Reviews. has to rest his rule, as did Lord Westbury in Phillips v. Phillips (4 De G. F. & J. 208) upon thin and unsatis. factory distinctions between the kinds of jurisdiction PURCHASE FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE. formerly exercised by the Court of Chancery, which, as OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEFENCE OF PURCHASE FOR The evolution of our jurisprudence is certainly a slow and gradual process. Five years after the Judicature Acts an author, writing upon so important a subject as that with which Mr. Haynes has dealt in this p mphlet, finds the question as much res integra as on the day when the Acts came into operation. Yet the position of a purchaser for value without notice might have been supposed to be a point which would soon elicit some decisions upon the meaning of the 24th and 25th sections of the Judicature Act, 1873. Before the Act such a person is said to have found himself the peculiar favourite of the courts of equity, who, however, tempered their favour by irritating distinctions between the circumstances in which he should be entitled to it and those in which he should not. Now, under the 24th section above referred to (sub-section 2) a defendant in any action in the Supreme Court is entitled to have the same effect given to any equitable defence as the Court of Chancery ought to have given if the same or the like matters had been relied on by way of defence in any suit or proceeding instituted in that court for the same or the like purpose before the passing of the Act," and under the 25th section (sub-section 11), the rules of equity are to prevail in all matters not mentioned in the Act in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and those of law. It might seem that by virtue of the latter section the rules of equity must prevail whenever the fact of a purchase for value without notice is pleaded. But the writer of this pamphlet points out what is no doubt the more correct view, namely, that, having regard to the words of section 24, the question for the purchaser to ask himself is, firstly, whether or not a proceeding similar to the one in which he is now the defendant might formerly have been instituted in the Court of Chancery for the same purpose; and, secondly, whether or not in such a proceeding his defence of purchase for value without notice would have been successful. Thus Mr. Haynes supposes a case in which "chattels belonging as he himself suggests, are rather technical than substantial. The fact that it is impossible to state the law, except with reference to these ancient distinctions, sufficiently indicates that, now that we have got one court with a single jurisdiction the law itself needs re-modelling and simplification. It is to be observed that this plea rested primarily on the fact of conflicting jurisdiction. Where the Court of Chancery was exercising its ordinary jurisdiction—that is to say, its jurisdiction in matters in which the courts of law had practically no jurisdiction at all, but in which the long-established practice of the courts of equity assigned to the parties definite rights and obligations, as in suits relating to trusts, mortgages, and the like-the plea was generally inapplicable; for, as between equitable claimants, the maxim qui prior est in tempore potior est in jure was the measure of their rights. But there might, in a proceeding of this character, be a legal claimant, a defendant, for instance, who, in addition to his equitable right as thus ascertainable, had acquired a legal interest under such circumstances that the court would, in case of his being a purchaser for value without notice, allow him the benefit of his legal position; a second mortgagee, for instance, who had advanced his money without notice of the prior charge, might have got in an outstanding legal estate, and might, by virtue of that, claim a priority over the first mortgagee, to which he would not, apart from his legal right, be entitled. And the circumstances under which this benefit, commonly called the tabula in naufragio, was allowed, are clearly defined by Mr. Haynes, in his In this one case, then, the success second chapter. of the plea clearly depended upon the existence General Correspondence. ARTICLED CLERKS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Enclosed I send you a copy of a notice that I have given to the Incorporated Law Society of the special resolutions I intend to move at the annual general meeting. I trust that, considering the present position of the society, and the very large sum that it annually receives in the shape of examination fees, these resolutions will meet with general approval, and that I shall be well supported at the meeting. G. R. DODD. 54, New Broad-street, E.C., June 22. [The following is the notice referred to by our correspondent : To the Secretary of the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom. I hereby give notice that it is my intention at the next annual general meeting of the society, or at any adjournment thereof, to move the following resolutions, viz: 1. That this society takes this opportunity of expressing its great satisfaction at the recent institution of examinations for honours at the final examinations. 