in that office has been unsatisfactory. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the fault in a great measure lies at the door of the Treasury. The office is undermanned, and the fact has been repeatedly brought to the notice of the authorities, but hitherto without result.

The Paymaster has this week received a reprimand in open court from the Master of the Rolls for his non-acceptance of the recent allotment of London and North-Western Railway Stock in respect of the several sums of the stock of that railway standing in his name. We must say that, although we have no great affection for the Chancery Paymaster, we think the

observations of the learned Master of the Rolls were made

without due consideration. The Chancery Paymaster is not entitled to deal in any way with the funds under his control except in pursuance of an order of court. He has no knowledge whatever as to the rights of the parties to an action, and has no means of knowing who may be entitled to require his acceptance of the newly allotted stock. Besides this, it must be remembered that the acceptance of the stock necessitates payment being made in respect of it. Where is the money for this purpose to come from? Without the order of the court the Paymaster cannot obtain this money, and he cannot be expected to incur a personal liability to pay for a large amount of railway stock which he would not know what to do with. In cases where stock has been a redeemable stock, such as the old East India Ten per Cents., there is good reason why the court should make a general order directing the Chancery Paymaster to accept the substituted stock. But a "general order" could not be made universally applicable in such a case as the recent allotment of fresh railway stock, and the circumstances of each case must guide the court in its directions with respect to the stock allotted.

In the case before the Birmingham County Court, reported ante, p. 633, in which an objection was taken to the certificate of registration of a bill of sale, on the ground that there was no commissioner in existence named “Edward B.," by whom it purported to be signed, it was explained on the further hearing, on the 23rd inst., that it was a clerical omission on the part of a person in the Bill of Sale Office. The signature was originally written in full, and the objection was met by the production of a corrected office copy.

In the recent cases of Lucas v. Cooke, before Mr. Justice Fry (28 W. R. 439), and Dicks v. Brooks, before the Court of Appeal, it was held that in an action for infringement of copyright in an engraving taken from a painting, the burden lay upon the plaintiff of proving that the picture, of which complaint was made, was in fact pirated from the engraving of which the plaintiff was the owner, and was not taken from the original painting or from an engraving made by a different artist. The Tribunal of Commerce of the French Department of the Seine has just decided in the same way in an action brought against a French firm of publishers, who had brought out one of the well-known tales of M. Jules Verne-L'Ile Mystérieuse-and had assigned to the plaintiffs the right of translation into and publication in Spanish, with the original plates. The plaintiffs, failing to show any exclusive assignment to them of the right of publication, fell back upon an allegation that the engravings embellishing the Spanish edition complained of were furnished by the defendants to the publishers of that edition; but the plaintiffs failed to discharge the burden of proof which the court held to rest upon them in this respect, or to show either that the engravings were taken from the original blocks, or had been supplied by the defendants, and they consequently failed. It would be rather too much if, in cases of alleged infringement of artistic copyright the plaintiff were to be entitled to assume in his own favour the fact of infringement on which the case principally turned.

PLANS ANNEXED TO PARTICULARS OF SALE.

THE lesson of the recent case of In re Arnold, Arnold v. Arnold (28 W. R. 635) is that vendors' solicitors times annexed to the particulars of sale. "In conshould look very carefully to the plans which are somesidering what the particulars of sale are," said Baggallay, L.J., "it is, in my opinion, impossible to exclude the plan which is attached to them, and which, as everybody knows, purchasers are as much guided by as by the printed portions of the particulars." This is, of course, no new doctrine. In Weston v. Bird (2 W. R. 145), the particulars of a house were accompanied by a plan which contained an outline of a piece of common in the occupation of the vendor. The particulars did not, in any way, refer to this piece of common; but the defendant, who purchased under these particulars, alleged that he had been led by the plan to suppose that the piece of common was included in the purchase. Vice-Chancellor Kindersley declined to enforce specific "A. prudent and a cautious man," he performance. said, "entertaining a doubt, would have inquired further "; but it was impossible to say that the particulars and conditions "representing the thing to be sold to the public, might not lead persons to the conclusion that the strip of land was comprised" in the sale, "although it was probable that some might not think

so."

