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that she kept a cockatoo; and the Scottish Lunacy Com. THE SECRETARY of the United Kingdom Alliance, permissioners mention a certificate which alleged, as a fact turbed, we presume, by the comfortable dining saloon tending to show the existence of lunacy, that “the carriages which certain railway companies have recently patient has a great desire to appear conspicuous as a provided, has written to Mr. Cross to ask “whether the musician.” We agree with Lord Coleridge and the jury sale of intoxicating liquor in railway carriages is legal, that some alteration is needed in the mode of giving and under what statute licences for this sale are prothese certificates, but it may be suggested that a few cured,” and Mr. Cross has cautiously declined to deliver verdicts against certifying doctors for heavy damages a legal opinion. The answer appears to be that the would probably work more amendment in their prac- railway traveller is not uncared for by the Licensing tice than any new legislative provision on the old Acts, but it is in the railway refreshment room that the lines
Legislature intends intoxicating liquor to be sold to him.
the railway refreshment room is exempted from the proThe INCIDENT mentioned in our last issue as having visions which require other licensed premises to be of a occurred at the sittings at Nisi Prius at Westminster
certain annual value, and by the 10th section of the before Denman, J., happened very opportunely by way Licensing Act, 1874, "nothing in this Act contained as of illustration of our remarks on Mr. Erle's pamphlet on
to hours of closing shall preclude the sale at any time, the present Nisi Prius arrangements.
It appears that
at a railway station, of intoxicating liquors to persons two cases were fixed for trial in the same court, on the arriving at or departing from such station by railroad.” ground that the same leading and junior counsel were
It seems clear that these saving words will not include engaged in them. This seemed a very proper and judi
the case of a sale by a seller accompanying the traveller cious arrangement, but while the first case was being
in the railway carriage itself. A nicer question might, tried an announcement came in that Mr. Justice Field, however, arise if the sale takes place on the railway in an adjoining court, had gone through his list, and platform, and in order to ascertain whether this sale wanted a cause sent over. There was no case to go over
is or is not illegal, the licence of the keeper of the but the second of the two cases above referred to.
refreshment room would have to be inspected. If that Counsel naturally remonstrated. Mr. Justice Denman,
licence contained large general words as to the place of in connection with this incident, expressed himself sale, probably the sale on the platform by the refreshstrongly on the fact that counsel undertake cases and
ment room holder would be protected, but not other
wise. leave them. We should agree with Mr. Justice Denman's remarks if we believed that counsel had as much choice in the matter as is gererally supposed by outsiders. But
FARM LEASES. if there is laxity in this respect in some quarters, it naturally arises from the arrangements for the con
11. duct of judicial business, which render it imposa We endeavoured last week to trace the gradual growth sible for any man, even with the best intentions, always to of provisions in farm leases relating to cultivation down meet his engagements by personal attendance. The to the commencement of the present century. It will common law system keeps a great variety of courts be observed that, notwithstanding the protection afforded sitting simultaneously, and no one who has not ex. by the law of waste, provisions restricting the ploughing perienced it can have any idea of the difficulty of fore up of meadow land have been in constant use from an casting with regard to the possible clashing of engage. early period. The permanent employment of land for ments under this system. Two cases may be in constant the production of hay has always been a main point in danger of clashing for a week, and the actual hearing of English farming; and it is not a little remarkable that a them may be divided by an interval of six months. The system of agriculture by which, as compared with the courts too, are constantly varying the order of business, other system of rotation of crops, it has been estimated and indeed must necessarily do so according to the that only about half the produce of human food can be changing circumstances of the cases. The state of things obtained from the same acreage, should have prevailed that has long existed is not calculated to foster