Solicitors' Journal.

LONDON, AUGUST 14, 1880.

state of things partly to a speech made two years ago in the House of Commons by the present Attorney-General while in Opposition, but partly also to the fixing by the Treasury Order of the 24th of April, 1877, of an uniform fee of £5 for every reference, irrespective of the time occupied, instead of one guinea for every hour or part of an hour during which the referee sits.

IT IS SATISFACTORY to learn from the statement made by the Solicitor-General in the House of Commons on Monday last that the time of the official referees has, during the present year, been fully occupied, and that they were even unable to complete all the pending references before the long vacation; and therefore the statistics of the business done by them during the legal year which has just expired will be looked for with considerable interest. It was hardly to be expected that an economist like Mr. Rylands would allow a vote for so large a sum as £6,800, being £1,500 for the salary of each referee, and £800 for their clerks, to pass unchallenged, but the explanation elicited by his opposition certainly justified the withdrawal of his amendment. It is to be observed that Mr. Watkin Williams, who had on several occasions severely criticized in the House the appointments made and the manner in which the business of the official referees has been carried on, now stated that 'experience had induced him to alter his opinion." The Solicitor-General attributes the prescat more satisfactory

THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY in Scotland has had to decide a curious charge of cruelty to animals preferred under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Scotland) Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 92), s. 1, which is in the same terms assection 2 of the corresponding English Act of 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 72). The appellant and his wife were walking in Leith with two dogs which were attacked by a larger dog. The dogs were separated once, but began to fight again. Neither the appellant, nor his wife, nor his servant, nor a policeman, were able to separate them. The appellant, having destroyed his umbrella in his efforts for the protection of his own dogs, fetched a knife from his house, which was close by, and inflicted several stabs on the large dog, from the effects of which it died on the following day. The police magistrate fined him thirty shillings, and it was argued in support of the conviction that the appellant had committed an offence within the statute, since he had been guilty of wanton cruelty, and had inflicted needless pain by causing the dog to die a lingering and painful death. The court, however, allowed the appeal. The Lord Justice Clerk, after observing that "it is not comfortable to try to separate dogs which are fighting," held that there had been no cruelty within the Act, which was only aimed against persons who make an animal suffer without cause. The court, however, expressly abstained from expressing an opinion as to whether the appellant was liable to an action at the suit of the owner of the deceased dog.

NOT VERY LONG AGO a daily contemporary published a series of letters from correspondents of every age and degree complaining of the extent to which the habit of profane swearing had been carried in this country. None of these correspondents, so far as we can remember, appeared to be aware of the amount of protection afforded them by the law. Independently of provisions in the Town Police Clauses Act, and the Metropolitan Police Act, to which we will presently refer, there is upon the Statute-book an Act passed in the reign of George the Second (19 Geo. 2, c. 21), which is, without a single exception, the most stringent Act of Parliament we ever read. This statute, after reciting that the "horrid, impious, and execrable uses of profane cursing and swearing, so highly displeasing to Almighty God and loathsome and offensive to every Christian, are become so frequent and notorious that unless speedily and effectually punished they may justly provoke the Divine vengeance to increase the many calamities these nations now [1745] labour under," proceeds to enact that "if any person shall profanely curse or swear and be thereof convicted," &c., "every person so offending shall forfeit and lose the respective sums hereinafter mentioned-that is to say, every day labourer, common soldier, and common seaman, one shilling; and every other person under the degree of a gentleman, two shillings; and every person of or above the degree of a gentleman, five shillings.' It is also pro

vided that after a conviction the fine is to be doubled, and after a second conviction trebled; although it was held in Reg. v. Scott (33 L. J. M. C. 15) that the swearing of any number of oaths on one single occasion is one offence only, with a cumulative penalty for each oath. But the peculiar force of the statute lies in the succeeding sections. By section 2 it is enacted that if any person swear in the presence and hearing of any justice of the

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peace," such justice "shall and is hereby authorized and required to convict every such offender without any other proof whatsoever." And in order to make the statute still more effective, the 6th section provides that if any justice "shall wilfully and wittingly omit the performance of his duty in the execution of this Act, he shall forfeit and lose the sum of five pounds, one moiety thereof to the use of the informer, and the other moiety thereof to the use of the poor of the parish," &c. Similar, but lesser penalties may be extracted from constables' failing in the performance of their duties under the Act, amongst which is the duty to seize any unknown person swearing in their presence," and such offender forthwith to carry forthwith before the next justice of the peace, &c."