2. That, for the further encouragement of persons bound or about to be bound under articles of clerkship, it is, in the opinion of this society, now expedient to establish scholarships and studentships to be awarded at the preliminary and other examinations, and that for such purpose a sum of not less than £500 a year be paid out of the funds of the society. 3. That the council be respectfully requested to make all requisite arrangements for carrying out the last resolution and to frame the necessary regulations.] Cases of the Week. PARTITION ACT, 1868 (31 & 32 VICT. c. 40), ss. 3, 4, 5SALE-PURCHASE OF SHARES AT A VALUATION.-In the House of Lords, on the 21st inst., judgment was given in the appeal of Pitt v. Jones. The action was brought under the Partition Act, 1868, by the owners of two sixteenth shares in certain property in the town of Birmingham, who desired an immediate sale of the property. The defendants, representing ten sixteenth shares, opposed the sale upon the ground that, owing to certain local improvements which were in progress, the value of the property would shortly be increased. Malins, V.C., on the defendants undertaking to purchase the shares of the plaintiffs and other persons in the same interest, ordered a valuation in chambers under section 5 of the Act, and a sale and purchase of such shares (Gilbert v. Smith, 26 W. R. 905, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 548). This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (Jessel, M.R., James and Bramwell, L.JJ.), holding that where section 3 applied section 5 had no operation, and a sale was directed with leave to any of the parties to bid (23 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 276, 27 W. R. 719, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 78). The parties who desired to buy the shares at a valuation appealed to the House of Lords. Lord HATHERLEY held that the the order of Malins, V.C., ought to be restored. He thought that the Legislature had foreseen that the concarrence of all the parties interested could in many cases not be obtained, and, therefore, section 5 of the Partition Act, 1868, had provided for a case where only a minority desired a sale by enabling the court to allow those opposing the sale to buy in the shares of the minority at a valuation. Lord BLACKBURN thought that the balance of authority was in favour of the decision of the Court of Appeal. He adopted the view taken by Lord Hatherley in Pemberton v. Barnes (19 W. R. 988, L. R. 6 Ch. 685), that the onus of showing good reasons why there should not be a sale was upon the parties objecting to it; and he also approved of the decision in Williams v. Games (23 W. R. 779, L. R. 10 Ch. 204) and Drinkwater v. Ratcliffe (24 W. R. 25, L. R. 20 Eq. 528). Section 5 did not compel a party desiring a sale to submit to his own share being sold at a valuation; and if such a person did not choose to accept the valuation he would still have his common law right to a partition, or a right to a sale under the earlier sections. In other words, he had the option of selling his share at a a valuation, but he could not be compelled to do so. Lord WATSON Concurred with Lord Blackburn, and the appeal was, therefore, dismissed, with costs.-SOLICITORS, Whateley, Milward, & Whitehead; Gamlen & Son; Letts & Son. PARTITION EQUITABLE ESTATES-ACTIVE TRUSTS OVER WHOLE ESTATE.-On the 15th inst., the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of Fry, J., in the case of Taylor v. Grange (28 W. R. 93, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 22). The action was brought for the partition of real estate. Under the will of the former owner of the property, the legal estate was vested in a trustee, upon trust for tenants for life and remaindermen. The will contained a direction that the trustees should work and dispose of the stone under the estate during the continuance of the trusts. And for that purpose the testator empowered the trustees to make such roads over the estate as they might think proper or find necessary, and he conferred on them other discretionary powers affecting the whole estate. The profits of the stone business were to be applied for the benefit of the tenants for life and remaindermen in the same way as the income was directed to be applied. The action was brought by one of the tenants for life and some of the remaindermen against the other persons beneficially interested and the sole acting trustee, claiming a partition of the estate. Fry, J., expressed an opinion that he could not grant a partition except as to the interests of the tenants for life, and the claim was at the bar limited to those interests. But Fry, J., held that there was no legal right to partition, the trust being of an active description, and the plaintiffs having no legal interest in the land. And his lordship said that he could find no precedent for a partition in equity in such circumstances. And, upon principle, he thought that a partition ought not to be granted, because the effect of it would be to extinguish the active trusts which the testator had created. It would put an end to the possibility of carrying on the business which the testator desired should be carried on, and would divide the property in a manner inconsistent with the exercise of the powers which he had thought fit to create. His lordship was of opinion that an equitable owner of property might require partition in a court of equity whenever he was entitled to call for the legal estate, and whenever, on becoming possessed of the legal estate, he might have a partition at law. The present case was not one of that description. The action was accordingly dismissed with costs. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, COTTON, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) affirmed this decision, without hearing the counsel for the respondents.-SOLICITORS, Torr & Co.; Nash & Field; Johnson & Weatheralls. PROOF IN BANKRUPTCY-BILL OF EXCHANGE-PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-GUARANTOR.-In a case of Ex parte Bishop, before the Court of Appeal on the 17th inst., & question arose as to the right of a guarantor of the due payment of a bill of exchange to prove in the liquidation of the acceptor for the amount which he had, under his guarantee, paid to the holder of the bill. Bills of exchange for sums amounting to about £20,000 were drawn by one firm upon another, and accepted by the firm upon which they were drawn, mainly for the accommodation of the drawers, it being part of the arrangement that the acceptors were to have £5,000 of the proceeds of the bills. The drawers procured the bills to be discounted by a firm of bill brokers in the city of London, indorsing the bills to the brokers in the ordinary way. The brokers re-discounted the bills with their bankers, but they did not indorse the bills to the bankers. They had, however, some years previously given to the bankers a letter of guarantee, by which, in consideration of the bankers discounting for them any bills they might approve from time to time, the brokers guaranteed the due payment of them as they should respectively fall due. It was proved that it is the common and almost invariable practice cf billbrokers in the city of London not to indorse the bills which they rediscount with their bankers, but to give the bankers instead a general floating guarantee to the above effect. Both the drawers and the brokers had stopped payment before the bills became due, and the acceptors were unable to pay them at maturity. The acceptors, however, paid about five shillings in the pound to the bankers, and entered into an arrangement with them for the payment of the balance by instalments. This arrangement they failed to carry out, and they afterwards filed a liquidation petition. The bankers received dividends on the amount of the bills from the estates of both the drawers and the brokers, and they claimed to prove for the unpaid balance in the liquidation of the acceptors. This claim was compromised. The trustee of the brokers then claimed to prove against the estate of the acceptors for the amount of the dividends which the estate of the brokers had paid to the bankers in respect of the bills. It was admitted that, if the brokers had indorsed the bills to the bankers, the claim could not have been resisted. But it was contended that, though by the law merchant the bolder for value of a bill of exchange must be taken to have an implied authority from the acceptor to indorse it over, and thus to become a surety at the implied request of the acceptor for the due payment of the bill by him, yet a guarantee given by the holder, without the knowledge of the acceptor, could not be taken to have been given by his implied anthority or at his implied request, but the giver of it, though paying a part of the amount of the bill on the compulsion of his guarantee, must be taken as against the acceptor to have made a mere voluntary payment, for which he could not prove against the acceptor's estate. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, COTTON, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) refused to accede to this argument, and held that the proof ought to be admitted. JAMES, L.J., said that it would be contrary to ordinary notions of justice if the proof was not admitted. The acceptors were liable for a sum of money part of which had been paid by other persons. The bills were manufactured for the purpose of raising money for the joint benefit of the drawers and acceptors, and were put out into the world as negotiable instruments. So far as the brokers were concerned, it did not signify which of the two firms were drawers and which acceptors. The transaction was in substance the same as if both drawers and acceptors had gone together to the bankers and asked them to discount the bills. It must have been perfectly well known to both that the brokers could discount the bills only by means of advances made to them by their bankers; that they would re-discount the bills and would have to make themselves liable to the bankers. The well-established practice of bill brokers not to indorse the bills which they re-discounted with their bankers, but to give the bankers a general guarantee that they would be liable upon the bills to the bankers as if they hod indorsed them, must have been well known to the gentlemen who manufactured these bills. So far as his lordship was aware, there was no authority, and he could see no principle, for holding that the liability created by such a guarantee differed from that which was created by the indorsement of a bill. No special anthority was ever given by the acceptor of a bill to the holder to indorse it. His lordship was of opinion that by the making of a negotiable