Arkwright v Newbold Steel v. Dixon... SOCIETIES .... 626 627 628 629 629 630 ..................... 631 632 .... 632 ...... 633 ........ 633 634 ......... 635 • 636 ........ 639 610 CREDITORS' CLAIMS....................... way companies and other common carriers applied also to telephone companies. Having established their lines and adopted a uniform mode of serving the public, consistent with their powers under their charter, they must treat alike all persons similarly situated with respect to those lines. It was not for them to select whom they would serve, or impose conditions upon one class of customers which did not apply to all other persons occupying the same relative position towards the company. Hence if the telephone company had established offices of their own where instruments were placed and messages received, they would have been bound to receive and transmit all such messages as were tendered, without favouring any one person or class of persons. But the Bell Telephone Company had chosen to carry on their business in a different way. They had constructed their main lines along certain streets, under a power in their charter, and had held themselves out to the public as ready to supply instruments, and afford facilities for direct communication, to residents and occupants of offices in such streets. They were bound to treat all such residents or occupants with absolute impartiality, and could not refuse to the American Union Telegraph Company facili ties which they granted to their next-door neighbours. MR. MORGAN LLOYD has introduced his promised Bill to put a stop to canvassing at parliamentary elections, and the first two clauses certainly cannot be said to fail in stringency. Clause 1 proposes to provide that it shall not be lawful for any candidate before or during any parliamentary election, or for any agent of such candidate-(1) "to ask for or solicit a promise from any voter to vote for or refrain from voting against any candidate at such election;" or (2) "to visit the houses, countinghouses, workshops, or other places of business of any voter or voters for the purpose of canvassing, soliciting, or inducing such voter or voters to promise to vote for or to refrain from voting against any candidate at such election;" or (3) "to attempt by letter, circular, or otherwise, to induce or prevail upon any voter to give a written promise to vote for or to refrain from voting against any candidate at such election." And any candidate or agent so offending is to be liable to forfeit £50 to any person who shall sue for the same. Not content with this, the Bill goes on to provide (clause 2) that any candidate employing paid agents for the purpose of soliciting promises from voters to vote for, or refrain from voting against, any candidate; or by himself or his agent visiting voters at their houses or places of business for the purpose of asking for promises, and actually asking for such promises, shall be guilty of a "corrupt practice" within the meaning of the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868. These provisions are so stringent that if they stood alone the only absolutely safe course for a candidate during a parliamentary election would be to betake himself to a captive balloon," and to survey his constituency from a height beyond the reach of voice or influence. But clause 3 allays the terror inspired by the two previous clauses, for it provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to any public meeting." At a public meeting, therefore, people may be canvassed to any extent; and a public meeting is an indefinite term which means anything, from a handful of people to a crowd; and people may be visited at their houses to ask them to attend the "public meeting" to be held in the same street. The result of the passing of Mr. Morgan Lloyd's Bill would probably be to multiply prodigiously the number of election "public meetings.' IT WILL BE SEEN from a case noted elsewhere that a form of proceeding in trade-mark registration cases which has of late been not unfrequently employed has been decided by the Master of the Rolls to be irregular. Under the 16th of the Trade-Mark Rules an opposed application for registration stands for the determination of the court upon security for costs being given by the opponent, and a copy of the applicant's counter-statement being forwarded to the opponent by the registrar; and in In re Brandreth (27 W. R. 281, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 618) it was held that this is the point from which the costs of the application are in the discretion of the court. When the case stands for the determination of the court, some mode of proceeding has to be employed by which it may be brought under the notice of the court. A practice may be said to have grown up-certainly it has been adopted in several cases, of which some are reported-by which the opponent has brought the matter before the court by moving to restrain the registration, and has thus obtained the advantage, such