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bankruptcy,' such bill of sale shall be void as a preferen- | ing a bill of sale shall, before the execution thereof, tial security as against the trustee of the debtor, and explain its full meaning and effect to the grantor." shall only entitle the grantee or holder thereof to rank This is, of course, an attempt to convert into law the as an ordinary creditor against the debtor's estate." views expressed by Vice-Chancellor Malins in Aill v. It will be observed that when once the grantor of Kirkwood (ante, p. 304). It is apparently not intended the bill of sale has, within the four months, com that the bill of sale shall be void if not duly explained, mitted an act of bankruptcy, the bill of sale is to be for clause 6, as we have seen, only provides that a bill of void as a preferential security against a trustee under sale shall not be valid as a security until it has been the bankruptcy of the grantor at any time afterwards. attested " in accordance with the provisions” of the Act Can this be intended ? The result of the enactment of of 1878, and under those provisions it is suficient if the such a provision will probably be to put an end to the attestation states the fact that the effect of the bill of making of bills of sale. If this is the object, it would sale has been explained to the grantor. The effect of be better to accomplish it by direct legislation, and not the new clause will apparently be to render any solicitor by & side wind.
attesting a bill of sale liable to the summary jurisdiction We incline to think, indeed, that the abolition of bills of the court if he does not explain the "full meaning of sale must be the object of the framers of the Bill, for, and effect” of the instrument. Considering the length not content with these provisions, they propose (clause 9) of time it takes to explain the full meaning and that “ within seven days after the registration of a bill effect of any legal instrument to an ignorant grantor, of sale, notice thereof shall be given by the grantee by and the probability that after all he will not compreadvertisement in the London Gazette, and such notice hend the explanation, it will be seen that, if this clause shall state the name, address, and occupation of the becomes law, solicitors will either have to decline to person by whom the bill of sale was given, and also the attest bills of sale or to raise their fees to a sum proporname of the person to whom or in whose favour it was tioned to the length of time employed and the risk run given.” Considering the wide sweep of the provisions of in attesting the bill of sale. the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, which imposed the necessity The Bill we have been considering appears to us to be of registration as bills of sale on classes of instruments ill-considered as regards objects, and singularly defective executed by persons very far removed from the class for in drafting. We hope the law societies will devote whose protection the provisions of the present Bill are a little consideration to it, and some
one of the intended, this proposal seems to us to be simply out numerous new legal members of Parliament might userageous.
fully employ himself in pointing out its defects. By another clause it is provided that every bill of sale, whereby the grantee shall have power to seize
any property,” shall have attached thereto, or written thereon, a schedule containing an inventory of all the goods
CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. and chattels therein referred to, “and such bill of sale Fluctuations are to be expected in rules based upon shall be a security only in respect of the goods and the “policy of the law"-that is to say, on the opinions chattels enumerated and described in the said schedule, on certain general questions entertained by the judges which were the property of the grantor at the time of for the time being; but it is not very often that these the execution of the bill of sale, and shall so continue changes occur so suddenly as in the doctrine to which during the period within which the bill of sale is a sub. the case of Roussillon v. Roussillon, (28 W. R. 623) sisting security.' It is curious to speak of goods com. relates. Up to last month one would have said prised in a bill of sale as continuing the property of the with tolerable confidence that the doctrine as to congrantor, but reading this clause according to the natural tracts in restraint of trade might be expressed in two construction, it would really appear that by selling any of rules—(1) such contracts if unlimited in point of area the goods and chattels comprised in the schedule the are invalid ; (2) such contracts are invalid if they are ungrantor of the bill of sale is to be able at any time to reasonable, one test of such unreasonableness being that deprive the grantee of his security. The bill of sale is to
