week from the 24th of May till the 25th of July, during which time their lordships decided twenty-two appeals, including five from Scotland and one from Ireland. It is noticeable that in only three cases has the decision of the court of first instance been restored. In SouthEastern Railway Company v. Smitherman the House reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and held that the Queen's Bench Division had rightly directed a new trial, on the ground that the question of contributory negligence had not been sufficiently left to the jury. In the case of The Khedive the law lords concurred with Sir Robert Phillimore in holding that both ships were to blame for the collision, and in Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. Rowe the judgment of Mr. Justice Mellor, who had tried the case without a jury, was also restored by the House.

AN AMERICAN CONTEMPORARY has been sorely exercised with the question whether nothing can be done to put a stop to Dr. Tanner's exhibition; and, after consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that "there seems to be no law against a man's making an ass of himself." There is no doubt an insuperable obstacle to proceedings against the doctor on the ground of attempted suicide. He does not want or intend to die, but to live, and, as Wightman, J., told the jury in R. v. Doody (6 Cox, 463), the question to be considered in such cases is whether the prisoner did in fact intend to take away his life. But we may suggest one way in which Dr. Tanner might possibly be visited for his iniquities. The life and limbs of every citizen are under the safeguard and protection of the State, because they may be called on for the service of the State (see Co. Litt. 127b). "Hence," says Coke, "in my circuit, in anno 1 Jac. regis, in the county of Leicester, one Wright, a young, strong, and lustie rogue, to make himselfe impotent, thereby to have the more colour to begge or be relieved without putting himself to any labour, caused his companion to strike off his left hand; and both were indicted, fined, and ransomed therefor, and that by the opinion of the rest of the justices, for the cause aforesaid." Dr. Tanner has imperilled the life which belongs to the State; could not both he and his abettors be indicted for that offence?

Lambkin v. The South-Eastern Railway Company (P. C.)...... 837

CURRENT TOPICS.

...... 815 833 .......... 859 ..... 856

IT WILL BE OBSERVED that in the vacation notice which we print elsewhere it is provided that in the case of certificates of sale and transfer brought in during the Long Vacation, the certificates shall be left for examination at least one clear day previously. This appears, we believe, for the first time in the vacation notice, and it states the conditions on which such certificates will be signed. It will be remembered that under the Chancery Funds Amended Orders, 1874, rule 12, the registrars are not, without the special direction of a judge, to be required to issue certificates of sale and transfer during any vacation in their office. As, therefore, the signing of these certificates is a matter of grace, it will be necessary for practitioners to comply with the requirements of the notice.

IT IS SATISFACTORY to find that the business of one tribunal, at least, has not been retarded by assizes or election petitions. The early date at which Whitsuntide occurred this year enabled the House of Lords to sit continuously for the hearing of appeals on four days a

VERY SERIOUS COMPLAINTS have for many years been made of the delay in printing Acts of Parliament. To take three instances of recent date, we may mention that the Customs and Inland Revenue Act of last gession, which materially altered the probate duties, was not obtainable until a considerable time had elapsed after the Royal assent, and that the County Bridges Loans Extension Act, and the Union Assessment Committee (Single Parishes) Act, which are stated in the Parliamentary Record to have "received the Royal assent on the 19th of July last," are not yet (August 3rd) obtainable. We have no hesitation in saying that any printer could turn out the work with equal accuracy and within one-fifth part of the time at present occupied, and we think that the profession and the public are entitled to a full explanation of the reasons for the delays complained of. An Act of Parliament, it must be remembered, commences from the date of the Royal assent, "where no other commencement shall be therein provided" (see 33 Geo. 3, c. 13, before the passing of which Acts of Parliament commenced from the first day of the session in which they were passed), and becomes law as soon as the day commences (Tomlinson, Appellant, Bullock, Respondent, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 230). It is a truism to say that modern statutes frequently bristle with penalties; and in order to avoid some 66 great and manifest injustice' similar to that (see Latless v. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660), to remedy which the Act 33 Geo. 3, c. 13, was passed, it would seem desirable that a statute should be passed

