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Addington Newton Olding, who served his clerkship to Mr. Frederick Kent, of London; and Mr. John Attenborough, of London.

Frederick Henry Hooper Orchard, who served his clerkship to Mr. Thomas Floud, of Exeter.

James Albert Orchard, who served his clerkship to Mr. John George Galloway Redford, of Sidmouth.

Henry Bishop Priest, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Hill & Dickinson, of Liverpool; and Messrs. Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle, of London.

George Roose, who served his clerkship to Mr. Thomas George Everill, of London.

James Rose, B.A., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Phillips & Son, of Chippenham; and Messrs. Whitakers & Woolbert, of London.

Frederick William Skardon, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Edmonds & Son, of Plymouth.

Ernest Theodore Smith, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Henry Smith, of London.

William Ernest Taylor, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Sanders, Smith, & Parish, of Birmingham. James William Henry Walsh, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Trollope & Winckworth, of London.

Hugh Septimus Winter, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Plummer & Fielding, of Canterbury; and Messrs. Speechly, Mumford, & Co., of London.

Herbert John Wright, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Flavell & Bowman, of London.

The Council of the Incorporated Law Society have accordingly given class certificates and awarded the following prizes of books:

To Mr. Thwaites, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clement's-inn. Value ten guineas.

To Mr. White, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clifford's-inn. Value five guineas.

To Mr. Elkin, the prize of the Honourable Society of New-inn. Value five guineas.

To Mr. Crafter, Mr. Hodgson, Mr. Todd, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Moyle, Mr. Cowl, Mr. Robinson, Mr. Davison, Mr. Johnstone, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Stone, Mr. Parker, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Baxter, and Mr. Bayley, prizes of the Incorporated Law Society. Value five guineas each.

The council have given class certificates to the candidates in the second and third classes.

The number of candidates examined was seventy-five.

New Orders, Etc.

NOTICE AS TO AFFIDAVITS. General Directions as to Searching for Affidavits.] All affidavits filed in the Central Office are deposited in the affidavit room and entered in the index books under the initial letter of the suit or matter in which the affidavit is used. There are two distinct sets of index books:

(1.) Affidavits filed in this office by the parties themselves, and

(2.) Affidavits transmitted from court or chambers or

the master's office which are usually received the day after they have been used;

But affidavits used on application in the common law chambers and in court may have been filed in the first instance in this office and office copies of them used on the application, in which case the original affidavit would be in the index book (No. 1). An affidavit not found in the index book (No. 2) of affidavits transmitted should be searched for in the index book (No. 1). Affidavits filed in the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer Divisions, previous to the 6th of April, 1880, have been deposited in the affidavit office.

In Answer to Interrogatories or of Discovery of Documents.] Every affidavit in answer to interrogatories shall, when tendered for filing, be plainly marked on the outside by the party filing it with the capital letter A., and every affidavit of the discovery of documents shall, in

like manner, be marked with the capital letter D., and notice shall be given to the clerk receiving such affidavit that it is an affidavit in answer to interrogatories or of documents (as the case may be); unless this be done, the affidavits may be overlooked in searches made for the purpose of giving certificates.

Stamps.] All adhesive stamps must be put on the first page of the affidavit in the margin.

Exhibits.] Exhibits should be annexed, when practicable, between the leaves of the affidavit for better security.

Bills of Sale Affidavits.] Affidavits used on application in court or at chambers respecting bills of sale are filed in each case under the name of the party by whom the bill is given.

Election Petition Affidavits.] Affidavits used on applications under the Election Petition Act are filed under the name of the petitioner.

Office Copies left to be Examined and Marked.] All office copies left to be marked must be stamped at the rate of 2d. per folio, and must have indorsed on the outside the name of the solicitor who will call for them. Where they are left after the original has been filed, the party leaving them must search the index for the index number of the original and the year in which it was filed, which must be indorsed on the back of the copy.

Bespeaking Copies to be made in the Office.] Where office copies are required to be made in the office the party bespeaking such copy must fill up on the printed (blue) bespeak form necessary particulars, including the number of the affidavit in the index book, which he must ascertain for himself. The stamps in payment of such copies must be left pinned on the bespeak form.

