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tell him to go and give notice of the order, then the person affected would have the responsibility of an officer of the court for what he was doing." Why should not a solicitor, who is to be served with notice of an order, be entitled to the same responsibility? It should not be forgotten that the difficulty in these cases is usually occasioned by delay in applying for the restraining order, and it seems to us that it would be just in all cases to throw upon the person obtaining it the obligation of taking the precaution mentioned by the Lord Justice.

THE RECENT CASE of Cummins v. Fletcher, (28 W. R. 772) removes a misapprehension as to the consolidation of mortgages. THE principle on which this doctrine rests is, that he who seeks the assistance of equity must himself do equity. The person whose right to redeem is purely equitable must act equitably to the mortgagee, and not redeem one only of his securities leaving him with the chance of deficiency on the other. These are the terms on which the court affords its assistance to the mortgagor who is compelled to ask it. But when a mortgagor has a legal right to redeem, there is no ground for imposing any conditions upon him. In other words, there is no rule of the courts of equity that, whenever two properties are subject to two mortgages to the same mortgagee, one shall not be redeemed without the other. In Cummins v. Fletcher the assign of the mortgagor in a building society mortgage, the payments on which had been punctually kept up, applied to the society to redeem the mortgage. The society claimed that he must also redeem another mortgage to them by the same mortgagor, on which default had been made. The Court of Appeal decided against this claim. "It seems to me," said Lord Justice James, “that when a man has a legal right in one property-the 1871 mortgage in this case-he has no occasion whatever, and never will have any occasion, to come into a court of equity. The fact of these two properties being subject to two mortgages gives the court of equity no more power than it has to take any other property belonging to him for the purpose of satisfying the debt for which there was insufficient security." It is to be observed that in the infancy of the doctrine of consolidation, when it was supposed to relate only to legal mortgages, Sir William Grant, in Jones v. Smith (2 Ves. jun. 376), seems to have expressly confined its operation to cases where both estates are within the domain of equity by saying that, "if two separate estates are mortgaged, by which I understand the legal estate absolutely and at law irredeemably conveyed, this court will not interpose in favour of the redemption of one without the redemption of both."

IT IS STATED that a house surgeon at the Gloucester Infirmary has been unsuccessfully sued by a labourer for damages for a post-mortem examination of his wife, made without his knowledge or consent. The plaintiff admitted that he had not suffered any pecuniary loss, but alleged that "the examination had hurt his feelings," and that portions of the body had been taken away, an allegation which was denied. It is worth noticing that a very similar case arose some years ago before one of the superior courts of Cincinnati. The surgeon there contended that there was no property in a dead human body, and there could, therefore, be no legal remedy for an injury to a corpse. But the court held that, although at common law there could be no property in a corpse, yet the law gave to the husband the custody of the wife's corpse for the purpose of decent burial, and there would be a civil remedy for any interference with this right.

IT WILL BE SEEN from the list we print elsewhere, that there were seventy-five candidates at the last Honours Examination of the Incorporated Law Society, and that of these eighteen succeeded in obtaining a place in the first class. Twenty candidates appear to have been plucked.

LORD JUSTICE COTTON announced last Saturday that it was intended to issue a General Order to enable the Paymaster-General to deal with the converted East Indian Railway Stock in the same way as the original East Indian Railway Stock, without the necessity of any application to the court.

THE IRISH LAND ACT (1870).

In the course of the discussions upon the Compensation for Disturbance Bill, a question of some importance, respecting the nature and extent of the rights given to the Irish tenantry by the Land Act of 1870, has been raised, and not, as we think, very satisfactorily answered.

It is hardly necessary to say that we have no intention of entering upon any discussion of the policy of the Bill in question, or of the desirability of granting to any tenantry, Irish or other, proprietary rights in the soil they occupy; we are only concerned with the much narrower question, What are the rights now in fact enjoyed by occupying tenants in Ireland, and whence and how were those rights derived and conferred? And for this purpose it is necessary at the outset to draw a distinction, too often overlooked, between the Province of Ulster and the rest of Ireland, a distinction a dae regard to which would have saved Mr. Sullivan from the ludicrous error into which he was betrayed on the last night of the debates in committee. For the tenantry of