In this case there was an actual representation on the plan of certain land as being part of the premises to be sold. But a plan may also mislead by omission. Thus in Denny v. Hancock (19 W. R. 54, L. R. 6 Ch. 1), the plan annexed to particulars of sale of a house and grounds showed at the western side a strip of ground covered with shrubs or trees, but did not show three large clm trees which constituted a material element in the value of the property as a residence. The intending purchaser went to look at the property, with the plan in his hand, and found on the western side a belt of shrubs bounded on the west by an iron fence and including the three trees. After he had bought the property he discovered that the real boundary was not the iron fence, but a row of stumps which were concealed in the shrubbery. The court held that the plan was calculated to deceive the purchaser, and refused to enforce specific performance. According to Lord Justice Mellish, in his judgment in this case, where there is on the property to be sold an apparent visible boundary distinct from an almost invisible real boundary, it is necessary to show on the plan the relative situations of the real and apparent boundaries.

In Boscomb v. Beckwith (L. R. 8 Eq. 100), upon the plan annexed to particulars of sale the different lots were coloured, and the land belonging to adjoining owners was left uncoloured and marked with their names. A piece of land reserved by the vendor was left uncoloured, but was not marked with his name. The estate was sold subject to conditions providing that no public-house should be built and no trade carried on upon the property. The late Master of the Rolls refused to compel a purchaser of one of the plots to complete his purchase unless the vendor would enter into restrictive covenants as to the excepted piece of land. "Another circumstance," he said, "which has great weight with me is the fact that in the plan nothing in the shape of colour, or of the name of the proprietor, appears on this unsold plot to mark that it was part of the estate belonging to the vendor. [The auctioneers] state that it is a frequent occurrence to reserve a few plots on the sale of a building estate, in order that they may be free from the building covenants, and that it is not the usual practice of surveyors to mark the name of the vendor on every piece reserved from a sale. Strictly and literally I have no doubt of the truth of this evidence, but I have no evidence before me, nor do I remember ever to have seen a case establishing the practice, that when the

vendor professes to print the names of the adjoining proprietors, he omits to print his own name on an adjoining plot, or to point out by the colour that it covers part of the estate belonging to the vendor, though not included in the sale."

Now in all these cases, it will be observed that if the purchaser, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, had asked a question or two he would have avoided all misapprehension. But the court, in considering whether it will enforce specific performance, does not consider whether the plan is likely to deceive a cautious purchaser; if it is calculated to mislead any purchaser, the court will withhold its assistance.

In In re Arnold, in the court below, the present Master of the Rolls seems to have dissented from this view. According to the particulars one of the parcels of a farm, No. 490a., contained about four acres, but a plan was annexed to the particulars, upon which 490a., as coloured, appeared to contain about seven acres. As a matter of fact the vendor was only entitled to four undivided sevenths of 490a. The Master of the Rolls said there had been a mistake in the particulars, 66 a mistake which ought not to have misled a careful or prudent purchaser. .. A very careful purchaser would have said, 'I am getting only four acres out of Bottlesey Green, 490a., which contains seven acres, and he would say, How am I only to get four acres? ... Then he would have been told, We do not sell you any four acres, but four undivided sevenths; you will get four acres on partition. That is the only mistake in the particulars." In other words, according to the Master of the Rolls, a purchaser ought to be put on his inquiry by such a difference between the particulars and the plan. But the Court of Appeal promptly disavowed this doctrine. Lord Justice James said that if a man makes a thing calculated to mislead, it is not well for him to say, If you had been very careful, you would have found out the blunder. If the vendor did not mean to deceive, he must have overlooked the inconsistency between the plan and the particulars, although he or his agents prepared and corrected these documents; how then could he say to the purchaser, "You ought to have found out for us the very blunder which we never found out for ourselves"? And Lord Justice Bramwell laid it down distinctly that "it would be monstrous to make Mr. Borrett (the purchaser) take this estate without giving him the whole of 490a."-i.e., the whole seven acres as shown on the plan. This seems to mean that if there is a plan annexed to the particulars, and differing from them, the purchaser may, if he chooses, shut his eyes to the particulars and rely upon the plan.

