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-consisted in part of real estate. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), affirming the decision of Malins, V.C., held that the interest of the testator in the proceeds of the sale of the real estate of the partnership, though it was personal estate as between his real and personal representatives, was still an interest in land, and was therefore within the Statute of Charitable Uses, and consequently that the gift of it to the charity was void.-SOLICITORS, Clarke, Woodcock, & Ryland; Walker & Battiscombe; Hollams, Son, & Coward; Robinson & Preston; Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle; Hare & Fell.

POWER OF APPOINTMENT-EXERCISE BY INFANT-MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT OF PERSONAL ESTATE. In a case of In re D'Angibau, before the Court of Appeal on the 12th inst., the question arose whether an infant married woman could exercise a power of appointment of personal estate reserved to her by her marriage settlement. At the time of her marriage the wife was an infant of about the age of nineteen, and she was described in the settlement as an infant. She was, under the will of her father, entitled to a sum of money, subject to the payment of an annuity to her mother, and this sum had been set apart to answer the annuity, and was held by the trustees of the father's will. Previously to the marriage a settlement was executed, by which the husband covenanted that, in the event of the marriage taking place, he and all other necessary parties would assign to trustees the interest to which, under her father's will, the intended wife was entitled in the fund set apart to answer the annuity, and that the trustees should hold the fund upon trust for the intended wife for her life, for her separate use, and after her death upon certain trusts for the benefit of the intended husband till he should become bankrupt, with remainder in trust for the issue of the marriage, and, if there should be no issue who should become absolutely entitled, upon trust as the intended wife should by deed or will appoint, and in default of such appointment, if the wife should survive the husband, in trust for her absolutely; but, if the husband should survive the wife, upon trust for her next-of-kin at her death, as if she had died intestate and a widow. There was no issue of the marriage, and the wife died while still an infant. She had previously executed a deed by which she purported to exercise the power of appointment by giving the fund to her husband absolutely. He survived her, and shortly after her death he filed a liquidation petition. The trustee in the liquidation claimed the appointed fund, and brought the action against the trustees of the settlement, and the mother and brother of the deceased wife, who were her next of kin. The mother and brother demurred to the statement of claim. Jessel, M.R., overruled the demurrer (ante, p. 67). was of opinion that the power was a power in gross-i.e., that, though not simply collateral, it did not affect any interest of the infant. He was of opinion that, although an infant could not exercise a power appendant, he could validly exercise a power in gross, and, moreover, that even if the power could not be treated as a power in gross, there was a clear intention that the power might be exercised during infancy, and that the exercise of it was, therefore, valid. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), though Cotton, L.J., differed from the view of the majority. COTTON, L.J., said that there was very little authority as to the exercise by an infant of a power over personal estate. Hearle v. Greenbank (3 Atk. 695) was, as regarded powers over personal estate, only an authority that a power to appoint by will could be exercised during infancy after the infant had attained the age when, independently of any power, he could make a will of personal estate, and the passage in 1 Sug. Powers (6th ed.), p. 220, did not carry the case any further. There was no authority that a power, the exercise of which could affect the interest of the infant, or one in gross, could be exercised by an infant, except where infancy would not, if there was no power, prevent him from disposing of the property. In the absence of authority his lordship thought that on principle an infant could not exercise a power like that in the present case, which, in his opinion, was in the nature of property, by which he meant that the trusts of the settlement, independently of those for the children and husband, were intended to put the wife as nearly as possible in the same position, as

