. The court thought that at the time when the plaintiff proved in bankruptcy the policy could not be said to have any marketable value, the clause that the office would then reinstate it being, under the circumstances, of no value, and, consequently, that the defendant's position as surety had not been altered. But they further expressed an opinion-and this, we think, is the important point of the case-that, even assuming that it had some value, and could, therefore, be said to be a security, the plaintiff was none the less entitled to exercise the option given by the Bankruptcy Act of surrendering the security to the trustee, and proving for the whole of the debt, because there happened to be a security for that debt. The ground on which this seems to have been put by Lord Justice Baggallay is that, where three persons enter into the relations of creditor, debtor, and surety, the possible bankruptcy of the debtor is an event which the surety must be taken to have had in his contemplation at the time of entering into the contract of suretyship, and that, consequently, it be comes an implied term of the contract that, in the event of bankruptcy occurring, the creditor shall be entitled to exercise the option which the bankruptcy law gives him in the way which is most advantageous to himself.

It is very material, in considering the effect of this decision, to bear in mind what the question in dispute really was, and it is therefore necessary to refer from the report of the case in the Court of Appeal to the report in the court below (28 W. R. 428, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 138). It will be seen, on so doing, that it was admitted in the Queen's Bench Division by the plaintiff that the defendant was discharged to the extent of the value of the policy when reinstated, viz., £32, the point argued being whether the defendant was discharged altogether. This has an important bearing on the decision of the Court of Appeal, which only actually decided that the defendant was not entirely discharged. It seems to us that, the Bankruptcy Act giving the option to the creditor to abandon the security to the trustee and prove for the whole debt, it would certainly be unreasonable to hold that he thereby discharged the surety altogether. In our view, quite apart from the point taken by the ruptcy law, it would be unreasonable to hold that Court of Appeal as to the operation of the bankthe surety was discharged altogether, and that the decision of Manisty, J., was correct both in the result and the reasoning on which it was founded.

The decision of the Court of Appeal seems to leave open the question whether, assuming the security to be of some value, the surety is discharged pro tanto. We do not quite follow the expressions used by the Court

Why should it be taken that there is an implied contract that in case of bankruptcy the creditor may surrender the security without prejudice to his rights against the surety? It would seem to follow from this way of looking at it that the surety is not here discharged pro tanto. The law apart from bankruptcy appears to be that the surety is entitled to the benefit of the security on paying the debt; and therefore, by parting with the security, the creditor increases his ultimate liability by the amount of the value of the security. We cannot see why this should be altered in the case of bankruptcy. The effect is that the unfortunate surety, who might be looked upon as a secured creditor pro tanto before the bankruptcy, is deprived of his security without having any option in the matter by the act of the creditor. We can understand why the surety is not to be discharged entirely apart from any consideration derived from the bankruptcy law and no doubt it would be harder still in the case of bankruptcy that the creditor, having to make the election required of him by the bankruptcy law, should be held to discharge the surety altogether by electing to give up his security and prove for his whole debt-but we find some difficulty in appreciating the effect of the decision on cases where the question is not whether the surety is discharged altogether, but whether he is discharged pro tanto. Why is he to lose the security which the law gives him because the debtor's estate is administeredi n bankruptcy, when the creditor chooses to give up the security and take his chance of getting his whole debt out of the estate and the surety? If the surety is a rich man the creditor may well take that course. If the surety paid the whole debt the creditor would be a trustee for him of the security, and the surety might then prove for the balance against the estate of the bankrupt. Why, because recourse is first had to the estate of the bankrupt, is the position of the surety to be altered in this respect? It. seems to us that, owing to the fact that the question before the court was limited, as above stated, there is considerable uncertainty as to the effect of the decision.

Recent Decisions.

FOREIGN DECREES OF DIVORCE. (Briggs v. Briggs, P. D. & A. D., 28 W. R. 702, L. R. 5 P. D.163; Harvey v. Farnie, P. D. & A. D., 28 W. R. 723, L. R. 5 P. D. 153.)