a high throughout England during the time of protective duties. degree of conscientious strictness in this respect at the It is also worthy of observation that, while the early common law bar. At assizes, the young member of the Continental leases are stated to have carefully prescribed profession finds his engagements in the Crown Court, in the mode of cultivation, the early English lease left the which he has already got a good business, clash with farmer to crop the land as he thought best. The framers those in the Civil Court, in which he is beginning of these ancient instruments were more concerned about to get some business, and is anxious to get more. the stubbing of thorns and the protection of the trees on Again, when the Civil Court finishes before the the farm than about the rotation of cropel; and for many Criminal, or vice versa, two courts often sit for generations after provisions relating to this subject were the same sort of business, civil or criminal as it may inserted in leases, they usually took the lax form of only happen, simultaneously, the result necessarily being that restrieting more than two or three white crops in succescounsel are to some extent separated from their cases. sion from the same land. The same thing goes on all through the life of a common It may, perhaps, be suggested that in early times the law barrister. And it being impossible for the most lack of express provisions as to cultivation in leases was conscientious man entirely to prevent it, the result is supplied by what has been termed the common law as to that the moral tone of the profession is altogether cultivation—the custom of the country impliedly incorlowered, and its members are not awake to the serious porated in leases. But it is not till the close of the last grievance to suitors that is involved. We say that no century that any allusion occurs in the law reports system can be considered satisfactory under which the to customs relating to the mode of cultivation, evils we speak of happen. These evils were made the although in 1769, when the of Trumper subject of serious comment some time ago in Parliament v. Cardwardine was tried at Hereford, before Yates, J. and elsewhere. But neither the bench nor the common (see Dougl. 202), a custom was set up for the law bar are sensitive in the matter. Custom has rendered tenant to reap his away-going crop. In this case, them callous. Their moral inertia on the subject is the however, the judge held that the custom could not ex. more difficult to stir, because it is admittedly so hard tend to lessees who held by deed, although it might to find a remedy. Perhaps it may be impossible to apply to parol agreements. Nine years afterwards, in find a complete remedy ; even the Chancery system does Wigglesworth v. Dallison, Lord Mansfield reversed this not altogether preclude the occasional occurrence of the doctrine and allowed a tenant holding under a lease by evil; but something might be done to improve the present deed, which contained no stipulation on the subject, to condition of matters
take an away-going crop under the custom of the
country. But it was not until 1793 that it was expressly list might be largely extended, but the instances we laid down (Powley v. Walker, 5 T. R. 373), that the have given will show the rapidity with which an mere relation of landlord and tenant was a sufficient agricultural custom may be established. The custom consideration to support an implied obligation on the is in reality, as Lord Ellenborough said, nothing part of the tenant to cultivate a farm in a husbandlike more than the expression of the approved and premanner according to the custom of the country. We valent habit of husbandry in a particular district, may conclude, therefore, that up to nearly, the close of and as these habits change from time to time with the last century the only obligations as to cultivation by improvements in farming, so the custom varies. As which the agricultural tenant was bound were the ex might be expected, the result is that the cuspress covenants on this subject contained in leases, and tomary law as to cultivation and allowances on quitthere seems to be no reason to suppose that even on the ting presents a curious medley of provisions, resting subject of allowances to out-going tenants any incident on no general or uniform principle. For instance, a was then annexed by custom to leases other than tenant quitting his farm in one district can claim an the rude expedient of the away-going crop, whereby the allowance for guano when applied to corn crops, while outgoing tenant was compelled to carry on business in in another district he is only entitled to allowance for two places at the same time.