It is reasonable that a vendor of land in lots for the purpose of building who accompanies his particulars and conditions with a map showing the intended division of the property by new roads, should be held to thereby represent that the lots, if sold and divided at all, will be so divided; and it will not be competent for him to divide the land in a different manner so as to attract an occupancy entirely different from that which would have been produced by acting on the plan annexed to the particulars (Peacock v. Penson, 11 Beav. 355). But the mere indication on the sale plan of intended roads on adjacent land will not bind the vendor to make such roads (Heriot's Hospital v. Gibson, 2 Dow. 301; Squire v. Campbell, 1 My. & Cr. 459; Nurse v. Lord Seymour, 13 Beav. 269); nor can the purchaser under particulars having such a plan annexed, claim a right of way over such roads, except over the road adjoining his lot, and thence directly to the nearest highway (Randall v. Hill, 4 De G. & S. 343).

Where a sale plan accurately delineates the property, it is merely tantamount to a view of the property; hence, if it correctly appears upon the plan that one lot is supplied with water by a drain leading from a well in another lot, the plan will not be held to amount to an engagement by the vendor that a right to water shall be reserved in the conveyance of the lot on which the well Es situate (Forster v. Turner, 6 Jur. 144).

A MAN AND HIS NAME. IV.

AMONG the rights which a man has in respect of his name, not the least is the right to use it as describing his business, or indicating the produce of his manufacturing industry and ability; and the mere fact that that there is another manufacturer of the same name before him in the market does not deprive him of the right so to use his name (see Burgess v. Burgess, 3 De G. M. & G. 896; Ainsworth v. Walmsley, 14 W. R. 363, L. R. 1 Eq. 518). But the limitation must not be forgotten-viz., that the second person to use the name must not use his name with such additions or in such a manner as to cause his business or goods to be mistaken for another's. "Where a person," says Lord Justice Turner, in Burgess v. Burgess, "is selling goods under a particular name, and another person, not having that name, is using it, it may be presumed that he so uses it to represent the goods sold by himself as the goods of the person whose name he uses; but where the defendant sells goods under his own name, and it happens that the plaintiff has the same name, it does not follow that the defendant is selling his goods as the goods of the plaintiff. It is a question of evidence in each case whether there is false representation or not." From this it follows that a person whose name is the same as that of well-known manufacturer has an advantage in this respect, that the mere fact of his using the wellknown name is not of itself sufficient to convict him of fraud. There must be something more; the burden of proof is shifted on to the plaintiff, and he must show that intention to deceive which otherwise would probably be presumed. However, from the principle of the decision in Orr Ewing v. Johnston (27 W. R. 575, 28 lb. 330, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 434), it appears that, if the use of the name is of itself calculated to produce decep. tion, the second person to use the name would act wisely in taking active steps to remove the probability of deception, and should not be content with merely refraining from actually fraudulent conduct. At all events, "it is a question of evidence in each case whether there is false representation or not," and wherever there is a resem

a

blance in the manner in which the two manufacturers use the name, though not an absolute identity, the observations of Lord Hatherley in Taylor v. Taylor (2 Eq. Rep. 290) clearly indicate the course which the court will take. "In every case," he says, "the court must ascertain whether the differences are made bond fide in order to distinguish the one article from the other, whether the resemblances and the differences are such as naturally arise from the necessity of the case, or whether, on the other hand, the differences are simply colourable, and the resemblances are such as are obviously intended to deceive the purchaser of the one article into the belief of its being the manufacture of another person. Resemblance is a circumstance which it is of primary importance for the court to consider, be cause if the court finds, as it almost invariably does find in such cases as this, that there is no reason for the resemblance, except for the purpose of misleading, it will infer that the resemblance is adopted for the purpose of misleading."