declaring that future statutes should not commence until a certain date after their passing. Or we might perhaps fall back upon the humane precedent set (inter alios) by the Act 33 Hen. 8, c. 9 (not yet repealed), "for maintaining of artillery and the debarring of unlawful games." The 19th section of that statute, "to the intent that every person may have knowledge of this Act, and avoid the danger and penalties of the same," enacts that "all mayors, sheriffs, &c., shall make open proclamation of this present Act in every market to be holden within their several jurisdictions," and the 20th section provides that "the justices of gaol delivery, assizes, and justices of the peace do cause the same to be proclaimed in their several circuits and sessious before them holden, and that this statute shall begin to take effect concerning the penalties of the same from the feast of St. John Baptist now next coming."

IN THE COURSE of a trial for perjury at the Norwich Assises, a question was raised as to the admissibility of the evidence of a judge. The counsel for the Crown called as a witness the chairman of the Court of Quarter Sessions in which the alleged false evidence had been given, in order to prove, by his notes of the evidence, the exact words in which the prisoner's evidence had been given. The witness objected to give evidence, and Mr. Baron Pollock said he thought the objection should be maintained on the ground of public policy, and suggested that the perjury should be proved by some other witness, a course which was followed by the prosecuting counsel. The learned Baron added that he had once himself been subpoenaed under similar circumstances as a witness at the Central Criminal Court, when Mr. Russell Gurney, the late Recorder of London, sanctioned his objection to give evidence. The authorities upon this question do not seem to be entirely consistent. In Reg. v. Gazard (8 C. & P. 595) which was a case like that recently tried at Norwich, Patteson, J., advised the grand jury not to examine the chairman of quarter sessions before whom the alleged perjury had been committed, saying, "he is the president of a court of record, and it would be dangerous to allow such an examination, as the judges of England might be called upon to state what occurred before them in court." On the other hand, in R. v. Harvey (8 Cox 99), Byles, J., held, on a trial for perjury committed in a county court, that the county court judge ought to have been called to prove the perjury from his notes; and he held that the rule of exclusion did not extend to all judges of courts of record, but only to the judges of the superior courts, and he said that if he himself were to be subpoenaed he should refuse to produce his notes. The real criterion however appears to be this: that a judge is a competent witness as to collateral matters occurring in his presence, though not as to anything done by him in his judicial capacity. Thus, in R. v. Earl of Thanet (27 How. St. Tr. 845), Heath, J., was admitted to depose as to a riot in court during a trial before him at the Maidstone Assizes. Early in the present year one of the Masters of the Supreme Court, when summoned before a magistrate to give evidence in support of a charge of perjury, alleged to have been committed before him during a reference, objected to do so on the ground of privilege, but he afterwards waived his objection, and Mr. Montagu Williams then stated that he had once examined Mr. Justice Fry as a witness under exactly the same circumstances. Mr. Justice Stephen in his "Digest of Evidence," seems to treat the whole question as unsettled, for he observes (art. 111) that "it is doubtful whether a judge is compellable to testify as to anything which came to his knowledge in court as such judge."

AN ODD LITTLE POINT was settled by the Court of Appeal on Tuesday last. Is an acknowledgment given