Producing Affidavits from the Affidavit Office before a Judge or Master, and in Court.] Where it is required to produce affidavits already on the file, before a judge or master in chambers, the party must fill up the (white) bespeak form, and leave it with the officer (where practicable) the day before such affidavit is required. Pursuant to rule 51 of the Rules of April, 1880, no original affidavit which is on the file can be produced in any court without an order from a judge or master, but office copies may be used.

Referring to Affidavits on the File for the purpose of drawing the Order.] Where an affidavit has to be referred to in an order, it will be sufficient if the parties produce at the summons and order desk a certificate of filing from the affidavit office, where forms of certificate are supplied. These must be filled up by the party, and handed to the filing clerk to be sealed.

Inspecting Original Affidavits.] When it is desired to inspect any original affidavit, a fee of 1s. (stamped on a the affidavit to be removed from the office, or to be "search præcipe") must be paid, and on no account is marked or written upon; when done with it should be returned to the officer.

Altering Office Copies.] No alteration, interlineation, or erasure shall on any account be made upon any office copy which has been issued from this office.

It is stated that the Lord Chancellor has received at his private office in the House of Lords a deputation of fifteen solicitors and two newspaper proprietors concerning certain disputes and unseemly proceedings which have occurred in the Somerset, Dorset, and Wiltshire County Courts, presided over by Mr. T. E. P. Lefroy as judge. The deputation was introduced by Mr. Montague Guest, M.P., who was accompanied by two of the members for Dorset, and also members for several of the Western boroughs, including A memorial setting Christchurch, Shaftesbury, and Poole. forth the grievances had been prepared, and addresses were delivered in regard to the manner in which the county The Lord Chancellor intimated that complaints and courts in Mr. Lefroy's circuits have been conducted. representations from various quarters had reached him, and promised that the matter should receive his careful attention.

Cases of the Week.

PROOF IN BANKRUPTCY INTEREST - GUARANTEE PAYMENT OF DEBT BY SURETY.-In a case of Ex parte Bishop, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., the question arose whether a proof ought to be admitted in the liquidation of the acceptors of a bill of exchange for interest upon a sum which a guarantor of the bill had paid under his guarantee. Bills of exchange, which were drawn and accepted with the view of raising money for the joint purposes of the drawers and the acceptors, were discounted by the drawers with some bill brokers, the money procured by the discount being divided between the drawers and the acceptors. The bill brokers re-discounted the bills with their bankers, but did not indorse the bills. They had, however, given to the bankers a general guarantee of all bills discounted by the bankers for them. The acceptors were unable to meet the bills at maturity, and the drawers and the brokers also stopped payment. The bankers received a dividend upon the bills from the estate of the brokers, and they also proved against the estate of the acceptors for the balance, and the latter claim was compromised. The brokers' trustee claimed to prove against the estate of the acceptors for the sum which the broker's estate had paid to the bankers, and for interest thereon. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, COTTON, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) admitted the proof for the sum which had been paid (vide ante, p. 651), on the ground that, although the brokers did not indorse the bills, there was an implied authority to them by the acceptors to become sureties for the payment of the bills. But the court reserved their judgment on the question whether proof ought to be admitted for interest on the amount paid. On the 15th inst., the court gave judgment admitting the proof for interest from the time of payment down to the commencement of the liquidation. COTTON, L.J., who delivered the judgment of the court, said that, if there were no authority on the point, there might be some doubt whether interest was payable. But the cases of Petre v. Duncombe (2 L. M. & P. 107); Hitchman v. Stewart (3 Drew. 271); and In re Swan's Estate (4 Ir. Rep. Eq. 209), were authorities for allowing interest. The principle of those decisions was that a person who was indemnified, either expressly or by implication, against a particular act ought to be placed in the same position as if the act against which he was indemnified had been done by the person by whom it ought to have been done.-SOLICITORS, Lawrance, Plews, & Baker; Travers Smith, & Braithwaite.