guano when applied to root or green crops, and many But when once the doctrine of the incorporation of similar cases are given in the reports last mentioned. agricultural customs into written leases had obtained a We propose in a future article to consider the influence foothold, the customs grew with remarkable rapidity; and of the growth of agricultural customs on the form of the in order to understand the changes which have occurred farm lease. during the present century in the provisions of the farm lease, it is necessary to trace the development of the unwritten law as to cultivation and allowances on quitting. In 1828, when Kennedy and Grainger wrote their book
CAN THERE BE A CONTRACT OF THE EXIST. on the Tenancy of Land, there were several counties in
ENCE OF WHICH ONE OF THE SUPPOSED
CONTRACTING PARTIES NEITHER KNOIS which there was no customary restriction on cropping and no rotation of crops—for instance, Derbyshire, Lan
NOR IS BOUND TO KNOW ? cashire, Bedfordshire, and Berkshire; and these authors
II. Temark that there was then “but a small proportion of We resume the discussion of the case of The Household the country where a complete system of husbandry was Fire Insurance Company v. Grant (27 W. R. 858, L. R. regularly practised.” It is curious, however, to observe 4 Ex. D. 216), on which we made some observations last how common, even at that time, customs intended week. to secure to the outgoing tenant the benefit his It was held by the majority of the court in that case expenditure during the last year of his tenancy that they were concluded by authority. We wish to in the ordinary operations of husbandry, had be make a few remarks on the authorities. The great
Some interesting information as to the way anthority relied upon was the case of Dunlop v. Higgins in which customs grew up about this time is afforded (1 H. L. 381). Before discussing that case we should by the evidence given before the Parliamentary Com. wish to deal with some of the authorities upon which mittee on Agricultural Customs in 1848. One witness the judgment professes to be based. We have states that customs relating to the compensation of already incidentally given reasons hy the authori. the outgoing tenant became general in Leicestershire ties on notice of dishonour of a negotiable instrument soon after 1826; and an opinion was expressed by some are not really in pari materiâ. The case of Adams v. of the witnesses that twenty years' practice was sufficient Lindsell (1 B. & A. 681) was relied on. When that to establish an agricultural custom. With the progress case comes to be looked at, it is clearly a right decision, of farming even in the first half of this century, new but it turns on grounds which make it no authority on customs sprang up, conferring a right on an outgoing the subject we are discussing. The offer there was tenant to be reimbursed expenses incurred in cultivation misdirected, and consequently the answer accepting the beyond those of ordinary husbandry. Thus the out offer did not arrive until two days after the offer was going tenant in some places had, before 1848, acquired sent. The defendant not receiving an answer so soon as a customary right to compensation in respect of food he expected, sold the goods elsewhere. It seems to us purchased for his cattle; for certain kinds of artificial clear that a party who has sent an offer, though he may manure, and for draining and marling land. And after withdraw it before there has been aggregatio mentium, 1848 this process of addition to existing agricultural cannot treat it as withdrawn without intimation to the customs went on with increased rapidity. Nothing, in person to whom it is sent until the time within which it fact, is more curious than the contrast between the ought to be accepted has passed. It was, in Adams v. slowly changing express provisions of leases and the Lindsell, the offeror's own fault that the offer reached
and therefore the answer was delayed. Unless he reafforded than a comparison of the customs set forth tracts the offer the offeror must be considered as conin the report of the Parliamentary Committee in tinually making it for a reasonable time-i.e., if the 1848 with those mentioned in the reports published by answer accepting arrives in reasonable time the offer the Central Chamber of Agriculture in 1875. In the must be considered as continued up to that time. What course of little more than a quarter of a century a new is a reasonable time would depend on the circumstances. set of customs had become firmly established in many Even if a letter went astray through the laches of counties. For instance, in Lincolnshire, in 1848, no the offeror, it would not be reasonable, if it was delivered allowances were given for guano or other highly con six months afterwards, for the offeree to treat it as a subcentrated manures, which in 1875 were universally sisting offer, but if a slight delay occurred through the allowed for in that county. Compensation for draining laches of the offeror or any person for whom he was was then only partially introduced, though it is now a responsible, then it might be reasonable that the offeree general custom in Lincolnshire. In Staffordshire, in should treat it as a subsisting offer. The dicta of the 1848, there was no allowance for purchased oilcake, Queen's Bench in Adams v. Lindsell, on which such feeding stuffs, and artificial manure, or for marling, reliance has been placed, seem to be directed only boning, liming, planting quickset hedges, or draining, be meeting the argument that because there could all which are now subjects of compensation in, at any be no agreement binding on the offeror until he rerate, the southern division of that county. In parts of ceived an
to his offer, therefore he might Cambridgeshire, South Wiltshire, and Gloucestershire act as if no offer had been made, and, without any allowance for artificial manures is new since 1848. The withdrawal of the offer, sell the wool to a third party,
custom. No better proof of these changes can be the party to whom it was sent later than he expected,
There may be a reasonable time during which the offeror far. It is sufficient protection that directly the letter is is bound to wait for an answer, otherwise transactions by posted the offeror cannot withdraw. We do not believe letter never could take place. If the answer comes in the contract is complete until the letter is received by the such time he is bound by the contract. That, surely, is offeror, but the process of completion may be going on an entirely different thing from saying that if by no without his power to stop it. To put it in another way, fault of his no answer can reach him, he is bound. By it seems to us that " acceptance of the offer” for this making the offer and leaving it unwithdrawn he has laid purpose consists of a process involving two elements himself open to a contingent liability in the event of the assent in one party's mind, and the communication the other party accepting during a reasonable period for, of it to the other party. As soon as the process begins the acceptance of such offer. If, during such period, the right to withdraw the offer ceases, for the process the offer not being withdrawn, the other party accepts it, must be regarded in law as, for this purpose, indivisible. the offeror will be bound on receipt of the answer This is obvious justice. There can be no difficulty, as accepting the offer.