by a mortgagee to a mortgagor, who was, when the acknowledgment was given, a bankrupt, but whose bankruptcy was afterwards annulled, sufficient to prevent the operation of the Statutes of Limitation in barring the mortgagor's right to redeem? In Mark. wick v. Hardingham the facts were these:-The action was commenced in 1877. The mortgagee had been in possession of the property since 1845. The mortgagor had been adjudicated a bankrupt in that year. The assignee in the bankruptcy treated the equity of redemption of the mortgaged property as worthless, and took no steps to redeem. In 1865 some correspondence took place between the mortgagee and the bankrupt, which was relied on as an acknowledgment of the bankrupt's right to redeem. In 1877 the bankrupt obtained an order annulling his bankruptcy, and then commenced the action. The court held that there had been no sufficient acknowledgement, and dealt with the matter in this way: When the letter was written, the plaintiff was, in point of law, a stranger to the property. He had been mortgagor; but if the estate of a mortgagor had become, by his own act, or by the operation of law, vested in some one else, it would be an absurd and inadmissible construction of the Statute of Limitations, to consider him a mortgagor capable of receiving an acknowledgment of a title to redeem. A statement to A., or a communication with A., from which it was to be inferred that B. had a right to redeem was not an acknowledgment toB. Nor was it the more so because A. had, many years previously, been the original mortgagor. Could it then be considered as an acknowledgment made to the bankrupt as agent of his assignee or of his estate ? It was quite clear that the plaintiff did not correspond with the mortgagee in any such character or with any such intention, or with any authority express or implied from his assignee. Was it possible to connect the correspondence between the plaintiff and the mortgagee with the former's subsequent acquisition by reverter of his estate through the annulling of the bankruptcy? Their lord. ships were unable to find any legal principle on which. such a connection could be made. If the bankruptcy had not been annulled, could the assignee have used the correspondence to maintain, or could he otherwise have maintained, a suit for redemption at the time when the plaintiff commenced his action? Their lordships thought that he clearly could not, and nothing would revert to the plaintiff but what was in the assignee, and, therefore, no right to redeem reverted. We do not venture to say that the decision is wrong, but we should have thought that, since it has been said that in order to make a person an agent to receive an acknowledgment it is not necessary that he should have an actual authority to act (Trulock v. Roby, 12 Sim. 402), the ex-mortgagor might have been held to be agent for the person in whom his estate was, for the time being, vested.

em

THE VERY UNUSUAL EVENT of proceedings for " bracery" seems likely to occur in respect of the strange course taken by one of the grand jurors at the last Rutland Assizes, who, it is alleged, obtained a panel of the petty jurors to be summoned, and called on or wrote to them, warning them to take refreshments in their pockets, and telling them that he knew that a person who was to be prosecuted at the assizes was innocent. He admitted that he had given the jurors the advice that they should "go straight and stick tight." It is also stated that he brought the witnesses to his house, where he locked them up, refusing to let them go on until they had promised, as he alleged, "to tell the whole truth." The offence of embracery consists in " any attempt whatsoever to compel or influence, or instruct a jury, or any way to incline them to be more favourable to the one side than the other, by money, promises, letters, threats or persuasions, except only by the strength of the evidence and the arguments of the counsel in open

court, at the trial of the cause"; and it matters not whether the jurors, on whom such attempt is made, give any verdict or not, or whether the verdict given be true or false (1 Hawk, P. C. 466).

ADMISSION OF ASSETS BY EXECUTOR. WE briefly referred last week to the ancient doctrine that where an executor voluntarily pays one or more legacies, he is presumed to have received sufficient assets to discharge all the rest. It may be worth while to notice, somewhat more at length, this old rule, and the modifications it has received in recent times. The rule, of which Sir J. Strange, M.R., said there were "several cases in Eq. Abr., is that whenever an executor pays a legacy, the presumption is that he has sufficient to pay all legacies; and the court will oblige him, if solvent, to pay the rest, and will not permit him to bring a bill to compel the legatee, whom he voluntarily paid, to refund; although, if the executor proves insolvent, so that there is no other way, the court will admit a bill by the other legatees to compel that legatee to refund" (Orr v. Kaines, 2 Ves, Sen. 193). It was, moreover, laid down by Lord Eldon that an admission of assets could never be retracted unless a

case of mistake were most clearly established (Drewry v. Thacker, 3 Swanst., at p. 548). The course of decision in subsequent years has been towards the modificacation of these curious doctrines. Thus it has

own

been held that an executor who pays legacies -for instance, legacies to servants-on his responsibility, and without reference to the assets, is not bound to pay all the legacies under the will (Cadbury v. Smith, L. R. 6 Eq., at p. 41). And if the circumstances on which the executor built his admission fail him, then the admission fails also; he cannot be bound by an admission made under circumstances with which he was not acquainted. Hence, if new claims arise after an admission of assets, the executor will not be bound by such admission (Payne v. Little, 22 Beav. 69). In any case, according to Postlethwaite v. Mounsey (6 Hare, 33, note), it is open to the executor who has admitted assets, by paying a legacy or otherwise, to explain that the payment has been made by mistake, or for other reasons. And, in that case, Vice-Chancellor Wigram went so far as to say that "it would be difficult to hold that the payment of one legacy would of itself bind the executor to pay all the legacies given by the will."

