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absurd to suppose that though the Legislature provided
A MAN AND HIS NAME. this, they did not mean the roll to be conclusive evidence of qualification. It may be argued that the reasons for
II. introducing the necessity for being on the roll, if looked WHEN a name has once been turned into a trade-mark, into, render it highly desirable that the roll should be and
a proprietary right acquired therein, this right in the conclusive, but to establish this is very far from establish.
name is capable of protection, even after it has passed ing that the two enactments cannot stand together with
away from the person to whom it originally belonged. out absurdity. Again, at first sight, it might appear Thus within the last few weeks the Court of Appeal arguable that being on the burgess roll is in the nature decided in Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Company of things proof of title to be on the roll; that the roll (ante, p. 505) that the executors of the originator of settled in a quasi-judicial manner year by year itself “Thorley's Cattle Food” were entitled to restrain the use determines the right to be on it conclusively in favour of
of the name by a company formed for the purpose of those who are on it, and that, therefore, the later statute manufacturing a similar article, thus practically overcovers all the ground when it says that the qualification ruling James V. James (20 W. R. 434, L. R. 13 Eq. 421). shall consist of being on the roll. As to those not on the And the same is the case when what has happened is, roll there is no question; as to those on the roll they are not the death of the proprietor, but an assignment of the necessarily entitled to be on the roll. But it may be business, carrying with it the right to use the tradeanswered that this argument would have arisen before marks, in which a trade-mark consisting of a name, but the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 40, and would render the words which has ceased to possess a personal significance, would “entitled to be" in the old Act nugatory ; that sub. be included. “A name, though originally the name of stantially the meaning of these words is to enact in a the first maker, may, in time, become a mere tradecompendious way by reference that the qualification of a mark or sign of quality, and cease to denote, or to be burgess shall be a part of that of a councillor-in other current as indicating, that any particular person is the words, that “entitled to be on the roll” means possessing maker. In many cases a name once affixed to a manuthose qualifications that entitle a man to be on the roll. factured article continues to be used for generations The decisions under the old Act appear conclusive that after the death of the individual who first atized it. In being on the burgess roll was not the test under that such cases the name is accepted in the market either as Act, but the question whether the party was entitled to a brand of quality, or it becomes the denomination of be on; and these decisions seem to exclude the possi. the commodity itself, and is no longer a representation bility of the argument suggested above. Again, 6 & 7 that the article is the manufacture of any particular Will. 4, c. 104, provided for exemption from penalties in person” (Per Lord Westbury in Hall v. Barrows, 12 favour of persons who acted as councillors without being W. R. 322, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; Leather Cloth Company duly qualified but were on the burgess roll. This is V. American Leather Cloth Company, 12 W. R. 289, 4 conclusive to show that under the old Act the being on the De G. J. & S. 144). But it must not be forgotten that roll was not conclusive as to the qualification. It would the assignability of a name trade-mark entirely depends have been easy for the Legislature, while enacting in upon the personal element having been wholly eliminated 38 & 39 Vict. c. 40, s. 5, that the burgess roll should be (Leather Cloth Company's case, ubi suprà, and also in conclusive as to the right to vote, to enact that it should House of Lords, 13 W. R. 873, 11 H. L. C. 523; Bury be conclusive as proof of the qualification, but they do v. Bedford, 12 W. R. 726, 4 De G. J. & 8. 352); Thus, not enact this. Upon the ordinary principles that govern when the founder of a theatre, which he had called after the interpretation of statutes this is a strong argument his own name, “ Booth's Theatre," and which he had against the contention for the respondent.
described by that name in various mortgages of the When, however, we come to deal with the expediency premises, sought to restrain the assignees of the lease of of the thing, we have strong doubts as to whether it the premises from continuing to call the theatre by that would not be far better that there should be some decisive mode of ascertaining the qualification open to
name, the injunction was refused, on the ground that
the name had become the name of the establishment, the public at the time of the election. Why should not and had ceased to imply any personal interference of the the same reasoning apply to the qualification of councillors as to that of voters? It seems a misfortune that
plaintiff (Booth v. Jarrett, 52 How. Pr. 169). the expense and trouble of an election should be thrown
This question of the assignability of name trade-marks
and of trade-names—which, since the decision of the away by its subsequently turning out that a candidate, House of Lords in Singer Manufacturing Company v. though upon the roll and therefore a person whom the
Wilson (26 W. R. 664, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 376), must be voters had primâ facie ground for believing to be
taken to be pretty much the same thing-has most qualified, was not qualified because he had no right to be on the roll. It may be said that it would be wrong
frequently come up in cases of disputes between persons that a man not duly qualified should be a town coun
who have, at some time or other, filled the position of cillor; but the same argument applies in some degree,
co-partners. Both in England and in America the extent
to which a purchaser of a business, or a partner who has though perhaps not so strongly, to a voter. A single voter may turn the election, and yet that voter may not
acquired his partner's share in the business they have really be qualified.