He

regarded the enjoyment of and power over the property settled, as if she were a feme sole. To hold that an infant could exercise such a power would, in his lordship's opinion, be to allow an infant to biud her property which the law, on general principles of public policy, said that she could not do. The case might be thus disposed of if there were an indication of intention on the part of the donor of the power that it might be exercised notwithstanding the infancy of the donee. But the mere fact that a power, which might not have to be exercised for many years, was given to a person who at the time was an infant, was not, in his lordship's opinion, a sufficient indication of intention that the power might be exercised during infancy, and he was unable to find that the settlement expressed any such intention. The fact that the power might be exercised by deed or will was, he thought, against there being any such intention, as no will could be made by an infant, and as at the date of the settlement the property settled was reversionary, and the wife, though an infant, was upwards of nineteen years of age, there was, his lordship thought, no presumption that the consent to a change of investment would have to be given during her infancy. BRETT, LJ., thought that the power was a pure mandate, and that it did not deal with any property of the infant, but only with the property of the settlor. But, if it did affect property of the infant, he thought that the proper inference was that it was the intention of the settlor that the power should be exercised during infancy. The power was a mandate, and when exercised it would take effect from the direction of the settlor. It was delegated by a person who had full power himself to do the act which he delegated, and to say that the mandate was suspended during the infancy of the mandatory appeared to his lordship a most artificial doctrine. If it had been a power over real estate, no doubt the matter would have been concluded by direct authority. But that authority was founded on one of those artificial rules which had done more than anything else to bring disgrace upon the law. carried a step further. As a general rule an infant might Unless there was some principle the rule ought not to be exercise a mandate. If it was merely to be exercised by writing, it could be exercised at any time; was there any reason why it should not equally be exercised by deed ? The deed did not take effect as the deed of the infant; it was only a very solemn form of exercising the mandate. The fact that the power was to be exercised by deed or will, when the exercise of it by will during infancy was rendered invalid by express statutory enactment, led, in his lordship's opinion, to the inference that it was intended to be exercised by deed during infancy. JAMES, L.J., agreed with the Master of the Rolls and with Brett, L.J. According to his view, an infant might be an agent. He might be the donee of a power of attorney, and it was difficult to understand why he might not equally be the donee of a power in a will or a settlement. Hearle v. Greenbank no doubt decided that an infant could not exercise a power over real estate, but the judgment was carefully limited to real estate; and the case had been considered by eminent text-writers as an authority that an infant could exercise a power over personal estate. His lordship would be sorry to express any doubt that an infant feme covert could exercise the ordinary powers contained in a marriage settlement of personal estate, unless there was something in the settlement to raise a presumption that she was not intended to do so, though of course an infant could not by making a settlement give herself such a power. On another ground, however, which had not been taken before the Master of the Rolls, the court all agreed in supporting his decision. The settled fund had never come to the hands of the trustees of the settlement, but was still in the hands of the trustees of the father's will, the widow being still living. liquidation of the husband, but was also the legal personal The plaintiff was not only trustee in the representative of the wife. And the court held that the settlement, which contained no declaration of trust on the part of the husband, but was merely a covenant by him to make a settlement, could not be considered as a declaration of trust constituting the relation of trustee and cestui que trust between the husband and the demurring defendants, and the court would not, as against the legal title of the plaintiff, enforce the covenant in favour of those defendants, who must be regarded as mere volunteers.-SOLICITORS, Yarde & Loader; Wilkins, Blyth, & Fanshawe; Petgrave & Hopkinson.

PARTIES-ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS-ORD. 16, R. 12B. (APRIL, 1880)-APPEAL-SECURITY FOR COSTS.-A case of In re Dorsett, before the Court of Appeal on the 14th inst., shows that the existence of the new rule of April last, ord. 16, r. 12b. (ante, p. 424), is hardly yet recognized even by some of the judges. The rule provides that, "In any cause for the administration of the estate of a deceased person, no party to the cause, other than the executor or administrator, shall, unless by leave of the judge, be entitled to appear, either in court or in chambers, on the claim of any person not a party to the cause against the estate of the deceased in respect of any debt or liability." In In re Dorsett the application to the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) was for security for the costs of an appeal from the rejection by Hall, V.C., of a claim which the appellant had carried in against the estate of the testator in the cause. The plaintiff in the action was one of the executors, and the defendant was the residuary legatee, who was also the other executor. It was mentioned by the counsel for the plaintiff, who was the applicant for security for the costs of the appeal, that before the Vice-Chancellor the plaintiff and the defendant had appeared separately, and that the Attorney-General had also appeared on behalf of some charities, and that the Vice-Chancellor had ordered the claimant to pay the costs of all those parties. It was admitted that the attention of

the Vice-Chancellor bad not been called to the new rule. JESSEL, M.R., said it was clear that only the executor was entitled to appear upon the claim. The two executors ought to have appeared together, and the Attorney-General ought not to have appeared at all. There had been a slip owing to the Vice-Chancellor's attention not having been called to the new rule. As to the security for costs, it appeared that the notice of motion had been served on a Saturday, and that on the next Monday the plaintiff's solicitors wrote to the appellant's solicitors saying that they had not yet delivered a brief to their counsel, and that before doing so they wished to know whether the appellant would give £50 security. In reply to this letter no offer was made by the defendant. The court held that the plaintiff's offer was made in time and that the costs of the motion must be costs of the appeal. And they ordered security to be given by paying £25 into court.-SOLICITORS, S. F. Miller & Son; Tweedies