Ulster, or the greater part of them, have unquestionably rights in the soil which are essentially rights of property; rights which have been purchased with hard cash, if not by the tenants themselves, at any rate by their predecessors in title, and this always with the conniv ance, generally with the active co-operation, of the landlord or his agent; and the existence of such rights has never, in this century at least, been denied in Ulster, though much difference of opinion has existed, and still exists, as to their extent, and the limits and conditions to which they are subject. As the rights themselves are essentially customary, it naturally follows that they are subject to considerable variation, the custom on one estate seldom accurately agreeing with that on any other, and even the different holdings on the same property being not unfrequently subject to different customs, according to the origin of the tenancy, or the devolution of the landlord's interest. All the varieties, however, present the same general features-viz., a right in the tenant, when giving up his holding, whether voluntarily or otherwise, to offer "the goodwill" for sale, under conditions, more or less stringent, as to the character of the purchaser and the terms of his acceptance by the landlord; and a right in the landlord to fix, within certain more or less elastic limits, the terms upon which the incoming tenant should be permitted to hold. This right was not conferred on the tenant by the Land Act, it has existed and been recognized for generations; and, at least until after the operation of the Incumbered Estates Court had introduced a number of landowners, "who knew not Joseph" into the province, it was never questioned in an ordinary case, though its applicability in certain circumstances was often hotly contested-e.g., on some estates it was never recognized when the tenant had a lease, however short, the contention being that the lease was what he had paid for, and that, therefore, he could have no rights beyond his bargain; and there were many estates where a tenant who had not bought (or inherited from some one who had bought) was not allowed to sell.

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The nearest analogy, perhaps, to the Ulster "tenantright" would be found in copyhold tenure, with, however, this important difference, that the courts in England have recognized and enforced the rights of the copyholder from a very early period, whereas the courts in Ireland, till compelled by the Land Act, steadily refused to recognize the peculiar position of the Ulster tenantry at all. These tenants had, from generation to generation, bought and sold their rights of occupancy, with the full knowledge the landlords, who, moreover, found in the sale of the goodwill a most valuable addition to their security, the arrears of rent being always first charge the purchase-money, so firmly rooted was the confidence in the custom thus engendered, that we have frequently known tenants to refuse to accept leases for twenty-one years, when voluntarily offered by the landlords, on the ground that the goodwill of a tenancy (in law) from year to year was a more saleable property. It would, of course, be an intolerable wrong if a landlord, who knew that an incoming tenant had given a large sum of money for the goodwill of his holding, on the faith of it again being permitted to dispose of leaving, and who had, perhaps, received a large of portion of the money in the shape of arrears rent, otherwise irrecoverable, had afterwards, in reliance on a strict legal right, refused to give effect to the tacit agreement in question, and insisted upon taking possession of the land, and confiscating the goodwill without compensation. It is, however, to the credit of the landlords of Ulster that, although the Irish courts, both of law and equity, had, so long ago as the Chancellorship of Lord Lifford, refused to recognize the validity of the custom, it was all but universally respected throughout the province, at least except in those doubtful classes of cases to which reference has been already made. To the rights thus acquired the Land Act added nothing; it did, indeed, expressly legalize all such customs as could be proved, and enabled the tenants to enforce their rights under them by the medium of the county courts-i.e., it substituted the discretion of the county court judge for the conscience of the landlord in applying the right, but the right itself remained entirely unaltered.

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But the condition of the tenantry throughout the South-west of Ireland was, and is, entirely different. With exceptions so few as to be immaterial, neither they nor any one through whom they claimed ever had paid a single shilling for their right of occupancy, nor had the landlord received directly ever indirectly any benefit from their occupation beyond the payment of the stipulated rent, or (more frequently) some part thereof. They were, therefore, absolutely without those moral rights which constituted the foundation of the Ulster customs, and were simply in the position of any other persons who had hired the use of a commodity-say a horse, or a steam-engine -upon a bargain to pay a fixed rent for it, and to return it any time upon six months' notice. It was, indeed, alleged, and with just sufficient show of truth to require some recognition, that they, or some of them, had laid out money upon improvements, and so long ago as 1860 an Act was passed with the object of securing to the tenant, on quitting his holding, full compensation for all such improvements as he might have effected with the landlord's consent. This right was considerably extended by clause 4 of the Act of 1870, but so far as we can learn, the cases, even in the North, where this clause has had any operation, have been very few and far between. The 3rd clause of this Act, however, conferred upon the tenant a right of an entirely new kind, utterly different as well from anything arising out of the contract of tenancy, as from any customary right which ever existed in Ireland or elsewhere. If we remember rightly, this clause was not in the Bill as originally introduced, but was added at the instance of the late Mr. McCarthy