instrument, 8 sufficient authority was given to the brokers to render themselves liable in respect of the bills, and that they paid the amount which they had paid to the bankers as much under compulsion as if they had indorsed the bills in the ordinary way. Indeed, it might be called a mere accident that the brokers did not, by the guarantee, confer on the bankers a formal authority to indorse their names on the bills. If they had done so there would have been no dispute about the right to prove. COTTON, L.J., said that no doubt the payment of a bill of exchange under a compulsion, undertaken without the express or implied request of the person primarily liable, would not give a right to prove against that person's estate. But why was it that the indorser of a bill of exchange was under a compulsion, authorized by the acceptor, to pay it? Because the acceptor impliedly authorized any holder to indorse the bills, and to transfer his rights against the acceptor. In the present case the drawers of the bills must be taken to have been acting on behalf of the acceptors as well as of themselves, and to have been authorized by the acceptors to deal with the bills in the ordinary way of business, for the purpose of getting them discounted. They acted within that authority in going to the brokers to get the bills discounted, and that conferred on the brokers an authority to deal with the bills according to the ordinary course of business in the city of London, and consequently to guarantee the payment of the bills to the bankers. The payment, therefore, was made under a compulsion, which was undertaken under the implied authority of the acceptors, and the brokers were entitled to prove against the estate of the acceptors for what they had paid. THESIGER, L.J., was also of opinion that an original authority from the acceptors to the brokers to give the guarantee was to be implied from the circumstances.SOLICITORS, Lawrance, Plews, & Baker; Travers, Smith, & Braithwaite. on the debtor's summons. ADJUDICATION OF BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION-PRIOR ADJUDICATION BY IRISH COURT.-In a case of Ex parte M'Culloch, before the Court of Appeal on the 17th inst., a question arose whether an adjudication of bankruptcy ought to be made against a debtor who had already been adjudicated a bankrupt in the Court of Bankruptcy in Ireland. The debtor traded in Ireland and also at Liverpool, and had creditors and assets in both places. He also had creditors in Scotland. On the 19th of April he presented a petition to the Irish court, asking for protection of his property and person from process until further order, and that such proposal as he might make to his creditors, and which should be agreed to by them, might be executed under the direction of the court. A protection order was made the same day until the 18th of May, and a meeting of the creditors was summoned for the 3rd of May. The meeting was held on that day, and a proposal made by the debtor was rejected by the creditors. No further proceeding was taken under this petition. On the 24th of April an English creditor issued a debtor's summons against the debtor out of the Liverpool County Court and served it on him. On this summons an act of bankruptcy was committed on the 1st of May, and on the 3rd of May the summoning creditor presented a bankruptcy petition in the county court, founded on the act of bankruptcy committed the hearing of the petition, and a receiver was appointed. The 13th of May was fixed for On the 4th of May an adjudication of bankruptcy was made against the debtor in the Irish court on a petition presented by himself on that day. A man sent by the English receiver took possession of the debtor's property in Ireland on the 4th of May, but was turned out of possession by a receiver appointed by the Irish court. When the English petition came on for hearing, the judge of the county court refused to make an adjudication, on the ground that Bacon, C.J., reversed this decision, holding that the an adjudication had been already made in Ireland. petitioning creditor was entitled to an adjudication ex debito justitiæ. Before the Court of Appeal it was urged that the Irish adjudication could not relate back, whereas the English adjudication might relate back to an earlier act of bankruptcy than the default on the debtor's summons, and would thus be more for the benefit of the creditors generally. And reliance was placed on the fact that the debtor himself was the appellant, and that no creditor was complaining. The court (JAMES, COTTON, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of Bacon, CJ. JAMES, L.J., thought that the English adjudication ought to stand for what it was worth. The only person who was contesting it was the debtor. It was quite clear that he was within the very words of the Act; he had committed an act of bankruptcy, and the petitioning creditor had applied for an adjudication in the proper way, and to the proper tribunal. Without saying that in every case an adjudication was er debito justitia-for, as the Chief Judge had pointed out, the Court of Bankruptcy still retained its old jurisdiction to decline to make an adjudication when it saw that it was being used inequitably, or to annul it when it had been made-yet if the court refused to make the adjudication in the present case, it