LIQUIDATION PETITION-BILL OF SALE-SEIZURE BY GRANTEE INJUNCTION-JURISDICTION-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 12, 13-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, R. 260.—In a case of Ex parte Bayly, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., the question arose whether an injunction had been properly granted to restrain the grantee under a bill of sale from further proceeding with a seizure which he had made of the chattels comprised in his bill of sale shortly before the filing of a liquidation petition by the grantor. On the filing of the petition a receiver was appointed at the instance of the debtor, and an interim injunction was granted, which was afterwards continued, on the applica tion of the debtor ard the receiver, until after the time appointed for the first meeting of the creditors under the petition. There was no evidence that any objection could be raised or was likely to be raised to the validity of the bill of sale, but before the Court of Appeal the counsel who appeared for the debtor and the receiver suggested that when a trustee was appointed he might be able to discover facts showing that the bill of sale was invalid, and urged that the circumstances were suspicious; and they contended that the injunction ought to be continued until a trustee had been appointed, so that he might have an opportunity of making a case against the bill of sale. On the other side it was urged that the court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the legal rights of a mortgagee in possession. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) said that it was unnecessary to decide whether there was jurisdiction, for the court could not, in the absence of any evidence, even as to belief, impeaching the bill of sale, on a mere suggestion that possibly the trustee, when appointed, might be able to make out a case, interfere with

the legal right of a mortgagee.-SOLICITORS, Edward Hen ley; W. Crook.

ILLEGAL ASSOCIATION-" TRUST"-ASSOCIATION OF MORE 1862, s. 4.-In a case of Smith v. Anderson, before the THAN TWENTY MEMBERS-REGISTRATION-COMPANIES ACT, Court of Appeal on the 16th inst., the question arose whether the persons interested in a trust, similar to that which existed in the case of Sykes v. Beadon (27 W. R. 464, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 170), constituted, within the meaning of section 4 of the Companies Act, 1862, a company, association, or partnership consisting of more than twenty person, and "formed for the purpose of carrying on a business that has for its object the acquisition of gain by the company, associa tion, or partnership, or by the individual members thereof," and therefore an illegal association because it had not been registered under the Act. The trust was constituted by a deed which declared the trusts of certain stocks and shares of different submarine cable companies, which had been transferred to, and were standing in, the names of five trustees. The securities had been purchased by moneys contri buted by a number of persons (many more than twenty), each of whom received for every £90 which he subscribed a certi. ficate for £100 nominal value, and also another document called a coupon of reversion. The trustees were to receive the annual income of the securities and to apply it in payment, first, of the expenses of the trust, including the remunera tion of the trustees, and then in paying interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum to the certificate holders on the nominal amounts of the certificates. The surplus income was to be employed in the redemption of the certificates, at a price not exceeding a specified maximum price. The redemption was to be effected by purchase of the certificates in the open market or by tender from the certificate holders, and if in those ways the whole of the surplus income of any year was not exhausted, the remainder of the surplus was to be employed in the redemption, at the maximam price, of should have been redeemed, the securities remaining certificates to be drawn by lot. When all the certificates subject to the trusts of the deed were to be realized, and the proceeds to be divided among the holders of the coupons of reversion in proportion to the nominal value of the coupons held by them respectively. The trustees were authorized to sell any of the securities if and when they should be capable of being sold in the market, and should be sold, at a premium of not less than thirty per cent. over the price at which they were purchased, and the proceeds of the sale were to be applied in the same way as the surplus income, though, if it should be so decided by a unanimous resolution of the trustees, and the resolution should be confirmed at a meeting of the certificate holders, the trustees were entitled to invest the proceeds of sale in the purchase of securities of the same character as the securities originally purchased, to be held subject to the trusts of the deed. There was to be a meating of the certificate holders once every year. At the meeting no person was to be present who did not produce his certificate, and persons were to vote in proportion to the value of the certificates produced by them. The proceedings of the meeting were, so far as might be, to be conducted in the manner prescribed in Table A. to the Companies Act, 1862. The business of the meeting was to be (1) to receive and consider a report from the trustees on the condition and affairs of the trust; (2) to appoint auditors to audit the trustees' accounts and to report to the next meeting; (3) to elect new trustees to supply any vacancies. The plaintiff was a certificate holder, and he brought the action, on behalf of himself and all other holders of the certificates, against the trustees. He alleged that the holders of the certificates and the defendants formed an illegal association, under section 4 of the Act, the trust not having been registered, and he claimed to have the trusts of the deed, or such of them as were not illegal, carried into execution under the direction of the court, and to have the securities subject to the trusts of the deed divided among the certificate holders in proportion to their respective interests. Jessel, M.R., followed his own previous decision in Sykes v. Beadon, and held the "trust" to be an illegal association, and he ordered that its affairs should

be wound up. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) reversed this decision. They were of opinion that there was no association between the certi