carried on together, acquires with the business or share in the business the right to continue to use, by way of tradename or trade-mark, the name of the person from whom
ho has acquired the business or share therein, has been The American Criminal Law Magazine says. " that a the subject of considerable difference of opinion. By long-winded lawyer lately defended a criminal unsuccessfully, and during the trial the judge received the following note :
some judges it has been thought that no right in the
name passed with the goodwill (Peterson v. Humphrey, The prisoner humbly prays that the time occupied by the 4 Abb. Pr. 394; Howev. Searing, 10 16. 264 ; Scott v. plea of the counsel for the defence be counted in his sen. tence.""
Rowland, 20 W. R. 508); and in one American case The third annual meeting of the American Bar Associa
(Reeves v. Denicke, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 92) the judge tion is announced to be held at Saratoga Springs on the 18th,
even went so far as to decide that a person who had 19th, and 20th of August next. It is anticipated that the
bought out a partner named E. H. Reeves was not en. meeting will be of much interest, and that it will be attended
titled to describe his new firm as successor to the old by a large number of members from all parts of the country.
one-thus : “Robert C. Reeves, successor to E. H. The object of the society is “ to advance the science of juris: Reeves & Co.” No other case, however, goes nearly as pradence, promote the administration of justice and
uniform. , far as this
; and on the whole, the authorities in favour ity of legislation throughout the Union, uphold the honour of the right of continuing to use the name appear conof the profession of the law, and encourage cordial intercourse siderably to predominate. In Churton v. Douglas (7. among the members of the American bar."
W. R. 365, Johns. 174), Lord Hatherley pointed out
most clearly the importance of the trade-nance as an the plaintiff had written humorous books under the element of the goodwill, and long before this time Lord nom de plume of “ Mark Twain." But whether Thurlow had held that surviving partners could not be the name be real or fictitious, the use by the defendant restrained from continuing to use the name of their de must be such as to be calculated to deceive, 80 ceased partner in their business, at all events unless his that, where no deception is to be anticipated, no relief estate would be thereby involved in some liability (Web will be granted, as in the case of “ Claribel's” songs ster v. Webster, 3 Swanst. 490). In Banks v. Gibson (Barnard v. Pillow, W. N. 1868, p. 94). In Gouraud (13 W. R. 1012, 34 Beav. 566), where the plaintiff was v. Trust (10 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 627), the plaintiff had the widow of one of the partners in Banks & Co., and changed his name from Trust to Gouraud, under which the defendant was the surviving partner, Lord Romilly name he sold “Gouraud's Oriental Cream," and the held that as the partnership had been simply dissolved, defendants, who were restrained by injunction, were and neither partner had bought the other out, each his sons, who had retained their original name, but bad could use the old firm name. He said, “The name or | begun to sell a preparation as “Crême Orientale, by Dr. style of the firm of ‘Banks & Co.,' in which the defend. T. F. Gouraud's Sons." And in such cases as the above ant had been engaged for a period of fourteen years, | the fraudulent use of another's name is criminally punwas an asset of the partnership, and if the whole concern ishable, either on a prosecution for false pretences or on and the goodwill of a business have been sold, the name, one for a cheat at common law; but such an offence is as a trade-mark, would have been sold with it. If by not forgery, as was decided in the case of the name of arrangement one partner takes the whole concern, there the painter Linnell (R. V. Closs, D. & B. 460). must be a valuation of the whole, including the name Even apart from a trade or business, a person whose or style of the firm. But if the partners merely divide name has without authority been injuriously used by the