and were clerks rather than pupils; and I believe that they learnt more of the practice of the profession, that they acquired habits of thought and reliance, that they were, in short, better trained than they can be under a system which results in the whole efforts of an articled clerk being concentrated upon reading for his examination, and three-fourths of his time being wasted in cramming, with the aid of an advertising professional coach, a mass of case law which he cannot digest or assimilate, much less apply or turn to any practical use. A man may continue his reading after he is in practice, but seldom or never after the days of his pupilage will he acquire those habits of mind which are of so much importance to him.

I am very far from objecting to proper examinations : no one is more conscious than I am of the importance of some test being insisted on to insure the exclusion from the profession of ignorant and incompetent persons: but what I do urge is that the Incorporated Law Society should carefully avoid a system that may result in all the rewards and honours being obtained by men who have a great capacity for cram and nothing else. What is wanted in a practising solicitor is not the erudition of a university don, but rather the parts of a man of the world. H.

Cases of the Week.

MORTGAGE ATTORNMENT CLAUSE-EXCESSIVE RENTBANKRUPTCY OF MORTGAGOR-FRAUD ON BANKRUPT LAW -BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 34.-In a case of Ex parte Jackson, before the Court of Appeal on the 25th ult., the question arose whether an attornment clause in a mortgage deed was valid as against the trustee in the liquidation of the mortgagor. The mortgage was given by a trader to his bankers to secure the balance of his current account. It contained a clause by which the mortgagor attorned tenant to the mortgagees of that part of the mortgaged property which was in his possession as tenant from year to year, at an annual rert of £8,000, payable in advance, the tenancy to be determined by the mortgagees at one week's notice, unless the rent for the current year should be fully paid before the giving of such notice. All rent which might be paid or recovered under or by virtue of the attornment was to be applicable in or towards payment or satisfaction of the principal and interest secured by the mortgage, and any surplus was to be accounted for to the mortgagor. The deed also contained an assignment by the mortgagor to the mortgagees of the stock-in-trade and other chattels belonging to him either then or at any time during the continuance of the security. The deed was rot registered as a bill of sale. It was stamped to cover an advance of £8,000. It was executed in February, 1877. On the 30th of May, 1879, the bankers distrained upon the property which was in the occupation of the mortgagor for £6,530, as for part of one year's rent due under the attornment, that being the amount of the balance which was then due to them from the mortgagor. On the 3rd of June he filed a liquidation petition. The trustee in the liquidation claimed the chattels which had been seized under the distress, on the ground that the attornment clause was invalid against him. There was evidence that that part of the mortgaged property which was in the mortgagor's possession was assessed for the poor rate at the gross annual value of £140. Bacon, C.J., was of opinion that the case was governed by the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re The Stockton Iron Furnace Company (27 W. R. 433, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 335), and held that the bankers were entitled to retain their distress (28 W. R. 523). The Court of Appeal (BAGGALLAY, COTTON, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) reversed the decision of the Chief Judge, and held that the amount of the rent fixed was so excessive as to show that it could not have been intended to create a

real tenancy or to provide for the payment of a real rent, but that the whole thing was a mere device to evade the Bills of Sale Act, and to enable the mortgagees when the occasion should arise to lay their hands upon chattels of much more value than the rest of their security. BAG

GALLAY, L J., said that attornment clauses were originally introduced into mortgage deeds in cases when the mortgagor was in the occupation of the mortgaged property, the intention being to give the mortgagee the same benefit as he would have had if the property had been in the occupation of a third party-i.e., the benefit of a fair and reasonable rent for the property. And his lordship thought that that was what a fair and proper attornment clause should provide for-not necessarily the exact value of the property, but what a willing tenant might be ready to pay for it. If the sum reserved as rent was excessive and unreasonable, it was not really rent. The Chief Judge was very much influenced by the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re The Stockton Iron Furnace Company. But in that case the judges came to the conclusion that the rent reserved by the attornment clause was not excessive or unreasonable. If they had been of opinion that it was, his lordship thought it was clear that their decision would have been the other way. He thought that the principle of Ex parte Williams (26 W. R. 274, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 138) exactly applied to the present case.