It may be said, perhaps, that this curious statute is obsolete; but Reg. v. Scott, which was decided only about twenty years ago, shows that it is not so; and we understand that the Act has been put into force in more than one seaport town within the last year or two. The principle of the Act, too, is adopted by the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, s. 28, and by the Metropolitan Police Act, 1839 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47), s. 12, under which a maximum penalty of forty shillings is imposed upon persons using profane language in public streets or thoroughfares, and as these these Acts have only a limited local application to the metropolis and large towns, the country swearer is provided for by the Act of George the Second alone,

IN DELIVERING JUDGMENT in the Sandwich Election Petition, Mr. Justice Lush alluded to the revival in that borough of an illegal practice, which was thought to have died out-the distribution of flags and ribbons. Probably many persons are unaware of the express enactment on this subject. The Bribery, &c., at Elections Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 7), enacted, by section 7, that ". 'no candidate before, during, or after any election shall, in regard to such election by himself or agent, directly or indirectly provide to or for any person having a vote at such election, or to or for any inhabitant of the county, city, borough, or place for which such election is held, any cockade, ribbon, or other mark of distinction." Every person giving or providing such things is liable to a penalty of £2, with costs of the suit, to whoever shall sue for the same, and all payments for or on account of any cockade, ribbon, or mark of distinction, as well as for or on account of chairing, or bands of music, or flags, or banners, are to be deemed "illegal payments within the Act. This Act was carried through the House of Commons by Lord John Russell, but many of its most important provisions were incorporated by a select committee from an independent measure, which had been introduced by the present Lord Chief Baron.

Mr. Edward Clarke, Q.C., M.P., was, on Monday evening last, at the Drill Hall, Bermondsey, presented by the Southwark Working Men's Conservative Association with a silver inkstand, value seventy guineas, and accompanied by an address engrossed upon vellum and bound in morocco.

At the Warwick Assizes the case of Seal v. Claridge, an interpleader issue tried before Baron Huddleston, raised a nice point under the new Bills of Sale Act, 1878. The plaintiff, a solicitor in London, is the holder of a bill of sale on the goods of a man named Johnson; and the defendant is an execution creditor. The Bills of Sale Act, 1878, requires that every bill of sale shall be attested by a solicitor, and by him explained to the parties. In the present case the plaintiff, being himself a solicitor, had attested the bill of sale, Baron Huddleston held the bill of sale to be void, saying that the Act clearly contemplated attestation by an independent solicitor, and if this attestation was good, any solicitor, who was also a money-lender, might attest, and so the Act, which was passed for the benefit of grantors, would be defeated. Judgment for the defendant.

DECISIONS UNDER THE INFANTS RELIEF АСТ.