other partnership assets, then each is at liberty to another is entitled to an injunction, as in Routh v. use the name just as they did before. It is the same as Webster (10 Bear, 561); and, even though what the if two persons who alone carried on the business of defendant has done amounts to a libel, it seems that, if * Child & Co.,' thought fit to separate, each would be he does not exercise his right of claiming a jury at the entitled to use the name by which they carried on their proper time, but allows that opportunity to slip, he will business." Then, again, in The McGowan Bros. Pump not be allowed afterwards to contend successfully that Machine Company v. McGowan (2 Cinc. 213), it was the court has no jurisdiction under the Judicature Acts said in the Superior Court of Cincinnati that “There can to grant an injunction to restrain a libel without the be no doubt that, where one partner sells to another verdict of a jury (Massam 7. Thorley's Cattle Food partner a going business, every advantage arising from Company, ante, p. 505; Thomas v. Williams, ante, p. the fact of the sole ownership of the premises, 539). In Reid v. Sibbald (18 Journ. of Jurisp. 392), the stock, and establishment, including advantages acquired Scotch court granted an interdict to restrain a name by the old firm in carrying on its business, whether con intended to represent the name of a sheriff's officer from nected with the old place or the old name, passes to the being used in such a manner as to bring discredit and purchaser.” Lastly, in Levy v. Walker, already cited, ridicule upon the latter, who would thus be injured in it was held that one of two partners who had bought his position in life; and it seems, from the decisions the other partner's interest in the business was entitled referred to, that in a similar case the English court to use the old firm name, in which the names of both would now sit as a jury and grant an injunction at the partners appeared, and Lord Justice James said dis. hearing of the action, unless the defendant claimed a tinctly, “I hold that the sale of the goodwill and busi jury at the proper time and in the proper manner ness did convey the right to the use of the partnership | indicated by the Acts and Rules governing the practice name as a description of the articles sold in that trade, of the court. and that that right is an exclusive right as against the person who sold it, and as against all the world, if any person in that world were representing himself as carrying on the same business.” Where the purchase has
Recent Decisions. been from a trustee in bankruptcy, it has been held in the Supreme Court of New York (Helmbold v. Helmbold
SUCCESSION DUTY. Manufacturing Company, 53 How. Pr. 453) that
(Attorney-General v. Dowling, Ex. D., 28 W. R. 673.) there is a difference, and that the bankrupt could not be deprived of the right to use his name, though he might In Fryer v. Morland (25 W. R. 21) the Master of the have been if the purchase had been from himself; but in Rolls held that the Succession Duty Act granted duties on Bury v. Bedford no such distinction was recognized. gratuitous successions only, and that it was not intended
Of course, when a man has given another a contract to apply to a case where a person takes under a convey. right to use his name, he is not entitled to complain if ance by way of bona fide sale. In the present case this the latter exercises his privilege, as in Ward v. Beeton principle seems to have been taken for granted on both (23 W. R. 533, L. R. 9 Eq. 207), where an annual, in sides, and the contest was vhether the disposition which which Beeton had had no hand, was allowed to be pub had been made of the property amounted to a purchase lished under the name of Beeton's Christmas Annual; for value. Shortly put, the disposition as to which the and where the proprietor of a trade-name, or trade-mark, question arose was this. A lunatic was tenant in tail goes into partnership with some one else, he carries the male in possession of property. His brother Reginald was trade-name or trade-mark into the partnership with him, next in succession, and had mortgaged his interest (which as in Condy v Mitchell (26 W. R. 269).