In

Morton

V. Woods (17 W. R. 414, L. R. 4 Q. B. 293) there was no suggestion that the rent reserved was not a reasonable and proper one, and the decision was nothing more than that effect would be given to a proper attornment clause as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor. COTTON, L.J., said that a mortgagor and mortgagee had undoubtedly a right to insert such a clause in their mortgage deed, and thus to constitute be relation of tenant and landlord between themselves, and when it was a real tenancy, not a mere sham, a distress could be levied for the rent. A mortgagee had a right to turn his mortgagor out of possession of the property, whether he was in possession himself or by his tenant. There was nothing approaching to a fraud on the bankrupt law in making such a stipulation in a mortgage deed, and the court would not isquire too strictly whether the rent reserved was too large. But when the question was whether the contract to create the relation of landlord and tenant was real or fictitious, the amount of the rent reserved was a very material matter. If the rent was more than enough to cover the interest on the mortgage debt, the mortgagee, if he received it, must apply it in reduction of the principal, and a stipula tion that the rent should be applied in payment of principal as well as interest would not avoid a contract for a real rent. In the present case the rent reserved was so large that, if the power of distress was exercised for a year's rent, the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee between the parties would be brought entirely to an end by payment of the whole amount secured by the deed. Could it be sup posed that the clause was really intended to provide that the mortgagor should remain in possession of the proporty, giv ing the mortgagee a fair return for it? Moreover, but for the Bills of Sale Act, the assignment of the chattels would have been a valid security; must it not be concluded that the attornment clause was intended to make good the defect in the security caused by the non-registration of the deed? Under such circumstances his lordship could only conclude stipulated for under the name of rent, and that no legal that no rent was really reserved, but that a sum was merely

incident of distress arose out of it. A distress must be for a real rent, to which the law annexed a power of distress. When it was not a real rent, but something called rent that was not rent-an attempt to give to a mortgagee as mortgagee a right which he could only have as a landlordit was a fraud on the bankrupt law. THESIGER, L.J., said that there could be no doubt that such a clause was valid, and that it created the relation of landlord and tenant, and that the ordinary right of distress which was by law attached to that relation was attached to it. Nor could it be doubted that the clause would be valid, although the rent reserved was considerably greater than the sum required to keep down imagine a case where the rent reserved might be large enough the interest on the mortgage money. Indeed, he could to cover both principal and interest. But it must be admitted that the object of the clause was to place the mortgagee in the same position when the mortgagor was occupying the property as if it had been leased to a third party, and though it was open to the parties to bargain as to the amount of the rent, and the court would not lightly interfere with their bargain, the amount of the rent was very important to be considered in determining whether it was a real rent, and whether a tenancy was really created.

If from the terms of the deed, or from the amount of the rent fixed, it could be collected that the rent was not a real rent, and the tenancy not a real tenancy, but a mere sham, and that the clause was only a device to give the mortgagee in the event of the mortgagor's bankruptcy a security upon chattels which would otherwise be distributed among his creditors, then the clause was void as a fraud on the bankrupt law. That was the principle of the decision in Ex parte Williams. In In re Stockton Iron Furnace Company the court came to the conclusion that the rent was a fair one, that there was a real rent and a real tenancy. In Ex parte Williams, on the other hand, it was admitted that the property was worth only about one-seventh of the rent reserved, and this was so disproportionate to the real value that the court held that they might infer from it that there was not a real tenancy. In the present case the rent was about fifty-seven times as much as the fair letting value of the property, and it was equal to the whole amount which the stamp on the deed would allow to be secured by it. It was open, therefore, to the mortgagees to fold their hands, and allow their debtor to go on acquiring credit on the faith of his possession of the chattels which were on the property, and then upon his bankruptcy to come forward and sweep away the whole of those chattels by a distress for a year's rent. In this respect there was a great distinction between the mischief which would be done by an unregistered bill of sale and by such an attornment clause. No doubt, if the grantee of a bill of sale could seize the chattels comprised in it before the bankruptcy of the grantor, he could hold them as against his trustee. But it was always a great chance whether he would be able to seize them in time.

Under an attornment clause, however, it was not necessary to take possession before the bankruptcy, for by section 34 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, a landlord was entitled to distrain for a year's rent after the bankruptcy. If, however, you could arrive at the conclusion that the whole thing was a sham, there never could be any right to levy a distress, and it was immaterial whether it was levied before or after the bankruptcy. The appeal was accordingly allowed. The bankers' counsel asked for leave to appeal to the House of Lords, but the court declined to give it.SOLICITORS, Helder, Roberts, & Gillett ; Johnston & Harrison.