Downing, then M.P. for the county of Cork, who threatened the Bill with an opposition which might have proved fatal to it, on the ground that, as framed, it provided no security against "capricious evictions." Although the bargain between landlord and tenant had been that possession should be given up on six months' 66 'equity" whatever existed, or was notice, and no alleged, for varying the agreement, still, it was argued, it was such a hardship to the tenant to be obliged to leave his holding, that a landlord who enforced his right of re-entry without sufficient cause ought to be compelled to make good the loss thus caused. The avowed object was to check evictions for political reasons, and the clause was so framed as not to apply to cases where the tenant had been guilty of a breach of any of the fundamental conditions of his tenancy-e.g., non-payment of rent, sub-letting, waste, &c.

66

And here we may appropriately notice a peculiarity in the law in Ireland which has not been sufficiently kept in sight. Besides his ordinary common law right to bring an ejectment, arbitrarily, upon notice to quit, a landlord in Ireland to whom a year's rent is due has a statutory remedy analogous to a mortgagee's right of foreclosure. He may bring an ejectment "for nonpayment of rent," a proceeding which differs from the ordinary ejectment on the title" in several important particulars. It requires no notice to quit: it can be stopped at once by payment of the arrears of rent: even after decree the tenant has six months' "equity of redemption," and the landlord is unable to admit a new tenant during that time so as to defeat the equity. As the process of eviction is hardly ever resorted to except for the purpose of compelling payment of rent, the superior rapidity and cheapness of this process have caused it in great measure to supersede the old eject. ment on the title, but it is obvious, from the nature of the proceeding, that it cannot be used as an instrument for capricious eviction. This process, therefore, never could be a "disturbance" within the meaning of the Land Act, and is, indeed, a rather substitute for an action of debt than an ejectment in the proper sense of the term, which is an action to vindicate a right of possession.

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It will be seen from the foregoing that the right of compensation for disturbance given by the 3rd clause of the Land Act differs fundamentally, both in nature and origin, from the rights of sale arising under the customs of Ulster: these have been purchased by the tenant with hard cash expended with the knowledge of the landlord, that has been given, without any consideration moving from the tenant, by the will of the Legislature, and for reasons mainly political these: exist at all times, and may be exercised by the tenant, no matter under what circumstances he may be quitting his tenancy, that has no existence whatever unless or until the tenant is "disturbed" by the voluntary act of the landlord: these can never, under any circumstances, necessitate a payment by the landlord to the tenant, that can never operate in any other manner: under these the landlord is more or less compensated for the diminution of his proprietary rights by increased security for his rent, that has been imposed upon him without any compensation whatever.

Any argument, therefore, in support of the one drawn from the existence of the other, is entirely fallacious; each must be supported, if at all, on its own merits: these we have no intention of discussing; it is enough for our purpose if we have cleared the question of an element of ambiguity which seems to have misled more than one of the speakers, on both sides, in the late debates upon the subject.

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LIABILITY OF TENANT FOR LIFE FOR
PERMISSIVE WASTE.

Ir sometimes excites surprise to find that points which one would suppose must have frequently arisen have either never been decided or have never been reported. Such a point arose in a case of Woodhouse v. Walker (28 W. R. 765), recently decided by the Queen's Bench Division. The facts were these. A testator devised certain houses to his wife for life, "she keeping them in repair," with remainder to the plaintiff in fee. The tenant for life entered upon and enjoyed the houses during her life, but neglected to repair them, and at her death the plaintiff repaired them, and brought his action in the county court against her executor to recover the expenses so incurred. The county court judge decided against the plaintiff, apparently on the ground that no action of tort in respect of the permissive waste would have lain against the tenant for life in her lifetime, and that, consequently, no action lay against her executor under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 2, which applies only to actions for wrongs. Against this decision the plaintiff appealed. It was argued on the part of the plaintiff that an implied contract to repair arose as against the tenant for life from acceptance of the devise, on the ground that if she accepted the devise she must accept the burthen to which it was expressly made subject. It seems to us that there is great difficulty in working out this notion. With whom can such a contract be supposed to be made? What privity of contract is there between the tenant for life and the remainderman. There may be several remaindermen with different estates. Is there a contract with each of them? It ultimately became unnecessary for the court to express any opinion on this contention, because they came to the conclusion that the county court judge was wrong, and that an action of tort would have lain against the tenant for life for the permissive waste in her lifetime, and consequently that it lay against her executor.