he had converted into a base fee) for a sum exceeding It is not with business pursuits in the ordinary sense its full value. His sister Frances and her issue were exclusively that the name claimed must have been con- next in succession, contingent of course on the deaths of nected. In Lord Byron V. Johnston (2 Mer. 29), the the lunatic and Reginald without male issue. In this name protected was the name of a poet; in Archbold v. state of things an arrangement was come to, with the Sweet (1 M. & Rob. 162), it was the name of an author consent of the Lord Chancellor as protector of the of legal works ; in Christy v. Murphy (12 How. Pr. 77), existing settlement, in pursuance of which a deed and Montague v. Moore (Wood, V.C., March 1, 1865), was executed whereby Reginald, Frances, and her it was the name of the organizer of a troupe of husband, and the mortgagees conveyed the property Ethiopian minstrels. Nor does it make any difference (subject to the lunatic's estate in tail male) to whether the name is a genuine or an assumed one. In trustees upon trust to raise a sum for the mortgagees, Isaacson v. Thompson (20 W. R. 196), the plaintiff, a mil and subject thereto to convey the property to the uses liner, was carrying on business as “Madame Louise"; in and upon the trusts declared by a deed of even date, Clemens v. Such (N. Y. Supreme Court, July 11, 1873), / whereby it was declared that the trustees of the first
deed should stand possessed of the property to the use of shape as rather technical, and hardly supported by the the trustees named in the second deed upon trust for cases :-" Where the special Act declares the works Frances for life, her husband for life, with remainder to authorized to be of public advantage, the court will not the use of the first and every other son of Frances make an order, unless it is positively shown that there is and her husband in tail male. Under this dispo. no other remedy.” In the observations upon the Trustee sition & son of Frances had become entitled in po. Relief Act, we find no notice of the law, which was settled ssession, and the question was whether he succeeded after some conflicting authority by the Court of Appeal in to the property upon the disposition of Reginald or of Re Hardley's Trusts (27 W. R. 587), as to the court Frances, his mother. The court held that the mother i giving directions with regard to the notice of payment in. was the predecessor, on the ground that, in substance, Perhaps the point was considered to be not strictly within the arrangement carried out by the deeds amounted to a the scope of the book. On p. 118, in summarizing the purchase by Frances for valuable consideration. “In cases under the Settled Estates Act, in which consents substance, she agreed to purchase the estate of her have been dispensed with, the facts of In re Spurway brother Reginald, his equity of redemption, the interest are imperfectly stated. It should have been added that of the [mortgagees], and (subject to the lunatic's life there were four children living under age. At p. 306 estate) the immediate and certain possession of the it is said that a guardian of a person of unsound mind property; and as a consideration she agreed to forego has been appointed in the Chancery Division on petition, any contingent right she might have to possess the prop- referring to the authorized report of Vane v. Vane. erty free from incumbrances, and consented that it should The inaccuracy of that report has since been pointed out be absolutely charged sin favour of the mortgagees) in fee on the bench, and was noticed in this journal in connecwith a sum of £37,000.” We think a good deal may be tion with a subsequent decision (see 23 SOLICITORS' said for the view that the arrangement was a re-settlement JOURNAL, p. 850). We do not wish to carp at writers of the property by Reginald, but we are not concerned to who fail to give the references to all the contemporaneous question the construction of the particular transaction. series of reports; but we should have applauded Mr. The important point to be observed is the inclination of | Williams if his eye had fallen on the more accurate the court to give a liberal interpretation to the doctrine reports which existed of Vane v, Vane. laid down in Fryer v. Morland.
In that part of the work which relates to winding-up petitions great allowance must be made for the restricted space at the author's command, and the immense mass of law upon which his subject touches. Nevertheless,
we are bound to protest against such unqualified stateRebiews.
ments as the following:-"A fully paid-up shareholder
who presents a petition must allege and prove that there PETITIONS IN CHANCERY AND LUNACY.
are assets of such an amount that in the event of a
winding up he will have a tangible share of surplus to THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO PETITIONS IN CHAN
receive (citing Re Rica Gold Company); and if the CERY AND LUNACY. By SYDNEY E. WILLIAMS, Barrister.
company is in voluntary liquidation, he will not be at-Law. Stevens & Haynes.
entitled to a compulsory or supervision order, except in In the presence of the various admirable books of a case of fraud, or where creditors support the petition." practice which already exist, it is not quite easy to say i The first part of this sentence should have been modified that this work supplies any want felt by the profession by reference to the case of the Diamond Fuel Company, generally. It is, however, a compilation of modest in which Vice-Chancellor Malins' view (reported 27 W. dimensions, and intelligently constructed ; and it may R. 336) was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Novemaccordingly be of service to practitioners (if such there ber last. In the latter half of the sentence the word be) who do not thoroughly know their way about the “fraud" is, of course, intended to be read in some larger books ; and it may also probably be useful to highly artificial sense, but the language of Lord Justice students. We should have been glad to find throughout | James in the Gold Company's case (to which Mr. Williams the book references to the pages in the works of Daniell, refers) was more guarded, and left a greater latitude. Seton, Buckley, &c., where the matters are more fully The book is furnished with a selection of forms and dealt with ; this single improvement, systematically precedents; the arrangement of matter seems concarried out, would have rendered the present book venient, and we have found it easy to consult. We a very convenient digest or index upon its own subject- have not observed any important omission within the matter.