ficate bolders; that, if there was an association, no business was carried on; and that, if any business was carried on, it was carried on, not by the certificate holders, or by the trustees as their agents, but by the trustees as the legal Owners of the property, and that, as the trustees were less than twenty in number, section 4 would not apply. JAMES, L.J., said that the powers given to the trustees were only of the same kind as those which might be given to the trustees of a settlement or a will when the trust property was very large. The purpose of the deed was only to secure a good investment of capital by spreading it over a number of securities, and thus to obtain the benefit of the doctrine of averages-to get a good dividend, and, at the same time, to have a good security for the invested capital. This decision in effect overrules that of Jessel, M.R., in Sykes v. Beadon, a case which the Court of Appeal recognized as involving the same principle as Smith v. Anderson. BRETT, L.J., added that the same reasoning would lead to the conclusion that the opinion of the Master of the Rolls, expressed in In re Arthur Average Association (23 W. R. 939, L. R. 10 Ch. 542), that mutual insurance associations consisting of more than twenty members are illegal if not registered under the Companies Act, 1862, was wrong. He was inclined to think that no transaction within the association, no transaction between the members themselves, would bring the case within section 4. COTTON, L.J., said that, if it had been apparent that the real object of the trust was that the trustees should speculate in investments of a particular class, the case would have stood in a very different position.-SOLICITORS, Ashurst, Morris, & Co.; Baxters & Co.

PRACTICE-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-APPEAL-TRIAL BY JUDGE WITHOUT JURY-ORD. 39, R. 1A-ORD. 58, R. 5A (MARCH, 1879) (Vide 23 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL,448, 449).-A case of Pannell v. Nunn, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., shows that the proper mode of proceeding to obtain a new trial, when an action has been tried by a judge without a jury, is not yet fully understood. The action was tried by Stephen, J., without a jury, who gave judgment for the defendant, not finding a verdict on the facts separately from his decision on the law, but giving his judgment on the facts and the law. The plaintiff gave notice of appeal from the judgment, asking, by his notice, that the judgment entered for the defendant might be set aside, and that instead thereof judgment might be entered for the plaintiff, or that a new trial might be had. This notice was accepted by the officer of the court in the first instance without any objection as a proper notice, but afterwards the appellant's solicitor was informed by him that the notice had been received by mistake, and that the proper course would have been to apply for a rule nisi for a new trial. The point was then mentioned to the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and BRETT, L.JJ.) who said that the practice had been settled by the decision of the Court of Appeal at Westminster in Potter v. Cotton (28 W. R. 160, L. R. 5 Ex. D. 137), and that the appellant would be quite safe in relying upon the notice which he had already given.-SOLICITOR, James Goren.

ADMINISTRATION ACTION-TAKING ACCOUNTS OF EXECUTOR IN CHAMBERS EVIDENCE OF PAYMENTS.-In a case of Raines v. Raines, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., a question arose as to the evidence which ought to be adduced of payments made by an executor upon the taking of his accounts in an administration action. The testator, who died in 1859, had given his property to trustees, upon trust for his wife for her life, with remainder for his six children in equal shares, and had appointed his wife sole executrix. The income of the property was only a little more than £200 a year. The widow from time to time paid debts contracted by one of the sons while he was at the university, the sums thus paid amounting in all to £332. She died in 1877, and after her death the action was brought to administer the testatrix's estate, her representative being a party to it. The question was whether this sum was to be taken as having been paid out of the capital of the son's share, and whether it was to be set off against his share. The set-off was opposed, by some mortgagees of the share. There was no strict legal proof that the widow had made the payments out of the capital. But the vouchers for the payments were found

in the widow's possession, and one of the daughters said that her mother had told her that she had made the payments out of the capital of the son's share, and it appeared that he had written to his mother asking her to pay his debts. Malins, V.C., allowed the payment as part of the son's share, and his decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and BRETT, L.JJ.). JESSEL, M.R., said that in taking an executor's accounts in chambers, especially after the death of the executor, the judge exercised a discretion, and did not require strict legal evidence of every item. To require strict evidence would in many cases simply be to rob the estate of the deceased executor. If such evidence was required, either every executor must institute an administration action, at the latest within a few years after the testator's death, or he would be mulcted of large sums which he had honestly expended. Though the court would not allow the Statute of Limitatations to be set up against a cestui que trust, still it must do justice in a reasonable way, and not require strict proof of every item in an executor's account. JAMES, L.J., said that the court was bound to act upon reasonable probability and fair inference, and ought to set its face against any attempt to plunder the estate for costs. BRETT, L.J., said that the rule which the Master of the Rolls had laid down was a most wholesome one, and it was absolutely necessary for the purposes of justice.-SOLICITORS, J. P. Murrough; Bowlings, Foyer, § Hordern.

