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duties of counsel should be intrusted to those who are unfitted to perform them. It is no answer to this to say that these men could pass the requisite examination, as it is the three years' study, and not the examination, which has ever been regarded by the benchers as the qualification for a call to the bar, and a student often has to keep three terms after his examination before he can be called. J. J. [We should, perhaps, add that our correspondent is a solicitor.-ED. S. J.]

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INDORSEMENT OF COSTS.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-A curious illustration of the anomaly and confusion in respect to the new indorsement of costs on writs of summons occurred to me on the 30th ult. The form given in the schedule to the Rules of April last, after providing for particulars of claim, proceeds as follows:-" And £ (or such sum as may be allowed on taxation) for costs. If the amount claimed is paid to the plaintiff or his solicitor or agent within four days from the service hereof, further proceedings will be stayed." The words in parentheses are new, and the word or "is printed in italics, while in the forms sold by the Inland Revenue at the Central Office, the whole of the words in parentheses are italicized. Law stationers, however, print, the whole of the indorsement in Roman type. A writ issued by me was SO printed, and failing to effect personal service, the usual order for substituted service was obtained. On the fourth day after a copy of the order and writ were posted, the defendant's solicitor called at my office, and in my absence he left the amount of debt and costs as indorsed on writ (£2 12s. 6d.), the costs then incurred amounting to about four guineas. On my return I addressed and sent a letter to the defendant's solicitor requesting him to send me the difference, threatening further proceedings unless paid. An appearance was then entered, and as the debt was paid, I, with a view to obtain the master's decision, issued the usual summons for judgment under order 14, when one of the ablest masters held that the word 66 or," having been printed in Roman type on the writ, gave the defendant the option of either paying the costs indorsed or of having them taxed, and the defendant having elected to pay the amount indorsed within four days after service of the order for liberty to proceed, he would make an order staying further proceedings without costs to either party. The master stated that on looking carefully at the forms of indorsement in the schedule he had no hesitation in saying that the intention of the framers was that either claim for costs might be used—that is, a fixed sum, or such sum for costs as the master on taxation should allow, but not both. This view appears to me to be a correct reading of the words of the present indorsement, which places solicitors in a difficulty. By order 3, rule 7 of the Judicature Act, 1875, "where the

Perhaps some of your readers interested in the matter may be able to offer a suggestion applicable to the point. C. THORP. 18, Garrick-street, Covent Garden, Aug. 5.

New Orders, Etc.

LONG VACATION NOTICE.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, CHANCERY DIVISION. During the vacation, until further notice, all applica tions which may require to be immediately or promptly heard are to be made to the Right Hon. Lord Coleridge, Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, or the Hon. Baron Pollock. One of the Vacation Judges will sit in the court of Vice-Chancellor Malins, at Lincoln's-inn, at eleven o'clock, on Wednesday in every week, com. mencing on Wednesday, August 18, until further notice, for the purpose of hearing such applications. No case will be placed in the court paper unless leave has been previously obtained or a certificate of counsel that the case requires to be immediately or promptly heard, and stating concisely the reasons, is left with the papers. Application for leave to give short or other special notice of motion may be made at the chambers of Vice-Chan cellor Malins, 12, Staple-inn, Holborn. The necessary papers relating to every application made to the Vacation Judges are to be left with or addressed (under cover marked outside "Chancery Vacation Papers") to the officer in attendance, Chancery Registrar's chambers (room 136), Royal Courts of Justice, before one o'clock on the Monday previous to the day on which the applica tion is intended to be made. In any case of great urgency the brief of counsel is to be sent to the judge by book post or parcel, pre-paid, accompanied by office copies of the affidavits in support of the application and also by a minute, on a separate sheet of paper, signed by counsel, of the order he may consider the applicant entitled to, and an envelope capable of receiving the papers, and addressed as follows:-"Chancery Official Letter.-To the Registrar in Vacation, Chancery Registrar's Chambers, Royal Courts of Justice London, W.C." On applications for injunctions or writs of Ne exeat Regno, in addition to the above, a copy of the writ and a certificate of writ issued must also be sent. The papers sent to the judge will be returned to the registrar. The address of the judge for the time being acting as Vacation Judge in the Chancery Division can be obtained on application at the Chancery Registrar's chambers. The chambers of Vice-Chan cellor Malins will be open on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday in every week from eleven to one o'clock.-12, Staple-inn, July 31.