as it is, of opening the case. In In re Simpson, Davies, & Sons' Application, however, on Friday last, the Master of the Rolls held that this form of proceeding was improper, and that it was for the applicant for registration to bring the matter before the court, and that the mode in which this should be done was by taking the direction of the judge a chambers as to the mode of trial, and then adopting the course directed. THE ISSUE of the Madras Standard, received by the last mail, gives a very discouraging account of the prospects of the Madras bar. There are, it is stated, nearly 150 legal practitioners to divide "the dwarfed, attenuated, and miserable-looking split pea known as Madras litigation." These practitioners are divided into three classes, barristers, solicitors, and vakeels. The vakeel may act as barrister and solicitor, and the barrister is prohibited from accepting briefs from him. The vakeel may accept what fees he pleases, while the barrister is bound to adhere to the established fees. Moreover, the vakeel can live on less than the barrister or solicitor. "An average vakeel lives on an anna's worth of inferior rice per diem. His dress in comparison with the cost of a barrister's apparel is as if Macaulay's New Zealander in fig leaf and top boots were compared to the Lord Chancellor of England in his robes on the woolsack." If this last statement is true, we fear there is little hope for the Madras barrister. The best thing he can do is to pack up his voluminous wardrobe and betake himself to some country less smitten with a desire for cheap (and bare) justice. A FEW DAYS AGO a Queen's Counsel, while moving in a case in the Exchequer Division, addressed one of the learned judges as "Sir FitzJames Stephen," whereupon his lordship corrected the title to Mr. Justice Stephen. Counsel, in apologizing for the error, mentioned that he had been led into it by the fact that another learned udge wished to be styled Sir Henry Hawkins; and ne might have added that yet another learned judge appears to desire to drop the "Mr.," and to share with a once eminent financier and many foreign potentates the title of "Baron." To any other learned judge who may be in search of some designation distinguishing him from his brethren we would respectfully commend the title by which the court is frequently addressed in petitions drafted by native pleaders in India-" The Presence." THE QUALIFICATION OF TOWN In the case of Middleton v. Simpson (28 W. R. 629, 66 taing his name is not conclusive evidence for this purpose that he is entitled to be on the roll. We do not impugn the correctnesss of this decision, but we are disposed to think the result not altogether satisfactory. By the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 28, no person is to be qualified to be elected councillor of any borough who is not entitled to be on the burgess list. By the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 55, s. 1, occupation of premises, rating, and residence for a year within the borough, or within seven miles thereof, constitute the qualification; but it is provided by section 3 that the occupier rated as in the Act mentioned shall be entitled to be elected a councillor if resident within fifteen miles of the borough, although by reason of his residence beyond seven miles from the borough he is not entitled to be on the burgess roll, provided he is otherwise qualified. Under the law as it stood prior to 38 & 39 Vict. c. 40, it appears to have been well established that the candidate for the office of town councillor must have been entitled to be on the burgess roll. It was not sufficient that he was on the roll. By the 38 & 39 Vict. c. 40, s. 1, sub-section 2, it is enacted that every person nominated shall be enrolled on the burgess list of the borough, or a person whose name is inserted in the separate list at the end of the burgess roll as provided by section 3 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 55, and shall be otherwise qualified to be elected." It was contended for the respondent that this provision prescribed a fresh qualification and im. pliedly repealed the 28th section of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, and the provisions by which the register is made conclusive of the right to vote were cited in aid of thiscontention. The words " and shall be otherwise qualified to be elected" do not throw much light on the matter, for they may receive a meaning apart from any question of the title to be on the burgess roll. There are personal disqualifications such as infancy and so forth which may be referred to. It appears to us that there is a good deal of force in the contention of the respondent in the case we are discussing; but, on the other hand, there are some arguments against it which are very difficult to get over, and which appear to have preponderated in the opinion of the court. 