PRACTICE-ADDING PARTIES-AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS -APPLICATION AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT-Ord. 16, R. 13.In a case of The Attorney-General v. The Borough of Birmingham, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., a question arose as to the power of the court to order the amendment of the pleadings after final judgment in the action. The suit was commenced by information and bill at the relation of a landowner, who was the plaintiff, and in April, 1875, a decree was made, granting a perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants from polluting by their sewage a certain river. And, on the undertaking of the defendants to carry on certain works for the purification of their sewage, and the undertaking of the plaintiff not to enforce the injunction for five years, it was ordered that the defendants should pay the plaintiff £6,000 for damages and costs up to the date of the decree. In September, 1877, the defendants' sanitary district was by an Act of Parliament embodied, with other districts, into a larger united district, the powers and liabilities of the defendants being vested in the new district board. In April, 1880, the plaintiffs took out a summons, under r. 13, of ord. 16, asking that they might be at liberty to amend the information and bill by adding the district board as defendants. Bacon, V.C., granted the application. The defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and BRETT, L.JJ.) held that an order to amend could not be made aftor final judgment, and that the only way of enforcing mencing a new action against them.-SOLICITORS, Sharpe, the judgment against the district board would be by comParkers, & Co.; Paines, Layton, & Co.

PRACTICE NOTICE OF INJUNCTION BY TELEGRAM DUTY OF PARTIES RECEIVING SUCH NOTICE-COSTS.—In a case of Tonkinson v. Cartledge, before the Master of the Rolls on the 16th inst., a motion was made to commit the defendant, her solicitor, and an auctioneer, who had sold certain effects which the plaintiff alleged belonged to her, and which had been seized under a distress for rent. The plaintiff obtained an ex parte injunction against the defendant on the 2nd of July, restraining the sale under the distress about to take place that day at two o'clock at Newcastleunder-Lyme. Notice of the injunction was sent by telegram to the auctioneer and the defendant's former solicitor between eleven and twelve. The auctioneer, after consulting with the defendant and her solicitor, continued the sale, and the motion was made in respect of this contempt. In answer to the motion, it was alleged that the defendant, who was the aunt of the plaintiff, and her solicitor, and the auctioneer, all believed that no order had, in fact, been made, and that the telegram was a forgery. It was also proved that the local agent of the plaintiff's solicitors knew nothing of the injunction. The defendant's solicitor did not, however

& Lambert; Peacock & Goddard; Thomson, Son, & Brooks; Marson & Greenfield; Dod & Longstaffe; Ramsden & Austin.

communicate by telegram with the plaintiff's solicitors, and only wrote to them on the following day. It also appeared that the defendant's solicitor had a London office. The plaintiff did not now press for a committal, but simply that the respondents might be ordered to pay the costs of the motion. JESSEL, M.R., said he thought he might strain a point in CHARITABLE USES ACT-PURE OR IMPURE PERSONALTY favour of the auctioneer, and not order him to pay the costs, in-MONEY CHARGED BY BOND ON POLICE RATES.-In a case consequence of the observations of Lord Justice James, in Ex parte Langley (L. R. 13 Ch. D. 110). It was no doubt the auctioneer's duty to have sent a telegram back to the plaintiff's solicitors, and so have inquired if the injunction were really granted, but as he had his positive affidavit (said by James, L.J., in the above case to be sufficient to save him from the contempt) that he thought the telegram a forgery, there was just sufficient to save him from the costs, more especially as there were other persons to pay them. As to the defendant's solicitor, the Master of the Rolls certainly thought he had acted with imprudence. He had an office in London, and he had a telegram between eleven and twelve stopping a sale to take place at two, and it was his plain duty, if he had any doubt as to the authenticity of the telegram, to have telegraphed to the plaintiff's solicitors and asked them if it was genuine or not. There was ample time before the sale to have done this, but he did nothing until the next day, when the sale was over. The next day he did write to the plaintiff's solicitors, with whom he evidently was acquainted, and asked them whether the telegram was genuine or not, and at once received the answer that it was. The solicitor's duty had been as plain as possible, and he must certainly pay the costs of the motion. As to the defendant, she did not even swear in her affidavit that she believed the telegram was a forgery, she took the risk of allowing the sale to go on, and she must clearly also be ordered to pay the costs of the motion. The order for costs would be without prejudice to the question of damages that the plaintiff might have sustained by reason of the sale having been proceeded with.-SOLICITORS, Pitman & Lane; Coopers; Collyer-Bristow, Withers, & Russell.