plaintiff's claim is for a debt, or liquidated demand only, CERTIFICATES FOR SALE AND TRANSFER.

the indorsement, besides stating the nature of the claim, shall state the amount claimed for debt and costs respectively, and shall further state that, upon payment thereof within four days after service, further proceedings will be stayed." Provision is thus made for taxation of such costs, and if more than one-sixth be disallowed, plaintiff's

solicitor shall pay the costs of taxation. The decision of the master that the indorsement for costs may either be for a specific sum, or for a sum which may be allowed on taxation, but that both should not be used, will not relieve the profession from the obligation of the rule.

For instance, if a writ were issued with no certain sum for costs, either the rule would become a dead letter or the proceedings would be set aside for irregularity; and, having regard to the consequences or the penalty in the event of more than one-sixth being disallowed, it would be neither wise nor prudent to indorse a larger sum in anticipation that in every case an order for substituted ervice would be required.

CHANCERY DIVISION.

Long Vacation, 1880.-Notice to Solicitors. On and after the 20th of August, the registrar in attendance will, for the purpose of facilitating vacation and Friday in every week, but the certificates should be business, sign certificates for sale and transfer on Tuesday left for examination at least one clear day previously; and on Tuesday in every week the registrar will make Chancery Paymaster. The registrar will not attend on alterations necessary in orders to be acted on by the Saturdays and Fridays, unless on notice of any intended application to the judge for an order of an urgent

nature.

R. H. LEACH, H. LATHAM, Vacation Registrars.

Chancery Registrar's Chambers, Royal Courts of Justice.

VACATION TAXING MASTER.

The Vacation Taxing Master will, at the request of the parties, take any reference in which the payment or distribution of money under any order made on or after the 19th of July last depends upon the taxation of costs.

EXTRADITION ACT.

An Order in Council is published in the Gazette of Tuesday giving effect to a law of the Legislature of the Transvaal (the Extradition Law, Transvaal, 1880), extending the provisions of the Extradition Acts to that Province.

Cases of the Week.

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP-SALE OF ASSETS AND GOODWILL TO ONE PARTNER-RIGHT OF OTHER PARTNER TO DEAL WITH OLD CUSTOMERS.-In a case of Leggott v. Barrett, before the Court of Appeal on the 27th ult., the question arose whether, after a dissolution of partnership, and a sale of the assets and goodwill to one of the partners, who was to continue the business alone, the other partner could be prevented from dealing with any of the customers of the old firm who chose voluntarily to come to him. The plaintiff and the defendant had carried on business in partnership together at Bradford. They agreed upon a dissolution, upon the terms that the stock in-trade, book debts, and other assets of the partnership, and the goodwill of the business, should be taken by the plaintiff, who was to continue the business on his own account, The defendant was to retire from the business, and he agreed not to commence a similar business in Bradford, or within ten miles thereof, for ten years from the date of the dissolution, except in Leeds. The plaintiff was to pay to the defendant £2,000 for his share and interest in the business, stock-in-trade, and other assets. The plaintiff paid the £2,000, and a formal deed of dissolution was executed. The defendant had subsequently set up a similar business in Leeds, and the plaintiff alleged that he had been soliciting the customers of the old firm; and he claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from doing this, and also from actually dealing with any customers of the old firm. Upon an interlocutory motion for an injunction until judgment in the action, Jessel, M. R., was of opinion that, inasmuch as the defendant had sold his share in the goodwill of the business, he was not entitled even to deal with customers of the old firm who came to him without any solicitation on his part. And bis lordship accordingly granted the injunction asked for. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that, as the defendant had not entered into any express agreement not to deal with customers of the old firm who might come to him voluntarily, the injunction must be confined to preventing the solicitation of the old customers.-SOLICITORS, R. Smith & Wilmer; WynneBaxter & Rance.