DIVORCE LUNACY OF HUSBAND-PETITION BY COMMITTEE.—In the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, on the 22nd ult., the appeal of Baker v. Baker, Wheeler, and Owen was heard before the full court, consisting of Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., HANNEN, P., and PHILLIMORE, J. The petition was filed by the committee of the estate of a lunatic husband, under the direction of the Lords Justices of Appeal sitting in lunacy, for the dissolution of his marriage on the ground of his wife's adultery. The respondent demurred to the petition, on the ground that it did not allege that the husband was permanently insane, and that it was not competent for the committee of a lunatic to present a petition for a divorce. The President of the Division overruled the demurrer, holding that the principle of the decision of the House of Lords in Mordaunt v. Moncreiffe (24 W. R. 12, L. R. 2 P. & D. 374) applied to the case of a lunatic petitioner as well as to that of a lunatic respondent. Lord COLERIDGE now delivered the judgment of the full court. He observed that, if the question was an open one, he should be inclined to hold that the petition must be dismissed, and to approve the view taken by Lord Penzance when Mordaunt v. Moncreiffe was before the Court of Divorce, but the judg; ment of the House of Lords in that case was binding, and following that decision it was impossible to distinguish the cases of a lunatic petitioner and a lunatic respondent. The judgment in favour of the petitioner was therefore affirmed, but leave to appeal was given.-SOLICITORS, White & Son; Surr, Gribble, & Bunton.

PRACTICE-ACTION BY THE CROWN-INJUNCTION-UNDERTAKING IN DAMAGES.-In a case of The Secretary of State for War v. Chubb, before the Master of the Rolls on the 25th ult., a motion was made by the plaintiff to restrain the defendants from constructing certain tramways_in alleged contravention of their statutory powers, and a question arose whether, on an interim injunction for a week being granted, any undertaking in damages could be required on the part of her Majesty's Government. JESSEL, M.R., said he could make no exception in

favour of the Crown, and if the plaintiff's counsel could not give the usual undertaking in damages he should not grant the interim injunction. On this the plaintiff's counsel gave the usual undertaking.-SOLICITORS, Solicitor tothe Treasury; Chubb & Co.

TRUSTEE AND CESTUI QUE TRUST-REMUNERATION— STIPULATION IN TRUST INSTRUMENT.-In a case of Henderson v. Ray, before the Master of the Rolls on the 25th ult., a question arose whether on the construction of a document under which certain bonds were deposited with a committee for the purposes of litigation, and to enforce payment of the bonds out of a fund in the hands of the trustees, the committee were entitled to retain a sum to secure remuneration for their services. The con-ditions of deposit under which the bonds were deposited with a bank, authorized the committee of the bondholders, and the corporation of foreign bondholders to represent the depositor, and to take the necessary proceedings to obtain a rateable distribution among the bondholders of the pro.. ceeds of the loan, "after making such deductions therefrom as the committee and corporation may authorize." The bonds and coupons deposited were to be subject to and charged with a sum of ten per cent., to be paid to the joint order of the committee and corporation "in contzibution towards their past and future expenditure in con-nection with the representation of the bondholders interests, but repayable, if possible, in whole or in part by deductions from the fund if the same shall become distributable." By a decree of the House of Lords the committee had recently secured the distribution of the funds representing the loan, and they had given notice that they proposed to distribute a portion of this sum, retaining a sum of £2 per cent. as security for a sum claimed by them for their remuneration, contending that under the words of the conditions they were entitled to do so. The plaintiff brought this action seeking to restrain the committee from deducting anything from the bonds, and for delivery of his bonds, he offering to pay the committee the percentage according to the conditions of deposit. The committee claimed to be allowed their remuneration as part of the expenses under the House of Lords' decree, but until that time they desired to retain a sum as security for their remuneration. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the above words as to "deductions" were too ambiguous to entitle the committee who were in the position of trustees to retain any sum for their remuneration. To entitle any such body to remuneration he considered that clear words authorizing the same should be inserted in the document. creating the trust, and that such right should be communicated to the cestuis que trust before the deposit was made or the trust entered upon. After this expression of his lordship's opinion, the defendants abandoned their contention, and consented to an order giving the plaintiff hie bonds on payment of the amount according to the deposit note.-SOLICITORS, Dawes & Sons; Wilson, Bristowe, & Carpmael.