The basis of the doctrine, as of the rule with reference to executors' assent, on which we commented last week, would seem to be that the other legatees are entitled to act on the faith of the executor's admission of assets (see Hutton v. Rossiter, 3 W. R. 97, 7 De G. M. & G. 11). If the executor pays one legacy, the other legatees may fairly assume that he has satisfied himself that the assets are sufficient to pay all the legacies, and it would be unjust to allow him by his conduct to deceive the other legatees. But if this is the foundation of the rule, it is obvious that it must be open to the executor to show that the circumstances under which the payment was made were such as were not calculated to deceive, and ought not to have deceived, the other legatees; and also to show that in point of fact the other legatees were not deceived, and did not regulate their conduct upon the assumption that there were sufficient assets to pay their legacies in full.

The recent case of Morewood v. Currey (28 W. R. 213) shows the progress which has been made towards the establishment of this reasonable modification of the old rule. In this case, the personal estate of the testator being insufficient to meet his liabilities and the legacies, an arrangement was made between the eldest son, the executors, and such of the parties interested as were then entitled to their legacies, whereby it was agreed that the eldest son, electing to take under the will,

should take possession of a colliery and plant, and should provide the balance of the money necessary to pay off the legacies then payable, as well as those which should from time to time become due. Upon this basis certain of the legacies were paid in full, and the executors, having paid full duty upon all the legacies, passed their residuary account showing all the legacies as paid in full. The eldest son subsequently failed to provide sufficient funds to meet all the legacies, and there were, in fact, insufficient assets to meet the whole of the testator's liabilities. One of the younger children, when he became entitled, claimed payment in full of his legacy from the executors, upon the ground of their having admitted a sufficiency of assets. ViceChancellor Hall decided against the claim on the ground (1) that the payment of legacies could always be explained by the executor. "With reference to the payment of one legacy," he said, "being an admission of assets for every other legatee, I think this observation may fairly be made, that although this is very old law, and you can go back to Lord Hardwicke's time for an authority, the tendency of modern decisions has been to deal fairly and justly with these cases, and not by a mere unintentional admission of assets by executors to subject them to liabilities which they have never contemplated or meant to undertake. You have to examine the facts of the case, and to deal with it fairly and properly." And so dealing with this case, he held that the payment had been satisfactorily explained by the executors as being made in pursuance of an arrangement which was based on the supposition that the legatees could not be paid in full out of the assets; hence, no one could be deceived as to the amount of the assets. (2) It appeared that the legatee claiming against the executors was a minor up to a very recent period, and the Vice-Chancellor thought "could not have been misled as to his prospects or position in life." And (3), there was the further circumstance that a claim had arisen against the estate, which had not come to the knowledge of the executors at the time they passed the residuary account.

It may be hoped that we have heard the last of any attempt to apply the old rule in its harsh and unreasonable form, but executors and their advisers will do well to keep it before their minds.

THE REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER IN BANKRUPTCY.

Ir is rash to prophecy on a matter as to which we have so often been disappointed; but it does seem probable that next session will not be allowed to pass without some bankruptcy legislation; and it may be worth while to notice the defects in the present law which are pointed out by the comptroller in his report just printed, considering afterwards how far these are proposed to be remedied by the Bills now before Parliament for the amendment of the law of bankruptcy.