COSTS-PUBLIC FUNCTIONARY-PAYMENT OUT OF FUND -7 & 8 VICT., c. 101, s. 35-ELEMENTARY EDUCATION ACT, 1870, s. 60.-In a case of The Queen v. Sir Charles Reed, before the Court of Appeal ou ths 28th ult., the question arose whether the court had jurisdiction to order the costs of a public functionary to be paid out of a particular fund. The defendant was the chairman of the London School Board, and represented the board in the proceedings, which were by certiorari. The Government auditor had disallowed certain items in the accounts of the board, and the question was whether those items ought to have been allowed. The Queen's Bench Division held that the items ought to have been allowed; but the Court of Appeal at Westminster reversed this decision, holding that the disallowance was right. The order of the Court of Appeal, as drawn up, made the defendant personally liable for the costs of the auditor, and made no provision for the defendant's own costs. An application was made to vary this order by directing that the costs should be paid out of the school board rate, or that, at least, no personal order for payment of the auditor's costs should

be made against the defendant. Reliance was placed on section 35 of the Act, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, which, by section 60 of the Education Act of 1870, is made applicable to the audit of the accounts of a school board; and it was contended that, if nothing was said about the auditor's costs, that section would enable him to get his costs paid out of the rate. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that they had no jurisdiction to do what was asked. JESSEL, M.R., said that, though in the old Court of Chancery orders were made for the payment of the costs of an unsuccessful defendant out of a fund which was under the control of the court, at common law it was never the practice to give costs to an unsuccessful defendant; and section 35 only provided for the payment of costs of the person prosecuting the certiorari out of the rates when the decision of the auditor was overruled. The court, however, added to the order a direction that it was to be without prejudice to any question as to the right of the defendant to be reimbursed out of the rate the costs which he was ordered to pay.-SOLICITORS Gedge, Kirby, & Millett; Sharpe, Parkers, & Co.

mons

PRACTICE-CROSS-EXAMINATION ON AFFIDAVIT-SUMMONS TO VARY CHIEF CLERK'S CERTIFICATE-ORD. 37, R. 2DISCHARGE OF SEQUESTRATION-COSTS.-In a case of The Republic of Costa Rica v. Strousberg, before the Court of Appeal on the 28th ult., the question was raised whether the power given to the court by rule 2 of order 37 to order the attendance for cross-examination of the person making an affidavit "upon any motion, petition, or sumapplies to a summons to vary a chief clerk's certifi cate. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that it does. Another question was what order ought to be made as to the costs of a sequestrator when the court of Appeal discharges an order for a sequestration, which it holds to have been rightly issued in the first instance, on the ground that the object for which it was granted has been attained. It was urged that the party who succeeds on appeal in getting the sequestration discharged ought not to pay the costs of the sequestrator between the date of the refusal of the judge of first instance to discharge the sequestration, and the date of the order on the appeal. The court, however, held that the sequestration could be discharged only on the payment of costs, other than the costs of the appeal. The latter costs were made costs in the action.-SOLICITORS, Freshfields & Williams; Lee, Houseman, & Brodie.

MEETING OF CREDITORS UNDER LIQUIDATION PETITIONVALIDITY OF RESOLUTIONS-RIGHTS OF ABSENT CREDITORS.In a case of Ex parte The Swaledale Banking Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 29th ult., the question arose whether a creditor, who was not present at a meeting of creditors under a liquidation petition, could be heard to object to the resolutions which had been passed by the creditors who were present. The objection to the resolutions was that a proper quorum of creditors was not present at the meeting, and this depended upon the question whether one of the persons who was present, and who had voted as a creditor, had a proper proof of debt upon the file. The court (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) said that though a creditor who was not present at a meeting was bound by the resolutions passed at it, if they were validly passed, there was no obligation upon him to attend the meeting, and he was entitled, though he had not been present, to proceedings.-SOLICITORS, Ullithorne, Currey, & Villiers; question the resolutions, on the ground of the illegality of M. Abrahams & Co.

PRACTICE

COSTS SUCCESSFUL PLAINTIFF ACTION TRIED BY JURY- LIBEL ORDER 55.-In a case of Harnett v. Vise, before the Court of Appeal on the 2nd inst., a question arose as to the power of a judge to deprive a successful plaintiff of his costs of the action. The action was for libel, and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, with £10 damages. The defendant's counsel then applied to Huddleston, B., who tried the action, to deprive the plaintiff of his costs, and his lordship acceded to the application, on the ground that the letter, which the jury had found to be a libel, had been brought about entirely