Acting in accordance with the law here laid down, an injunction was granted in Rodgers v. Nowill (5 C. B. 109, 6 Hare, 325)—" Rodgers' cutlery"-to restrain the use of a name which the defendants claimed as their own firm name, a jury having found that they had acted with the intention and result of deception; and a defendant, who afterwards committed a breach of the injunction, was ordered to be committed unless he adopted a mark approved by the court within a week (3 De G. M. & G. 614). So, in Holloway v. Holloway (13 Beav. 209)— "Holloway's pills "-Lord Langdale restrained the defendant from using his name upon pills and ointment so

as to cause them to be mistaken for the plaintiff's, his brother's, pills and ointment, and his lordship observed "The defendant's name being Holloway, he has a right to constitute himself a vendor of Holloway's pills and ointment, and I do not intend to say anything tending to abridge any such right. But he has no right to do so with such additions to his own name as to deceive the public, and make them believe that he is selling the plaintiff's pills and ointment." So, in Taylor v. Taylor-"Taylor's thread"; Clark v. Clark (25 Barb. S. C. 76)-" Clark's thread "-the injunction being limited to such user of the name as should be calculated to produce deception: Stonebraker Stonebraker (33 Md. 252)—" Stonebraker's medicines"; James v. James (20 W. R. 434, L. R. 13 Eq. 421)—“ James' horseblisters"-where the defendant was restrained from signing his name "Robert James," and compelled to use his full name, Robert Joseph James, "Robert James," having been the name of the original inventor of the article under whom the plaintiffs claimed: Holmes, Booth, & Hayden v. Holmes, Booth, & Atwood Manufacturing Company (9 Amer. Rep. 324), where the two leading members of the plaintiffs' firm had left it and used their name again in the formation of a rival concern; and in Gouraud v. Trust (10 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 627), the defendants were restrained from making use of a name which their father had assumed (they not having themselves changed their original name), in such a way as to profit by the reputation which the father had acquired under his new name. Moreover, the fraudulent use of a man's own name has been held to render the person using it criminally responsible for obtaining money by false pretences. (R. v. Dundas, 6 Cox. 380-"Everett's blacking").

On the other hand, the court has refused to restrain persons from the use of their own names in Burgess v. Burgess (3 De G. M. & G. 896)—“Burgess' anchovy sauce"; Comstock v. White (18 How. Pr. 421)—“ A. J. White & Co.'s pills"; Ainsworth v. Walmsley (14 W. R. 353, L. R. 1 Eq. 518)-"Ainsworth's thread"; Faber v. Faber (49 Barb. S. C. 357)-" Faber's lead pencils"; Meneely v. Meneely (62 N. Y. 427)-"Meneely's bells"; Decker v. Decker (52 How. Pr. 218)-"Decker pianos"; Gillman v. Hunnewell (122 Mass. 139)-" Hunnewell's medicine"; Prince Metallic Paint Company v. Carbon Metallic Paint Company (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1877)-" Prince's paint"; and in Dence v. Mason (Jan. 25, 1877), Vice-Chancellor Malins held that, during the continuance of a partnership between two persons named Mason and Brand, it was impossible to prohibit the use of the latter's name in the business, which was carried on as "Mason and Brand," but that after he had quitted the firm, the remaining partner had not the right to use his, Brand's, name so as to deceive. And see McLean v. Fleming (96 U. S. Rep. 246), and Binninger v. Wattles (28 How. Pr. 206).