would be prejudging the question what was the best course to take in the interest of the creditors-whether the English or the Irish adjudication should go on. The Irish court could be trusted to decide which was the proper course. COTTON, L.J., said that there might be difficulties in working out the order, but the question was whether the court ought to cut the matter short at once. THESIGER, L.J., said that the proceedings in Ireland were obviously taken by the debtor for the purpose of defeating the English bankruptcy, and it was reasonable, as regarded both the petitioning creditor and the creditors generally, that the adjudication should be made in England. The petitioning creditor had taken all the proper steps regularly to obtain the adjudication, and under it transactions might be overreached which could not under the Irish adjudication. SOLICITORS, J. Hands; Singleton § Tattershall. - PRACTICE ACCIDENTAL SLIP IN ORDER - MODE OF ALTERATION.—In a case of Hayes v. Booth, before the Master of the Rolls on the 18th inst., a motion was made for the alteration of an order by inserting the words “freehold and" before the word "leasehold," they having been omitted by an accidental slip from the order as drawn up. A question was raised as to whether a fresh order need be drawn up to enable the original order to be altered. JESSEL, M.R., said that the practice was to alter the order on the production of counsel's brief only, and that no fresh order was required to amend the original order. -SOLICITORS, Peacock & Goddard. COSTS HIGHER SCALE-RULES AS TO COSTS-Ord. 6, R. 3.-In a case of Worms v. De Valdor, before Fry, J., on the 17th inst., the question arose as to the scale on which costs were to be given. The action was brought for the purpose of obtaining the delivery up for cancellation, on the ground of fraud, of certain bills of exchange accepted by the plaintiff, or for the cancellation of the plaintiff's acceptance of the same. The plaintiff also asked for damages for the wrongful detention of the bills, and an injunction, until the delivery up or cancellation, to restrain the defendants from negotiating, parting with, or in any way dealing with the bills, with further relief. The action was tried before Fry, J., on January 28. He gave judgment for the plaintiff, with costs (28 W. R. 346), but no mention was made in the order of the scale on which the costs were to be given. The plaintiff now moved for a direction to the taxing master to tax and allow the costs to the plaintiff on the higher scale. FRY, J., said that he thought he might accede to the application, and direct that the costs should be given on the higher scale. The case was one of great perplexity, and one in which it was fit that the higher scale should be applied. As a general rule he should be unwilling to direct the higher scale to be applied on an application made subsequent to the hearing, since the facts of the case would, in all probability, have to be re-discussed at a great expense of public time. The facts of the present case, however, were within his lordship's recollec-. tion, and he thought that under the rules as to costs (ord 6, r. 3), he had power to make the order now asked, subsequent to the hearing, and he accordingly directed the costs to be taxed on the higher scale.-SOLICITORS, M. Abra PRACTICE-TRIAL BY JURY-INFRINGEMENT OF PATENT -SUFFICIENCY OF SPECIFICATION-COMPLICATED ISSUES TRIAL BEFORE JUDGE-RULES OF COURT, 1875, ORD. 36, R. 26. In a case of Downes v. Hughes & Company (Limited), before the Master of the Rolls on the 18th inst., a motion was made by the defendant that, notwithstanding the notice of trial before a jury given by the plaintiff, the action might be tried before the judge withont a jury under ord. 36, r. 26. The action was one for infringement of a complicated patent for a combination, and the issues raised were want of novelty, the insufficiency of the specification and the infringement. JESSEL, M.R., said that this was an action which as an ordinary rule would be tried before a judge of the Chancery Division without a jury, but the plaintiff had, notwithstanding that he had marked it for his court, chosen to give notice of trial before a jury. The defendant said this was not a proper case for a trial before a jury, and he relied on several grounds. The first was that the question of novelty, involving, as it did, the consideration of various previous patents, was not a fit one for a jury. As a general rule juries were not able to understand these questions properly, and in effect there was no fact in dispute, and the whole question was one of applied mechanics. In his opinion that issue was not a proper one for a jury. The second issue was also an extremely difficult one as to the sufficiency of the specifi-hams & Co. cation, and it was one which he did not consider a jury would be competent to deal with. Then the other issue as to infringement was also most complicated and difficult, having regard to the character of the two machines. This no doubt was in a sense an issue of fact, but it really would almost entirely depend on expert evidence, and was not an issue which a jury could satisfactorily dea! with. In his opinion the action was one that ought clearly to be dealt with by a judge of the Chancery Division, and he ought not to be afraid to say so. There was, moreover, this remark to be made as to a trial at the assizes, there might not be sufficient time to try the case and it might be made a remanet, or the judge might not think it a case fit for a jury and might send it for trial to an official referee. Anything more unsatisfactory than either of the last events happening he could not conceive, and in mercy to the parties he thought the present order would be the best. The costs would be costs in the action.