THE Infants Relief Act, 1874 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 62), has given rise to several discussions. Section 1 provides that "all contracts, whether by specialty or by simple contract, henceforth entered into by infants for the repayment of money lent, or to be lent, or for goods supplied, or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries), and all accounts stated with infants shall be absolutely void, provided always that this enactment shall not invalidate any contract into which an infant may, by any existing or future statute, or by the rules of common law or equity, enter, except such as now by law are voidable." By section 2 "no action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted during infancy, whether there shall or shall not be any new consideration for such promise or ratification after full age." The first case decided upon the statute was a bankruptcy appeal, Ex parte Kibble, In re Onslow (23 W. R. 433, L. R. 10 Ch. 373). The Lords Justices of Appeal affirmed an order of a registrar, dismissing a petition for an adjudication of bankruptcy against the drawer of a bill of exchange, given in respect of a debt contracted by him during infancy, but not for neces saries. He attained his majority two or three weeks after the passing of the Act, and the bill became due in the following month. The court held that the 2nd section of the Act applied to a ratification after the pass. ing of the Act of a contract made by an infant before it. Ex parte Lynch, In re Lynch (24 W. R. 375, L. R. ? Ch. D. 227), was a case where an infant had traded, and the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy held that the Infants Relief Act was no bar to his being adjudicated a bankrupt in respect of a debt contracted while so trading, the creditors having been ignorant of the fact that he was an infant. The effect of the statute was also considered by the Queen's Bench Division in Ireland, in Belfast Banking Company v. Doherty (4 L. R. Ir. 124). The defendant, when of full age, accepted a bill of exchange in renewal of a former bill which had been accepted by him when an infant in respect of a debt contracted during infancy, but not for necessaries. The court held that the statute was no answer to an action upon the bill by an indorsee for value having no notice of the acceptor's infancy, but Justices O'Brien and Fitzgerald both expressed an opinion that the Act would have prevented an action by the drawer of the bill against the acceptor, since as between the drawer and the acceptor the contract would have been either a promise to pay a debt contracted during infancy, or a ratification of a promise made during infancy within the 2nd section. The statute was also discussed by the Common Pleas Division in two actions for breach of promise of marriage. In Coxhead v. Mullis (27 W. R. 136, L. R. 3 C. P. D. 439), the defendant, when an infant, made a promise of marriage to the plaintiff, but broke it after attaining his majority, though there was evidence of ratification after he was of full age. Lord Coleridge and Mr. Justice Lopes held that the plaintiff was properly nonsuited, for the words of the 2nd section of the Act were wide enough to include a promise of marriage, and they were not limited to the contracts mentioned in the 1st section-namely, contracts for repayment of money, contracts for the supply of goods (other than necessaries), and accounts stated. In Northcote v. Doughty (L. R. 4 C. P. D. 385), the defendant had, while an infant, made an offer of marriage to the plaintiff, which she accepted, subject to the approval of his parents. Two days before attaining his majority (being then on a visit to his father) he wrote a letter to the plaintiff, in which he stated that he had obtained his parents' consent to the engagement, and on the day after his twenty-first birthday he said to her-" Now I may and will marry you as soon as I can." The case was tried before Mr. Justice Lopes, who asked the jury

whether the promise made during infancy was absolute or conditional, and whether what occurred after the plaintiff came of age was a new promise or a ratification of the former one. The jury found that the first promise was conditional, and that the second promise was an entirely new one, and a verdict was found for the plaintiff. On an order nisi for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, Coxhead v. Mullis was relied upon by the counsel for the defendant, who contended that the only possible consideration for the second promise was the promise made during infancy, which was absolutely void and incapable of ratification. The case was heard by Justices Denman and Lopes, who distinguished it from Coxhead v. Mullis, since the jury had found that there was a fresh promise. They held that in such a case it is for the jury to say whether there had been any fresh promise by the defendant after attaining full age, or merely such a ratification of a promise made during infancy as would be avoided by the 2nd section of the Act. In the recent case of Ditcham v. Worrall, the same question came for the third time before the Common Pleas Division. Here again the defendant's offer of marriage had been made to, and accepted by, the plaintiff while the former was still a minor. After he had attained his majority a day was fixed for the marriage, but it was afterwards postponed for a month on account of the illness of the plaintiff's mother. A quarrel afterwards took place, and the defendant declined to fulfil his promise. At the trial before Lord Coleridge it was arranged that the court should enter judgment for the plaintiff, with £400 damages, if it should be of opinion that there was reasonable evidence of such a fresh promise after the defendant came of age as was not a mere ratification, and would take the case out of the operation of section 2 of the Infants Relief Act. Ultimately the majority of the court (Justices Denman and Lindley) held that there was evidence of such a fresh promise, while Lord Coleridge arrived at an opposite conclusion. The 1st section of the Act also formed the ground of decision in a recent criminal case. In Reg. v. Wilson (28 W. R. 307, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 28), the prisoner had been convicted under section 12 of the Debtors Act, 1869, for having within four months before the presentation of a bankruptcy petition against him left England, and taken with him property to the amount of £20 and upwards, which ought by law to have been divided among his creditors. He was a minor at the date of his adjudication of bankruptcy, and all the debts proved against his estate were trade debts, and not debts for necessaries. The court held that, since all his trading contracts were absolutely void under section 1 of the Infants Relief Act, none of his property could be by law divided among creditors, and that therefore he had not committed any offence under the Debtors Act, and the conviction was quashed.