It is satisfactory, so far as the justice of the case is concerned, that the court were able to come to this conclusion; and the dicta contained in the ancient books of authority are certainly somewhat in its favour. It is no doubt equitable that a person who accepts a devise should accept it subject to the burthens imposed upon it by the devisor, if such burthens are not contrary to public policy. There is, however, considerable difficulty in reducing the law on this subject to logical principles. Lord Coke says (2 Inst. 300), that the common law gave an action of waste against tenants in dower and by the curtesy, but not against tenants for life or for years, the reason being this-viz., that as the law created estates in dower and by the curtesy, the law gave a remedy for waste, whereas estates for life and for years arising from grant or devise, the party making such grant or devise might have provided expressly against waste, and, therefore, it is his own negligence or default if he does not. This is rather strange reasoning, because it seems hard on remaindermen or reversioners who were no parties to the negligence or default of the party creating the particular estate, and it is they who suffer. It may be said that they have privity of estate with the original grantor, and so ought to suffer for his neglect, but the whole doctrine savours of extreme narrowness and unreality. It looks very much as if some rigid worshippers of precedent had in olden times, finding no precedent for an action of waste against tenant for life or for years, held that the action would not lie, and the reason was subsequently invented to justify the law. The Statute of Marlbridge afterwards gave an action of waste against the "fermors" of tenements, in which term tenants for life as well as for years were held to be included, and the Statute of Gloucester increased the stringency of the remedy. The action of waste was in process of time superseded by the action on the case for waste, but the principles which governed the whole

action still apply to the more modern form of action. The ancient authorities, such as Lord Coke (2 Inst. 145), seem to have thought that the provisions of the Statute of Marlbridge applied to permissive as well as commissive waste, but there is a conflict between the modern dicta on this point and the opinion so expressed by Lord Coke (see 1 Wms. Saunders, 323, 2 Wms. Saunders, 251). In Jones v. Hill (7 Taunt. 396), it is said that waste can only lie for that which would be waste if there were no stipulation respecting it, and, therefore, it could not be waste to leave premises in a worse condition that A. B. had put them into. The reporter inserts in the head-note a semble that an action for permissive waste will not lie against tenant for years, but the judgment does not appear to contain any dictum to that effect. It has been held that an injunction in respect of permissive waste is not grantable except in cases where there is an express covenant; but that does not seem conclusive on the point. The truth is that in the case of tenants for years there is almost always an express covenant to repair, and so no question as to permissive waste can arise. With regard to tenants from year to year it may be argued that their estate is but a sort of expansion of the tenancy at will, and tenants at will stand on a different footing. It may well be that they were not within the Statute of Marlbridge (see Wms. Saunders, ubi supra). In the case of Gibson v. Wells (1 N. R. 290) it was certainly held that the action for permissive waste did not lie, but there the action was against a tenant at will.

The court held it to be unnecessary to determine as to the liability of tenants for years to an action for permissive waste in ordinary cases, because in the case we are discussing they thought that the action lay at common law, and, therefore, there was no necessity for considering the effect of the Statute of Marlbridge in this respect, or choosing between the conflicting authorities on the subject. They held that the reasons given by Lord Coke for the non-existence in general of an action of waste against tenants for life or years by implication showed that at common law an action of waste lay when the grantor of the particular estate had expressly stipulated against waste. This is perhaps a somewhat slender foundation to build upon, but the conclusion is a reasonable one. It may be urged that Lord Coke's meaning was that, as there were means by which the gran tor could bring about the desired effect without the action of waste, such an action was altogether unnecessary. He might have insisted on a covenant, or he might have pro