TRADE-NAME-SIMILARITY-INTENTION TO TAKE TRADECOSTS. In a case of the Guardian Fire and Life Assurance Company v. Guardian and General Insurance Company (Limited), before the Master of the Rolls on the 25th ult., a motion was made to restrain the defendants from carrying on business under the above name, on the ground that it was calculated to deceive. The defendants had acquired the business of another company known as the "Guardian Horse and Vehicle Insurance Company," formed to assure horses and vehicles from accidents, and they had then changed their name to the above, as they alleged in consequence of their intention also to undertake the insurance of persons against accidents and also general fire insurance business. The defend ants carried on their business a few doors from the plaintiffs and it was proved that letters addressed to the latter company had been delivered to the former, and vice versa. After the motion was opened the defendants offered to give an undertaking to carry on their business in future under the name of the "Guardian Horse, Vehicle, and General Insurance Company," and the only question then argued was as to the costs of the action. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the name of the defendants was calculated to deceive, but that the name they offered now to use would not deceive.

He could not but think that one object of changing their name was to obtain some portion of the plaintiffs' business, and that being so he considered the defendants ought to pay the costs of the action.-SOLICITORS, Parkin, Pagden, & Woodhouse; Denton & Hall.

66

TRADE-MARK- INFRINGEMENT-SIMILARITY-FRAUDINJUNCTION-COSTS.-In a case of Lamplough v. Beedzler, before the Master of the Rolls on the 25th ult., a motion was made by the vendors of a medicine called "Pyretic Saline" to restrain the defendant from selling a medicine which he called "Beedzler's Salubrious Saline," describing it on his labels as an excellent pyretic, antibilions, and headache, effervescing saline." The plaintiff had registered his name as a trademark, and his case was based on two grounds-first, the infringement of the trade-mark; and, secondly, that the defendant was selling his goods as those of the plaintiff. JESSEL, M.R., said there was no similarity between the two names, and that the defendant was not infringing the plaintiff's trade-mark. On the question of fraud he thought there was not sufficient similarity in the two labels for him to say the defendant intended to defraud, and the actual cases of fraudulent sale relied on entirely failed. The motion must, thereby, be refused, and as he had in effect decided the whole case on the motion, he should give the defendants their costs, and not make them costs in the action or the defendant's costs "in any event."-SOLICITORS, Crouch, Spencer, & Edwards; Plunkett & Leader.

PAYMASTER-GENERAL-SHARES IN HIS NAME-BENEFICIAL ALLOTMENT OF NEW SHARES-OBTAINING BENEFIT OF SAME FOR CESTUIS QUE TRUST.-In a case of Stewart v. Stewart, before the Master of the Rolls on the 26th ult., it was stated that the Paymaster-General bad vested in his name a large amount of railway stock, in respect of which a very beneficial allotment of new stock had been recently made, and as to which the Paymaster-General declined to take any step to enable the benefit of the allotment to be secured for the beneficiaries. An application was accordingly made on their behalf for the direction of the court. JESSEL, M.R., directed the Paymaster-General, or his deputy, to sign a letter of renunciation in favour of a particular broker, so as to enable the allotment to be sold at a premium for the benefit of the beneficiaries, and he observed that it was inconceivable that estates in chancery should lose the benefit of an allotment on account of some routine of the office. He also added that it seemed as if the Paymaster-General was not so much under the control of the court as the AccountantGeneral had been formerly.-SOLICITORS, Nash & Field.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-LEASE-PRIOR COVENANT BY DEFENDANT NOT TO ASSIGN WITHOUT LICENCE OF LESSOR -MISTAKE OF LEGAL RIGHTS-EXPENDITURE OF MONEY ON ANOTHER PERSON'S LAND-ACQUIESCENCE.-In a case of Willmott v. Barber, before Fry, J., on the 19th ult., the question arose whether a lessee, who had in his lease covenanted not to assign the demised property, or to part with the possession of it, without the written licence of the lessor, could be compelled to perform a contract which he had entered into to assign the lease, the lessor refusing to give his licence. There was a further question whether the lessor could be compelled to give his licence, on the ground that he had acquiesced in the expenditure of money on the property by the proposed assignee, knowing of his own rights, and knowing that the proposed assignee was acting in the mistaken belief that he could obtain a good title to the property from the lessee with whom he had entered into the agreement. The agreement was entered into in January, 1874, and it provided that Barber would let to the plaintiff one acre of a property comprising three acres, which he held as tenant to Bowyer, and which adjoined other property belonging to the plaintiff, for ninety-four years, the residue of his term, and that he would sell to the plaintiff his interest in the whole three acres at any time within five years from the date of the agreement. The agreement said nothing about the covenant not to assign without licence, and the plaintiff id not actually know of that covenant. It was, however, contended that he must be taken to have had notice of the provisions of Barber's lease, because he knew that had only a leasehold interest. The plaintiff was let into