-SOLICITORS, Doyle & Sons; J. Henry Johnsm. WILL-HOTCHPOT CLAUSE-EXTENT OF APPLICATION -INTENTION OF TESTATOR.-In a case of Stewart v. Stewart, before the Master of the Rolls, on the 21st of June, a question was raised on further consideration as to the extent of the application of a hotchpot clause in a will. By the will the testator had given certain property to his six children, and had directed them to bring into hotchpot any advances made to them. By a codicil the testator revoked the gift to one of his children, and, accordingly, one-sixth of the property was undisposed of, and passed to his next of kini.e., his widow and the other five children. The ques The testator tion argued was whether any advances were to be Law Students' Journal. LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY. The weekly meeting of this society was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, on Tuesday evening last, Mr. A. M. Ellis in the chair. The following was the question appointed for discussion: "A testator bequeaths his residuary estate upon trust for all his children who shall attain the age of twenty-one years, but directs that none of them shall be entitled to receive their shares until the youngest for the time being shall have attained the age of twenty-one years. Testator has a number of children, and one of them having attained the age of twenty-one years dies during the minority of the youngest child. Are the representatives of the deceased child entitled to his share ?" Mr. Percy B. Gregson opened the discussion in the affirmative; Mr. Christopher Child supported the negative. Messrs. J. W. Evans, B.Sc., F. J. Green, and E. G. Spiers supported the affirmative. The question on being put to the meeting was decided in the affirmative by a large majority. UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. On Monday, the 14th inst., a meeting of the above-named society was held at the Law Institution, Mr. D'A. B. Collyer in the chair, to discuss the following moot :-" A. by a letter posted on the 3rd of October, enters into a contract with B. The letter reaches B. on the 11th of October, who immediately posts his acceptance to A. Meanwhile, on the 8th of October, A. posts a letter to B. revoking the contract. Can A. revoke the contract?" Mr. Owen opened the discussion in the affirmative, and Messrs. Acland, Mott-Whitehouse, Kains-Jackson, Shera, and several other members opposed the opener. Mr. Pickersgill gave a qualified support to Mr. Owen, who replied late in the evening, and, after the chairman had summed up, the moot was decided in the negative by a large majority. On Wednesday, the 16th inst., the society met at Clement's-inn Hall, Mr. B. T. Bartrum in the chair. The motion on the paper, "That this society views with satisfaction the non-renewal of the Peace Preservation Act," was opened by Mr. N. F. Synott. The motion was supported by Messrs. Morice, Kittle, Pickersgill, and Maclaren, and it was opposed by Messrs. Kains-Jackson, Owen, MottWhitehouse, and Phillips. Shortly before ten o'clock, Mr. N. F. Synott replied, and, after the chairman had put the motion to the society in the usual manner, it was found that the votes for and against the motion were equal. The chairman then gave his casting vote against the motion, which was accordingly lost. A meeting of this society was held on the evening of Wednesday, the 23rd inst., at Clement's-inn Hall, Mr. B. T. Bartrum in the chair. The motion on the paper was, "That the rights of landowners with respect to the preservation of game require curtailment." Mr. A. H. Spokes opened the debate, and was supported by Messrs. Renner-Maxwell, Kittle, and Maclaren, and opposed by Messrs. Acland and Bateman- Napier. Mr. Spokes then replied, and upon a division the motion was carried by a majority of five. The annual dinner of the society will take place at Anderton's Hotel, Fleet-street, on Wednesday, the 30th inst., at seven p.m., Mr. Montague Cookson, Q.C., in the chair. Members intending to be present are requested to communicate with Mr. R. B. D. Acland, 13, Vincentsquare, S. W., and to come in morning dress. Appointments, Etc. Mr. JOSEPH BROWN, Q.C., has been appointed a Commissioner of Assize for the Oxford Circuit. Mr. Brown practised for several years as a special pleader, and was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1845. He became a Queen's Counsel in 1865, and he is a member of the South-Eastern Circuit. He is a bencher of Lincolns'-inu, and chairman of the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting. Mr. FREDERICK THEOBALD LANGLEY, solicitor (of the firm of Corser, Fowler, & Langley), of Wolverhampton, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature. Mr. CHARLES ROBERT LYNE, solicitor, of Newport, Monmouthshire, has been appointed by Lady Llanover to be Steward of the Manor of Abercarne, in succession to