vided for a forfeiture of the estate in the case of waste.
It does not seem to us, therefore, to follow necessarily,
from Lord Coke's words, that an action of waste lay at
common law in a case where there was an express stipu
lation against waste. But it is very reasonable that such
an action should lie, and we think that a little agility in
jumping to the result that it would lie was very well
bestowed, though we can imagine future difficulties
arising from the decision-as, for instance, when there are
successive remainders, and the case is not, therefore, so
simple as that of tenant for life and immediate re
mainderman in fee. Again, it is true, no doubt, that
the conflict of opinions which we have alluded to arose
with regard to the action of waste under the Statute of
Marlbridge, but on consideration it seems that the same
question substantially arises with regard to the common
law action of waste. Did an action for permissive waste
lie at the common law against the tenant by the curtesy
or the guardian in chivalry? We should doubt it. The
judgment of the court appears to assume, not only that
an action of commissive waste lay at the common law
when the instrument creating the estate provided against
it, but that an action for permissive waste lay when
such instrument prescribed repair, which is perhaps going
a step further. The dictum in Jones v. Hill, that nothing
is waste except that which would be waste if there were
no stipulation against it, seems difficult to reconcile with
the decision in Woodhouse v. Walker. But these are,

perhaps, over-subtle refinements. The truth is that the justice of the case required that the person who took the estate subject to a burthen should be made liable to the burthen, and the court, finding a loophole in the ancient doctrine through which they could reach the mark, somewhat ingeniously availed themselves thereof. It is a curious illustration how our judge-made law, through somewhat tortuous ways, reconciles decisions required by the justice of the cases with which is has to deal with the ancient precedents.

Recent Decisions.

FOLLOWING TRUST FUNDS INTO BANKING ACCOUNT.

(In re Hallett's Estate, C. A. 28 W. R. 732.) WHATEVER may be thought of the course pursued by the majority of the Court of Appeal in this case, of overruling successive decisions of eminent judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction, there can be little question that the result is to bring the law more into harmony with general principles. As Lord Justice Turner said in Pennell v. Deffell (4 De G. M. & G. at p. 388), it is an undoubted principle that, as between cestui que trust and trustee, and all parties claiming under the trustee otherwise than by purchase for valuable consideration without notice, all property belonging to a trust, however much it may be changed or altered in its nature or character, and all the fruits of such property, whether in its original or altered state, continues to be subject to, or affected by, the trust. If a trustee pays trust money into a bank to his credit, the account being a simple account with himself, not marked or distinguished in any other manner, the debt thus constituted from the bank to him is one which, so long as it remains due, belongs specifically to the trust, just as the money so paid would have done had it been specifically placed by the trustee in a particular repository and remained there. If the trustee subsequently pays into the same banking account private moneys of his own, the character of the moneys previously paid in is not altered, and the court will separate and secure them for the benefit of the cestuis que trust. The difficulty has arisen where there has been a series of payments into and drawings out of the banking account by the trustee, so as to leave a balance in the hands of the banker derived partly from the trust estate and partly from the private property of the trustee. How is it to be ascertained what portion of this balance has been derived from the one source, and what from the other? According to Lords Justices Knight Bruce and Turner, in Pennell v. Deffell, this is to be ascertained by applying the rule in Clayton's case (1 Mer. 572)—viz., that in the absence of any other specific arrangement between banker and customer, the first item on the credit side is to be applied to the first item on the debit side, and so on. The result is that if the trust fund happens to be paid in first, subsequent drawings by the trustee will be considered as diminishing, and ultimately it may be entirely destroying, the right of the cestuis que trust to have any part of the balance appropriated to the repayment of the trust fund. The principle is applicable, said Lord Justice Knight Bruce," notwithstanding the different nature and character of the sums forming together the balance due from the bank to the trustees, and whatever the nature and objects of the cheques."