the restraint imposed is larger than is required for the be a security only iu respect of the goods and chattels de protection of the interests of the person in favour of scribed in the schedule which continue to be the property whom the restraint is imposed. The well-known old of the grantor during the period within which the bill cases in which the first of these rules was, or was supposed of sale is a subsisting security. Can this really be to be, laid down proceeded on the doctrine that no man meant ? Apparently not, for a proviso immediately ought to be allowed by contract to deprive the com. follows that, “in default of such schedule as aforesaid, munity of his industry and skill. Such contracts tend the grantee or holder of a bill of sale shall thereby to discourage enterprize, prevent competition, and deprive be entitled to seize or take possession of such the public of the services of men in the employments for only of the grantor's goods and chattels as were comprised which they are best fitted. On the other hand, it is in, or referred to, in the bill of sale, and were the prop obvious that, in order to dispose to the greatest advanerty of the grantor at the time when such bill of sale was tage of a business or other property of the like nature, a executed.” That is to say, the clause provides (1) that man must be enabled to preclude himself from entering there shall be a schedule, and the bill of sale shall be a into competition with the purchaser. The second of the security only in respect of the goods mentioned in such rules above mentioned seems to indicate the proper adschedule, and which continue the property of the justment of these conflicting principles, and in Leather grantor; (2) that if there is no schedule, the grantee | Cloth Company v. Lorsont (18 W. R. 572, L. R. 9 Eq. may nevertheless seize such of the grantor's goods as are 345), Vice-Chancellor James showed a disposition to comprised in the bill of sale, and are the property regard it as the only rule. He expressed an opinion of the grantor at the time of the execution of the that the previous cases had not laid down the rule that bill of sale. Comment appears to be needless on this a covenant in restraint of trade unlimited as to area was clause.
necessarily invalid. But that case related practically to the Clause 5 requires an affidavit to be made by the non-disclosure of a trade secret, as to which it is clear that grantor that he is the absolute owner of all the a covenant unlimited as to area is valid. Accordingly, goods and chattels described in such bill of sale or in the subsequent case of Allsopp v. Wheatcroft (21 W. schedule, and that he has not charged, assigned, or in- R. 102, L. R. 15 Eq. 59), Vice-Chancellor Wickens held cumbered the same; and this affidavit is to be filed with that Leather Cloth Company v. Lorsont was no authority the bill of sale.
for a departure “from the recognized rule as to limitaBut the clause which needs the most vigilant attention tions of space," and since that decision, in 1872, we are on the part of the profession is the 7th, which proposes not aware that the doctrine has been judicially imto provide that “a solicitor of the Supreme Court attest. pugned.
But in Roussillon v. Roussillon Mr. Justice Fry has denied the existence of any such doctrine. He had, he said, “to choose between two sets of cases. He adhered to those which refused to recognize this rule.”
THE AUTHORITY OF PREVIOUS DECISIONS. “How could such a rule," he said, " be reconcileable
(Osborne v. Rowlett, M. R. 28 W.R. 365, L. R. 13 with the different systems of trading? Many trades
Ch. D. 785.) extended over the whole kingdom which, by their very nature, were extensively diffused; others were localized. We took occasion some time ago to comment on various If this rule obtained there would be complete protection ex pressions which fell from the Master of the Rolls with for the latter class of trade, while it would prohibit regard to the extent to which previous decisions of a complete protection to the former. The rule, if it ex court of co-ordinate jurisdiction are binding. We isted, would apply to two classes of cases: (1) where observe that in the present case he again expressed similar want of limitation of space was unreasonable, and (2) views to those on which we commented. He is by the where the universality of the contract was reasonable. report of that case made to say, “Now, I have often In the former case, where the universality was un said, and I 'repeat it, that the only thing in a judge's reasonable, the rule would operate nothing, because decision binding upon a subsequent judge is the prin. that was already covered by the rule that the contract ciple upon which the case was decided; but it is not must be reasonable. It would only operate in cases in sufficient that the case should have been decided upon & which the universality of prohibition was reasonable principle if that principle is not itself a right principle that was, the rule would operate just where it ought not.” or one not applicable to the case, and it is for a subse