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-COMMISSION MERCHANT SALE OF GOODS-RIGHT TO FOLLOW PROCEEDS OF SALE.-In a case of Kirkham v. Peel, before the Master of the Rolls on the 9th inst., a question arose as to the mode of taking the accounts before the official referee in a case where the defendants had sold goods for the plaintiff on commission. The action was one for an account and an order to take the usual accounts of the dealings between the parties before the official referee had been made. He had directed the defendants to bring in certain accounts, and, amongs others, an account (No. 7) of the application by the defendants' banking house "of the proceeds realized by sale of the plaintiff's goods in India, including an account of the purchase with such proceeds of any produce, and of the amounts realized by sale of the produce so purchased." An objection was taken before the referee as to this account, and he submitted the question for the decision of the court whether the account should be brought in. A motion was now made by the defendants to exclude account No. 7. The course of dealing between the parties, so far as it appeared from the evidence, was as follows:-The defendants' firm in Manchester shipped goods to their firm in Bombay for sale either on their account or on account of the plaintiff and others desirous of sending goods to Bombay, the defendants generally making advances on the goods of other persons. The Bombay firm sold the goods in India and received the proceeds. If no advances had been made, then the Bombay firm bought bills on England and sent them to the defendants, such bills being treated as the property of the persons for whom the goods had been shipped, but where advances had been made, then the Bombay firm directed the defendants to credit their customers, and debit them with the amount mentioned in the remittance sheet or account sent by them. The Bombay firm were also in the habit of purchasing produce in Bombay and shipping it to the defendants in England, the Bombay firm being credited with the proceeds. They

also shipped produce to all parts of Europe, and drew upon their correspondents for the price. These bills, when not negotiated in India, were transmitted to the defendants for collection, and, when collected, the Bombay firm were credited with the amount. These bills had nothing whatever to do with the proceeds of any particular goods sent to India, and the Bombay firm bought goods to a much greater value than the goods shipped to them, with the result that they had to draw on the defendants for the difference of the goods sold and bought, and also for the proceeds of bills remitted to the defendants for collection. For the plaintiff it was contended that the defendants were in the position of brokers or factors, and that the proceeds of sale of the plaintiff's goods could be followed so as to see what profit was made thereby, and reliance was placed upon Taylor v. Plumer (3 M. & S. 576), and the recent case of Re Hallett's Estate (L. R. 13 Ch. D. 696). JESSEL, M.R., said that the decision of the Court of Appeal, in which he took part, of Re Hallett's Estate had nothing to do with commission agents. That decision was only applicable to a case of a bailee or broker whose duty it. was to remit the very proceeds of sale to his principal. This case was a totally different one, and the defendants were in the position of ordinary commission merchants, who received goods for sale on commission, and who would be liable to pay interest on any moneys which they failed to account for to the person intrusting them with the goods. merchant to keep a separate account at his bankers for The idea was novel, in his experience, for a commission each of his customers, and it was not to be supposed for a

The

moment that a commission merchant was bound to trans-mit to his principal the very coin he received. course of trade in such cases was that the commission agent was liable to the consignor for the amount of the goods, and he treated himself as a creditor for any advances made and interest, and his principal as a debtor for the amount received for his goods and interest. It appeared that the Bombay firm had a number of accounts open, and that they adopted the same mode of keeping their accounts with all persons, but the real contract was what he had above stated. As, however, there was some difficulty and liability to loss in sending back the exact equivalent in money or bills, it was thought cheaper to buy goods in India and send return cargoes, but whether such goods were bought with the plaintiff's money, or the defendants' money, or with the money of other people seemed to him quite immaterial, and all that the plaintiff could require was his money with interest. The other contention would lead to an account of every parcel of goods purchased by the Bombay firm, and an inquiry into every part of their trading. He did not think, therefore, account No. 7 need be brought in. The costs of the motion would be costs in the action.-SOLICITORS, Milne & Co., for Slater, Heelis & Co., Manchester; Bower & Cotten, for Rylance, Manchester.