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by some previous unsatisfactory and improper conduct of the plaintiff in relation to another person, and that therefore in justice he ought not to be allowed his costs of the action. This decision was upheld by the Exchequer Division (Huddleston, B., and Stephen, J.). Before the Court of Appeal it was urged that the order in effect overruled the verdict of the jury, and that the "good cause to be shown for depriving a successful party of costs referred only to some conduct of his in the course of the litigation, not to something which had taken place previously, and in relation to a stranger to the action. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of the Exchequer Division. JAMES, L.J., was of opinion that the jurisdiction as to costs, given by order 55, was not confined to the conduct of the parties in the litigation itself. The judge could not take upon himself to overrule the verdict of the jury, and had no right to say that the particular thing complained of was not a libel; but in determining the question of costs it was his duty to consider the whole of the circumstances of the case-anything which led or conduced to the libel, anything in the conduct of the parties, anything showing that the action was not properly brought in respect of the libel complained of. His lordship was satisfied that the letter in question in the case never could have done the slightest harm to the plaintiff, and that it was not the real cause of the litigation. The real object was to set the plaintiff right as to scme disagreeable rumours which had been current about him, and be availed himself of some incautious expressions in the letter for that purpose. conduct had been such as to give rise to the rumours, and the judge who tried the action came to the conclusion that there had been a great deal in that conduct which had caused the whole matter, and therefore thought himself justified in depriving the plaintiff of his costs, and bis lordship thought the judge was right in so doing. SOLICITORS, Digby & Tabor; T. S. George.

His

PRACTICE JURISDICTION-VESTING RIGHT TO TRANSFER STOCK-ORDER CN SUMMONS IN CHAMBERS-TRUSTEE ACT, 1850, s. 43-TRUSTEE EXTENSION ACT, 1852, ss. 6, 7— 15 & 16 VICT. c. 80, s. 26-18 & 19 VICT. c. 134, s. 16-CONSOLIDATED ORDERS OF COURT OF CHANCERY, ORD. 35, R.1.— In a case of Frodsham v. Frodsham, before the Court of Appeal on the 2nd inst., the question arose whether an order under the Trustee Acts, vesting the right to transfer stock, can be made upon summons in chambers. The action was brought by one of two executors against the other for the administration of the estate of the testator. It was commenced by writ, and an administration decree was made upon an application by the plaintiff under rule 1 of order 15. Afterwards an order was made by Jessel, M.R., upon summons in chambers, that (it appearing by affidavit that the defendant could not be found) the right to transfer a sum of console, to which the plaintiff and the defendant were jointly entitled upon the trusts of the testator's will, and which was standing in their names in the books of the Bank of England, should vest in the plaintiff, but only for the purpose of transferring the amount into court as thereinafter directed. The Bank of England declined to act upon this order, on the ground that there was no jurisdiction to make such an order in chambers. On the motion of the plaintiff another order was then made by Jessel, M.R., in court, that the bank should act in accordance with the previous order in chambers. The second order contained a recital that the court was of opinion that the judge had jurisdiction on an application by summons in chambers to make the vesting order. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) thought that, especially having regard to the course of practice, there was, at any rate, suflicient doubt as to the jurisdiction to make the order in chambers, that it would be much safer that it should be made in open court. JAMES, L.J., said that no doubt a general order would soon be made prescribing the conditions and safeguards under which the jurisdiction might in such a case be exercised in chamters.-SOLICITORS, Freshfields & Williams; Norris, Allens, &

Carter.

COSTS ACTION TRIED BY JURY-CERTIFICATE OF ASSOCIATE-ORDER 55-ORD. 36, R. 23, 24.-In a case of Bozward v. Stallard, before the Court of Appeal on the 3rd inst., there

was a claim and a counter-claim. The case was tried by a jury, and a verdict was found for the defendant on the claim and for the plaintiff on the counter-claim. The certificate of the asscciate stated that judgment was given for the defendant on the claim, with the costs of the defence, and for the plaintiff on the counter-claim. But the certificate said nothing about the plaintiff's costs of the counter-claim. The plaintiff insisted that under order 55 he was entitled to his costs of the counter-claim, because he had succeeded upon it and the judge had given no direction depriving him of the costs. The taxing master, however, refused to tax the costs of the counter-claim. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the taxing master was right. So long as the certificate of the associate remained he was not entitled to go behind it, and as it stood it was consistent with the judge having made an order depriving the plaintiff of his costs of the counter-claim. The plaintiff ought to have applied to the judge to have the certificate amended.-SOLICITORS, Phelps & Woodforde; Thomas White & Sons.