possession of the one acre, and laid out a considerable sum of money upon it, and this was known to Bowyer. Bowyer admitted that he knew of the agreement early in 1875. In October, 1877, Barber surrendered his lease, and Bowyer granted him a new lease for a longer term, and including other property. This was done without the knowledge of the plaintiff. The new lease contained a covenant by the lessee, similar to that in the old lease, not to assign, &c., without the written licence of the lessor. Ia November, 1877, the plaintiff gave notice to Barber of his desire to exercise his option to purchase the whole three acres. Barber refused to execute an assignment, on the ground that Bowyer would not give his licence. The action was then brought against Barber and Bowyer, claiming specific performance by Barber of his agreement, and a declaration that under the circumstances Bowyer had no right to refuse his licence, and an order that he should give it or concur in an assignment to the plaintiff. Bowyer swore that he was not aware of the covenant not to assign without licence in Barber's original lease until about the time when the new lease was granted. It was contended that Bowyer, by reason of his acquiescence in the plaintiff's expenditure, was precluded from asserting his legal rights. And as to Barber it was contended that the surrender of the old lease behind the plaintiff's back could not affect his rights under the agreement, and that he was entitled to have the agreement performed out of the interest which Barber had acquired under the new lease. But it was urged that, though for this purpose the plaintiff was entitled to treat the old lease as still subsisting, he was entitled to treat it as at an end so far as regarded the covenant not to assign without licence. The result of that would be that the covenant not to assign without licence contained in the new lease was entered into by Barber subsequently to his agreement with the plaintiff, and it was his own fault that he had voluntarily entered into a covenant inconsistent with that prior agreement. He could not complain of being compelled to perform an agreement the result of which would be to make him commit a breach of a covenant into which he had afterwards voluntarily entered. Bowyer had not attempted or threatened to turn the plaintiff out of possession of the one acre, and no question as to that possession was raised in the action. FRY, J., said that there must be a very strong case to justify the court in depriving a man of his legal rights on the ground of acquiescence. He must have acted in such a way as to make it fraudulent for him to set up his legal rights. There were several elements necessary to constitute a fraud of this description. The plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal rights; he must have expended money or done some other act on the faith of his mistaken belief. The defendant-i.c., the possessor of the legal right-must have known his own right, which was inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff. If he did not know it he was in the same position as the plaintiff. The doctrine of acquiescence depended upon conduct with knowledge of your rights. The defendant must also have known the plaintiff's mistaken belief of his rights, and he must have encouraged the plaintiff in his laying out money, or in the other acts which he had done, either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal rights. When all these elements existed, there was fraud of such a nature as would enable the court to restrain the defendant from exercising his legal right. But, in his lordship's judgment, nothing short of that would be sufficient. In the present case the plaintiff had shown that he had made a mistake as to his rights. It was not necessary to decide whether he was affected with notice of the contents of Barber's lease, for, with reference to this kind of equity, a mistake of fact was not the less a ground of relief, because the person who made the mistake had the means of knowledge. But it could not be said that the plaintiff had expended his money on the property on the faith of the option to purchase the three acres rather than on the faith of his possession of the one acre. At the time when he made the expenditure he had not exercised his option to purchase, or even made up his mind to do so. Again, Bowyer's evidence that he did not know of his own rights had not been contradicted and must be taken to be true, and, assuming that the agreement with the plaintiff was communicated to him, there was nothing in it to show him that the plaintiff was ignorant of his rights. Bowyer might well have supposed that the plaintiff was a prudent man, and that he had inquired as to the provisions of

Barber's lease. His lordship could not come to the con. clusion that the plaintiff's mistaken belief had been brought home to Bowyer's mind, and he could not, therefore, restrain Bowyer from exercising his legal rights. And, as to Barber, his lordship held that the plaintiff was right in saying that the surrender of the original lease could not affect his rights. But, if he treated that lease as still subsisting for one purpose, he must treat it as still subsisting for all purposes, and, if that was so, the plaintiff, in asking for specific performance of the agreement by Barber was asking the court to compel Barber to break his covenant of prior date not to assign the property without the licence of Bowyer. This his lordship declined to do. He accordingly dismissed the action, but without costs.-SOLICITORS, G. Badham; G. J. § P. Vanderpump.