of Re Harris, Jackson v. Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty before the Master of the Rolls on the 19th inst., a question was argued whether certain bonds charged on the police rates of the division of a county were a charge on land so as to be impure personalty. The bonds were in similar form, and were signed by three justices present in annual general session. After reciting two Acts of the 2 & 3 Vict. and 3 & 4 Vict., "for the establishment of county and district constables," giving the justices power to order station-houses to be provided in such places as the justices should think fit, and for that purpose to purchase and hold lands and to build and provide such station-houses, and to defray their cost out of the police rates, and to borrow money for such purposes, and to charge the future police rates with the amounts of the loans and interest, and reciting the facts as to the particular loan, the bond witnessed that the justices, in exercise of the powers in the said Acts, thereby charged the future police rates of the division with the amount of the loan and interest, the principal being repayable by instalments. And the justices thereby, as far as they lawfully could, directed and ordered the payments to be made out of such police rates. JESSEL, M.R., said that in his opinion the bonds were not a charge on any lands. The police rates were not now leviable in the same way as formerly. The machinery now was for the justices to issue a precept to the overseers to levy a rate to pay the necessary amount. The justices no longer had any direct right to levy the police rates, but if the overseers did not pay the requisite amount they would be personally liable. The justices, it appeared, only paid away the sums actually paid them, and they had no actual charge on the rates, and all they professed to charge by the bonds on the police rates was the amount actually coming to their hands. The case was within the second ground of the decision in Thornton . Kempson (Kay, 592), and also within the principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in Attree v. Hawe (L. R. 9 Ch. D. 337), which case must be taken to have overruled Finch authority, he should decide that the bonds were not impure v. Squire (10 Ves. 41), and therefore, on principle and personalty.-SOLICITORS, Norris, Allens, & Carter; S. Dun

PARTNERSHIP-POWER FOR EXECUTOR TO USE PORTION OF TESTATOR'S ESTATE IN CONTINUING BUSINESS-LIABILITY OF SUCH PORTION OF ESTATE TO CREDITORS OF FIRM WHERE EXECUTOR GUILTY OF BREACH OF TRUST-In a case of Re Johnson, Shearman v. Robinson, before the Master of the Rolls on the 19th inst., a question was argued on further consideration as to the rights of creditors against a testator's estate where the executor had, under a power in the will, carried on the business and had become bankrupt. The power in the will was to carry on the business inning. the name of an infant, and to employ an aliquot share of the residue (being the infant's share) in so carrying it on. It appeared that the executor had carried on the business, and had used, not only an amount equal to the aliquot share, but that he was, in addition, considerably indebted to the estate. The executor had given bills to several creditors, and was now bankrupt. The creditors now contended that, in addition to the personal liability of the executor, their debts were also a charge on the share of the testator's residuary estate. JESSEL, M.R., said he understood the doctrine to be this: that, where an executor had a limited power to carry on a business and to use certain assets therein, his creditors had a right to stand in the place of the executor as against the testator's estate, and to have the benefit of any lien on the assets the executor might have. If, however, a trustee or executor had robbed the trust estate and had put the money into his own pocket, there was no such equity as against the cestuis que trust, whose money he had taken. The different cases on this subject did not exactly decide as to the mode of working out the rights of the creditors in such a case, although, in his opinion, the correct principle was laid down by Turner, L.J., in Ex parte Edmunds (4 De G. F. & J. 488), who there said that the creditors' right was to resort for indemnity simply to those assets directed to be employed in the business-i.e., to put themselves in the position of the executor quá those assets. There would, bowever, be no right to put themselves in the position of the executor, except on the terms of their replacing the trust estate which had been lost by him. His lordship then held that, as the facts were not very clearly proved as to the partnership dealings, he would not distribute the infant's share until the creditors had had an opportunity of ascertaining the facts and presenting a petition to get the fund.-SOLICITORS, Ward, Mills, Witham,