far as we see, in saying that if the process is completed Some of the expressions in Adams v. Lindsell may the contract must be considered to exist from its com. seem to point to the contract being complete before the mencement ; that is quite different from saying that arrival of the answer, but it is obvious that the court was commencement is equivalent to completion. not dealing with such niceties as prove to arise in the But then the difficulty is raised that the rights of the subsequent cases. All they appear to mean is that the parties are in effect fixed at the date of the acceptance, acceptance by the person to whom the offer was made and not of the communication of it; and it is asked, bound the offeror in the sense that he could not then Can a contract have a relation back, as in the case of withdraw the offer. We do not believe there is anything relation to an act of bankruptcy? We do not think in the judgment (which, it should be noticed, is merely a men should be frightened by vague phrases. It is really summary or “per curiam") which amounts to saying no question of relation back in the same senise as in that the contract, so far as it was to bind the offeror, bankruptcy. The contract may not arise until the comwas complete when the letter was posted. On the points i munication of the acceptance, in the sense of a binding that may arise with regard to the right to withdraw the legal obligation, but the agreement as to what the offer, we shall say a few words farther on.
rights of the parties are to be may be antecedent. The With regard to Dunlop v. Higgins, there, again, it sort of case suggested is, for instance, if the company was a question of delay in the receipt of the answer. made calls while the letter of allotment was on its way. There the answer, though posted in due time, did not It would only be in extraordinary cases that such a arrive in the ordinary course of post through delays in thing could occur; but we should say that the reason. the post. It seems to us that the judgment rather goes able construction would be that the contract, when it on the assumption that there was a trade usage that if a became of legal obligation, was that the party should be letter were duly posted the same day that was all that a shareholder as from a certain date. No cause of was required of the party to whom the offer was made. action on the contract can arise until the legal obligation What does this, when analyzed, come to but that, in es is complete; but why is there anything absurd in the timating the reasonable time within which the acceptor supposition that parties may contract as from a period has to accept, and notify his acceptance of, the contract, / antecedent to the arising of the legal obligation ? If it is to be considered that he does so in reasonable time you will allot me shares, and so entitle me to the profits if he posts the letter on the same day, whatever delays of the company as
from the date of allotment, I may take place in the post ? We admit that the case will share its liabilities from that date. Why, because goes very near to establishing the proposition that the the contract to this effect does not arise until a date post-office is the agent of the offeror, but when strictly after the allotment, is there any relation back such as looked at, we think it falls short of quite laying this down, in bankruptcy? The suggestion lurking in the comeven as an obiter dictum. The proposition being that | parison to bankruptcy is that people's vested rights may the acceptor is to communicate his acceptance within a be overridden by ec post facto matters; but there is no reasonable time, the judgment answers that such time analogy between the two things. & the post may take to deliver the answer posted on the It seems to us, summing up the whole case, that the same day is a reasonable time. This is obviously quite question is, of two innocent parties, one of whom must a different thing from saying that if no communication suffer loss or inconvenience, which is to suffer? We of acceptance is ever in fact made at all, the offeror is think the one who trusted the post-office. And who bound.