SERVICE OF THIRD-PARTY NOTICE APPEARANCE NOT ENTERED-COSTS. In a case of The Commissioners of the Exhibition of 1851 v. The Royal Horticultural Society, before Fry, J., on the 21st ult., the trial of the action had been ordered to stand over (vide ante, p. 611), with a direction that the plaintiffs should serve notice of the action on some third persons (who the defendants had, by the statement of defence, objected ought to have been made parties) informing them that they were at liberty to attend the proceedings. When the trial came on again, on the 21st ult., it appeared that the order giving this direction had not been drawn up by the plaintiffs, in consequence of a dispute between them and the defendants as to its exact terms, and that, though a notice had been served on the third parties, the record and writ clerk would not enter an appearance for them because the order had not been drawn up. Counsel, however, appeared for the third parties. FRY, J., ordered the trial again to stand over until the order should have been drawn up, and he ordered the plaintiffs to pay the costs occasioned by the standing over, including those of the third parties, inasmuch as though no appearance had been entered for them, they could not safely have declined to appear after the notice which had been actually served on them.-SOLICITORS, Fladgate, Smith, & Fladgate; Webb, Stock, & Burt.

Societies.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. This association held its twentieth anniversary at the Ship Hotel, Greenwich, on Wednesday last, the 30th ult., the Right Hon. Sir James Hannen taking the chair.

This is the third annual festival of the association held out of London, and about 150 gentlemen were present. The usual loyal and patriotic toasts having been given and duly responded to,

Mr. GEO. BURROW GREGORY, M. P. for East Sussex, in proposing "The Bench and the Bar," said it was one of the proudest possessions of this country to feel that the administration of justice was and had been for centuries perfectly pure, and they must remember that justice was not, as in some other countries, an object of concealment, an object of police, an object of State, but it was performed in this country in the open air as it were the judge was before the people; and when they considered that there must be disappointed suitors, that there must be many who considered their interests neglected or not recognized in the course of justice, and when they considered the oppor.tunities afforded these persons of ventilating their grievances by publications, and when they saw how little was said derogatory to the bar and the bench of England, and if anything should happen to be said how instantly it was repudiated-what a great testimony this was to the impartiality and justice of that bar and bench. He sometimes heard people speak of judge-made .law. In his opinion judge-made law was often the very best law, and he was happy to know that there were such able interpreters of statute law as those who sat upon the English bench. He felt more strongly every day that more consisted in the administration of the law than in the mere law made by Act of Parliament. Turning to another branch of the toast, he hoped everybody present would sympathize with him, and recognize to the fullest extent the desirability of having an independent and a highly

honourable bar of England. He was one who always advocated the separation of the bar from the solicitors' branch of the profession. Most of those present knew how much the solicitors were mixed up and identified with their clients. The clients' wrongs were the solicitors' wrongs, their injustice the solicitors' injustice, and the solicitors took up their cases as friends-almost as advocates-and were ready to go to almost any extent for their clients. The solicitors put their impressions on paper and submitted them to an independent mind, and they had the benefit of that independent mind, and its impartial deliberation, and it very often turned out that the solicitors feelings and views were not right. He believed that it was very much for the client's benefit that this should be the case. The solicitors often entered too much into the feelings of the client, and were often unable to control themselves sufficiently, and the intervention of an inde pendent mind was of great advantage, not only to the client, but to the solicitor himself; therefore he (Mr. Gregory) had always advocated the distinction that existed between the solicitor branch of the profession and the bar. He thought also he envied the bar of England in being able to enlist such recruits as it did, because there was no doubt that it had the

pick of the youth of England, the very best men the country could produce. They were happy to honour the toast, "The Bench and the Bar of England."

toast.