The pro

The drift of the present report, as of many of its predecessors, is this. The returns relating to bankruptcy proper present nothing calling for particular remark, except that the costs are this year above the average and the assets below the average. visions of the Act for preventing abuses by debtors and trustees, where they are applicable, work fairly well. But they are only applicable to about 7 per cent. of the whole number of cases of bankruptcy, arrangement, and composition. In 93 per cent. of these cases debtors and their agents escape the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act relating to the examination and discharge of the bankrupt, and to the accounts, charges, and conduct of the agents employed by him. The result is that abuses are rampant. The number of compositions not exceeding one shilling in the pound has increased from 76 in 1870 to 1,056 last year, and the number of composi

Recent Decisions.

5,000 arrangements and compositions last year. Instead of this there were nearly 12,000. Of these 7,167 were liquidations, and 4,809 compositions.

The ultimate cause of this is, of course, to be found in the indifference of creditors. The majority of the creditors is commonly represented by proxies held by, or in the interest of, an agent; and the position of a trustee representing the majority of creditors in a liquidation is, as the comptroller remarks, "singularly desirable; he can make his own arrangements with the debtor for a discharge, dispose of the funds, vote his own remuneration, tax his solicitor's bill of costs or not, as he prefers, audit his own accounts at such time and in such manner, and impose such terms and conditions as he thinks fit, and, finally, grant himself a 'release,' discharging him from all liability in respect of any act done or default made by him as such trustee." Under the Act the creditors are to see to these matters; but if one thing is more clearly proved than another it is that whatever is left to creditors is left undone. It is a fixed maxim with creditors that it is useless to throw away valuable time after lost money, and the result is that the proxy system has grown to the proportions of a gigantic abuse. Every proxy has, says the comptroller, a money value, "and a single proxy will sell for a considerable sum when needed to carry or to prevent a resolution. It is the regular practice in some parts of England to hold 'knock-outs,' or meetings of touting agents, for the purpose of arranging that the proxies they have collected among them shall be used in the interest of one of their number; but such arrangements are more commonly made at the first meeting of creditors in a liquidation, or before the registration of the resolutions. Stray proxies are bought from the holders; but where two or more agents hold each a sufficient number to prevent the other carrying the resolutions, a joint trusteeship may be agreed upon, though more often one becomes trustee on the usual terms,' an expression which evidently indicates a very usual transaction, and means that the trustee shall pay to the other one-third of whatever he can make out of the trusteeship."

What then is the moral of the report? That the existing system shall be wholly re-modelled or swept away? Surely not, for, according to the report, it works not unsatisfactorily wherever it has fair play. What is wanted is to extend to liquidations and compositions the precautions against abuse adopted in the case of bankruptcies. There should be fuller and earlier information given to the creditors as to the affairs of the debtor; his control over liquidation proceedings should be checked, the abuse of proxies restrained, and the provisions as to costs, trustees' remuneration, and trustees' accounts should be made more effective. We propose to consider hereafter the mode in which the Bankruptcy Bills now before Parliament deal with these various matters.

:-A

The Paris correspondent of the Daily News says:curious law point has been decided by the Court of Cassation in the case of Abadie, a murderer, who, by the caprice of a Paris jury, obtained a verdict with extenuating circumstances.' Being indicted for a murder previous to the one for which he was convicted, the counsel demurred that all previous crimes were merged in the conviction. The Court of Cassation holds that technically a trial may be had, if only to give the right to the prisoner to clear himself, but probably the objection will be decided on its merits in the Assize Court.

CONDITIONS OF SALE.

shott, V.C.H., 28 W. R. 794.)

In the first of these cases the action was brought to set aside a contract of sale of leasehold property, and the defendant counter-claimed for specific performance. One of the conditions provided, as usual, that the purchaser should be deemed to have full notice of the covenants in the lease; and another was the ordinary condition that "the production of the last receipt for rent shall be taken as conclusive evidence of the due and satis. factory performance of the lessee's covenants contained in the lease by which the premises are held, or the waiver of any breaches of the same covenants up to the time of the completion of the purchase, whether the lessor was cognizant of such breaches (if any) or not." The purchaser objected that a continuing breach of covenant had been committed, and it was contended that, although the above condition covered all breaches of covenant down to the date of completion, the court would not force on the purchaser a lease which might be determined by the landlord's re-entry the day after the completion of the purchase. In other words, if this contention had succeeded, the condition relating to the last receipt for rent being conclusive evidence, would be inoperative whenever there was a continuing breach of covenant.