trusted the post office? We should say, plainly, the Another case which was relied on as an authority in i sender of the letter. the case we are discussing is Harris' case (20 W. R. 690, L. R. 7 Ch. 587). Here, again, the answer was received allotting the shares, but while it was on the way the applicant had written a letter declining to take
SOLICITORS' CASES OF THE YEAR. shares. This, again, does not seem to us to be aa
III. authority for the decision in the case now under discus Whiteman v. Hawkins (27 W. R. 262, L. R. 4 C. P. D. sion. Mellish, L.J., in giving judgment, certainly used 13) is an important decision as to what constitutes negexpressions tending to show that the contract was com ligence on the part of a solicitor. The plaintiff had ad. plete on the posting of the letter of acceptance, and vanced £4,600 on mortgage, and agreed to advance a gives various illustrations of the difficulties there would further sum of £400 to the same mortgagor, on a small be if it was not so. But we think that all these sug. piece of land being added to the former security. The gested difficulties really are consequences that would advance was made, the mortgage deed being prepared by arise from holding that the offeror can withdraw the the defendant, who acted as solicitor for both parties. offer in the interval between the posting of the letter and The defendant omitted to get from the mortgagor the its receipt by him. We think he cannot so withdraw it, deeds of the additional piece of land, and a year afterbut that does not seem to us to necessitate holding that wards, upon the plaintiff's instructions, he called in the there is a complete contract on its posting.
mortgage, and put up the property for sale. It was then If we are right in this, a merchant can, in general, discovered that the mortgagor had previously deposited safely act on the offer when he has accepted it, because the title deeds of the land in question with another perthe post generally, in fact almost always, goes right. The son as security for an advance of £46, and the plaintiff decision in Dunlop v. Higgins makes him the more had to pay this sum in order to get possession of the secure in this respect. But to say that business must deeds. The judge of the Thrapston County Court gave come to a standstill because in very exceptional cases judgment for the defendant, on the ground that he had the letter may miscarry altogether seems to us going too not been guilty of any gross negligence, but the Common
Pleas Division, on appeal by way of motion, entered entire day, refreshers to counsel for the second and fol. judgment for the plaintiff for £46. Denman, J., said lowing days may be allowed upon taxation; and he disthat, as against a solicitor, it was not necessary to estab sented from the rule stated by Malins, V.C., in Smith v. lish gross negligence as distinguished from a want of due Buller (25 W. R. 332, L. Ř. 19 Eq. 473), that the care and attention to his business, and Lindley, J., added allowance of refreshers depends upon the time occupied “it was manifestly the duty of the defendant to see that by the trial and not upon the mode of taking the evithis piece of land was unincumbered, and to get the title dence. Hargreaves v. Scott (27 W. R. 323, L. R. 4 deeds.” It had been argued that the plaintiff could, in C. P. D. 21) was a municipal election petition, and the any view, recover only nominal damages, but it was held Common Pleas Division held that the master had a dis. that, in the absence of evidence in reduction, the measure cretionary power as to reducing the amount of counsel's of damages was the sum of $46.
fees to be allowed, which discretion would not be interThe Irish case of Parker v. Dickie (4 L. R. Ir. 244) fered with unless it should appear that it had been also involved the question of the amount of damages exercised unreasonably. payable by a solicitor. The plaintiff had employed a solicitor, to whom the defendant was executrix, to raise a sum of money on mortgage. The plaintiff went to New Zealand in May, 1876, having received a part of the
Cases of the week. money, but the balance was not remitted before his return to Ireland in August, 1877. There was no allegation of special damage. The balance due, with BREACH OF INJUNCTION-COMMITTAL FOR CONTEMPTinterest at five per cent., was paid before action, and the NOTICE BY TELEGRAM_LIABILITY OF SHERIFF'S OFFICER.defendant paid into court a sum representing the differ- In a case of Ex parte Langley, before the Court of Appeal ence between interest at five per cent. and interest at ten
on the 12th inst., the question was raised whether notice per cent., the latter rate representing the value of money by telegram of an injunction, granted by the Court of in New Zealand when the plaintiff was there. The Bankruptoy to restrain a sale, was safficient to render Irish Common Pleas Division held that the plaintiff was
persons, who, after receiving the notice, committed a entitled to no damages beyond the amount paid into tempt of court. The Chief Judge had made an order for
breach of the injunction, liable to be committed for a concourt. Mr. Justice Lawson observed, “I think it would the committal of a sheriff's officer and an auctioneer, the be very dangerous in actions against an agent or solicitor, latter having sold the goods of an execution debtor, who or other accounting party, for not paying over his balance, had filed a liquidation petition, after a telegram had been to leave it open to the jury to mulct the defendant shown to him, purporting to be sent by some London according to their notions of the amount of punishment solicitors, and addressed to the sheriff's officer in posseshe deserved ”; and he also quoted the rule laid down by sion, which stated that an injanotion restraining the sale Pollock, C.B., in Hamlin v. Great Northern Railway (which was taking place in the country) had been granted Company (5 W. R. 76, 1 H, & N. 411), that “in actions by the London Court of Bankruptoy. The sheriff's officer for breaches of contract the damages must be such as was not present when the telegram was received, he are capable of being appreciated or estimated.”