AGREEMENT TO ACT FOR A.-PRIOR AGREEMENT TO ACT FOR B.-EXISTENCE OF AGREEMENT-INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN ACTING FOR ANY PERSON OTHER THAN A.-In a case of Leavitt v. Williams, before the Master of the Rolls on the 9th inst., a motion was made by the plaintiff to restrain the defendant from acting for any other person than the plaintiff, in accordance with an agreement of the 29th of May, 1880. By such agreement the defendant agreed. to act for a term of forty weeks from the 15th of September, 1880, in America, and not to play for any person. during the engagement without the plaintiff's written consent. The defendant admitted the agreement, but declined to carry it out, on the ground that she had entered into a prior binding agreement with another theatrical manager named Rice. The evidence as to this agreement was as follows:-On the 27th of April, Rice wrote an offer to the defendant to engage her to act in America from the 30th of August, 1880, saying she must cable him immediately her refusal or acceptance, as he had to communicate with another actress before the 15th of May, and if she accepted she was to send him her photograph, and a sketch of her history. The defendant did not telegraph to Rice, but sent him her photograph about the middle of May, stating she was too ill to write. The defendant heard nothing further from Rice, but saw his agent in England in June. When the agreement with the plaintiff had been

discussed prior to execution, the plaintiff and his agent both told the defendant there was no binding agreement with Rice, and she thereupon signed the agreement of the 29th of May. For the defendant it was contended there was a binding agreement with Rice, and, therefore, that she could not be restrained by injunction from acting for any person other than the plaintiff, on the authority of Fechter v. Montgomery (33 Beav. 22). JESSEL, M.R., said that the only question was whether a binding agreement with the plaintiff should not be enforced because the defendant was afraid someone else might have a binding agreement with her. In his opinion there was no binding agreement with Rice, as the defendant's acceptance must have been by telegram, and no telegram had been sent. If the sending the photograph was intended as a new offer of a contract by the defendant, that offer required to be accepted by Rice, but there was no such acceptance by him, and only an interview with his agent, after the plaintiff's agreement had been entered into. must, therefore, be an injunction as asked.-SOLICITORS, Foss & Legg; Lewis & Lewis.

There

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS-REFUSAL TO PRODUCERIGHT TO USE IN EVIDENCE-ORD. 31, R. 14.-In a case of Webster v. Whewall, before Denman, J. (sitting for Fry, J.), on the 8th inst., a question arose upon the construction of rule 14 of order 31 as to the right of the plaintiffs to put in evidence a document referred to in their statement of claim, which they had refused to produce to the defendant. In their statement of claim the plaintiffs stated that the property in question in the action was conveyed to them or their predecessors in title by a deed dated the 16th of August, 1866. Before the defendant had delivered bis statement of defence, he gave notice to the plaintiffs to produce this deed for his inspection. They refused to do so, but after the statement of defence had been delivered, they offered to produce the deed, and tendered it to the defendant for that purpose. The defendant objected that the offer came too late, and refused to accept it. And at the trial it was objected that the plaintiffs could not put the deed in evidence, reliance being placed on rule 14. DENMAN, J., held that the plaintiffs had sufficient cause for not producing the deed before the statement of defence was delivered, and he overruled the objection. SOLICITORS, Williamson, Hill, & Co.; Philbrick & Corpe.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-POSSESSION BY PURCHASERPAYMENT OF INTEREST ON PURCHASE-MONEY.-In a case of Ballard v. Shutt, before Denman, J. (sitting for Fry, J.), on the 13th inst., the action was brought by a purchaser for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, and the question arose whether the plaintiff ought to pay interest on his purchase-money. The land was not in the occupation of any tenants, but the plaintiff had, immediately after the agreement was signed, erected a notice-board on the land, announcing that it was to be let or sold, and referring to himself for information, and that he had actually entered into -contracts relating to the land. DENMAN, J., came to the conclusion that the plaintiff did this, intending then and there to assume the ownership of the land, and to deal with it as his own, and that he was, therefore, bound to pay interest on his purchase-money from the time when he had taken possession, notwithstanding the fact that he had made no profit out of the land.-SOLICITORS, Dixon, Ward, & Co.; Johnson & Weatheralls.