Mr. LEONARD FIELD, barrister-at-law, acknowledged the He was proud to be a member of the bar, and he would be equally proud to which ever branch of the profession he happened to belong. They were a united body and they worked well together, and he thought worked better separate as they were. Fusion had been of late the fashion, and the fusion of the bar with the solicitor branch had been advocated. He hoped they would be content to work together The for many years united, but yet separate as they were. barrister could do his duty only when the duty of the solicitor had been well performed, and he was glad to say, so far as his own experience went, that in most cases it was admirably performed.

The CHAIRMAN next proposed the toast of the evening, "The Solicitors' Benevolent Association, and may prosperity attend it." He said :-Nowhere better than in an assembly of lawyers is it known that there are few subjects in which there may not be a difference of opinion, and I believe that there are persons who entertain doubts of the utility of institutions like our own. I have heard such doubts expressed by a very distinguished person with reference to a kindred society-that of the Barristers' Benevolent Association-but this is certainly not the occasion upon which one should enter upon an exposition of the grounds upon which such doubts rest. Perhaps I ought not even to have referred to them, because if I rightly understand the duties I have to perform on this occasion, you have asked me to resume for the evening the practice of my old profession and become counsel for the Solicitors' Benevolent Association. I have felt that in doing so it was my duty to read my brief, and accordingly I have looked at the figures which I find in the paper which has been submitted to me, and some remarks occur to me with reference to it. Let me say before I enter upon them that you must all be aware of the satisfaction it is to counsel to feel that he is an advocate of the best case, and you also know how often it is that the case derives advantage from that conviction on the part of the advocate. At least I feel this satisfaction, and I trust that the society will have that advantage, namely, that I am firmly convinced of the utility of the institution which you are all here met to promote; and I trust that that conviction on my part will lend force and persuasive power to the remarks I have to make to you. Looking at these figures the first thing that occurs to me is this, that though the name of your association no doubt justly represents your objects, it scarcely with completeness represents the results of your useful labours. For it appears to me that it would be better entitled, having regard to these results, "The Solicitors' Provident and Benevolent Associa tion," because I find in the first place that the figures show that you have certainly justified your title of benevolent, for you have expended very nearly half that which has been paid away amongst those who were not members of the society and their families. But, secondly, I find that, as I presume all other things being equal, the preference has been given to members of the association, because I find that the sum which has been paid to members and their families amounts to £8,694, while that to non-members and their families is £7,901

But that in no other sense have you given the preference to members is proved by this, that in several years you have paid away more to non-members and their families than you have to members, and notably I find that in the last year, 1879, while £765 only has been paid to members and their families, no less a sum than £1,245 has been paid to non-members. But the third remark I have to make upon these figures is this, that it appears that slightly more than one-half of all that you have paid has been paid away to members and their families. Think for a moment what reflections that fact gives rise to. Think of the sad vicissitudes of fortune which it represents. How bright must have been the prospects of those who in the early days of their professional career, out of their scanty earnings, contributed, however slight the sum may have been, towards the wants of their brethren in the profession. Now to each one of those it seemed as impossible that he should ever want the guinea that he gave as it must appear to any one of you present on this occasion, and yet such has been the fate of many that no less than one-half of that which has been expended from their contributions-I speak of them collectively-has been paid to those who made the contributions. Now, that gives rise to these considerations, that it would be well that all those entering upon the profession should at once make their contributions to this society, the effect of which would be that, small as the contributions might be, it would make the task of the society easy with regard to all those who might have claims upon them. I was recently reading in a French book an account of the industry in the districts around Paris where the flowers are cultivated for the Paris market. Any association of the labours of solicitors with the labour of the cultivation of flowers is, perhaps, a little remote, but the application is what I wished to direct your attention to. They cultivate the flowers in succession for each anniversary of the saints, and they have to calculate that the blossom shall be ripe for the particular day of the calendar, but at uncertain intervals of years there appears a blackness on the horizon which rises rapidly overhead, and discharges a cannonade of hail upon the flowers and makes almost as clearly defined a line as the mower's scythe makes in the standing grass, and nothing can be more complete than the desolation of the flowers. Now only a few years ago a disaster of this kind brought inevitable ruin, but within comparatively recent times a new application of the principle of insurance is applied to this misfortune, and now the loss, which was before overwhelming, is mitigated, is almost obliterated, by being spread amongst a number over an extended area. Now that principle is applicable to the subject we are now dealing with. Every man who enters the profession, however clear the sky may seem to him, yet the storms of life may break upon him, and if he has contributed to this society he will at least find a refuge. He who was once the generous giver may become the grateful receiver, and that change must be indeed productive of some pang. The pang will be mitigated by the reflection that he has sown in the field where at last he is obliged to glean. In doing this, if he should be so fortunate as to escape the evils of life, he will at least have the satisfaction of feeling that he has contributed towards the relief of the wants of others, and, above all, in any case he will have the feeling that he has set an example of a prudent forethought and of a judicious charity to others who are entering upon a most honourable and useful, but, at the same time, necessarily uncertain profession. Gentlemen, these are the remarks which I have to make to you upon the general subject for which we are met here. I have had brought to my mind, but in a manner which prevents me doing justice to the subject, one matter which I know has been referred to by some of those who have preceded me in this chair. I mean the subject of there being another society having similar objects to your own. I remember reading, I think it was in the observations made by the Master of the Rolls, some remarks on this subject which struck me as characterized by his eminent good sense, and I do trust it will be found possible to bring about that economy which will necessarily result from uniting your efforts and working for the particular objects you have in view to the diminished staff which will be sufficient if the two societies shall be united. Gentlemen, with these remarks I again commend to your notice the toast of "Prosperity to the Solicitors' Benevolent Association."