scope of the treatise; and the writer deserves the praise The more recent cases upon the practice of the court of having put together with some skill an unpretending relating to petitions appear to have been noted with work, which is at least more useful than certain larger care, but we observe that here and there the true law books we know of. value of cases has hardly been appreciated. Speaking of payments for past maintenance to guardians of the poor, &o., of a fund in court belonging to & lunatic, Mr. Williams (at p. 29) says, “The court has, however, a dis.
Cases of the queek. cretion to refuse payment, and where there is also a claim for past maintenance by relations, such claim will be preferred”-for which he refers to In re Gibson (20 METROPOLIS LOCAL MANAGEMENT Act, 1855 (18 & 19 W. R. 107., L. R. 7 Ch. 52). Now, that proves on ex- | Vict. C. 120), ss. 96, 154-VESTING OF STREETS IN amination to have been a case where the fund was| VESTRY-DURATION OF ESTATE-DISUSED STREET.-On not in court, but in the hands of the lunatic's relatives, the 14th inst., the Court of Appeal (JAMES, Cotton, and 80 that it was a mere instance of a retainer being per- | TUESIGER, L.JJ.) reversed the decision of Jessel, M.R., in mitted of this kind of debt. In both that case and the the case of Rolls v. The Vestry of St. George's, Southwark case of Re Marman, which follows in the next foot-note,
| (28 W. R. 366). The question was as to the construction of it was carefully pointed out that these claims for
section 96 of the Metropolis Local Management Act of 1855, maintenance are to be regarded as debts of the
which provides that “all streets, being highways, and the
pavements, stones, and other materials thereof, . . . shall. lunatic; & doctrine which might well have been men.
vest in and be under the management and control of the tioned in the text-book, for other consequences of import
vestry or district board of the parish." And by section 154 ance flow from it-see In re Harris (49 L. J. Ch. 327). it is enacted that “the vestry may sell and dispose of .. With regard to the winding up of companies incorporated any property whatsoever vested in them under this Act which by special Act of Parliament, we find (p. 161) the it may appear to then may be properly sold or disposed of.' following statement, which strikes us in its unqualified Some streets, which were public highways, bad been stopped
up by order of quarter sessions. The plaintiff was the owner that, as there had been no default on their part, they would of the land through which these streets passed, the site of the not have been liable to pay interest to the plaintiff.-SOLICI- streets having originally belonged to his predecessors in title. TORS, O. B. Wooler; Watson, Sons, g Room. He claimed to be entitled to the site of the stopped-up streets, on the ground that the Act gave to the vestry only a qualified estate or interest in them, which ceased when the INCUMBENTS RESIGNATION ACT, 1871, s. 10—ARREARS OF streets ceased to be used as highways. Jessel, M.R., was of PENSION—ACTION AGAINST PRESENT INCUMBENT— RIGHT OF opinion that the case was governed by the recent decision of SET-OFF-APPLICATION TO STAY EXECUTION-TIME OF the Court of Appeal in Coverdale v. Charlton (27 W. R. 257, MAKING.-In a case of Gathercole v. Smith, before the L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 104), upon the construction of similar Master of the Rolls on the 15th inst., a question was raised words in section 149 of the Pablic Health Act of 1875, that as to the construction of section 10 of the above Act, which the property in the street and the subsoil to a certain is as follows:-“The pepsion so allowed shall be a charge depth (though the court did not define to what deptb) upon the revenues of the benefice, and shall be recoverable was vested in the vestry. He was of opinion that as a debt at law or in equity from the incumbent of the said section 96 did not in any way limit the duration of the benefice by the retired clerk, his