As

The Central Law Journal says :-Some anecdotes of an eminent lawyer in a city in one of the Eastern States will bear reprinting, even though we are compelled to omit the name of the State court against which they are directed. Some years ago the lawyer in question was counsel for a female client, but did not receive a decision in his favour, although justice and equity would have warranted it. he and his client were leaving the court-room, the lady, who was well known as the exponent of woman's rights, said to him, "That was rank injustice." "Certainly, madam," he replied. "Mr. the lady continued, "when we women get a chance to sit on that bench such injustice will not be possible." With a smile, the lawyer said, "Madam, never expect to see a greater set of old women than are at present on the Supreme Court bench." A short time ago, while in a street car, he was observed by one of the younger and lesser lights of the bar, who was acquainted with him, reading a sheep-covered book, and the young man, catching his eye, said, " 'Ah, Mr. -, reading law? I thought you knew the law, and it was for youngsters to study it." Gravely he replied, "I am not reading law; I am reading one of the decisions of the Supreme Court."

THE JUDICIAL STATISTICS. QUEEN'S BENCH, COMMON PLEAS, AND EXCHEQUER DIVISIONS.

THE proceedings in the Queen's Bench Division on the Crown side in 1877-78 were as follows:-Mandamus, applications on affidavit, 59; mandumus, made absolute, rules nisi granted, 53; other special rules made abso35; quo warranto, informations filed, 2; other special lute, 105; applications for habeas corpus, 51; writs of habeas corpus granted, 50; certiorari, writs issued by court, 28; certiorari, writs issued by judge, 11; writs of prohibition, 2; orders of sessions removed into Queen's Bench, 14. The total amount of fees received exclusive of business done for the public departments, for business done in the Crown office during the year, for which no fees were received, was £1,041 4s. 4d., being less than the amount for 1876-7 by £230 183. 4d. The process, practice, and mode of pleading in the three common law divisons at Westminster being together in the appended table. similar on the Plea side, the proceedings may be shown Those under the heading "Process issued

are the preliminary and incidental matters in suits transacted in the different offices connected with the courts; the "Matters heard before the judges sitting in banc.

"

come

Ex. Total.

16,914 16,573 22,168 55,655 8,707 6,945 10,622 26,274 7,416 6,884 9,501 23,801 4,599 4,704 6,056 15,359

347

277 371

995

190

131

The total fees were as follows:-Queen's Bench, Exchequer, £18,579 10s. 8d.-total, £53,365 10s. 4d. £20,603 6s. 6d.; Common Pleas, £14,182 13s. 2d.; The total for the previous year was £51,904 Os. 3d. exclusive of bills taxed under the statute, was 12,072. The number of bills of costs taxed in the divisions, proceedings in 1878 were two petitions presented from Under the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868, the only South Northumberland, and withdrawn by judge's order. The associates of the three divisions furnish, as usual, returns which show that at the end of 1876-7 the number of remanets was 1,128. During the year 1877-8 the number of cases entered for trial at Westminster was 2,146, and at Nisi Prius 1,330. At Nisi Prius there were 822 trials, and at Westminster 1,266 defended, and 106 undefended, and at the end of the year the number of remanets was 674 at Westminster, and 25 at Nisi Prius. The number of actions meantime withdrawn, struck out, &c., was 1,703, and 8 stood over for further consideration and for judgment. The number of causes entered for trial at Nisi Prius on each circuit in 1878, and the number of causes tried, were as follows:

--

Entered for Trial.

Tried.

In the three divisions there were during the year 453 motions for new trials, &c. In 97 cases applica

tion was refused; in 193 a rule nisi was granted; in 77 a rule absolute was made; and in 86 the rule was discharged. To the division of her Majesty's Court of Appeal sitting at Westminster there were 94 appeals from the Queen's Bench, and 52 from the Exchequer. The total proceedings in the chambers of the judges of the three courts amounted during the year to 214,662 in number, as against 210,819 in 1877. The state of the suitors' funds of the three courts was as follows:Amount on November 1, 1877, £88,199 10s. 9d.; amount paid in during the year ended October 31, 1878, £261,346 3s. 9d.; total to October 31, 1878, £349,545 14s. 6d.; amount paid out during the year, £252,309 2s. 2d.; balance on October 31, 1878, £97,236 12s. 4d.

PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. The Probate proceedings during the year included probates granted, 11,544; administration, 5,675; caveats, 1,105; appearances, 253; parties who had entered appearances in actions, 339; motions, 390; actions, 198; summonses, 1,084; trials by special jury, 14; trials by common jury, 17; causes heard by judge only, 68. The total amount of fees in court and contentious business was £1,902; and the taxed costs were £42,764. The value of effects sworn under in the principal registry was £68,998,655; and in the district registries £50,914,890.

As to Divorce business there were 687 petitions filed, together with 184 petitions for alimony. The number of motions was 1,073; of summonses, 1,472; and of causes tried 493. One judgment was given by the Divisional Court, and 493 were given by the court itself. There were 5 applications for new trial; and 4 appeals to the Divisional Court. The number of petitions dismissed were 63. There were 496 decrees nisi; 292 decrees absolute; 57 decrees for judicial separation; 10 decrees for nullity of marriage; and 1 decree under the Legitimacy Declaration Act. In 11 cases there was a reversal of decree. The fees received amounted to £5,571.

In Admiralty there were 378 actions instituted, 9 appeals brought from county courts, and 26 actions transferred to the division, the total amount of claims in actions instituted being £1,217,113. Of the 9 appeals brought from county courts, in two cases judgment was affirmed, and in 4 varied or reversed. The number of final judgments and decrees in 1878 was 165.

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY.

The cases brought under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, in 1878 were:-Bankruptcies, 1,084; liquidations by arrangement, 6,356; and liquidations by composition, 4,010; total, 11,450. Of the compounding debtors, 1,911, or nearly one-half, paid compositions not exceeding 2s. 6d. in the pound; while only four in every hundred offered to pay more than half of their debts. The comptroller in his report remarks, "The state of trade does not affect the number of insolvencies under the Bankruptcy Act so much as might perhaps be expected. Bad times, while tending to increase insolvency, not only directly, by also by affording an excuse to many who are not really affected, tend as well to decrease it, by checking speculation, speculative credit, and trading with insufficient capital, which are most fertile causes of insolvency. Depression of trade, caused by over-production, with fall of exports and of wholesale prices, would not, for a considerable time at least, have any very marked general effect on the number of insolvents under the Act, the great majority of whom are from the classes engaged in home distribution, chiefly retailers." total liabilities declared in 1878 amounted to nearly ten millions, against assets estimated at nine millions, but not likely to realize more than six and a half, of which more than a million is claimed by creditors in two of the large bankruptcies as security against liabilities. The actual loss by bad debts in cases under the Act is estimated at about £25,000,000 for the year 1878. The

The

number of bills taxed was 20,194, their gross amount being £506,625, and the amount struck off on taxation £90,569, leaving £416,056 as the net amount allowed. COUNTY COURTS, &c.

The number of plaints entered in 1878 in the whole of the county courts was 1,030,749; and there were also 756 cases from the superior courts. With a jury 993 causes were determined; and without, 615,497. The total amount for which plaints were entered was £3,343,203; and the amount of debts for which judgment was obtained by plaintiffs upon original hearings was £1,621,686, the costs being £119,620. The total fees on on all proceedings amounted to £433,583. The number of days of sitting for the whole of the circuits was 8,271. Of the judgments given, 97.1 per cent. were for the plaintiff; 1.1 per cent. were non-suits; and 1.8 per cent. were for the defendant. The number of equitable suits or proceedings was 633, and the amount of subjectmatter in dispute or otherwise was £97,953. The number of Admiralty suits or proceedings in the county courts was 305. In the City of London Court the num. ber of plaints issued in proceedings for the recovery of debt was 21,163; and there were 8 cases from the superior courts. The total amount for which plaints were entered was £121,547; and the number of days of sitting was 121. The equitable suits or proceedings numbered 6; and the Admiralty suits 157. In the Lord Mayor's Court, London, there were 12,518 actions entered in 1878, together with 19 ejectments and 5 appren tice petitions. The total amount for which actions were entered was £220,198. The number of foreign attachments issued was 424, for a total of £165,657. On the equity side of the court there were 5 bills of complaint filed in 1878. The fees on all proceedings amounted to £6,696.

ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS.

The number of suits in the ecclesiastical courts in 1878 was 13, ten being in the Arches Court of Canter bury. Of the whole, 3 were under the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874; 4 for granting a faculty; 1 was for decreeing a monition; and 5 were other suits. In 1 case the suit was dismissed; in 1 abandoned; in one a decree for institution was obtained; in 4 the decree or order was affirmed; in 1 the defendant was admonished; in 1 the defendant was suspended; in 1 suspension was relaxed; and 3 cases were still pending at the end of the year. There were further £20 suits for faculties. The fees amounted to £1,319.

COURT OF APPEAL, HOUSE OF LORDS, AND PRIVY
COUNCIL.

In her Majesty's Court of Appeal the total appeals from final judgments awaiting a hearing at the beginning of the year numbered 127; the number set down during the year was 346; the number heard during the year was 242; 48 were otherwise disposed of; and 183 awaited hearing at the end of the year. From interlocutory orders there were 19 appeals awaiting hearing at the beginning of the year; 226 set down during the year; 183 heard; 23 otherwise disposed of; and 39 awaiting hearing at the end of the year. Of original motions, 3 awaited hearing at the beginning of the year; 61 were set down during the year; 61 were heard during the year; 1 was otherwise disposed of; and 2 awaited hearing at the end of the year. From the County Palatine of Lancaster there were 9 appeals; from the Stannaries Court 6; and from the London Bankruptcy Court 124. There were also 2 appeals under the European Society Arbitration Act, 1875. The court sat 195 days at Lincoln's-inn, and 133 days at Westminster, or 328 days in all; and the Lord Chancellor sat 3 days on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; on 70 days in the House of Lords to hear appeals; and on 3 days on Committee for Privileges. Before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the number of appeals entered was 76; 35 were dismissed for non

prosecution; and 63 were heard and determined. The number of appeals (lodged since April 1, 1870) remaining for hearing at the end of 1878 was 123. The cases before the House of Lords were:-From the Court of Chancery (Ireland) 1; from the Court of Session (Scotland) 26; from the Court of Appeal (England) 37; and from the Court of Appeal (Ireland) 1; making a total of 65. In 1878, 36 judgments were affirmed: 1 being affirmed with variations, 7 reversed, 6 reversed with declaration, direction, or finding, and 3 reversed in part; the total judgments being 53. The number of effective cases remaining for hearing at the end of the session of 1878 was 12. The fees amounted to £1,982.

General Correspondence.

CALL OF SOLICITORS TO THE BAR.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,--Enormous responsibility has of late years been laid upon our shoulders by purely judge-made law. Nothing is so easy as to blame a solicitor. He has no right of audience, and, therefore, cannot speak up for himself. He is a convenient scapegoat for the sins of others. "My instructions are, &c., &c.," is the excuse when the case is not clearly apprehended; or, when the advocate must not be attacked by his opponent, the coup de grace is "No doubt my learned friend is acting upon instructions when he says, &c., &c." "Gentlemen of the jury, it is not him I blame. It is those who have instructed him, and who are responsible for this action." "This is a solicitor's action," &c., &c. No counsel ever dare attack a solicitor in this way before a judge or a jury in a county court.

Time was when judges instantly interposed to prevent attacks upon "officers of the court." Now the tables are reversed. Witness, for instance, the hundreds of appeals from county courts which were either struck out or dismissed by the divisional courts simply because the county court judges had not made notes-the solicitor conducting the case always being held to be at fault, because it was presumed without foundation that he did not ask for notes to be made. It has recently been decided by the Court of Appeal that notes are not a condition precedent for an appeal, and therefore all these decisions of the divisional courts are wrong, and their strictures upon county court judges and solicitors totally unwarranted,

It is not "ability and ambition" alone, as Mr. Sykes appears to assume, which seek for an outlet. It is the public demand for a good article which must inevitably sooner or later compel solicitors to act as advocates in all cases in all courts whether the profession like it or not. I have the pleasure of knowing many solicitors whose knowledge, experience, and skill are equal to any to be had on the bench or at the bar, and whose patience and condescension make their attainments shine all the more brilliantly. Nearly every great provincial town is possessed of such men.