66 First of all, it is a general rule in the construction of statutes that one enactment is not to be construed as overruling another unless the two cannot reasonably stand together. Now, there is no absurdity in saying that in order to be qualified a man must both be entitled to be on and be on the burgess roll. It may be argued we think, with some cogency, that there is a difficulty in seeing why the being on the burgess roll is introduced as an element of the qualification, unless it was intended to be conclusive. It may be presumed that the object of going to the roll at all is that there may be a means of judging of the qualification of the candidate given at the time of the election, but if it is possible afterwards to go behind the roll and upset the election because the candidate, though on the roll de facto, was not entitled to be so de jure, the object of the provision seems to a great extent to be defeated. Still, no absolute absurdity was suggested as arising from the construction of the petitioner. The Legislature may be conceived of as saying that in order to be a candidate a man must have that prima facie guarantee for his being qualified that arises from his being on the roll. If a man, though qualified, has not got himself put on the roll, he cannot complain that he is excluded from being a candidate. But it is not absurd to suppose that though the Legislature provided this, they did not mean the roll to be conclusive evidence of qualification. It may be argued that the reasons for introducing the necessity for being on the roll, if looked into, render it highly desirable that the roll should be conclusive, but to establish this is very far from establishing that the two enactments cannot stand together without absurdity. Again, at first sight, it might appear arguable that being on the burgess roll is in the nature of things proof of title to be on the roll; that the roll settled in a quasi-judicial manner year by year itself determines the right to be on it conclusively in favour of those who are on it, and that, therefore, the later statute covers all the ground when it says that the qualification shall consist of being on the roll. As to those not on the roll there is no question; as to those on the roll they are necessarily entitled to be on the roll. But it may be answered that this argument would have arisen before the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 40, and would render the words "entitled to be" in the old Act nugatory; that substantially the meaning of these words is to enact in a compendious way by reference that the qualification of a burgess shall be a part of that of a councillor-in other words, that "entitled to be on the roll" means possessing those qualifications that entitle a man to be on the roll. The decisions under the old Act appear conclusive that being on the burgess roll was not the test under that Act, but the question whether the party was entitled to be on; and these decisions seem to exclude the possibility of the argument suggested above. Again, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 104, provided for exemption from penalties in favour of persons who acted as councillors without being duly qualified but were on the burgess roll. This is conclusive to show that under the old Act the being on the roll was not conclusive as to the qualification. It would have been easy for the Legislature, while enacting in 38 & 39 Vict. c. 40, s. 5, that the burgess roll should be conclusive as to the right to vote, to enact that it should be conclusive as proof of the qualification, but they do not enact this. Upon the ordinary principles that govern the interpretation of statutes this is a strong argument against the contention for the respondent. When, however, we come to deal with the expediency of the thing, we have strong doubts as to whether it would not be far better that there should be some decisive mode of ascertaining the qualification open to the public at the time of the election. Why should not the same reasoning apply to the qualification of councillors as to that of voters? It seems a misfortune that the expense and trouble of an election should be thrown away by its subsequently turning out that a candidate, though upon the roll and therefore a person whom the voters had primâ facie ground for believing to be qualified, was not qualified because he had no right to be on the roll. It may be said that it would be wrong that a man not duly qualified should be a town councillor; but the same argument applies in some degree, though perhaps not so strongly, to a voter. A single voter may turn the election, and yet that voter may not really be qualified. The American Criminal Law Magazine says, "that a long-winded lawyer lately defended a criminal unsuccessfully, and during the trial the judge received the following note: The prisoner humbly prays that the time occupied by the plea of the counsel for the defence be counted in his sentence.'" The third annual meeting of the American Bar Association is announced to be held at Saratoga Springs on the 18th, 19th, and 20th of August next. It is anticipated