BUILDING AGREEMENT-FORFEITURE-WAIVER-ELECTION-ACQUIESCENCE-RESCISSION OF CONTRACT.-In a case of Marsden v. Sambell, before Fry, J., on the 1st inst, the question arose whether the plaintiff was entitled to insist on the forfeiture of a building agreement, or whether he had not waived his right to do so. On the 16th of January, 1879, the plaintiff agreed to grant a building lease or leases to the defendant (who was a builder) of a piece of ground, and seven houses then in the course of construction thereon. The defendant was to finish two of the houses by the 25th of March, 1879, and the remaining five by the 24th of June, 1879. The defendant was not, without the written licence of the plaintiff, to carry away any building materials after they had been delivered on the land. Until the lease or leases should be granted the plaintiff was to have a right of re-entry on the premises, in case of the breach or non-performance of the defendant's agreement to finish the houses, or of any other

agreement therein contained, without the necessity of having recourse to an action of ejectment. The defendant had not finished the five houses by the 24th of June, but the plaintiff did not give him notice of his intention to insist on the forfeiture until the 18th of July. Meanwhile, the defendant had to the knowledge of the plaintiff laid out further money upon the houses. On the 31st of July, and again on the 26th of September, the defendant removed a quantity of building materials off the land. On the 30th of September the action was commenced, by which the plaintiff claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from committing any act of trespass on the land, and damages. The defendant delivered a statement of defence and counter-claim, asking by the counter-claim for the specific performance of the agreement. At the trial the counter-claim was abandoned. It was contended that the plaintiff had waived the right of forfeiture which accrued on the 24th of June, and that by afterwards insisting on the forfeiture he had in effect rescinded the agreement. The defendant, therefore, it was said, was in possession of the property as tenant at will to the plaintiff, and was entitled to remove the building materials within a reasonable time, those materials having become his absolute property by virtue of the rescission of the agreement by the plaintiff. FRY, J., said that after the 24th of June the plaintiff was in a position to elect either to avoid the agreement or to affirm it, or he might do neither, and the question was whether he was on the 18th of July entitled to avail himself of the right which had accrued on the 24th of June. The question within what time a right to elect to avoid a contract was lost was open to some doubt. In the case of Morrison v. The Universal Marine Insurance Company (21 W. R. 774, L. R. 8 Ex. 197), the Court of Exchequer Chamber said that the judge had told the jury that the party entitled to elect must do so within a reasonable time, and they added, "It is not necessary to consider whether this decision is correct, or whether the party entitled to elect may not do so at any time, unless in the meantime he has elected to affirm the contract, or unless the rights of third parties have intervened, or the other party to the contract has altered his position, under the belief that the contract was a subsisting one; for, if the latter be the correct view, the direction of the learned judge was too favourable to the plaintiff, and of course he cannot complain of it," so that they left the point undecided. But, if the true view was that the right to elect must be exercised within a reasonable time, his lordship thought that, looking at the nature of the relation between the parties; to the fact that the defendant was bound by his agreement to go on with the buildings, and that it was, therefore, probable that, until he was stopped by the plaintiff, he would proceed with them at any rate, he had a right to do so, the 18th of July-i.e., three weeks after the right to forfeit had accrued-was not a reasonable time within which to elect to avoid the contract. If, however, the true view was the other one mentioned by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, then the evidence proved that in the interval of three weeks the defendant had altered his position by expending money on the houses in the belief that the agreement was still subsisting. In either view, therefore, the plaintiff was too late on the 18th of July to elect to avoid the contract. Bat, assuming that the contract was still subsisting after the 18th of July, the defendant had committed fresh breaches of it on the 31st of July and on the 26th of September, and the plaintiff, by issuing the writ on the 30th of September, had elected to avoid the contract. The defendant, however, said that the contract was not still subsisting, because the plaintiff, by asserting on the 18th of July that it was at an end, had done an unlawful act, and had thus rescinded the contract. That proposition was utterly untenable. Assuming that the plaintiff's act was a violation of the contract, yet a breach by A. of a contract between himself and B. did not of itself rescind the contract. It could only give to B. a right to rescind the contract, and that right he must exercise if he wished to rescind it. In the present case it was clear that the defendant had not given any notice to rescind the contract, on the contrary, he had continued to insist that it was still subsisting. But, even if he had rescinded the contract, he would have had no right afterwards to enter on the land to remove the building materials. For, though a tenant at will whose tenancy was determined by his lessor had a right to enter on the land within a reasonable time to remove crops and other things belonging to him, a tenant at will who determined his own tenancy had no such right.