BANKRUPTCY-SECURED CREDITOR-ELEGIT-SEIZURE OF GOODS BY SHERIFF-BankruPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 87.-In a case of Ex parte Abbott, before the Court of Appeal on the 29:h ult., a curious question arose as to the effect of the seizure of goods of a liquidating debtor under a writ of elegit. On the 28th of June, 1879, judgment was signed in an action against a trader for £207, debt and costs, and the same day the judgment creditor sued out a writ of elegit upon the judg ment (vide Form No. 2, Appendix F., to the Rules of Court, 1875), and lodged the writ with the sheriff for execution. On the 30th of June the sheriff issued a warrant to his bailiff directing him to seize and take all the goods and chattels" of the debtor "(except oxen and beasts of the plough) in my bailiwick, so that I may cause the same to be delivered" to the judgment creditor "as by the said writ I am commanded." On the same day the bailiff took possession of some goods and chattels of the debtor. On the morning of the 1st of July an inquisition was held before the sheriff, when the jury found that the debtor, on the 28th of June, and on the date of the inquisition, "was possessed in his own right of the goods and chattels named in the schedule hereto of the price of £327, as of his own proper goods and chattels." The proceedings on the inquisition commenced at 10.30 a.m. and were concluded at 11.15 a.m. Later in the day the sheriff delivered the goods and chattels mentiored in the schedule to the inquisition to the judgment creditor" to hold as his own, in satisfaction of his debt, costs and interest in such writ named as by such writ I am conmanded." At the time when this delivery was made, the judgment creditor had no notice of any act of bankruptcy having been committed by the debtor. He bad, however, in fact, filed a liquidation petition at 10.30 a.m. on the 1st of July. The trustee in the liquidation claimed the goods which had been delivered by the sheriff to the execution creditor. It was contended that the case, though not within the letter of section 87, came within its spirit, and reliance was placed on the case of Ex parte Rayner (20 W. R. 456, L. R. 7 Ch. 325), in which it was held by the Court of Appeal that, when the sale of goods of a trader, seized by the sheriff under a fi. fa. for a judgment debt of more than £50, had been intercepted by the filing of a liquidation petition by the trader, the trustee in the liquidation was en titled to the goods, though there had been no sale under the execution, inasmuch as under section 87 he would have been entitled to the proceeds of sale if the goods had been soid. And even if section 87 did not apply, it was urged that the writ of elegit did not authorize the sheriff to seize any goods of the debtor until their value had been appraised by a jury, and that consequently the possession of the sheriff was wrongful until after the inquisition had been completed, and the judg ment creditor did not become a secured creditor until after the filing of the petition. Consequently the goods which had been seized belonged to the trustee. It appeared, however, that in all the books of practice there is given a form of warrant by the sheriff to the bailiff directing the latter to seize the goods of the judgment debtor immediately of an elegit, and that the practice has always been to make the seizure at once. court (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), affirming the decision of Bacon, C.J. held that the judgment creditor was entitled to retain the goods. JAMES, L.J., who delivered the judgment of the court, said that the

after the issue

The

established practice having been for the sheriff to seize at once, it could not be said that he had acted wrongly, and he was therefore in possession of the goods before the filing of the petition just as he would have been under a fi. fa, and it was impossible to say that the judgment creditor was not a secured creditor just as he would have been if the seizure had been made under a fi. fa. Section 87 did not apply. The result of this, no doubt, was to make section 87 a laughing stock, but to extend the section to the present case would be, not construing the section, but legislating to supply an omission. The omission could only be cured by the Legislature. His lordship expressed a hope that the taking of goods under an elegit, which he characterized as an absurd anachronism, would be soon abolished. He added that the principle of the decision in Ex parte Rayner was this, that the beneficial owner of the proceeds of the sale of the goods was not obliged to have them sold, bat was beneficially entitled to the goods themselves. In the present case there were no proceeds of sale. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.-SOLICITORS, Shaw & Tremellen; Scott & Co.