The rule in Clayton's case, as laid down by Sir William Grant, was not, however, an absolute principle of this kind, but a rule based upon the presumed intention of the parties, in the absence of any expression of intention or of circumstances from which an intention can be implied with reference to the particular sums out of which the payments are to be made. It was expressly stated by Sir W. Grant (1 Mer. 608) that it applied in

cases where there is no room for any other appropriation than that which arises from the order in which the receipts and payments take place and are carried into the account. Presumably it is the sum first paid in that is first drawn out." In Henniker v. Wigg (4 Q. B. 792), Lord Denman said that, while the doctrine of Clayton's case generally speaking admitted of no doubt, it was equally certain that a particular mode of dealing between the parties might entirely vary the case. And in City Discount Company v. McLean (L. R. 9 C. P. 692) the Exchequer Chamber held that the presumption of appropriation laid down in Clayton's case might be rebutted by evidence showing that such appropriation could not have been the intention of the parties. Under the circumstances of Clayton's case, it was, said Bramwell, B., "reasonable to hold that the earlier items of debit were extinguished by the earlier items of credit. But we must decide every case according to its own circumstances."

that

Now, in Pennell v. Deffell and In re Hallett's Estate, we have a trustee drawing out money for his own purposes from a banking account consisting partly of trust funds and partly of his own moneys. It is obviously more reasonable to presume the trustee intended that the drawing out should be attributed to his own moneys, than that he intended unlawfully to draw out the trust funds and appropriate them to his own purposes. If so, the presumption laid down in Clayton's case must give way to this evidence of intention, and the drawings out by the trustee for his own purposes must be attributed to his own funds. This was the decision of the majority of the court in In re Hallett,

General Correspondence.

IS IDENTITY OF NAME EVIDENCE OF
IDENTITY?

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, -The learned President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division holds that identity of name is no evidence of identity. Thus in a very recent case, in which a certificate of a marriage - a bigamous marriage was given in evidence, he ruled, although the name of the husband mentioned in the certificate was identical with that of the respondent, and was by no means a common name, and although his profession as therein stated was the same as that of the respondent, that the certificate was no evidence that it was the respondent who was married. The petitioner fortunately was able to give evidence of the identity of the person mentioned in the certificate with the respondent, and therefore the President's ruling became immaterial in the particular case; but, as it may frequently happen that it will be difficult, or at all events, expensive, to prove identity, if identity of name is not accepted as prima facie evidence of it, it may be useful to refer to some of the decisions on the question.

In Sewell v. Evans (4 Q. B. 626), it was decided that in an action on a bill of exchange executed by a person bearing the defendant's name, it was not necessary to give evidence strictly identifying the person whose signature is proved with the party on whom the process has been served, unless facts appear which raise a doubt of the identity. Lord Denman said: "In cases where no particular circumstance tends to raise a question as to the party being the same, even identity of name is something from which an inference may be drawn. If the name were only John Smith, which is of very frequent occurrence, there might not be much ground for drawing the conclusion, but Henry Thomas Rydes are not so Lord Lyndhurst, C.B., asks why the onus of proving a negative in these cases should be thrown upon the defendant. The answer is, because the

numerous.

proof is so easy; he might come into court and have the witness asked whether he was the man."

In Hamber v. Roberts (7 C. B. 861), in an action by a messenger of the Court of Bankruptcy against James Roberts, for fees due from him as petitioning creditor under a fiat, it was held that the plaintiff proved a prima facie case by putting in the proceedings under the fiat without proving the identity of the defendant with the James Roberts named therein as the petitioning creditor. Wilde, C.J., said: "I think the evidence given on this occasion proved a primâ facie case, and it would be productive of much mischief to give rise to a doubt by granting a rule."

Lastly, in Hubbard v. Lees (L. R. 1 Ex. 255), an action of ejectment, a number of certificates of births, baptisms, marriages, and burials were produced from parish registers, and were objected to, on the ground that there was no evidence of the identity of the persons named in them with the persons of the same name who occurred in the plaintiff's line of proof. The learned judge admitted the evidence. Mr. Powell, Q.C., moved for a new trial, on the ground (amongst others) that the certificates were improperly admitted; and "the court, in granting a rule upon the other points, refused it on the objection as to the certificates, saying that the question of identity was entirely for the jury, and that they would not allow any doubt to be raised upon this point." Temple, July 21.

J. D. W.

Law Students' Journal.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.
HONOURS EXAMINATION.
June, 1880.

At the examination for honours of candidates for admission on the roll of solicitors of the Supreme Court, the examination committee recommended the following gentlemen as being entitled to honorary distinction:

FIRST CLASS.

[In order of merit.]