The question is, of course, much simplified when the defendant has contracted not to use the name, and the injunction will be granted with much less difficulty, as in Ainsworth v. Bentley (14 W. R. 630), where the defendant had covenanted not to publish another periodical of like nature with Bentley's Miscellany, which he had sold, and then published a new magazine with his name on the cover, and Gillis v. Hall (7 Phila. 422), where a person who had sold his interest in the firm of "R. P. Hall & Co.," and in a secret preparation known as "Hall's Vegetable Sicilian Hair Renewer," covenanting not to use his name in a similar business, began to do so, and was restrained by injunction, which he afterwards disregarded, and was thereupon attached for contempt (8 Phila. 231). It is not, indeed, necessary for there to be an express covenant not to use the name when a business is being sold with the goodwill, for "when you are parting with the goodwill of a business you mean to part with all that good disposition which customers entertain towards the house of business identified by the particular name or firm, which may induce them to continue giving their custora to it, as was

said by Lord Hatherley in Churton v. Douglas (7 W. R. 365, Johns. 174), (and see Levy v. Walker, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 436). In Churton v. Douglas, the principal partner in the firm of "John Douglas & Co. " sold his interest in the business and goodwill to his partners, and then set up in the neighbourhood as "John Douglas & Co." In other ways, also, he represented himself to be carrying on the old business, and an injunction was granted to restrain him from so doing. It will be observed that the fact that the defendant added " & Co." after his own name in commencing his new business weighed heavily against him as evidence of fraudulent intention, and the unnecessary adoption of these words will always form an element in the case adverse to the defendant's assertion of bona fides. In Fullwood v. Fullwood (1) (W. N. 1873, pp. 93, 185), where an injunction was granted, this addition had been made to the name; so in Fullwood v. Fullwood (2) (26 W. R. 435, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 176); and in Devlin v. Devlin (69 N. Y. 212). In Bond v. Milbourn (20 W. R. 197) no relief appears to have been prayed in this respect, and in Comstock v. White (18 How. Pr. 421) there were several defendants trading as "A. J. White & Co.," and as one of them was named A. J. White, the name of the firm was not interfered with.

Where the sale of a business and goodwill was effected, not by the proprietor himself, but by his assignee or trustee in bankruptcy, it was thought by a judge of the Supreme Court of New York, in Helmbold v. Helmbold Manufacturing Company (53 How. Pr. 453), that the result was different from what it would have been had the sale been by the owner of the name himself, and that the assignee or trustee in bankruptcy could not deprive the owner of the right to use his own name so as to entitle the purchaser from the representative in bankruptcy to restrain the man by injunction from using his own name in connection with a new business. Having regard, however, to the case of Bury v. Bedford (12 W. R. 726, De G. J. & S. 352), it hardly seems that this decision can be supported, and there does not, indeed, seem to be any adequate reason for the distinction.

Sometimes it is a company which has used as a principal feature in its trade-name the name of which complaint is made, and which the company has derived from one of its principal members; but it seems clear that the company can at all events assert no better right in the name than could have been asserted therein by the person from whom they derived it, and even that the company's rights therein may be inferior to his, for there was no natural necessity for the company to be originated under that particular name: Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Company (ante, p. 505); McGowan Brothers' Pump Machine Company v. McGowan (2 Cinc. 313); Holmes, Booth, & Haydens v. Holmes, Booth, & Atwood Manufacturing Company (9 Amer. Rep. 324).

We are requested to state that Mr. Quinn's examination of the equity classes at the Law Institution will be held in the Examination Hall on Monday, the 5th of July next. Subscribers to the equity classes are liberty to attend. The examination will commence at eleven a.m. and close at two o'clock p.m.

at

It was stated recently, says the Times, in the Lewiston Journal, that Mr. A. Gibbs, a lawyer at Rochester, New York, ninety-three years old, is still in practice. A reader of that journal cut out the paragraph and sent it in a letter of inquiry directed to Mr. Gibbs, and received an answer, dated the 19th of May, in which the writer says:-"I am the person named in the printed slip.' I never sought notoriety, but it seems my longevity is likely to give me more than my good deeds. My health is as sound as at any time of my life, for aught I know. I was slender until thirty. I have been a close student and kept up with the decisions of our courts, done a good amount of business, never was rich. My present patronage is select. From my youth I have entertained a fonduess for the profession."