having gone away on other business, but he had left & Disputes as to the payment of the costs of shorthand deputy in possession. Upon receipt of the telegram the notes of evidence have frequently arisen upon taxation, deputy telegraphed to the officer for instructions, telling and as a general rule they will not be allowed. In him that a telegram had been received to stop the sale, Ashworth 7. Outram (27 W. R. 98, L. R. O.Ch. D. raptoy. The officer replied by telegram, that if the
bat saying nothing about an order of the Court of Bank483), before the hearing of a summons, the solicitors on both sides agreed that a shorthand writer should be the sale was to be stopped, otherwise it was to pro
debtor had filed a petition or the debt was paid, employed at the joint expense of the parties to take ceed. The sale was then continued. It appeared notes of the proceedings and evidence. An order was from the evidence that there had been some previous made in favour of the defendant, and the plaintiff's attempts by the debtor to stop the sale, and that he had appeal against that order was dismissed with costs. The promised to come and pay the execution debt, and the auctaxing master disallowed the costs of all the copies of tioneer swore positively that he believed the telegram to the shorthand notes, except the notes of the Vice. the sheriff's officer was a mere ruse of the debtor, and Chancellor's judgment. Vice-Chancellor Malins held had no suspicion that any proceedings had been taken that the costs of all the shorthand notes ought to have in the Court of Bankruptcy, or that any order had been been allowed as costs in the cause, but the Court of made by it. The Court of Appeal (JAMES and THESIGER, Appeal held that the taxing master had no power to L.JJ.) held that there was no ground for the application as allow the items without the special direction of the against the sheriff's officer, he having had no actual notice court, and that the agreement between the solicitors of the ipjanction. He could not be held in such a way remade no difference, since in the words of Lord Justice sponsible for the act of his subordinate. And, as to the ancJames) “it was a mere agreement for saving expense, circumstances of suspicion against him, they could not, after
tioneer, the court said that, though no doubt there were and leaves the case on the same footing as if each party his positive affidavit, order him to be committed, the evi had employed his own shorthand writer.”