Mr. Thomas Morgan Llewellin, resigned. Mr. Lyne was for several years deputy town clerk of the borough of Newport. He was admitted a solicitor in 1871, and he is also steward of the manor of Rogerstone, and clerk to the Usk and Ebbw Fishery Board, and to the Mynyddislwyn School Board. Mr. JOSEPH JOHNSON LEEMAN, M.P., solicitor. of York, has been appointed a Deputy-Lieutenant for the West Riding of Yorkshire. Mr. Leeman is the son of Mr. George Leeman, clerk of the peace for the East Riding, and late M.P. for York, and he was born in 1842. He was admitted a solicitor in 1865, and is in partnership with his father and Mr. Joseph Wilkinson. He was elected M. P. for the city of York in the Liberal interest in March last. Mr. ROBERT PAYNE, solicitor, of Frome, has been appointed Steward of the Manor of Frome, in succession to Mr. Malim Messiter, deceased. Mr. Payne was admitted a solicitor in 1859, and is in partnership with Mr. William Dunn, clerk of the peace and clerk to lieutenancy for Somersetshire. Mr. SYDNEY CHARLES SCOTT, of the firm of Scott & Barham, of 39, King-street, Cheapside, London, EC., has been appointed a Commissioner of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William, in Bengal, to take the acknowledgments of married women in respect of property in India, and also to take affidavits or affirmatious in all suits, matters, and proceedings depending in that court. Mr. LEOFRIC TEMPLE, Q.C., who has been appointed Recorder of the City of Carlisle, on the resignation of the Solicitor-General, is the son of the late Mr. Christopher Temple, Q.C., judge of county courts, and chancellor of the County Palatine of Durham. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Easter Term, 1843, and is a member of the Northern Circuit. He was for several years a revising barrister, and became a Queen's Counsel in 1872. Mr. Temple is a bencher of Lincoln's-inn, and deputy recorder of Liverpool. Mr. WILLIAM THORNBURN, solicitor, of Carlisle, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature. Companies. WINDING-UP NOTICES. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. LIMITED IN CHANCERY. CHARLES DENHAM AND COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up presented June 15, directed to be heard before the M.R., on June 26. Emmet and Son, Bloomsbury sq, agents for Wavell and Co, Halifax, solicitors for the petitioners FLAGSTAFF SILVER MINING COMPANY OF UTAH, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up presented June 15, directed to be heard before the M.R., on June 26. Eley, New Broad st, solicitor for the peti tioner FLAGSTAFF SILVER MINING COMPANY OF UTAH, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up presented June 16, directed to be heard before the M.R. on June 26. Hillearys and Taylor, Fenchurch bldgs, solicitors for the petitioner MERCANTILE AND EXCHANGE CLUB, LIMITED-The M.R. has, by an order dated May 27, appointed Charles Minshull, Fenchurch st, to be official liquidator NAVAL, MILITARY, AND GENERAL DRESS AND OUTFITTING AssoCIATION, LIMITED.-V.C. Malins has, by an order dated April 29, appointed John Stockdale Stallard, 1, Gresham bldgs, Basinghal st, to be official liquidator. Creditors are required, on or before July 15, to send their names and addresses and the particulars of their debts or claims to the above. Thursday, July 29 at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims RIPLEY OLD BREWERY COMPANY, LIMITED.-V.C. Hall has fixed June 28 at 12 at his chambers as the time and place for the appointment of an official liquidator SHIPOWNERS' AND MARINERS' INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED. — Petition for winding up presented June 10, directed to be heard before the M. R. on June 26. De Fivas, Devonshire st, Portland pl, solicitor for the petitioner [Gazette, June 18.] CIVIL SERVICE AND GENERAL BREAD AND FLOUR SUPPLY AssoCIATION, LIMITED.-V.C. Hall has fixed July 1 at 1, at his chambers, as the time and place for the appointment of an official liquidator CIVIL SERVICE MEAT SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, LIMITED.-By an order made by V.C. Bacon dated June 12, it was ordered the above association be wound up. Vanderpump, Gray's inn sq, solicitors for the peti-tioner GREAT EASTERN GLACIARIUM COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by the M.R. dated June 12, it was ordered that the above company be wound up. Duncan and Co, Bloomsbury sq, solicitors for the petitioners OLDBURY BRICK COMPANY, LIMITED. Petition for winding up presented June 21, directed to be heard before the M. R. on July 3. Newman and Co, Cornhill, solicitors for the petitioners SLATE COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or before July 16, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims to Alfred Audrey Broad, Walbrook. Friday, July 30 at 11 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims TRADERS' BANKING AND SUPPLY COMPANY, LIMITED.-V.C. Hall has, by an order dated May 14, appointed Harry Seymour Foster, Copthall bldgs, to be official liquidator TRAVELLERS' ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED. By an order made by the M.R. dated June 12, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Hanbury and Co, New Broad st, solicitors for the petitioner UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY, [Gazette, June 22.] |