Recent Decisions.

DELUSIONS AS AFFECTING TESTA-
MENTARY CAPACITY.

(Smee v. Smee, Prob.D., 28 W. R. 703.)

In his summing up to the jury in this case Sir James Hannen purported to adopt the rule which he took part in laying down in the judgment in Banks v. Goodfellow (L. R. 5 Q. B. 549), that delusions and hallucinations not connected with the subject-matter of a will do not invalidate it. The same rule was laid down by Sir J. Nicholl in Dew v. Clark (3 Addams, 79), but was subsequently dissented from by the Privy Council in Waring v. Waring (6 Moore P. C. 349); and in Smith v. Tebbit (15 W. R. 562, L. R. 1 P. & D. 398), Lord Penzance held that mental disease invalidated a will, although "the particular subjects upon which the disease is manifested have no connection whatever with the testamentary disposition before the court."

It has always appeared to us that neither of these views can be accepted without reservation. On the one hand it seems absurd to hold (as was held in a case before the Prerogative Court) that a delusion which took the form of keeping fourteen dogs in kennels in a drawing-room destroyed the testamentary capacity of a testatrix; and on the other hand it is impossible to deny that delusions are often indications of insanity extending beyond the particular subjects on which they have manifested themselves. The fact is, as was admitted in the judgment in Banks v. Goodfellow, that, where delusions exist which have no foundation in reality, and spring only from a diseased and morbid condition of the mind, to that extent the mind must necessarily be taken to be unsound"; and the question in these cases appears to be not merely did the delusions relate to the subject-matter of the will, but was the testator so far under the influence of mental disease as to be "incapable of considering the matters which should be weighed and taken into account in making a will?"

In the recent case Sir James Hannen, while, as we have said, purporting to re-affirm the rule in Banks v. Goodfellow, appears to have adopted the above view. "If the delusions," he said, "could not reasonably be conceived to have had anything to do with the testator's power of considering the claims of his relations upon him, and the manner in which he should dispose of his property, the presence of a particular delusion would not incapacitate him from making a will." The dispositions in one of the wills before the court were, in the opinion of the court, unconnected with the testator's delusions; and as to this will, the learned judge remarked that "the capacity required in a testator is that he should be able rationally to consider the claims of all who are related to him, and who, according to the ordinary feelings of mankind, are supposed to have some claim to his consideration when dealing with his property as it is to be disposed of after his death. It is not sufficient that the will might, on the face of it, be considered a rational will; you must go below the surface and consider whether the testator was in such a state of mind that he could rationally take into consideration, not merely the amount and nature of his property, but also the interests of those who had claims upon him by personal relationship or otherwise." It will be seen that this is not very difficult from the doctrine laid down by Lord Penzance in Smith v. Tebbit.

The Lord Chancellor has appointed Mr. Thomas Lovell (chamber clerk to Mr. Justice Lindley) one of the permanent officers in the Central Office (Summons and Order Department) of the Royal Courts of Justice; and Mr. William Stewart has been appointed by Mr. Justice Lindley to succeed Mr. Lovell as chamber clerk.

Reviews.

FRENCH COMMERCIAL LAW.

THE FRENCH CODE OF COMMERCE AND MOST USUAL COMMERCIAL LAWS, &c. By LEOPOLD GOIRAND, Licencié eu Droit, Avoué au Tribunal Civil du Department de la Seine. Stevens & Sons.