dence showing that that which had taken place might not Duchess of Westminster Silver Lead Ore Company (27 unreasonably have led him to form the conclusion which he W. R. 539, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 307) is to the same effect, swore that he did form. The court ordered that the sheriff's the Court of Appeal holding that on an appeal the costs officer should have his costs in both courts, bat that the of the shorthand notes of the evidence in the court auotioneer should bear his own costs. James, L.J., was below ought not to be allowed as a matter of course, very far from saying that sufficient notice of an injunction but that a case for allowing them must be made out. could not in any circumstances be given by telegram, and In Wells v. Mitcham Gas Company (27 W. R. 112, L. R. TIESIGER, L.J., said that he did not dissent from the pro4 Ex. D. 1) the question was as to costs of brief position laid down by the Chief Judge in In re Bryant (25 copies for the use of counsel of the transcript of W. R. 230, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 98, 21 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 29), the daily proceedings at an arbitration, and the Ex- that under certain circumstances a notice of an injanction chequer Division held, on the authority of Croomes v. given by telegram might be sufficient to render & Easton (4 W. R. 462, 1 H. & N. 14), that these costs
person who disregarded it liable to be committed for concould not be allowed in the absence of an agreement tempt. But, in each case, the question would be, whether between the parties, or an order of the court or a judge. ferred that the person who received it had had actual notice
the notice given was such that it could be reasonably inTwo cases during the past year involved questions as to of the injunction. And the onus of proof must be on those the amount of counsel's fees. In Harrison v. Wearing who asserted that there had been such a notice. If the (27 W. R. 526, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 206) the Master of the sheriff's officer had received the notice of the restraining order Rolls decided that when the trial of an action with which purported to come from some solicitors in London, he witnesses in the Chancery Division lasts more than one ought to have telegrap:ed either to the sheriff's London
agents or to the Court of Bankruptcy to inquire whether the discussion the court (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and THESIGER order bad really been made, but it would be the height of L.JJ.) held that, notwithstanding the bankruptcy, the injustice to hold him criminally responsible for the omission defendant was entitled to appeal from the judgment, inas. of his subordinate to do this. JAMES, L.J., added that he much as the injunction imposed a personal liability upon thought the proper course for a solicitor who had obtained him. Notwithstanding that he had no interest in the order such an injunction would be to telegraph the order to some as to costs, for that affected his estate, which was now vested solicitor as his agent at the place in the country, asking him in the trustee. to give notice of it to the persons affected. There would then be the responsibility of an officer of the court.
WILL-CONDITION PRECEDENT-TIME FOR VALUATION
ENLARGING TIME.—In a case of In re Smith, before the PRACTICE-APPEAL-SECURITY FOR COSTS-INSOLVENCY
| Master of the Rolls on the 14th inst., a motion was made OF DEFENDANT—PLAINTIFF A FOREIGN CORPORATION
on behalf of a beneficiary entitled under a will that the ORD. 58, R. 15.-In a case of Jewett v. McHenry, before the
time for a valuation according to which he was to take & Court of Appeal, on the 12th inst., the plaintiffs applied certain business might be enlarged, on the ground that the for an order that the defendant might give security for valuation was extremely long and complicated, and that it the costs of his appeal, on the ground that, since the
was feared the gentleman appointed would not have time judgment in the court below, he had filed a liquidation to complete it within the time named in the will. JESSEL, petition. The plaintiffs were an American railway com
M,R., was of opinion that the time named was a conpany and their officer, the company having no property in
dition precedent wbich he had no power to waive or enlarge. England. The judgment bad ordered them to deliver
The best advice he could give the beneficiary would be to some shares to the defendant, and it was argued on his | get the valuation completed as soon as possible. bebalf that there were no means of enforcing this part of the judgment against the plaintiffs, and that it would be
PRACTICE — WRIT OF NE EXEAT - EQUITABLE DEBTreasonable, if the defendant was called upon to give
DEBTORS ACT, 1869, S. 6-JUDICATURE ACTS, 1873 AND security, that the plaintiff also should give security for the
1875.-In a case of Drover v. Beyer, before the Master of costs of the appeal. The COURT (JAMES and THESIGER,
the Rolls, also on the 14th inst., an application was made L.JJ.) acceded to this view, and said that, as a condtiion
ex parte for a writ of ne exeat under the followiog circumof the defendants giving security for the costs, the plain
stances. The action was by a mortgagee of a ship belong. tiffs must give security to the same amount.