The toast of "The Visitors" having been proposed by Mr. W. E. SHIRLEY, town clerk of Doncaster, and responded to by Mr. E. CRIPPS, vice-president of the Kent Law Society, the proceedings terminated.

During the evening a sum of £460 was subscribed towards the association.

LAW ASSOCIATION.

At the usual monthly meeting of the directors, held at the hall of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane, on Thursday, the 1st inst., the following being present, Mr. Boodle (chairman), and Messrs. Burges, Finch, Sawtell, Styan, Williamson, and A. B. Carpenter (secretary), grants of £35 were made to six non-members, and the ordinary general business was transacted.

Obituary.

MR. GEORGE BATTERSBY, LL.D., Q.C.

Mr. George Battersby, LL.D., Q.C., died at 20, Lower Leeson-street, Dublin, in his eightieth year. The deceased was the eldest son of the late Mr. Thomas Battersby, of Laugh Bane, Westmeath, and was born in 1801. He was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, where he graduated B.A. in 1824, and LL.D. in 1832. He was called to the bar in Ireland in Trinity Term, 1826, and he was a member of the Home Circuit. He was created a Queen's Counsel in 1844, and became a bencher of the King's-inns in 1861. Mr. Battersby had formerly an extensive business in ecclesiastical cases, and was for many years judge of the Provincial Court of Dublin, and Chancellor and Vicar-General of the united diocese of Dublin, Glandelough, and Kildare. He was a prosecuting Crown counsel for King's County, Kildare, and Westmeath, and a justice of the peace for the counties of Cavan, Meath, and Westmeath. Mr. Battersby was married to the daughter of the Right Hon. John Radcliff, LL. D., formerly judge of the Prerogative Court in Ireland, but he became a widower in 1876. His only surviving son, Mr. John Radcliff Battersby, LL.D., was called to the bar at Dublin in Hilary Term, 1864, and was called to the bar at Lincoln's inn in Easter Term, 1865.

Appointments, Etc.

Mr. JOSEPH JONAS BICKERTON, solicitor, of Oxford, has been unanimously elected Town Clerk and Clerk of the Peace for that city, and Registrar of the Borough Court, in succession to Mr. Robert Samuel Hawkins, resigned. Mr. Bickerton was educated at Charsley's-hall, Oxford, where he graduated third class in law and modern history in 1870, and he was admitted a solicitor in 1871. He is a proctor in the Chancellor's Court, and was till recently a member of the town council.

Mr. CHARLES FRANCIS BULLARD BIRCHALL, solicitor,Fof 5, Mark-lane, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. HENRY GRIFFITH, solicitor (of the firm of Hill, Fitzhugh, Woolley, & Griffith), of Brighton, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme

Court of Judicature.

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP.

WALTER STOTT NADIN and WILLIAM WILD, solicitors, 18, King-street, Manchester (Nadin & Wild). March 25, 1880. (Walter Stott Nadin will continue to practise in his own name.) (Gazette, June 29, 1880.)

At the Worcestershire Quarter Sessions, the Earl of Dudley, owing to ill-health, resigned the chairmanship of the court, which he has occupied for twenty-two years.