TRADE UNION SOCIETY-PURPOSES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-RIGHT TO SUE-TRADES UNION ACT, 1871 (34 & 35 VICT. c. 31), ss. 3, 4.-Iu a case of Duke v. Littleboy, the question arose whether an action could be maintained before Denman, J. (sitting for Fry, J.), on the 15th inst., by members of a trade union society, the rules of which showed that the objects of the society were in restraint of trade. The action was brought by the members of the executive council of the society, which was called an amalgamated society, against the officers and trustees of a branch of the society, claiming an injunction to restrain the defendants from dividing the funds in their hands among the members of the branch, or dealing with them contrary to the rules of the society and without the consent of the executive council, and an order for payment to the council of so much of the funds of the branch as should not be required for current expenses. The action arose out of the refusal of the amalgamated society to support a strike by members of the branch society. The preliminary objection was taken by the defendants that the action was one for enforcing an agreement for the application of the funds of the society to provide benefits to members, withia the meaning of section 4 of the Act, and that consequently, by virtue of that section, the action could not be mais tained. DENMAN, J., held that the decision of Jessel, M.R., in Rigby v. Connol (28 W. R. 650, ante, p. 327) was in point, and he accordingly allowed the objection, and dismissed the action.-SOLICITORS, W. H. Brooks; Woodbridge & Sons.

Societies.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

ANNUAL MEETING.

The annual general meeting of members of this society was held in the hall of the society, in Chancery-lane, on Friday afternoon, the 16th inst.

Mr. N. T. LAWRENCE, president of the society, occupied the chair.

After the election of Mr. John Moxon Clabon as president, and Mr. Charles Claridge Druce as vice-president of this society for the ensuing year, and Mr. Charles Ponsonby Wilmer, of 7, New-square; Mr. James Ward Russell, of 2, Bedford-row; and Mr. Joseph Henry Schroder, of 4, Lincoln's-inn-fields, as auditors for the ensuing year,

The CHAIRMAN mentioned the list of candidates for the offices of members of the council :-Mr. Lewis Fry, M.P., of Bristol; Mr. Henry Skrine Law Hussey, of Lincoln's-inn; Mr. Benjamin Greene Lake, of Lincoln's-inn; Mr. Henry Markby, of Coleman-street; Mr. John Hollams, of MincingJane; Mr. George Burrow Gregory, M.P., Bedford-row; Mr. Charles John Follett, of Queen's-gate; Mr. Frederick Halsey Jansen, of Finsbury-circus; Mr. Edward Field, of Norwich; Mr. William Alfred Jevons, of Liverpool; Mr. Frederick Leigh Hutchins, of Birchin-lane; Mr. Frederic Parker Morrell, of Oxford; Mr. John Eaden, of Cambridge; Mr. William Stephens Jones, of Malmesbury; and Mr. William Edwood Shirley, of Doncaster. Thus they had fifteen members nominated, and the number of vacancies was only thirteen; it would, therefore, be necessary to proceed to an election by voting-papers under the bye-laws. Scrutineers were appointed, and the chairman appointed Wednesday, the 11th of August, as the day for receiving the scrutineers' report.

The CHAIRMAN said the next business was to read the report of receipts and disbursements of the society. As that account had been circulated in print, he assumed that the meeting would consider it read, and he therefore moved, "That the accounts, receipts, and disbursements of the society for the year ending 31st of December, 1879, be received, and approved, and signed by the president."

Mr. CLABON seconded the resolution, and, after a short discussion, it was carried unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN next moved, "That the annual