that the meeting will be of much interest, and that it will be attended by a large number of members from all parts of the country. The object of the society is "to advance the science of jurisprudence, promote the administration of justice and uniformity of legislation throughout the Union, uphold the honour of the profession of the law, and encourage cordial intercourse among the members of the American bar." 66 A MAN AND HIS NAME. WHEN a name has once been turned into a trade-mark, and a proprietary right acquired therein, this right in the name is capable of protection, even after it has passed away from the person to whom it originally belonged. Thus within the last few weeks the Court of Appeal decided in Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Company (ante, p. 505) that the executors of the originator of Thorley's Cattle Food" were entitled to restrain the use of the name by a company formed for the purpose of manufacturing a similar article, thus practically overruling James v. James (20 W. R. 434, L. R. 13 Eq. 421). And the same is the case when what has happened is, not the death of the proprietor, but an assignment of the business, carrying with it the right to use the trademarks, in which a trade-mark consisting of a name, but which has ceased to possess a personal significance, would be included. "A name, though originally the name of the first maker, may, in time, become a mere trademark or sign of quality, and cease to denote, or to be current as indicating, that any particular person is the maker. In many cases a name once affixed to a manufactured article continues to be used for generations after the death of the individual who first afized it. In such cases the name is accepted in the market either as a brand of quality, or it becomes the denomination of the commodity itself, and is no longer a representation that the article is the manufacture of any particular person" (Per Lord Westbury in Hall v. Barrows, 12 W. R. 322, 4 De G. J. & S. 150 ; Leather Cloth Company v. American Leather Cloth Company, 12 W. R. 289, 4 De G. J. & S. 144). But it must not be forgotten that the assignability of a name trade-mark entirely depends upon the personal element having been wholly eliminated (Leather Cloth Company's case, ubi suprà, and also in House of Lords, 13 W. R. 873, 11 H. L. C. 523; Bury V. Bedford, 12 W. R. 726, 4 De G. J. & S. 352). Thus, when the founder of a theatre, which he had called after his own name, "Booth's Theatre," and which he had described by that name in various mortgages of the premises, sought to restrain the assignees of the lease of the premises from continuing to call the theatre by that name, the injunction was refused, on the ground that the name had become the name of the establishment, and had ceased to imply any personal interference of the plaintiff (Booth v. Jarrett, 52 How. Pr. 169). This question of the assignability of name trade-marks and of trade-names-which, since the decision of the House of Lords in Singer Manufacturing Company v. Wilson (26 W. R. 664, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 376), must be taken to be pretty much the same thing-has most frequently come up in cases of disputes between persons who have, at some time or other, filled the position of co-partners. Both in England and in America the extent to which a purchaser of a business, or a partner who has acquired his partner's share in the business they have carried on together, acquires with the business or share in the business the right to continue to use, by way of tradename or trade-mark, the name of the person from whom ho has acquired the business or share therein, has been the subject of considerable difference of opinion. By some judges it has been thought that no right in the name passed with the goodwill (Peterson v. Humphrey, 4 Abb. Pr. 394; Howe v. Searing, 10 Ib. 264; Scott v. Rowland, 20 W. R. 508); and in one American case (Reeves v. Denicke, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 92) the judge even went so far as to decide that a person who had bought out a partner named E. H. Reeves was not en titled to describe his new firm as successor to the old one-thus: "Robert C. Reeves, successor to E. H. Reeves & Co." No other case, however, goes nearly as far as this; and on the whole, the authorities in favour of the right of continuing to use the name appear considerably to predominate. In Churton v. Douglas (7 W. R. 365, Johns. 174), Lord Hatherley pointed out most clearly the importance of the trade-name as an element of the goodwill, and long before this time Lord Thurlow had held that surviving partners could not be restrained from continuing to use the name of their deceased partner in their business, at all events unless his estate would be thereby involved in some liability (Webster v. Webster, 3 Swanst. 