This was settled by Oland's case (5 Coke Rep. 116a). Consequently, his lordship granted the injunction claimed by the plaintiff, and awarded him £30 damages.― SOLICITORS, G. W. Marsden & Son; Bordman & Co.

Appointments, Etc.

Mr. FRANCIS WILLIAM CALVERT, solicitor, of York and Scarborough, has been appointed a Magistrate for the Borough of Scarborough. Mr. Calvert was admitted a solicitor in 1837, and is registrar and prothonotary of the York Court of Record, and assistant clerk to the visiting justices of the West Riding Lunatic Asylum.

Sir JULIAN GOLDSMID, baronet, has been elected Treasurer of University College, London. Sir J. Goldsmid is the only son of Mr. Frederick David Goldsmid, of Somerhill, Kent. He was born in 1838, and succeeded to the baronetcy in 1878 on the death of his uncle, Sir Francis Henry Goldsmid, Q.C. He was educated at University College, and graduated M.A. at the University of London in 1861. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Hilary Term, 1861. Sir J. Goldsmid was M.P. for Honiton in the Liberal interest from 1866 till 1868, and for Rochester from 1870 till the last general election. He is a fellow of University College, and a magistrate and deputy-lieutenant for the county of Kent.

Mr. ROBERT LOCK, solicitor, of Pembroke and Tenby, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for Pembrokeshire for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women.

Mr. THOMAS MARTINEAU, solicitor and notary (of the firm of Ryland, Martineau, Carslake, & Goodwin), of Birmingham, has been appointed a Magistrate for that borough. Mr. Martineau was admitted a solicitor in 1851, and is law clerk to the Birmingham Assay Office.

Mr. EDMUND SWETENHAM, Q.C., has been appointed a Magistrate for Denbighshire. Mr. Swetenham is the second son of Mr. Clement Swetenham, of Somerfoord Booths, Cheshire, and was born in 1822. Brasenose College, Oxford, and was Lincoln's-inn in Trinity Term, 1848. the North Wales and Chester Circuit, Counsel in April last.

He was educated at called to the bar at He is a member of and became a Queen's

Mr. ALLAN TASSELL, solicitor, of Faversham and Sittingbourne, has been elected Clerk to the Preston School Board. Mr. Tassell is the son and partner of Mr. James Tassell, solicitor, registrar of the Faversham County Court, and coroner for the borough. He was admitted a solicitor in 1872, and is registrar of the Sittingbourne County Court, clerk to the Faversham Board of Guardians, and clerk (jointly with his father) to the county magistrates and the deputy-lieutenancy.

Mr. FRANCIS WILLIS TAYLOR, barrister, has been appointed Registrar of the Liverpool District of the Chancery of the County Palatine of Lancaster, in succession to Mr. James Winckworth Winstanley, resigned. Mr. Taylor is an M.A. of University College, Oxford, and was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Trinity Term, 1872. He is a member of the Northern Circuit, and has practised locally at Liverpool.

DISSOLUTIONS OF PARTNERSHIPS. MARTIN BROWN, and HENRY PLUMBRIDGE JARMAN, solici tors, 2, Hatton-garden, Dale-street, Liverpool (Browne & Jarman). July 6.

WILLIAM GRIMWOOD TAYLOR, ADOLPHUS GRIMWOOD TAYLOR, and CHARLES WEAVER, solicitors, Derby (so far as respects the said Charles Weaver). July 5. (Gazette, July 9.) ALFRED CARR, CHARLES ALBERT BANNISTER, JAMES HENRY DAVIDSON, and THOMAS MYDDELTON MORRISS, solicitors, 70, Basinghall-street, London. July 10. (Gazette, July 13.)

Obituary.

MR. JOHN FINCHETT MARSH.

He was

Mr. John Finchett Marsh, solicitor, formerly town clerk of Warrington, died at Hardwick House, near Chepstow, on the 22nd ult. Mr. Marsh was born in 1818, and was educated at the Warrington Grammar School. He was admitted a solicitor in 1839, having served his articles with his uncle, the late Mr. John Finchett, of Warrington, to whose practice he shortly afterwards succeeded. formerly associated in partnership with Messrs. Joseph Wagstaff and William Wagstaff, next with Mr. James Barratt, and finally with Mr. William Dampier Jeans. He had a very extensive practice, and was a perpetual commissioner for Lancashire and Cheshire, and clerk to the governors of the Warrington Grammar School. In 1847, upon the incorporation of the town of Warrington, Mr. Marsh was elected as the first town clerk, and he held hat office till 1858. About seven years ago he retired trom business, and had ever since resided in Monmouthfshire. Mr. Marsh devoted most of his leisure time to literary and antiquarian studies. He published a history of the Warrington Grammar School, and had delivered some the Eighteenth Century." lectures upon "Literary Characters of Warrington during He also contributed several papers to the "Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire Historical Society." Mr. Marsh was a bachelor.