The Court of Appeal refused to accede to this view, and Lord Justice Bramwell seized the opportunity to enforce his favourite lesson that "a bargain is a bargain, and should be observed, and if this purchaser has agreed that he will take an arbitrary substitute, or something in lieu of evidence that the covenants have been performed, or that breaches have been waived, he should be bound by it; because people must be taught by suffering not to enter into improvident bargains from which in these days I hope they will not be released by their being set aside." With submission, that was not the point raised in the case. The purchaser was willing to observe his bargain that the receipt should be conclusive evidence of the performance of covenants up to the time of completion; the question was whether the court would lend its assistance to compel a purchaser to buy an interest which might be determined immediately after completion. The result of holding that a continuing breach is a bar to specific performance would be inconvenient, and contrary to the general understanding, and the other members of the court based their decision mainly on this ground.

The question may perhaps be raised whether Howel v. Kightley (4 W. R. 477, 21 Beav. 331) is still law? It will be remembered that in that case the above condition was held not to cover breaches of covenant committed by the vendor after the contract and before completion. Lord Justice Baggallay seems to intimate that the decision is still law, and it certainly seems to us that there is nothing in the recent case to show that a vendor may not, by his conduct in committing breaches of covenant after the contract, disentitle himself to obtain the assistance of the court.

Jackson to Oakshott turned upon the condition relating to rescinding. The members of the Birmingham Law Society hold a high rank for real property knowledge and conveyancing skill; but this case brought to light a curious flaw in their commo form conditions-viz., the omission of the ordinary words specifying objections or requisitions to title, abstract, evidence of title, particulars, conditions, conveyance, or otherwise." The condition began with a reference to objections and requisitions as to title, and Vice-Chancellor Hall held that the connection in language between the latter part of the condition and the former part showed that the same thing was still being

referred to-i.e., objections and requisitions as to title; hence, that the condition did not enable the vendor to rescind on an objection relating to conveyance.

Reviews.

MAGISTERIAL LAW.

A MAGISTERIAL AND POLICE GUIDE: BEING THE STATUTE
LAW, INCLUDING THE SESSION 43 VICT., 1880, WITH
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO THE MOST RECENTLY
DECIDED CASES RELATING TO THE PROCEDURE, JURIS-
DICTION, AND DUTIES OF MAGISTRATES AND POLICE
&c. By HENRY C. GREENWOOD, Stipendary
AUTHORITIES,
Magistrate, and TEMPLE C. MARTIN, Chief Clerk of
of the Lambeth Police Court. SECOND EDITION.
Stevens & Haynes.

The main changes in this edition are, of course, occasioned by the Summary Jurisdiction Act, which the authors have embodied in their introduction. The rules under the Act, which are printed without the schedules, do not appear to be referred to in the introduction, no doubt owing to their appearance while the work was going through the press. With this exception, and the omission on p. 4 of a reference to the case of R. v. Millidge (27 W. R. 659), relating to disqualification of justices as being interested parties, we have not observed any omission in the statutes or cases passed and decided since the last edition. It would probably conduce to the convenience of readers if the cross references were somewhat fuller, so as to give the Act and section referred to, and an idea of the subject-matter of such section. For instance, under the head "dogs,' a cross reference is given to "Police (Metropolitan)." It would save trouble if there were added "2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 47 (dog-fighting); s. 54 (2) (ferocious dogs)," and so on. But the work as it stands is a very convenient and well-executed guide to magistrates.

HAYNES'S OUTLINES OF EQUITY. OUTLINES OF EQUITY; BEING A SERIES OF ELEMENTARY LECTURES ON EQUITY JURISDICTION, &c. By FREEMAN OLIVER HAYNES, Barrister-at-Law. Fifth Edition. William Maxwell & Sons.