The rule is, no doubt, an arbitrary one, and the quent judge to say whether or not it is a right principle; other rule that a contract in restraint of trade and, if not, he may himself lay down the true prin. must be reasonable would seem to be in theory ciple. In that case the previous decision ceases to be a more just. But has not the learned judge overlooked binding authority." the litigation which the adoption of this as the only rule We feel some doubt whether we quite clearly appre. would occasion ? If there is no rule requiring these con hend the meaning of this, or whether the real intention tracts to be limited as regards space, the tendency will of the learned judge has been expressed in the reports. be to make them all unlimited, and then it will have to There is frequently great difficulty in extracting the be settled by judicial decision whether the contract is or exact result from the expressions used by a judge in an is not reasonable. How judges may differ on this point unwritten judgment. It is customary for judges to is well shown by comparing the decision of Vice-Chan abuse the reporters if the idea they had in their minds is cellor Wickens in Allsopp v. Wheatcroft with that of not quite clearly expressed, but only those behind the Mr. Justice Fry in the present case. In the former case scenes in this respect, from having been reporters or the Vice-Chancellor held that an agreement, unrestricted having had to do with reporting, can tell the difficulty as to area, entered into by a traveller for the Burton firm, there often is in making unwritten judgments into not to sell or procure orders for any Burton ale other than entirely definite and clear propositions without running that brewed by Allsopp, for two years, was void because the risk of substituting the ideas of the reporter for it went beyond anything that was required for the those of the judge. The truth is that no one in speaking plaintiff's protection; for "it could not have been held extempore is always quite accurate in his language. If necessary for the plaintiff's protection to prevent the the reports are correct, however, the doctrine thus prodefendant from soliciting orders for the ale of pounded seems remarkably sweeping. It appears to other Burton brewers in places where Burton ale amount to this :-No case can ever be binding except, had never been sold or heard of.” In the recent so far as the subsequent judge (to use the somewhat case Mr. Justice Fry held that an agreement, unre compendious expression of the report) thinks that the stricted as to area, entered into by a traveller for French principle which the previous judge applied to the case champagne merchants, not to represent any other cham was correct, and was applicable. If the principle was pagne house for two years was valid, because," looking correct, but inapplicable, then the case is not an at the extent of the plaintiffs' trade and its diffusion over authority. If the principle, though applicable, was not England, looking at the facilities of communication | correct, then, also, the case is of no authority. This which now existed, he could not say that it was made plain doctrine for enabling a judge to escape from the fetters to him that this contract exceeded in extent that which of previous decisions reminds one of the jester's answer the plaintiffs were entitled to for the protection of their in “All's Well that Ends Well," and the barber's trade.” It may perhaps be questioned whether, on the chair that suited all customers. We do not see how any whole, the public would be gainers by the substitution previous decision can escape from it. of the expensive process of obtaining the varying opinions The ways in which judges in the interests of the law of judges on each particular case for the rule which sometimes wriggle out of previous decisions are marcompels the limits of the area of restriction to be ascer. vellous and manifold. Sometimes they say that the tained by the parties at the time of the contract. As principle was wrong, and that the facts being different regards authority, Ward v. Byrne (5 M. & W. 548) | in some particular (albeit immaterial to the principle), and Hinde v. Gray (1 Man. & Gr. 195) have been they will not follow the case. They will only treat it understood to lay down, and do lay down, the rule as binding with regard to the very same facts. The which Mr. Justice Fry rejects. We need hardly point tendency has, however, generally been to regard a case out that, until the doctrine enunciated in the recent exactly on all fours as concluded by a previous decision. case has been reviewed by the Court of Appeal, it will | According to the Master of the Rolls this is quite & not be safe to assume that a contract in restraint of mistake. In his view you must regard, not the actual trade uprestricted as to area can in any case be valid. decision as to given facts, but the principle. It would
seem that the only cases in which the Master of the
Rolls would treat previous decisions as authorities are The American legal journals record the death of Mr. cases where the facts are the same, and the principle laid Sanford E. Church, Chief Judge of the New York Court down was applicable to these facts. But when one of Appeals. Judge Church, says the Albany Law comes to consider it, the question whether the principle is Journal, suffered from the worst infliction to which a applicable to the facts and whether the decision is correct judge can ever be subjected-namely, the constant use are generally in substance convertible questions. The of his name as a contingent candidate for the Presi- 'differences of judges on questions of principle are comdency, but in spite of this, it is due to his memory to / paratively few. The practical effect of the Master of the declare that he has gone to his grave with the reputa. | Rolls' view would, if logically carried out, as it seems to tion of an honest and unprejudiced magistrate.