MR. JOSEPH SHARPE, LL.D.

Mr. Joseph Sharpe, LL.D., died at Pembroke Lodge, Kensington, on the 2nd inst. Mr. Sharpe was born In 1818, and was educated at Jesus College, Cambridge, where he graduated first class in civil law in 1851, and in the first class in the moral sciences tripos in 1853, in which year he also obtained the Whewell Prize for moral philosophy, and afterwards proceeded to the degree of LL.D. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Easter Term, 1852, and formerly practised on the South-Eastern Circuit, and at the Surrey Sessions. Mr. Sharpe was for several years reader in jurisprudence and in civil and international law at the Middle Temple. He had acted as examiner for the LL.B. degree at Cambridge, and as examiner in civil law and the principlesof legislation in the University of London.

MR. CHARLES TREVOR.

Mr. Charles Trevor, solicitor, many years controller of legacy and succession duties, died at his residence, 18, Norfolk-crescent, Hyde-park, on the 5th inst. Mr. Trevor was born in 1801, and received the usual training of a solicitor. He was for a short time a clerk in the office of the solicitor partment about the year 1826, and discharged the duties of to the Stamp Office, and was appointed solicitor to that dethat office for many years with great success. He prepared (in conjunction with Sir Henry Thring and the late Mr. Peter Erle, Q.C.), the Succession Duty Act, 1863, and soon after the passing of that measure was appointed controller of legacy and succession duties under the Inland Revenue Board. Mr. Trevor retired on a pension about fourteen years ago.

MR. WILLIAM BAKER,

Mr. William Baker, solicitor, late of Taanton, died at Burnham, Somersetshire, on the 27th ult. Mr. Baker was the son of the late Mr. John Baker, solicitor, of Ilminster, where he was born in 1811. He was admitted a solicitor in 1835, and soon afterwards settled at Taunton, where he practised until about three years ago. Although he never held any public appointments, he had a lucrative private practice, and was highly esteemed in the neighbourhood, both for his professional ability and high personal character. He was a warm supporter of the Liberal party, and was for many years election and registration agent in the borough of Taunton. Mr. Baker was buried at the Ilminster Ceme-tery on the 2nd inst.

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Equity.

No student admitted after the 31st of December, 1872, shall be examined for call to the bar until he shall have kept nine terms; except that students admitted after that day shall have the option of passing the examination in Roman law at any time after having kept four terms.

An examination will be held in October next, to which a student of any of the Inns of Court, who is desirous of becoming a candidate for a certificate of fitness for being

called to the bar, will be admissible.

Each student proposing to submit himself for examination will be required to enter his name, personally or by letter, at the treasurer's or steward's office of the Inn of Court to which he belongs, on or before Thursday, the 7th day of October next; and he will further be required to state in writing whether his object in offering himself for examina tion is to obtain a certificate preliminary to a call to the bar; or whether he is merely desirous of passing the examination in Roman law under the above-stated rule.

The examination will commence on Monday, the 18th day of October next, and will be continued on the Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday following.

It will take place in the hall of Lincoln's-inn; and the doors will be closed ten minutes after the time appointed for

the commencement of the examination.

The examination by printed questions will be conducted in the following order :-Monday morning, October 18, at ten, on the law of real and personal property; Tuesday morning, October 19, at ten, on common law; Wednesday morning, October 20, at ten, on equity; Thursday morning, October 21, at ten, on Roman law; Thursday afternoon, October 21, at two, on constitutional law and legal history.

The oral examination will be conducted in the same order, and on the same subjects, as above appointed for the examination by printed questions.

NOTE. Only students admitted prior to January 1, 1873, and who are candidates for a pass certificate, have an option of passing in constitutional law and legal history, or Roman law; common law or equity; and real and personal property law.