ing to the defendant claiming payment or his mortgage
debt and a charge on certain insurances alleged to have EVIDENCE ON APPEAL-SHORTHAND NOTES OF EVIDENCE been effected by the defendant on the ship which had been -Judge's NOTES-ORD. 58, R. 15-APPEAL-ABATEMENT lost. It was alleged that the defendant was about to quit -BANKRUPTCY OF APPELLANT-INJUNCTION.-In a case of England, and, therefore, that the plaintiff would not be able Dence v. Mason, application was made ex parte to the Court
to obtain payment of his mortgage debt. Jessel, of Appeal, on the 13th inst., to postpone the hearing of the
M.R., refused the application. He said that no doubt defendant's appeal, which was in the paper for the following under the old practice the Court of Chancery did give day. The defendant's counsel stated that the defendant was relief in respect of equitable debts in cases not coming & poor man, and had been unable to afford to have shorthand within the 1 & 2 Vict. o. 110, by which arrest on mesne Dotes taken of the oral evidence before the Vice-Chancellor. process was allowed at law. The Debtors Act of 1869, by Shorthand notes had been taken on behalf of the plaintiffs. section 6, limited the right of arrest at law to those cases Application had been made to the Vice-Chancellor's clerk for where the absence of the defendant would materially prea copy of his lordship's notes, to which the reply given was judice the plaintiff in the prosecution of his action. As that, as shorthand notes had been taken, the judges of the soon as the Judicature Acts were passed and there was Court of Appeal would make use of them, and no copy need only one jurisdiction, he said it could not be supposed that be furnished. The defendant's solicitor had written to the any practice of the coprt of equity was to supersede tho plaintiffs' solicitor asking for the loan of a copy of the notes 6th section of the Debtors Act, because that really would taken for the plaintiffs. The only answer as yet received to restore the arrest on mesne process in every case where it this letter was that the clerk who had charge of the case was was not abolished by the 1 & 2 Vict. 0. 110, the rules of away. If the defendant's appeal had to be opened without equity wherever they conflicted being declared to preapy notes of the evidence he would be placed at a great dis. vail. He therefore considered that to entitle a person at advantage. The court (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and THESIGER, present to the issue of the writ in the Chancery Division L.JJ.) declined to grant the application ex parte. THESIGER, | he must bring bimself within the 6th section of the Debtors L.J., said that the practice in the common law divisiors is Act, and this the present applicant had not been able to this, that the judge who has tried the action always, do. as a matter of course, furnishes a copy of his notes of the evidence to the judges of the Court of Appeal on their application for them. If the parties desired to have the
WILL - HEIRLOOMS — PROVISION FOR NON-REMOVAL notes brought before the Court of Appeal they applied to
| VALIDITY.-In the case of Baker v. Sebright, before the that court, one of the judges of which then applied to the
Master of the Rolls on the 17th inst., a question arose judge wbo took the notes. But copies of the notes were
whether a provision in a will that certain furniture, plate, never furnished to the parties. When the appeal came on
and jewels should not be removed from a mansion-house for hearing on the 15th inst., the matter was again men
given to a tepant for life, “except in case of urgent neces-tioned, and it was stated that it is the practice in the
sity, and then only while such necessity should require," Chancery Division to supply copies of the judge's notes to the
was valid and binding on the tenant for life. The mansionparties. BAGGALLAY, L.J., said it would be very unfortun
house had been let by the tenant for life, and he had re åte that, if one party by reason of his poverty could not moved to his town house the plate and jewels, and it was take shorthand notes of the evidence, he should be deprived now argued that a case of urgent necessity-namely, the of the benefit of the judge's notes, because his opponent had letting of the house—bad arisen, and that the tenant for taken shorthand notes. His lordsbip added that before a life was entitled to retain and use them away from the copy of a judge's notes of evidence could be properly used it mansion-house. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that must be stamped. This, he said, was a matter not un. the will must be strictly followed, and that no case of frequently neglected in practice. Ultimately, the court sent urgent necessity had arisen, inasmuch as the necessity had & request in writing to the Vice-Chancellor for a copy of his been created by the tenant for life's own act. He did not connotes. When the appeal was opened it appeared that, sider that it would be of any use requiring the articles to after the date of the judgment appealed from the be sent back to the mansion-house while it was let, and all appellant had become a bankrupt, and the question was he considered that he was required to do on behalf of the raised whether onder such circumstances he had any infant entitled in remainder was to see that the property right to appeal. His trustee had not been made a party was properly secured. What he should require, therefore, to the proceedings. The judgment appealed from had would be that the tenant for life should give proper granted a perpetual injunction against the defendant, re- security for the value of the property removed. straining him from using the trade name of the plaintiffs, and had ordered him to pay the costs of the action. After some