executors, administrators, right of the vestry, but that the street was absolutely or assigns, but such pension shall not be transferable at law vested in them, and he thought that if it was ntherwise or in equity." The action was brought by the present is. section 154 would be absurd, for it would enable the vestry cumbent of a benefice who had resigned under the provisions to sell a street in actual use. The Court of Appeal were of the Act, subject to the payment of a half-yearly pension, of opinion tbat Corerdale v. Charlton did not affect the against the present incumbent for three half years' arrears of qnestion of the duration of the estate of the vestry, and the annuity. The present incumbent had, it appeared, ob they expressed their concurrence in that decision. They tained assignments of a mortgage of the advowson by the were of opinion that what was vested in the vestry was
plaintiff, of a sequestration of the living, and also of a judg. “streets being highways”-i.e., streets so long as they were
ment against the plaintiff, and he now by way of counterused as highwaye. When a street ceased to be used as a
claim claimed a set-off against the plaintiff's right to highway the estate of the vestry came to an end, like any
the arrears. It appeared that in a previous action other limited estate, by virtue of the original limitation for some arrears Lord Coleridge, C.J., had allowed imposed upon it in its creation. When the public pur
the set - off. JESSEL, M.R., declining to follow the poses for which the estate was given to the vestry came to
decision of Lord Coleridge, considered that the effect of ao end, their estate came to an end. And, in the same
section 10 of the Act was to create an inalienbale provision for way, wben a new street became a highway, it would vest
the benefit of the past incumbent, and that no right of set-off in the vestry. Their lordabips thonght that section 154
or right under any assignment of the pension was an answer created no difficulty, for it only authorized the vestry to
to the plaintiff's claim. He therefore gave judgment for the sell that, wbatever it wag, which was actrally vested in
plaintiff for the amount claimed in the action, with costs, and them.-SOLICITORS, Markby, Wilde, & Burra ; Cross, Sons,
dismissed the counter-claim with costs. He said that the & Riley.
sum must be paid within fourteen days, and that any application to stay execution in consequence of an appeal must
be by way of substantive application on motion, when INTEREST-POLICY OF LIFE ASSURANCE—3 & 4 WILL. 4, notice of appeal had been actually given.-SOLICITORS, Veniz C. 42, ss. 28, 29.-In a case of Webster v. The British Em- | $. Woodcock; Packers. pire Mutual Life Assurance Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., the question arose whether an insurance company were liable to pay interest on the sum
PRACTICE-OPPOSED APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF payable under a life policy, under the following circumstances.
TRADE-MARKS -- MODE OF OBTAINING DECISION OF COURT The assured had deposited the policy with the plaintiff by
-TRADE-MARKS RULES, 16, 44.-In a case of In re way of security for a loan, but no written assignment was
Simpson, Davies f Sons' Application, belore the Master executed. By the terms of the policy the sum assured was
of the Rolls on the 11th inst., the motion was by the parties made payable within two months after proof of the death of l opposing the application to register, for a declaration that the assured. The assured having died insolvent, no adminis. | the applicants were not entitled to register and an injanotration was taken out to his estate, and the company declined
tion restraining them from taking further proceedings to to pay the sum assured to the plaintiff in the absence of a obtain registration, and for leave to proceed ander the legal personal representative. After a delay of some years
notice of motion and not by special case. The matter stood the plaintiff brought the action against the company.