The examiner in the law of real and personal property will examine in the following subjects:-The creation, devolution, and disposition inter vivos, and by will, of estates, and interests in and powers over real and personal property, including estates and interests by way of statutory use, and of trust. Candidates will be examined in the elements of the foregoing subjects.

The examiner in common law will examine in the follow

ing subjects (1) The law of contracts; (2) The law of torts; (3) Criminal law; (4) The procedure in the common law divisions of the High Court of Justice. Candidates will be examined on general and elementary principles

of law.

The examiner in equity will examine in the following subjects:-(1) Trusts; (2) Specific performance. Candidates will be examined in the above-mentioned subjects.

The examiners in Roman law will examine in the Institutes of Justinian, books 1 and 2; book 3, title 13, to the end of the book; book 4, titles 1 to 5 inclusive.

The examiners in constitutional law and legal history will examine in the following books and subjects:-(1) Stubbs' Constitutional History of England; (2) Hallam's Constitutional History; (3) Broom's Constitutional Law. Candidates will be examined in No. 1 and No. 3 only, or in No. 2 and No. 3 only, of the foregoing subjects, at their option.

NOTE.-Only students admitted prior to January 1, 1873,

and who are candidates for a pass certificate, have an option of passing in constitutional law, and legal history, or Roman law; common law or equity; and real and personal property law.

HILARY EXAMINATION, 1881.

rules: The attention of students is requested to the following

and Roman law, twelve studentships of one hundred As an encouragement to students to study jurisprudence guineas each shall be established, and divided equally into two classes; the first class of studentships to continue for two years, and to be open for competition to any student since he kept his first term; and the second class to conas to whom not more than four terms shall have elapsed tinue for one year only, and to be open for competition to any student, not then already entitled to a studentship as to whom not less than four and not more than eight terms shall have elapsed since he kept his first term; two of each class of such studentships to be awarded by the council, on the recommendation of the committee, after every examination before Hilary and Trinity Terms respectively, to the passed the best examination in both jurisprudence and two students of each set of competitors who shall have But the committee shall not be obliged

Roman law.

to recommend any studentship to be awarded if the result of the examination be such as in their opinion not to justify such recommendation.

No student admitted after the 31st of December, 1872, shall receive from the council the certificate of fitness for call to the bar required by the four Inns of Court unless he shall have passed a satisfactory examination in the following subjects-viz., (1) Roman law; (2) The law of real and personal property; (3) Common law; and (4) Equity.

No student admitted after the 31st of December, 1872, shall be examined for call to the bar until he shall have

kept nine terms; except that students admitted after that day shall have the option of passing the examination in Roman law at any time after having kept four terms.

An examination will be held in December and January next, to which a student of any of the Inns of Court, who is desirous of becoming a candidate for a studentship, or honours, or of obtaining a certificate of fitness for being called to the bar, or of passing the examination in Roman law only, will be admissible.

Each student proposing to submit himself for examination will be required to enter his name, personally or by letter, at the treasurer's or steward's office of the Inn of Court to which he belongs, on or before Saturday, the 11th day of December next; and he will further be required to state in writing whether his object in offering himself for examination is to compete for a studentship, or honours, or of obtaining a certificate preliminary to a call to the bar, or whether he is merely desirous of passing the examination in Roman law under the above-stated rule.

inn; and the doors will be closed ten minutes after the The examination will take place in the hall of Lincoln'stime appointed for the commencement of the examination.

The examination by printed questions will be conducted in the following order :-Monday and Tuesday, December 27 and 28, at ten until one, and from two until five on each day, the examination of candidates for studentships in jurisprudence and Roman law.

The examination of candidates for honours and pass certificates, and for pass in Roman law only, will take place as and personal property law; Thursday morning, December follows:-Wednesday morning, December 29, at ten, on real at ten, on equity; Saturday morning, January 1, 1881, at 30, at ten, on common law; Friday morning, December 31, ten, on jurisprudence and Roman law; Saturday afternoon, January 1, at two, on constitutional law and legal history.

The oral examination will be conducted in the same order, and on the same subjects, as above appointed. for the examination by printed questions.

and who are candidates for a pass certificate, have an option NOTE. Only students admitted prior to January 1, 1873, of passing in constitutional law and legal history, or Roman law; common law or equity; and real and personal property law.

Jurisprudence, International Law, and Roman Law. Candidates for the studentships will be examined in all

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