ACT OF BANKRUPTCY-DEBTOR'S SUMMONS-NEGLECT TO PAY DEBT-DEBTOR PREVENTED FROM PAYING BY ACT OF CREDITOR BANKRUPTCY PETITION PRESENTED BEFORE TIME LIMITED BY SUMMONS FOR PAYMENT-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 6.-In a case of Ex parte Greener, before the Court of Appeal on the 29th ult., a question arose as to the right of a creditor who had served a debtor's summons to avail himself of the non-payment of the alleged debt by the debtor within the time limited by the summons as an act of bankruptcy. The debtor's summons was served on the 17th of April. The debtor was not a trader. On the 3rd of May (before the expiration of the twenty-one days limited by the summons for payment) the creditor filed a bankruptcy petition against the debtor for the same debt, alleging that he had committed an act of bankruptcy on the previous 5th of November, by executing a fraudulent conveyance of his property. The 21st of May was appointed for the hearing of the petition. The debtor did not pay the debt within the twenty-one days, and on the 12th of May, the creditor presented a second bankruptcy petition against him for the same debt, founded on the non-compliance with the debtor's summons as an act of bankruptcy. The 21st of May was appointed for the hearing of this petition also. When the two petitions came on to be heard, the petitioner applied to the judge of the county court to consolidate them, but the judge held that he had no power to do so under sub-section 2 of section 80 of the Act. He, however, required the petitioner's counsel to elect on which petition he would proceed, and the counsel elected to proceed with the second petition, and an order was made dismissing the first petition. The hearing of the second petition was then opened, and the judge dismissed it before all the evidence had been taken, on the ground that the debtor had been prevented from paying the debt within the twenty-one days by the petitioning creditor's own act in presenting the first petition alleging the commission of bankruptcy. In so deciding the judge was influenced by the decision of Knight Bruce, V.C., in the case of Ex parte Musgrove (3 M. D. & De G. 386). Bacon, C.J., reversed the decision of the county court judge, and remitted the petition to him for further hearing. Before the Court of Appeal it was argued that the effect of the first petition was to tie the debtor's hands, and to prevent him from dealing with his estate, as no one could safely lend him money during the pendency of the petition. This difficulty having been created by the summoning creditor's own act, it would be inequitable to allow him to use the nonpayment of the debt as an act of bankruptcy. The creditor had, in fact, assumed two inconsistent positions; by the debtor's summons he was insisting on the payment of his own debt, while by the petition he was claiming to have the debtor's property distributed equally among all his creditors. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that, if it could be shown as a matter of fact that the debtor had been prevented by the pendency of the first petition from paying the debt, it would be inequitable to allow the creditor to avail himself of the non-payment of the debt as an act of bankruptcy. But the mere fact that the first petition was pending was not sufficient to show that the debtor had been prevented from paying the debt, for if he had

an earlier act

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FROM VENDORS TO COMPANY-"DEBT INCURRED BY FRAUD AND BREACH OF TRUST"-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 49.In the case of Emma Silver Mining Company v. Grant, before the Master of the Rolls on the 29th ult., an important question was raised as to the construction of section 49 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. By that section "an order of discharge shall not relieve the bankrupt from any debt or liability shall release the bankrupt from all other debts proveable under incurred by means of any fraud or breach of trust; but it the bankruptcy with the exceptions" therein mentioned. In February, 1879, as reported L. R. 11 Ch. D. 918, Jessel, M.R., decided certain issues against the defendant Grant, whereby he found that the defendant was a promoter of the plaintiff company, and that he had received a large sum as promoter without the knowledge of the company, and that he was accountable for the same to the company, with interest. At the time of the trial of the issues the defendant had presented a petition for liquidation, but he had recently obtained his discharge therefrom. His trustee had been made a party, and the company now moved for judgment, following the findings on the issues; for leave to prove in the liquidation of the defendant for the amount found due, and also for a personal judgment against the defendant. The latter judg ment was asked, on the ground that the debt was incurred both by means of fraud and also of a breach of trust, and therefore that the defendant was not discharged therefrom under the above section. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the moneys had been obtained by the defendant by means of fraud and also of a breach of trust, and he therefore allowed judgment against the defendant for the amount found due. He also gave the plaintiff company leave to prove against the estate of the defendant for the same amount.-SOLICITORS, W. Snell & Greenip; Michael Abrahams & Roffey.

COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION CHARITY CLAIM AGAINST COLLECTOR OF SCHOOL-CHARITABLE TRUSTS ACT, (16 & 17 VICT. c. 137).-In the case of Christie v. Sanaberg, and In the matter of a plaint of the county court at Settle, before the Master of the Rolls on the 30th ult., cause was shown against a rule nisi, previously obtained for a certiorari, removing the plaint to this court, and staying the proceedings in the county court in the meantime. The plaint was by H. Christie and W. G. Perfect, the managers of a school at Langcliffe, against the incumbent of Langcliffe, and the alleged to be in the hands of the defendant for the use of the plaintiff's required payment of a balance of £37 19s. 4d., school. The plaintiff's also required an account of moneys received and paid by the defendant, and delivery by him of certain books relating to the school. The school was a Sunday-school founded in 1822 on waste land at Langcliffe, and it was alleged that the freeholders of Langcliffe had exercised ownership over the site, and that there was no conveyance to any other person. The incumbents for the time being had exercised certain duties of management. The defendant had, it appeared, received the subscriptions for the school, and had recently claimed to be the manager, and disputes had arisen between him and the manager appointed by the freeholders, which appointment had been recently accepted by the Education Department. grounds on which the rule nisi was granted were that the county court, under 16 & 17 Vict. c. 137, had no jurisdiction in the matter, as this was really a question relating to a charity. JESSEL, M.R., said that in his opinion the county court had jurisdiction to determine the matter. The court had no doubt jurisdiction to remove the matter by certiorari, if the inferior court were exceeding its powers; but that jurisdiction had always been discretionary, and if he had any doubt in the matter be should have refused to exercise it, on the ground that under the County Court Acts, the claim being for more than £20, the defendant could remove the case as of right to the superior court. In his opinion, the plaint was a

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simple action by the managers of a school against their collector to recover the amount in his hands. The defendant, the rector, defended himself on the ground that he was also a manager, ard, of course, if that was so, it might be a good answer. That fact was, however, denied by the plaintiffs, and it could very well be determined by the inferior court, but that issue did not involve any question of charity. It really made no difference whether the subject-matter was a charity or a brewery, and the question in dispute was wholly irrespective of any charity. The defendant said that by reason of the above Act the county court would not have jurisdiction, but the proviso in section 41 did not apply, as there was no claim adverse to the charity, and the sole question was whether the defendant was or was not a manager of the school. The order nisi must therefore be discharged.-SOLICITORS, Ridsdale & Co.: E. Kennedy.

PRACTICE-PETITION PRESENTED WITHOUT AUTHORITY -RETAINER-COSTS-ALTERATION OF ORDER AFTER A YEAR-SLIP-AFFIDAVITS TO BE USED ON A MOTIONAFFIDAVITS IN REPLY.-In a case of Re Savage, before the Master of the Rolls on the 4th inst., a motion was made to rescind an order to make a solicitor pay the costs of a petition on which an order had been made for the appointment of new trustees, in July, 1879, on the ground that the petitioners, who were interested in one-eighth of the property, had not authorized the presentation of the petition. Affidavits were filed in opposition to the motion, which stated that the solicitor had authority from the persons interested in six-eighths of the property, and that he believed he had also authority from the present applicants. There was no written retainer on their part, and they swore that no retainer had ever been given by them. The affidavits in support of the motion went into certain irre levant charges against the trustee appointed by the petitioner, and contained an allegation shown to be untrue by the respondents' affidavits. On the motion being opened, the respondents asked that the motion might stand over to enable them to answer an affidavit on the other side. For the applicants it was contended that the affidavit was simply in reply, and that there was no right to file any further affidavits. JESSEL, M.R., said there was no such rule on a motion, and that the parties could go on filing affidavits until they were exhausted. On this the applicants withdrew their affidavit, and the motion was heard on the merits. JESSEL, M.R., said that the application was an uncommon one, and that solicitors were bound to be very careful to see they had proper retainers from their clients. It was, in his opinion, clear on the evidence that the solicitor had no authority from the applicants to present the petition. He believed he had, and with a view to save costs no doubt joined the applicants as petitioners, whereas, if he had any doubt, he should have made them respondents. He knew their address, and, therefore, could have written to them to ascertain if he should make them petitioners or not. The order had been obtained more than a year ago, and he very much doubted whether he had jurisdiction now to alter it. If the petition had only been presented by one person, that would have been different; but there were several petitioners, and the Court of Appeal would only alter the order on special leave. The order was, however, in itself quite right, and he should have himself made it on the petition of persons interested in six-eighths of the property, even if the present applicants, as they should have been, had been made respondents. He should not, therefore, disturb the order, but would, under his general jurisdiction and the new rule allowing him to correct slips in orders, make the applicants respondents, not requiring to be served with the petition. As to the costs, as a general rule, the solicitor ought to pay the costs where the application was a proper one, and he had acted without retainer; but here the applicants had gone into irrelevant matters; had also stated an untruth on their affidavits; and, under the circum. stances, he should not order the solicitor to pay the applicants' costs, but he would have to bear his own costs and also the costs of the other respondents to the motion. -SOLICITORS, E. Kimber; Munns & Longden, for Reed, Portsmouth.