satisfied that they have been able to advance this important question nearer to a favourable solution." He would like to know how it was nearer a favourable solution if they refrained from taking one iota of trouble. Were Sir Wilfred Lawson and his alliance asleep during the election; and what was the result? It was that they had 229 gentlemen pledged on his question. But the most powerful trades union in the whole country, who would have been able to put their fingers upon willing agents in every constituency were unable to do anything. That was a most extraordinary thing, and when the Law Society went before Parliament, it was the reverse of surprising that honourable members treated it simply as a body of attorneys, if it refused to ask for that consideration which it was entitled to. What was taking place in Parliament now? The public were saying, You are a strong body, you are trade unionists; it you do not care about reform, we will thrust reform down your throats." Gentlemen laymen, like Mr. Joseph Cowen, Sir Baldwin Leighton, Mr. Rowley Hill, and Mr. Eustace Smith, had brought in the Supreme Court of Judicature (District Courts) Bill, and this was the third session in which that Bill had been introduced, and yet the report was devoid of any mention of it. Yet Mr. Cowen went a great deal farther than the council ever thought to demand; thus in one section he said, "Any solicitor of the Supreme Court may appear and be heard, as well in court as in chambers, in any district court, without being required to employ counsel." Had the council given any consideration to that Bill of the influential member for Newcastle? He thought the least they could have done was to go before the House of Commons, and say, "This is a public demand, and we ask that it be conceded"; but the council had done nothing. There was scarcely a single member of that society who was not an intimate friend of some member of the House of Commons, or House of Lords; could not those gentlemen be asked in their places in Parliament to support any demand of the council? He was almost ashamed to be a member of a society which could put forward such a helpless report as that, and he was seriously grieved for the reputation of their profession when he found such a body pinning their faith to such a document.

Mr. PROUDFOOT approved of the report as a whole, but in one respect he wanted information. At pregent solicitors were at liberty to make bargains with their clients, assuming that the clients were willing to do so, and certain forms were gone through so that there could be no advantage taken of the client at all. Now, it

report be received, and approved, and entered on the appeared from what he read in the report that

minutes."

Mr. CLABON Seconded the resolution.

After a pause,

Mr. EDMUND KIMBER said he was rather astonished that a report of this kind should be moved by the chairman, and seconded by Mr. Clabon, in the perfunctory manner in which had been, or that it should fall on the meeting like a dead letter; was there nothing upon which anybody should wish to say something? He would simply trouble the meeting with two or three remarks, and would ask it to observe the latin maxim, er uno disce omnes. At page 16 of the report, dealing with the subject of the call of solicitors to the bar, the council told them that action in Parliament had been unfortunately rendered impossible by the dissolution and the change of Government; he simply asked why? How was it that Parliament having been dissolved, and it being well known thoughout this country that the most important persons concerned in the election of new members were the solicitors in different provincial towns, the council positively looked upon the dissolution of Parliament almost as a dissolution of the society and of themselves, and said, "We can do nothing." Why, this was just the time when a society like that ought to do something, and ask of those persons who try to get into Parliament what they intend to do on the questions the society intended to bring before Parliament. But nothing of the kind had been done. The members were told in that slipshod manner that "action in Parliament has been unfortunately rendered impossible by the dissolution and the change of Government"; let it be published far and wide that the Incorporated Law Society of England and Wales, thought to be the strongest trades union in the kingdom, failed before a dissolution of the House of Commons. Then, as to the next sentence, how could the dissolution of Parliament be an "adverse influence ? He would like the council to explain that sentence. notwithstanding this adverse influence, the council

"But,

are

an

endeavour was being made to fix an amount, either in the way of percentage or otherwise, so that solicitors should be bound to take up certain business whether they liked it or

not.

If that was what it meant, he for one most strongly objected to it, for the solicitors would always get the worst of the bargain. Whatever amount of percentage might be fixed, clients would always object to pay that percentage or commission, unless they were perfectly satisfied and it agreed with their ideas. He therefore suggested for the council's consideration that they should give the option both to the solicitors and clients to enter into these bargains if they thought proper.

The PRESIDENT said the question of obtaining audience for solicitors at quarter sessions was one the council considered of considerable importance. Notwithstanding what Mr. Kimber had said, it was hopeless to suppose that a Bill for that purpose could be passed during the present session of Parliament. As to the question of mentioning honours obtained by the candidates during their examinations in the Law List, the council had devoted much attention to the preparation of a calendar, in which all the distinctions attained by their members should be recorded, and he would take that opportunity to say that that would be the more satisfactory mode of noticing such distinctions. With reference to Mr. Kimber's observations, their report stated certain important facts with reference to the important question of facilitating the admission of solicitors to the bar, and also the approval by Lord Cairns of the object of the society's Bill for dispensing with the three years' interregnum in the case of solicitors of five years' standing. Mr. Gregory had done all that it was possible for a private member of Parliament to do, but he had not yet been able to obtain a hearing, as when his motion came on the House was on the point of being counted out. It was a subject the council had diligently worked

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