M. Goirand's object is to afford to English lawyers and commercial men a practical treatise on French commercial law. He deals with the subject in a commentary, followed by a literal translation of the Code of Commerce and the subsequent commercial laws. Prefixed to the commentary is an interesting account of judicial organization in France, and the practice before the Tribunals of Commerce. These courts, which have exclusive jurisdiction in commercial suits, are composed of judges nominated by "a meeting of electors chosen from amongst traders, directors of Sociétés Anonymes, financial and industrial companies, and stock brokers,” and these judges adjudicate finally and without appeal in all cases where the amount in dispute is less than £60. The subjects of bankruptcy, companies, and bills of exchange are very fully treated of in the commentary, which also includes the heads of Stockbrokers, Cheques, Loans and Pledges, Maritime Law, Common Carriers, Trade-marks, Patents, and several other subjects connected with commercial law. The chapter on the execution in France of judgments rendered by foreign tribunals contains, within a short compass, a useful summary of the proceedings to be taken in order to render executory by the medium of the French courts 2 judgment recovered abroad.

COMMON LAW.

PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMON LAW. AN ELEMENTARY WORK INTENDED FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION. By JOHN INDERMAUR, Solicitor. SECOND EDITION. Stevens & Haynes.

Mr. Indermaur has added to this new edition of his useful elementary treatise many recent cases and enactments. With regard to the cases the difficulty in a book of this kind always lies in including all the important decisions, while not overloading the work. Mr. Indermaur has avoided the latter fault and has not very often lost sight of new points of importance. With reference to Bovill's Act, however (p. 116), a statement should have been given of the principles laid down in the judgments in the cases of Pooley v. Driver (25 W. R. 164) and Ex parte Delhasse (26 W. R. 341), as pointing attention to the meaning of the words in the Act "the advance of money by way of loan." The index to the book has been enlarged and now constitutes almost an analysis of the different heads.

PROCEEDINGS IN AN ACTION.

THE PROCEEDINGS IN AN ACTION IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH, COMMON PLEAS, AND EXCHEQUER DIVISIONS OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. BY SAMUEL PRENTICE, Esq., Q.C. SECOND EDITION. Stevens & Sons.

Mr. Prentice has carefully noted up the cases which have been decided since his first edition appeared, and his book now constitutes a very readable and practical manual of the practice relating to the Common Law Divisions. We do not know, for instance, where the student will find a better concise introduction to the action for the recovery of land than in chapter 30.

General Correspondence.

THE LEASES BILL.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-As I have taken part in the discussion of the Leases Bill, I wish to make one or two remarks on your article of last week.

First, I entirely concur with you that Mr. Warton's Bill should be amended, and several of the provisions of Lord Cairns' Bill be adopted. I consider it distinctly wrong that the lessor, having a right, should bear the 'burden of an application for leave to enforce it, as in Mr. Warton's Bill; the lessee seeking relief should apply for it, and get it if entitled.

There are cases where summary enforcement of rights is so important to a lessor that I do not like Lord Cairns' clause requiring previous notice. Suppose the case of a mine where workings are neglected, or a tavern where a licence may be forfeited (and many other cases may be suggested), and you will, I think, agree with me that the clause might do harm. I had a case two months ago where possession at the earliest possible date was essential to secure a crop from a large farm.

The truth is the proposed measure will not work any violent alteration; the vast majority of lessees and lessors fairly fulfil their engagements, and when needful make mutual concessions; and for them nothing is necessary for others, short and sharp powers of enforcing rights or obtaining relief are desirable, and the sooner they get their disputes disposed of by the court the better for the one in the right.

With regard to leases at a rack rent there is much to be said, but I venture to differ from you, and, on the whole, am of opinion that power to relieve would be beneficial. Apart from other considerations, often, owing to change in value or outlay by the tenant, a lease originally granted at a rack rent becomes valuable; and in any case, substantial, not literal, fulfilment of the bargain is the real intention of the parties, and this the court can secure, or refuse relief.

I notice that Lord Cairns' Bill excludes from its operation clauses prohibiting assignment without licence. This is the very clause I want the court to deal with, for it is used the most oppressively.