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SHARES IN CHARTERED BANK-7 WILL. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 73, s. 21-REGISTRATION OF TRANSFER-DURATION OF LIABILITY-SHARES PAYING DIVIDEND.-In a case of In re Griffiths, Tate v. Rolls, before Vice-Chancellor Hall, upon further consideration, on the 5th inst., a point was raised by the chief clerk's certificate as to the liability of certain executors with respect to shares in a chartered bank. A testator, who died in November, 1878, had, by his will, dated in the previous October, bequeathed certain specific legacies, and appointed executors. Part of the property belonging to him at his death, consisted of 338 shares in a banking corporation formed under a charter granted in 1844, whereby the liability of a shareholder is limited to double the amount of capital held by him. The statute (7 Will. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 73) under which the charter was granted, provides (section 21) that, any person ceasing to be a member, &c., whether by the transfer of any share, or by death, or otherwise, shall be considered, for all purposes of liability, as continuing a member, until a return of the transfer, or other fact whereby he shall have so ceased to be a member, shall be registered pursuant to the provisions herein before con tained." In the present case, the executors had sold the shares, and the transfer to the purchaser had been duly registered. The transfer had been made in February, 1879, and the dividends most recently paid upon the shares had been £6 per cent. The charter, however, contained no provisions as to the liability of past members of the corporation, nor does the statute expressly limit the dura tion of liability, and the question was raised whether the liability upon the shares ceased when the transfer way registered, or, if not, for what period it continued. The point reserved for the consideration of the court was whether any, and what, provision should be made by the executors before paying over the legacies against any possible liability upon the shares. HALL, V.C., held that, under the circumstances of the case, no liability attached, and no provision need be made.-SOLICITORS FOR ALL PARTIES, Maples, Teesdale, & Co.

PARTNERSHIP ACTION-COSTS.-In a case of Dawson v. Clever, before Denman, J. (sitting for Fry, J.), on the 3rd inst., the action was brought for the dissolution of a partner. ship between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the taking of the partnership accounts. There was a dispute whether a partnership had in fact existed, and the hearing of the evi dence on the point occupied several days. DENMAN, J found as a matter of fact that there had been a partnership, and he decreed a dissolution. He declared that the plaintiff was entitled to his costs down to and including the trial; but he directed that the costs should not be paid until after the result of the accounts should be known. He said that the difficulties had been caused by the plaintiff's fault in entering into a partnership in a very loose way, and that he ought not to be allowed to walk off at once with a large amount of costs, when it might turn out that a large sam was due from him on the balance of the accounts.SOLICITORS, E. F. Buttemer Harston; C. Harcourt.

At the meeting of the Common Council on Thursday week, a report was brought up from the Law and City Courts Committee on a letter from the judge of the City of London Court (Mr. Kerr) asking for a reconsideration of the duties assigned to him at the Central Criminal Court, on the ground that the business of his court demanded his whole time; that attendance at the Old Bailey Sessions compelled him to keep himself free for eleven weeks of the year; and stating that he was prepared either to give up his duties as commissioner or to remunerate a member of the bar for performing them. The judge also stated as his opinion that division of the month's work of the Central Criminal Court between two sessions would be a great boon, both to jurymen and to witnesses, and would produce a consider able saving in the maintenance of prisoners and the expense of prosecutions. The committee, who had consulted the Court of Aldermen on the subject, reported that it was not thought desirable that Mr. Commissioner Kerr should be relieved from his duties at the Central Criminal Court. The report to that effect was adopted.

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