In both these cases a wife sought relief on the ground of her husband's alleged bigamy, the petition being in the one case for a divorce, and in the other for a decree of nullity of marriage. In each instance the court had to consider the effect of a decree of divorce pronounced in another country for reasons which would not have afforded any ground for relief in England, with especial reference to the principles laid down in Lolley's case (Rus. & Ry. 237).

Briggs v. Briggs was an undefended suit by a wife for dissolution of marriage, on the ground of her husband's adultery, coupled with desertion and cruelty. The parties were domiciled and married in this country, but, after several years' cohabitation, the husband went to America with the object of avoiding his creditors, although Sir James Hannen found that there was no evidence of his intention to abandon his domicil of origin. He afterwards obtained a decree of divorce in the State of Kansas, on the ground of his wife's alleged desertion. It appeared that by the law of Kansas the above ground is sufficient to entitle a husband to relief, that twelve months' residence by the petitioner is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, and that service of the petition by advertisement for three weeks in a Kansas newspaper, and by posting a notice of it to the wife in England, is deemed to be a valid service. Sir J. Hannen held that the facts fell entirely within the resolution of the judges in

Lolley's case, that "no sentence or act of any foreign country can dissolve an English marriage a vinculo matrimonii, for grounds on which it was not liable to be divorced a vinculo matrimonii in England." He, therefore, held that the first marriage was still valid, and that the respondent had been guilty of bigamy, and he pronounced a decree nisi. Since the decision turned upon the non-abandonment by the husband of his English domicil, it became unnecessary to consider the consequences of the non-receipt by the wife of any notice of the proceedings in Kansas, and also the question raised by Lord Westbury in Pitt v. Pitt (12 W. R. 1089, 4 Macq. 627), whether a wife becomes subject for the purposes of divorce to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of any country in which the husband may choose to acquire a domicil.

In Harvey v. Farnie the respondent, who was then a domiciled Scotchman, was married in Wales to an Englishwoman. The parties cohabited for about two years in Scotland, where the wife afterwards obtained a divorce on the ground of the respondent's adultery. The respondent then abandoned his Scotch domicil, and came to reside in London, where he was married to the petitioner, who now sought a declaration of nullity of marriage, on the ground that the respondent's first wife was still living, and that her own marriage with him was therefore bigamous. As in Briggs v. Briggs, a marriage celebrated in England had been dissolved by a foreign court for reasons which are not recognized in this country, and Lolley's case was relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner. Sir J. Hannen however dismissed the petition, on the ground that the respondent, although he was married to his first wife in England, did not renounce his allegiance to the law of Scotland, where the cohabitation took place, while she of course acquired his domicil. The Scotch court, therefore, had full jurisdiction over the parties, and the decree of divorce was valid, and must be recognized in this country. He distinguished the case before him from Lolley's case, where the parties were domiciled in England at the time when the Scotch divorce was pronounced, and he observed that the effect of that case had been, on several occasions, misapprehended by Lord Brougham and other judges. He pointed out that Warrender v. Warrender (2 C. & F. 488) showed that the divorce was valid according to the law of Scotland, while Lord Chancellor Blackburn's decision in Maghee v. McAlister (3 Ir. Ch. Rep. 604) was an authority in favour of the recognition of the judgment out of Scotland as the dissolution by a court of competent jurisdiction of a marriage between two parties subject to the law of the domicil.

The judgment in Harvey v. Farnie, against which notice of appeal has been given, has at least prevented the absurd result of its being held that the respondent was, at the date of the celebration of the second marriage, a married man in England, but unmarried in Scotland.