for the determination of the court under rule 16, and the Jessel, M.R., held that the company could not have safely preliminary objection was taken that it was wrong in paid the money to the plaintiff, there being no one who form for the opponents to bring the matter on, it was could give a legal discharge for it, without the indemnity of for the applicants to do that. On the other hand, it the order of the court. And, under the power conferred by was argued that this mode of proceedin section 44 of the Act 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, bis lordship dis previously adopted in In re Farina (1) (26 W. R. 261); peosed with the presence of a legal personal representative. In re Farina (2) (27 W. R. 456), and other cases, in and ordered the money to be paid to the plaintiff, giving none of which had any objection been taken, and that the company all their costs of the action. But, following it was convenient for the direction of the court as to his own previous decision in Crossley v. The City of Glasgow the mode of trial to be asked on the same occasion as the Life Assurance Company (25 W. R. 264, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 421), subrtantial relief. JESSEL, M.R., held that the application he held that the company must pay interest on the money was irregular in form, and that the proper course was for from the date of proof of the death of the assured the applicant for registration to apply in chambers for a The Court of Appeal (JAMES, COTTON, and THESIGER, direction as to the mode of trial, and not for the opponent L.JJ.) held that 20 interest was payable. Thev to begin. The usual course followed by his lordship was to said that interest would only be given by way of direct the applicant to take out a sommons for leave to damages for the wrongful detention of the money by the register, which was adjourned into court and there argued.. company, and here the company bad been in no way in de- | If a different practice had been followed in previous cases, fanlt. They could not have got a good discharge for tbe it was because the irregularity had not been noticed by the money in the absence of a legal personal representative of the jodge. The motion would stand over and come on with Assured, except under the order of the court in the action. the summons, which bis lordship then proceeded to direct The delay was due to the plaintiff's own default in not in the applicant to take out.-SOLICITORS, Higginson & Vigers ; the first instance procuring an assignment of the policy, Wright, Becket, & Co. and afterwards in not taking out administration to the assured on bringing his action against the company. Though the giving of interest was a matter within the discre- CONTRACT TO TAKE SHARES IN COMPANY-MISREPREtion of the judge acting as a jury, the Court of Appeal could SENTATION - FRAUDULENT PROSPECTUS — ACTION AGAINST review his order when he had exercised his discretion on a DIRECTORS.-In & case of Arkwright 7. Newbold, before wrong principle. The evidence showed that the company Fry, J., on the 10th inst., the action was brought by a had kept the money lying idle, but THESIGER, L.J., 1 shareholder in the company against the directors, claimios said that, even if it had been shown that the company had | damages on the ground that the plaintiff bad been indoeu made interest on the money, he sbould have been of opinion to become a shareholder by means of misrepresentatios
-contained in a prospeotus of the company which had been issued by the defendants. The company bad proved un
Societies. Sucoessful, and the question was raised whether, inasmuch as the plaintiff had never attempted as against the company to rescind his contract to take shares, he was entitled to
SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. recover damages from the defendants. FRY, J., took time The usual monthly meeting of the board of directors of to consider this question, and ultimately held that the plain. this association was held at the Law Institution, on Wedtiff was not precluded from recovering damages from the nesday, June 9, the following directors being present :defendants. - SOLICITORS, Phelps, Sidgwick, f Biddle ; Mr. Sidney Smith (in the chair) ; Messrs. Asker (Norwich), Clarke, Woodcook, f Ryland.
Brook, Hedger, Pennington, Pidcock (Woolwich), Roscoe,
Rose, Walters, and Williamson-(Mr. Eiffe, secretary). PLEADING-ISSUE BETWEEN Co.DEFENDANTS—NOTICE A sum of £65 was distributed in grants to necessitous ORD. 16, R. 17.-In & case of Steel v. Dixon, before Fry, | non-members and the families of deceased non-members, J., on the 14th inst., a question arose as to raising issues | seven gentlemen were admitted members of the association, between co-defendants. The action was brought by two and other business transacted. persons named Steel and Chater, who had joined with two others named Dixon and Gurney in signing a promissory note as sureties for one Robinson. Robinson afterwards assigned his furniture to Dixon and Gurney as an indemnity to them against any liability they might incur on the note,
Law Students' Journal, and gave them a power of sale. Before the note became due, Robinson bad filed a liqidation petition, and the LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY. soreties had to pay the note at maturity. Each of them paid a fourth part of the amount. Dixon and Gorney sold
The weekly meeting of this society was held at the Law the furniture under their power of sale, and Steel and
| Institution, Chancery-lane, on Tuesday evening last, Mr. Chater brought the action against them, claiming, as co
A. E. Hemsley in the chair. The question appointed for sareties, the right to share rateably in the proceeds of sale,
the evening's debate was the following:-“Is it desirable to and an account of these proceeds, and payment accord.
alter the constitation of the House of Lords by giviog to ingly. The trustee in Robinson's liquidation was also made
life peers the right to sit and vote therein, and by making the a defendant to the action. He delivered to the plaintiffs a
holders of certain high political offices ex officio members ? " statement of defence, in which he said that at the date of
and was opened in the negative by Mr. J. D. Williams. Mr. the assignment of the forniture Robinson was utterly in.