490). In Banks v. Gibson (13 W. R. 1012, 34 Beav. 566), where the plaintiff was the widow of one of the partners in Banks & Co., and the defendant was the surviving partner, Lord Romilly held that as the partnership had been simply dissolved, and neither partner had bought the other out, each could use the old firm name. He said, "The name or style of the firm of 'Banks & Co.,' in which the defendant had been engaged for a period of fourteen years, was an asset of the partnership, and if the whole concern and the goodwill of a business have been sold, the name, as a trade-mark, would have been sold with it. If by arrangement one partner takes the whole concern, there must be a valuation of the whole, including the name or style of the firm. But if the partners merely divide the other partnership assets, then each is at liberty to use the name just as they did before. It is the same as if two persons who alone carried on the business of 'Child & Co.,' thought fit to separate, each would be entitled to use the name by which they carried on their business." Then, again, in The McGowan Bros. Pump Machine Company v. McGowan (2 Cinc. 313), it was said in the Superior Court of Cincinnati that "There can be no doubt that, where one partner sells to another partner a going business, every advantage arising from the fact of the sole ownership of the premises, stock, and establishment, including advantages acquired by the old firm in carrying on its business, whether connected with the old place or the old name, passes to the purchaser." Lastly, in Levy v. Walker, already cited, it was held that one of two partners who had bought the other partner's interest in the business was entitled to use the old firm name, in which the names of both partners appeared, and Lord Justice James said distinctly, "I hold that the sale of the goodwill and business did convey the right to the use of the partnership name as a description of the articles sold in that trade, and that that right is an exclusive right as against the person who sold it, and as against all the world, if any person in that world were representing himself as carrying on the same business.' Where the purchase has been from a trustee in bankruptcy, it has been held in the Supreme Court of New York (Helmbold v. Helmbold Manufacturing Company, 53 How. Pr. 453) that there is a difference, and that the bankrupt could not be deprived of the right to use his name, though he might have been if the purchase had been from himself; but in Bury v. Bedford no such distinction was recognized. Of course, when a man has given another a contract right to use his name, he is not entitled to complain if the latter exercises his privilege, as in Ward v. Beeton (23 W. R. 533, L. R. 9 Eq. 207), where an annual, in which Beeton had had no hand, was allowed to be published under the name of Beeton's Christmas Annual; and where the proprietor of a trade-name, or trade-mark, goes into partnership with some one else, he carries the trade-name or trade-mark into the partnership with him, as in Condy v Mitchell (26 W. R. 269). It is not with business pursuits in the ordinary sense exclusively that the name claimed must have been connected. In Lord Byron v. Johnston (2 Mer. 29), the name protected was the name of a poet; in Archbold v. Sweet (1 M. & Rob. 162), it was the name of an author of legal works; in Christy v. Murphy (12 How. Pr. 77), and Montague v. Moore (Wood, V.C., March 1, 1865), it was the name of the organizer of a troupe of Ethiopian minstrels. Nor does it make any difference whether the name is a genuine or an assumed one. Isaacson v. Thompson (20 W. R. 196), the plaintiff, a milliner, was carrying on business as Madame Louise"; in Clemens v. Such (N. Y. Supreme Court, July 11, 1873), In | the plaintiff had written humorous books under the nom de plume of "Mark Twain." But whether the name be real or fictitious, the use by the defendant must be such as to be calculated to deceive, so that, where no deception is to be anticipated, no relief will be granted, as in the case of "Claribel's" songs (Barnard v. Pillow, W. N. 1868, p. 94). In Gouraud v. Trust (10 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 627), the plaintiff had changed his name from Trust to Gouraud, under which name he sold "Gouraud's Oriental Cream," and the defendants, who were restrained by injunction, were his sons, who had retained their original name, but had begun to sell a preparation as "Crême Orientale, by Dr. And in such cases as the above T. F. Gouraud's Sons." the fraudulent use of another's name is criminally punishable, either on a prosecution for false pretences or on one for a cheat at common law; but such an offence is not forgery, as was decided in the case of the name of the painter Linnell (R. v. Closs, D. & B. 460). Even apart from a trade or business, a person whose name has without authority been injuriously used by another is entitled to an injunction, as in Routh v. Webster (10 Beav. 561); and, even though what the defendant has done amounts to a libel, it seems that, if he does not exercise his right of claiming a jury at the proper time, but allows that opportunity to slip, he will not be allowed afterwards to contend successfully that the court has no jurisdiction under the Judicature Acts to grant an injunction to restrain a libel without the verdict of a jury (Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Company, ante, p. 505; Thomas v. Williams, ante, p. 539). In Reid v. Sibbald (18 Journ. of Jurisp. 