I for a lessee always fight against it and, if I can't get it omitted, qualify it as much as possible. I have known many fines demanded for licence. For instance, a lessor who had approved a sub-tenant for a part of a house in the City (both lessee and sub-tenant being wealthy and desirable tenants) on the sub-tenancy being continued for a short period, extorted a large payment, and is about to repeat the process on a further extension.

Such demands are a great abuse of the clause. The excuse alleged for insisting on its insertion is that the lessor only wants to secure satisfactory occupants of his premises; but when change of plans, death, or other circumstances, render necessary the transfer or underletting of the premises, bad landlords (and I have nothing to say as regards others) use their powers most unjustly, and for far different purposes to what were originally supposed. I think the court should have power to prevent their doing so.

I enclose for your consideration a sketch uniting parts of the two Bills with alterations, which seems to me preferable to either separately.

7, Walbrook, E.C., June 28.

JOSEPH ADDISON.

[The following is the Bill referred to by our correspondent :

A BILL TO AMEND THE LAW RELATING TO LEASES. (Adapted from Lord Cairns' Bill).

Where a lessor is proceeding by action or otherwise to enforce a right of re-entry or forfeiture under any

provo or stipulation in any lease for the breach of any covenant or condition in the lease, or within two calendar month after any actual re-entry made without action brought, the lessee may, in the lessor's action, if any, or in any action brought by himself, apply to the court for relief, and the court may grant or refuse relief as the court having regard to the proceedings and conduct of the parties, and to all the other circumstances, thinks fit, and in case of relief may grant it on such terms, if any, as to costs, expenses, damages, compensation, penalty, or other matters relative to the breach, or to any subsequent like or other breach, as the court in the circum

stances of each case thinks fit.

Here follow sub-sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 of section 18 of Lord Cairns' Bill.

Here follow sections 4 and 6 of Mr. Warton's Bill.]

ARTICLED CLERKS.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-As Mr. Dodd has sought the support of your readers for the proposals he is about to make, having for their end the establishment of scholarships and prizes to be competed for at the preliminary and inter mediate examinations of the Incorporated Law Society, I hope you will permit me to protest against the adoption of any such scheme.

The indifference to intellectual training which prevailed half a century and more ago has been succeeded by a reaction which is tending to carry us in a wrong direction. England is examination mad, and no pursuit or study is considered of much value unless it lead to results capable of being tested by examination. Habits of careful observation and thought, the formation of a decided character, knowledge of men and of the world, are all subordinated in the training of youth to a cram of matter in order to produce marks or honours at an examination. In fact, for the ills which may afflict every sort and condition of men, for the peer as well as for the peasant, for men whose future is to be the senate, as for those who are destined for the counter or counting-house, for such as are to adorn the pulpit, and for those who will follow the plough, there is one universal panacea-Examine, examine, examine.

And, Sir, I am afraid that the duties of the Incorporated Law Society in reference to the examinations of articled clerks may be lost sight of in these days. the preliminary examination any other object than to

Has

ascertain that articled clerks have been so instructed as to be on a level, so far as education is concerned, with

middle-class youth of average education? Is it any part of the business of the society to compete with the universities, or to supersede the local examinations conducted under the general supervision of the university

authorities?

The object of the intermediate examination again is, as I have always understood, to induce articled clerks to acquire a certain amount of knowledge, and to get through a certain amount of reading, during the first portion of their articles, and not to encourage them to cram themselves to the neglect of everything else.

I am quite willing to admit that the balance of advantage may be in favour of a searching final examination, and, as part of it, of special honour papers and prizes; but the system is not without its drawbacks. Important as it doubtless is that members of our branch of the profession should have a knowledge of the principles and technicalities of the law, yet this is by no means all that a practising solicitor requires: I doubt, indeed, if it be the most important part of professional training.

Thorough habits of business, knowledge of men, a power of calculating probabilities and weighing evidence which is best included in the term judgment-method, resource, and many other qualities, are of even more importance. In the days when I served my articles, articled clerks really did much of the work of an office,