Charles Thwaites, who served his clerkship to Mr. Frederick Wm. Fisher, of Doncaster; and Messrs. Van Sandau & Cumming, of London.

James White, LL.B., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Barnard & Co., of London.

Benjamin Alexander Elkin, LL.B., who served his clerkship to Mr. Robert Dixon, of London.

Frank George Crafter, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Peacock & Goddard, of London.

John Hodgson, who served his clerkship to Messrs. E. & E. L. Waugh, of Cockermouth.

Robert Todd, who served his clerkship to Mr. James Girdlestone, of London.

James Douglas, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Lingards & Newby, of Manchester; and Messrs. Cunliffe, Beaumont, & Davenport, of London.

Francis Beaumont Moyle, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Hine-Haycock & Bridgman, of London.

Walter Herbert Cowl, who served his clerkship to Mr. Arthur Edwin Cowl, of Liverpool and Great Yarmouth.

Alfred Robinson, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Drawbridge & Rowntree, of Scarborough; and Messrs. Torr, Janeways, Torr, & Gribble, of London.

Charles John Davison, who served his clerkship to Mr. James William Lambert, of London.

David Johnstone, who served his clerkship to Mr. Philip John Wm. Cooke, of Gloucester; and Mr. James Milward Weightman, of London.

Charles Atkinson, who served his clerkship to Messrs.

T. & R. Nicholson, of Morpeth; and Messrs. Rogerson & Ford, of London.

Arthur William Stone, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Evans & Peacock, of London.

Edmund Henry Parker, who served his clerkship to Messrs. J. & A. Burton & Scorer, of Lincoln; and Messrs. Taylor, Hoare, & Taylor, of London.

James Carter Harrison, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Hogan & Hughes, of London.

Robert Dudley Baxter, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Baxters & Co., of London.

John Moore Bayley, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Barber, of Birmingham.

SECOND CLASS.

[In alphabetical order.]

Edward Bedford, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Peed, of Whittlesey; and Messrs. Speechly, Mumford, & Co., of London.

John Bickford, jun., who served his clerkship to Mr. Robert George Abraham, of Ashburton, Devon; Messrs. Charles & John Kitson, of Torquay; and Mr. George Edward Philbrick, of London.

John Nicholds Cotterell, who served his clerkship to Mr. George Cotterell, of Walsall; and Messrs. Bower & Cotton, of London.

Thomas Cross, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Buller & Bickley, of Birmingham.

George Robert Dransfield, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Brewis Elsdon, of Newcastle-upon-Tyne; and Messrs. Pattison, Wigg, Gurney, & King, of London.

Charles Eagleton, who served his clerkship to Mr. Octavius Chapman Tryon Eagleton, of London.

John Thomas Edmonds, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Bischoff, Bompas, Bischoff, & Co., of London. John Edward Fox, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Tomlinson Page, the younger, of Lincoln.

Basil Edward Hardy, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Parkers, of London.

John Haviland, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Meade-King & Bigg, of Bristol.

Thomas Heath, who served his clerkship to Messrs. H. T. Smith & Benett, of Devonport.

Edward Tyrrell Jaques, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Layton & Jaques, of London.

George William Jessop, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Robinson & Longden, of Sunderland; and Messrs. Rawson, George, & Wade, of Bradford.

Galen Jewell, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Marshall, of Southsea, Hants.

Matthew Henry Jones, who served his clerkship to Mr. Robert Knowles, of Liverpool.

Thomas Butler Redfearn, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Chatham & Son, of Hull.

Francis Shelton, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Oliver Reader, of London.

Arthur Edwin Sykes, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Woodhouse & Peach of Hull; and Messrs. Bell, Brodrick, & Gray, of London.

Sydney Thompson, M.A., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Hollams, Son, & Coward, of London.

THIRD CLASS.

[In alphabetical order.] John Cook Bulman, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Forshaw & Parker, of Preston.

Waples Canwarden, who served his clerkship to Mr. Charles Francis Yorke, of London.

Alexander Joseph Cheadle, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Crowther Umbers, of Wolverhampton. Arthur James Greenop, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Tatham, Oblein, & Nash, of London. Francis Jackson Kent, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Wilkins, Blyth, & Fanshawe, of London. Joseph Stevenson Lawson, who served his clerkship to Mr. Charles Bulmer, of Leeds.

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