392), the Scotch court granted an interdict to restrain a name intended to represent the name of a sheriff's officer from being used in such a manner as to bring discredit and ridicule upon the latter, who would thus be injured in his position in life; and it seems, from the decisions referred to, that in a similar case the English court would now sit as a jury and grant an injunction at the hearing of the action, unless the defendant claimed a jury at the proper time and in the proper manner indicated by the Acts and Rules governing the practice of the court. Recent Decisions. SUCCESSION DUTY. (Attorney-General v. Dowling, Ex. D., 28 W. R. 673.) In Fryer v. Morland (25 W. R. 21) the Master of the Rolls held that the Succession Duty Act granted duties on gratuitous successions only, and that it was not intended to apply to a case where a person takes under a convey. ance by way of bonâ fide sale. In the present case this principle seems to have been taken for granted on both sides, and the contest was whether the disposition which had been made of the property amounted to a purchase for value. Shortly put, the disposition as to which the question arose was this. A lunatic was tenant in tail male in possession of property. His brother Reginald was next in succession, and had mortgaged his interest (which he had converted into a base fee) for a sum exceeding its full value. His sister Frances and her issue were next in succession, contingent of course on the deaths of the lunatic and Reginald without male issue. In this state of things an arrangement was come to, with the consent of the Lord Chancellor as protector of the existing settlement, in pursuance of which a deed was executed whereby Reginald, Frances, and her husband, and the mortgagees conveyed the property (subject to the lunatic's estate in tail male) to trustees upon trust to raise a sum for the mortgagees, and subject thereto to convey the property to the uses and upon the trusts declared by a deed of even date, whereby it was declared that the trustees of the first deed should stand possessed of the property to the use of the trustees named in the second deed upon trust for Frances for life, her husband for life, with remainder to the use of the first and every other son of Frances and her husband in tail male. Under this disposition a son of Frances had become entitled in possession, and the question was whether he succeeded to the property upon the disposition of Reginald or of Frances, his mother. The court held that the mother was the predecessor, on the ground that, in substance, the arrangement carried out by the deeds amounted to a purchase by Frances for valuable consideration. "In substance, she agreed to purchase the estate of her brother Reginald, his equity of redemption, the interest of the [mortgagees], and (subject to the lunatic's life estate) the immediate and certain possession of the property; and as a consideration she agreed to forego any contingent right she might have to possess the property free from incumbrances, and consented that it should be absolutely charged [in favour of the mortgagees] in fee with a sum of £37,000." We think a good deal may be said for the view that the arrangement was a re-settlement of the property by Reginald, but we are not concerned to question the construction of the particular transaction. The important point to be observed is the inclination of the court to give a liberal interpretation to the doctrine laid down in Fryer v. Morland. Reviews. PETITIONS IN CHANCERY AND LUNACY. THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO PETITIONS IN CHANCERY AND LUNACY. BY SYDNEY E. WILLIAMS, Barristerat-Law. Stevens & Haynes. In the presence of the various admirable books of practice which already exist, it is not quite easy to say that this work supplies any want felt by the profession generally. It is, however, a compilation of modest dimensions, and intelligently constructed; and it may accordingly be of service to practitioners (if such there be) who do not thoroughly know their way about the larger books; and it may also probably be useful to students. We should have been glad to find throughout the book references to the pages in the works of Daniell, Seton, Buckley, &c., where the matters are more fully dealt with; this single improvement, systematically carried out, would have rendered the present book a very convenient digest or index upon its own subjectmatter. The more recent cases upon the practice of the court relating to petitions appear to have been noted with care, but we observe that here and there the true value of cases has hardly been appreciated. Speaking of payments for past maintenance to