Societies.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

At the adjourned annual general meeting of the Incor poroted Law Society, held on Wednesday, August 11, Mr. John Moxon Clabon, president, in the chair, the report of the scrutineers appointed to certify the result of the election of thirteen members of the council was read and services rendered by them to the society was unanimously adopted, and a vote of thanks to the scrutineers for the agreed to. The following gentlemen were elected members of the council :-Messrs. G. B. Gregory, M.P., L. Fry, M.P. (Bristol), F. H. Janson, J. Hollams, B. G. Lake, W. A. Jevons (Liverpool), C. J. Follett, E. Field (Nor. wich), H. Markby, F. P. Morrell (Oxford), H. S. L. Hussey, J. Eaden (Cambridge), and F. L. Hutchins.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. The usual monthly meeting of the board of directors of this association was held on Wednesday, the 11th of August, at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, London, Mr. W. B. Brook in the chair, the other directors present being Messrs. Asker (Norwich), Hedger, Kays, Pidcock (Woolwich), Rickman, Rose, and Walters (Mr. Eiffe, secretary). A sum of £305 was distributed in grants of assistance to necessitous solicitors and their families; thirty-five gentlemen were admitted members of the association; the ensuing half-yearly general meeting of the association was appointed to be held at Sheffield on the 7th of October next; and other general business was transacted.

Law Students' Journal.

UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. The first meeting of this society during the month of August was held on Wednesday, the 11th inst., in Clement'sinn Hall, Mr. C. Kains-Jackson in the chair. The motion on the paper was, "That this house views with much dissatisfaction the recent vote in the House of Lords upon the Compensation for Disturbance (Ireland) Bill." Mr. Ashton Cross opened the debate in the affirmative, and was supported by Messrs. Robinson, Shirley, and Curtis, and opposed by Messrs. Moyle, Napier, Foy, Donner, and Harvey. Mr. Bartrum, for Mr. Cross, then replied, and, upon a division, the notion was lost by a majority of one vote. number of members present was twenty-four. The next meeting of the society at Clement's-inn will be held on Wednesday, August 25, when the subject for debate is, "That the action of the present Government with reference to the affairs of Greece is calculated to involve this country unnecessarily in Eastern complications."

Obituary.

The

THE HON. WILLIAM CECIL SPRING RICE. The Hon. William Cecil Spring Rice, barrister, many years a registrar in bankruptcy, died at his residence in The Albany, Piccadilly, on the 11th inst. Mr. Spring Rice was the fifth son of the first Lord Monteagle, his mother being a daughter of the first Earl of Limerick. He was born in 1811, and he was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he took the usual degrees. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Hilary Term, 1848, and he practised for several years as an equity draftsman and conveyancer. He was chief secretary to Lord Cranworth when Lord Chancellor, and he was secretary to the Commissioners of Lunacy from 1861 till 1866, when he was appointed by Lord Cranworth to be one of the registrars of the Court of Bankruptcy. He discharged the duties of that office with great ability and success until last year, when, to the great regret of the profession, he was compelled by ill-health to retire upon a pension. The deceased was unmarried.

MR. FREDERICK BARLOW.

Mr. Frederick Barlow, solicitor (the head of the firm of Barlow, Palmer, & Bonnett), of Cambridge, died on the 11th inst. Mr. Barlow was admitted a solicitor in 1833, and he had ever since practised at Cambridge. He was in partnership with Mr. Charles William Palmer, clerk to the magistrates for the Cambridge Division of the county, and with Mr. John Bonnett, the clerk to the Harston School Board. Mr. Barlow was a perpetual commissioner for Cambridgeshire, and he had a very large private practice. He also held a large number of important public appoint ments, having been for many years county coroner, clerk to the county magistrates, clerk to the Cambridge Improvement Commissioners and the Chesterton Board of Guardians, superintendent registrar, and secretary to Addenbrooke's Hospital. He was one of the aldermen for the borough of Cambridge. He was elected mayor in 1875, and at the end of his year of office he was re-appointed for a second term.

Mr. Barlow was buried at Chesterton Church on the 16th inst. The widow of the deceased died a few days later.