The last edition of this admirable little book, to which many of our readers have been indebted for their first ideas of equity jurisdiction, was published on the eve of the coming into operation of the Judicature Act. The present edition has been adapted, mainly by excision, to the changes introduced by that Act. Lectures 2 and 3, relating to the general history and constitution of the equity courts, and the course of a suit in equity, have been omitted, and notes have been added explaining and qualifying statements in the lectures which are not in accordance with the present state of the law. The book was for many years the best equity primer in existence, and only needs a rather more extensive remodelling to resume its former position.

The report of the Select Committee appointed to inquire into the administration, operation, and effect of the Contagious Diseases Acts states that the advanced period of the session at which they were appointed renders it impossible for them to enter effectually upon the inquiry, and they, therefore, recommend their re-appointment next session.

An English institution, says the London correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, has been transferred to the Khyber. The Gazette announces the appointment of justices of the peace for the Khyber Pass and of the lands immediately adjoining the Pass on either side of the roadway. The political officer in charge and the officer in military command are to be justices of the peace, committing European subjects for trial to the chief court of the Punjab.

General Correspondence.

CALL OF SOLICITORS TO THE BAR. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-No one can read the account of the meeting at the Law Institution without perceiving that many members of the so-called "lower" branch of the profession would be quite contented to leave things as they are if only that hateful adjective could be got rid of, and that, totally forgetful that the division of the profession is one of labour and of labour only, and that the word "lower" is simply applied as a distinguishing term to the branch, and not to the individuals composing it, they are fighting against a shadow.

When once, however, this mistake has been pointed out, and it is clearly understood that socially a solicitor is esteemed in no way lower than a barrister (and, indeed, to do so would be absurd when one considers that some even of the judges have sons or brothers who are solicitors), a little calmer attention will be given to the consideration of the difference between the Law Society and the Inns of Court.

Now I think I may venture to say that no solicitor of any standing will contradict me when I assert that there is no similarity between the duties which devolve upon a barrister and those which fall to the lot of a solicitor. The barrister aims at being a skilful advocate and a lawyer, in the strict sense of the word, and his time is employed in the pursuit of these objects, and these objects alone. But the duties of a solicitor are widely different, and if their influence on the community be taken into account, far more important than those of the barrister. He has to be a man of sound common sense and vast knowledge of mankind, and, unlike the barrister, he has to advise his clients, not according to strict law, but according to what, irrespective of law, are their best interests-which is far more difficult-and it is well known that many of the most successful achievements in solicitors' offices are accomplished by acting contrary to the advice of counsel. A solicitor, moreover, has to conduct all important negotiations on behalf of his clients; he must know when to give and when to take; and in this again he is guided, not as barristers would be by the rights of their clients, but according to their true welfare, and it cannot be doubted that a good solicitor is a far more useful, and therefore, morally, a more honourable, member of society than a good barrister.

What, then, are the respective trainings which the young barrister and the young solicitor go through? The whole time of the former is taken up with the study of strict law, whereas, as soon as the articled clerk has gone through his Stephen or his Broom, he is at once taught to seek the true interests of his clients, to learn the art of negotiation, and consequently, although, perhaps, unknown to himself, to study mankind. This being so, can it be seriously contended for a moment that a solicitor, having been thus trained, can without any further study become an efficient counsel, either to practise in the courts where justice is administered according to strict law, and not according to what may happen to be the best interests of the suitors, or to advise upon those rights which it has been his constant practice to disregard?

That solicitors themselves do not consider that he can is seen from the fact that in the county courts where they have a right of audience they invariably think it advisable to employ counsel when the magnitude of the case will allow it.

No doubt men who have, by going to the wrong branch of the profession, made a mistake-or rather, I should say, for whom the mistake has been made-are to be sympathized with, and yet not more so than a doctor who would have done better as a clergyman, or vice versa; but there is no reason why, on their account, th