W. B. M. Bird followed in the negative. The following solvent, and that the assignment was an act of bankruptcy
gentlemen addressed the society in the affirmative:- Messrs. and void as against the trustee; that Dixon and Garney
Kirk, Wright, Lloyd Jones, Napier. Mr. Ellis also spoke. bad sold effects belonging to Robinson which were not
| The opener having replied, the question having been put to comprised in the assignment, and that they claimed to
the meeting, was decided in the negative. deduct from the proceeds of sale an exorbitant and im*proper amount for costs and expenses. And the trustee also said that he claimed to receive the whole of the
GRAY'S INN MOOT SOCIETY. proceeds of the sale of the forniture comprised in the A meeting of the above society was held in Gray's-inn assignment which had been received by Dixon and Gurney. Hall on Monday, the 7th inst., when the following question *The defendants Dixon and Gurney applied to the trustee's was argued before A. S. Eddis, Esq., Q.C.:solicitors for a copy of tbeir statement of defence, and a A, in January, 1878, paid into his private account at his copy was furnished to them upon payment for it, but the bankers £1,000, which arose from a securityimproperly realized, statement was not delivered to them in any other way. which he held in trust for B. In February, 1878, he paid They applied to the court by motion for an order that those into the same account £500 of his own moneys, and in paragraphs of the trustee's statement of defence which con. the subsequent part of the same year drew out for his own tained the above-mentioned allegations and claims might be purposes, by cheques in the ordinary, manner, struck out or amended, on the ground that they tended to ing in the whole to £1,000. He paid into the same account prejudice, embarrass, and delay the fair trial of the action, in Jangary, 1879, £500 of his own moneys. In February, or that the defendants Dixon and Saffery might be at liberty to 1879, £2,000, which arose from a security improperly deliver to the trustee a pleading to his statement of defence. realized, which he held in trust for C., and in March, 1879, FRY, J., held that, there being no question at issue between £1,500 of his own moneys. In the subsequent part of 1879 the applicants and their co-defendant, the trustee, they he drew out for his own purposes, by cheques in the ordinary could not be beard to complain that the fair trial of the manner, sums amounting in the whole to £2,500. He died action would be embarrassed by his pleading, this being a in January, 1880. matter which concerned the plaintiffs. But his lordship B., C., and the personal representative of A. respectively, thought the points raised by the trustee affected the rights
claim to be interested in the balance of £2,000 standing to of the defendants Dixon and Gurney, and that it would be his credit. What are their respective rights? most convenient that they should be determined as between Mr. H. F. Boyd, Inner Temple, appeared for the represenhim and these defendants, as well as between him and the
tative of A.; Mr. F. B. de M. Gibbons, of Gray's-inn, for plaintiffs, in the same action. He could not compel the B.; and Mr. Todd, of Gray's-inn, for C. The president trustee, if he was unwilling to do so, to amend his pleading was accompanied by J. A. Russell, Esq., Q.C. (hon. president 80 as to raise the questions as against his co-defendants, but of the society), and several other benchers of the Inn; and he would give them liberty to serve a notice, uoder rule
there was a large attendance of barristers and students 17 of order 16, on the trustee, so as to raise those points as belonging to the various Inos of Court." between themselves and him. That notice must be served Judgment was given by the learned president in favour of within four days, and then the trustee would have a week C. for the whole amount. within which to deliver any further pleading which he might On Friday, the 11th inst., the following question was argued be advised to put in. The applicants must pay the plain before W. č. Fooks, Esq., Q.C., by Mr. H. F. Lester, Inner tiffs' costs of the motion, without prejudice to the question Temple, and Mr. C. A, V. Congbeare, Gray's-inn, for the how these costs were altimately to be borne, and the costs of affirmative case; and Mr. E. R. Levey, and Mr. Richards, the other parties would be reserved to the trial of the action. of Gray's-ind, for the negative:-SOLICITORS, Armstrong & Lamb; J. B. Churchill; Stocken A. B., passing over a thronged thoroughfare, comes into $ Jupp.
I collision with tools carried by a workman which project from his side.
The workman had been using the tools at an unfinished “ Civis” writes to the Times to warn the public that the piece-work job,” upon which he was employed by aud Leases Bill, which entirely alters the relations between land. | under the direction of his master, and he was on his road, lord and tenant, is quietly making its way through the during his own time, to place the tools in his master's store House of Commons without public attention being called to from whence they had been supplied. the sabject. [We have already drawn attention to the The rules of the master's service were that his workmen BHI.]
| should deposit money to secure the master against loss of