MR. HENRY FORD.

Fareham, died from a sudden attack of apoplexy on the 14th Mr. Henry Ford, solicitor, of Portsmouth, Portsea, and inst. Mr. Ford was born in 1819, and was admitted a solicitor in 1840. He was for several years in partnership with his brother Alderman Richard William Ford, but more recently he was associated with his son, Mr. William Henry Ford, who was admitted a solicitor in 1867. The deceased was a perpetual commissioner for Hampshire, and his private practice was very extensive. He was formerly solicitor to to the Portsmouth Pier Harbour Company, and the Portsmouth and Ryde Steam Packet Company, and he was at the time of his death solicitor to the Portsmouth Licensed Victuallers' Association and Brewers' Protection Society, and to the Portsmouth Building Society. Mr. Ford had also been for several years clerk of the peace for the borough of Portsmouth, and he was very highly esteemed by all the members and officials of the corporation.

MR. RALPH WARD JACKSON.

Mr. Ralph Ward Jackson, solicitor, formerly M.P. fer Hartlepool, died at 9, Albion-street, Hyde-park, on the 6th inst. Mr. Jackson was the third son of Mr. William Ward Jackson, of Normanby Hall, Yorkshire, and was born in 1805. He was educated at Rugby, and he was admitted a solicitor in 1828. He formerly practised at Stockton, having been at one time associated in partnership with Mr. Joseph Frank, and afterwards with Mr. John Bury. He was for many years solicitor to the Stockton and West Hartlepool Railway Company, of which body he was more recently the chairman. He retired from practice in 1854, and from that date he devoted himself entirely to commercial pursuits. He was one of the chief promoters of the Hartlepool Docks, and was for several years chairman of the West Hartlepool Improvement Commissioners. After the passing of the Reform Bill of 1867, Mr. Jackson became a candidate for the representation of the new borough of Hartlepool in the Conservative interest. He held the seat from 1868 till 1874, when he was defeated at the general election, and he did not again attempt to enter Parliament. Mr. Jackson was married to the second daughter of Mr. Charles Swainson, of Cooper Hill, Lancashire. He became a widower in 1865, and he leaves one son.

MR. JAMES WARD RUSSELL. Mr. James Ward Russell, solicitor, died at Bryn Glas, Merthyr Tydvil, on the 6th inst. Mr. Russell was born in 1812, and was educated at Eton. He served his articles with an uncle at Marlborough, and he was admitted a solicitor in 1834. Three or four years later he settled at Merthyr Tydvil, where he had practised for over forty years and he had a lucrative business. He was a perpetual commissioner for Glamorganshire, and he was formerly clerk to the Merthyr Tydvil Local Board of Health. Soon after the passing of the County Courts Act, 1846, he was appointed assistant clerk of the Merthyr Tydvil County Court (Circuit No. 30), and about ten years later he became registrar for the same district, which office he held until his death. He was for several years solicitor to the Merthyr Tydvil Gas Company, and the Rhymney Iron Company. Mr. Russell was a captain in the local corps of Rifle Volunteer, and he was a leading member of the Masonic body in Glamorganshire.

MR. REGINALD ROBERT WALPOLE. Mr. Reginald Robert Walpole, barrister, of Hanslope Lodge, Buckinghamshire, died at Brighton on the 25th u Mr. Walpole was the eldest son of the Rev. Robert Walpole, rector of Christ Church, Marylebone, and he was born in 1817. He was educated at Caius College, Cambridge, where he graduated as a senior optime, and also in the third class of the classical tripos in 1842, and he was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Easter Term, 1846. He formerly had a good practice as a conveyancer, and he was for several years reader on the law of real property to the Honourable Society of Gray's-inn. Mr. Walpole retired from practice about twenty years ago. He was a magistrate for Buckinghamshire and Northamptonshire. He was twice married, and leaves four daughters.