guardians of the poor, &c., of a fund in court belonging to a lunatic, Mr. Williams (at p. 29) says, "The court has, however, a discretion to refuse payment, and where there is also a claim for past maintenance by relations, such claim will be preferred "-for which he refers to In re Gibson (20 W. R. 107., L. R. 7 Ch. 52). Now, that proves on examination to have been a case where the fund was not in court, but in the hands of the lunatic's relatives, so that it was a mere instance of a retainer being permitted of this kind of debt. In both that case and the case of Re Marman, which follows in the next foot-note, it was carefully pointed out that these claims for maintenance are to be regarded as debts of the lunatic; a doctrine which might well have been mentioned in the text-book, for other consequences of importance flow from it-see In re Harris (49 L. J. Ch. 327). With regard to the winding up of companies incorporated by special Act of Parliament, we find (p. 161) the following statement, which strikes us in its unqualified shape as rather technical, and hardly supported by the cases: "Where the special Act declares the works authorized to be of public advantage, the court will not make an order, unless it is positively shown that there is no other remedy." In the observations upon the Trustee Relief Act, we find no notice of the law, which was settled after some conflicting authority by the Court of Appeal in Re Hardley's Trusts (27 W. R. 587), as to the court giving directions with regard to the notice of payment in. Perhaps the point was considered to be not strictly within the scope of the book. On p. 118, in summarizing the cases under the Settled Estates Act, in which consents have been dispensed with, the facts of In re Spurway are imperfectly stated. It should have been added that there were four children living under age. At p. 306 it is said that a guardian of a person of unsound mind has been appointed in the Chancery Division on petition, referring to the authorized report of Vane v. Vane. The inaccuracy of that report has since been pointed out on the bench, and was noticed in this journal in connection with a subsequent decision (see 23 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, p. 850). We do not wish to carp at writers who fail to give the references to all the contemporaneous series of reports; but we should have applauded Mr. Williams if his eye had fallen on the more accurate reports which existed of Vane v, Vane. In that part of the work which relates to winding-up petitions great allowance must be made for the restricted space at the author's command, and the immense mass of law upon which his subject touches. Nevertheless, we are bound to protest against such unqualified statements as the following:-"A fully paid-up shareholder who presents a petition must allege and prove that there are assets of such an amount that in the event of a winding up he will have a tangible share of surplus to receive (citing Re Rica Gold Company); and if the company is in voluntary liquidation, he will not be entitled to a compulsory or supervision order, except in a case of fraud, or where creditors support the petition." The first part of this sentence should have been modified by reference to the case of the Diamond Fuel Company, in which Vice-Chancellor Malins' view (reported 27 W. R. 336) was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in November last. In the latter half of the sentence the word "fraud is, of course, intended to be read in some highly artificial sense, but the language of Lord Justice James in the Gold Company's case (to which Mr. Williams refers) was more guarded, and left a greater latitude. The book is furnished with a selection of forms and precedents; the arrangement of matter seems convenient, and we have found it easy to consult. We have not observed any important omission within the scope of the treatise; and the writer deserves the praise of having put together with some skill an unpretending work, which is at least more useful than certain larger law books we know of. Cases of the Week. METROPOLIS LOCAL MANAGEMENT ACT, 1855 (18 & 19 VICT. c. 120), ss. 96, 154-VESTING OF STREETS IN VESTRY DURATION OF ESTATE-DISUSED STREET.-On the 14th inst., the Court of Appeal (JAMES, COTTON, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) reversed the decision of Jessel, M.R., in the case of Rolls v. The Vestry of St. George's, Southwark (28 W. R. 366). The question was as to the construction of section 96 of the Metropolis Local Management Act of 1855, which provides that "all streets, being highways, and the shall pavements, stones, and other materials thereof, vest in and be under the management and control of the vestry or district board of the parish." And by section 154 it is enacted that "the vestry may sell and dispose of. any property whatsoever vested in them under this Act which it may appear to them may be properly sold or disposed of.' Some streets, which were public highways, had been stopped |