After all it it not so much a question for us as for the public, and having addressed many hundreds of meetings in London and different parts of the provinces, I think I can say that the public have been for some time unanimous upon the question which at last, after years of urging, the Council of the Incorporated Law Society seem to have taken up in sincerity and truth.

22, Queen-street, E.C., Aug. 3. EDMUND KIMBER.

Jean Luie, who was convicted of perjury at the trial of the Tichborne claimant, and sentenced to seven years' penal servitude, was discharged from Portland Convict Prison last Tuesday, having completed his term of imprisonment.

Cases of last Week.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-FRAUD-BREACH OF TRUST -COMPANY--ACCEPTANCE OF BRIBE BY DIRECTOR.-In a case of The Metropolitan Bank v. Heiron, before the Court of Appeal on the 5th inst., the question arose whether the plaintiffs' right to sue had been barred by the Statute of Limitations. The action was brought to recover from the defendant, a former director of the bank, a sum of money which it was alleged that he had received from one Daniels, who was indebted to the bank in the amount of £3,000, in consideration of the defendant's agreeing to use his influence with the bank to accept a much smaller sum in discharge of the debt. It was alleged that the defendant accordingly induced the bank to accept from Daniels £50 in discharge of the debt. It was admitted that this charge against the defendant was made kaown to the board of directors of the bank in 1872, and that they inquired into it, but took no proceedings against the defendant. The action was commenced in 1879 by the liquidator in the voluntary liquidation of the bank, Stephen, J., held that the plaintiffs' right to sue was barred by the statute, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.). It was argued that the plaintiffs were suing in respect of a breach of trust, and that consequently the statutory bar had no application. JAMES, L.J., said that the action was really founded on "concealed fraud." If a man, who held a fiduciary relation, received money by way of a bribe to betray his duty, the injured cestui que trust was entitled in equity to recover the money from the wrongdoer. But courts of equity had always followed the Statute of Limitations in aualogous cases. A cestui que trust was not bound by any lapse of time so long as the wrong was concealed from him. But if it was known to him he ought to make up his mind whether he would proceed against the wrongdoer. If he allowed years to elapse after he had full knowledge of the wrong, the defendant had a full right to avail himself of the lapse of time as a defence. The statute was therefore a good defence from the time when the charge was made known to the board of directors, which was more than six years before the action was commenced. BRETT, L.J., thought that the only action which could be maintained by the bank was an action in equity, founded on the fraud of the defendant. Neither at law nor in equity could the money be treated as the money of the company until it had been proved to be their money by a judgment of the court, on the ground that it was received by the defendant in breach of his duty. Till that had been done the money must be considered as held by the defendant adversely to the company, and therefore the Statute of Limitations applied, and the time ran from the period at which the fraud was made known to the board of directors acting for the company. COTTON, L.J., said that the argument that time did not run as against a breach of trust was founded on a misapprehension of the expression "breach of trust." When trust money was in the possession of a trustee, and he misappropriated it, time would not run as against the cestui que trust. But in the present case the money that it was sought to recover was in no sense the money of the company unless it could be made so by the judgment of the court in this very proceeding. The action was founded on a breach of duty by the defendant. The case was very different from one in which a cestui que trust was seeking to recover money which was his own before any act had been done by the trustee. The claim was founded on the act of the trustee making the money the money of the cestui que trust. Time would not run against him until the discovery of the fraud, but when the fraud became known to him the person defrauded could not be allowed to stand by with knowledge of his rights.-SOLICITORS, Newman, Hilliard, & Stretton; Harper, Broad, & Battcock.

PRACTICE-COSTS-SET OFF-ADDITIONAL RULES, 1875, R. 19. In a case of Barker v. Hemming, before the Court of Appeal on the 5th inst., the question arose whether there could be a set-off of costs under rule 19 of the Additional Rules as to Costs of 1875, which provides that "in any case in which, under the preceding rule No. 18, or any other rule of court, or by the order or direction