us, be that very few previous decisions would be binding
on a judge if he thought them wrong. If you are bound bonds. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, COTTON, and THESIGER, only by the principle and not by the application of it, it L.JJ.) reversed this decision, and ordered that the bonds can nearly always be shown that it is inapplicable to the
should be unconditionally given up to the owner. They facts if a judge thinks it wrong. This may be a desirable
said though, as the bonds were negotiable instruments, the result, but it is certainly hardly in accordance with the
company would, on the principle of the decision in Goodwin ideas that have been hitherto prevalent.
v. Robarts (24 W. R. 987, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 476), have had It is worth noting that one of the most curious
a valid lien upon them as against the true owner, yet, as the features of our system of judge-made law-yiz., that a
company had been paid off, neither the fraudulent bankrupts
nor their trustee could have any lien on the bonds as against judge does not hold himself bound by a precedent if
he true owner. JAMES, L.J., said that the case might have another judge has ventured to disregard it—will be found
been different if the trustee had advanced moneys of his own to be curiously illustrated in the case to which we have to redeem the bonds.-SOLICITORS, R. S. Taylor, Son, & referred. If Vice-Chancellor A. decides so and so, Vice- | Humbert; Truefitt & Gane. Chancellor B. ought ex concessis to follow the previous decision, but if he does not Vice-Chancellor C. is alto.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCEgether at large. It is, no doubt, necessary occasionally
MINLEADING PARTICULARS OF SALE-OMISSION TO STATE to tem per the system of judge-made law, and evade pre
THAT LEASE IS SUBJECT TO GROUND-RENT.-In the case of vious decisions by pious frauds on the part of the judges;
Jones v. Rimmer, before the Court of Appeal on the 2nd but we must say that the Master of the Rolls seems to
inst., the question aroge whether & purchaser of leasehold go rather far in this respect, and if there is an admirable property at a sale under the order of the court ought to be absence of judicial fraud, there is likewise a certain discharged from his purchase under the following circumabsence of judicial piety about his proceedings.
stances. The property in question was lot No. 11 at the sale, which took place in Liverpool. Lot 11 was situate in Liverpool, and was described in the particulars of sale as four leasehold houses and a yard, respectively let at rents
the amounts of which were mentioned," the whole held for Cases of the Week.
the residue of a term of seventy-five years from the 16th of
September, 1845. This lot is offered for sale subject to a APPEAL FOR Costs_ORDER FOR NEW TRIAL-VARIATION mortgage for £500, bearing interest at five per cent." It OF CONDITION_COSTS OF FIRST TRIAL-In the House of was not stated whether the property was subject to any Lords, on the 28th ult., in the case of Metropolitan Asylums ground-rent. Lots 8, 9, and 10 also consisted of leasehold District Board v. Hill, a question was argued as to the com houses in Liverpool. Lot 8 and lot 9 were stated to be held petency of an appeal. The action was brought to recover under the corporation of Liverpool. Nothing was said as to damages for a nuisance alleged to have been caused to the a ground-rent in the case of either of those lots. Most of the plaintiffs by the erection and maintenance of the Hampstead property in Liverpool which is held under the corporation Small-pox Hospital, and for an injunction. At the trial, of Liverpool is let at a peppercorn rent. This fact is well all the issues were found in favour of the plaintiffs, and known in Liverpool, and the purchaser was aware of it. One Pollock, B., after argument of the case on further considera of the conditions of sale provided that “the respective purtion, entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and granted an chasers of lots 8, 9, 10, and 11 respectively, shall, by the injunction. The Queen's Bench Division made absolute a respective assignments to them, enter into the usual rule for a new trial, the costs of the first trial to await the covenants for paying and performing and observing the rents, event of the second trial. The plaintiffs appealed, and covenants, and conditions of the respective leases, and in. the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Queen's demnifying the vendors therefrom." After the sale the Bench Division as to the new trial, but varied the order by purchaser discovered that lot 11 was subject to a grounddirecting that the new trial should be granted on condition rent of £43, and he sought to be discharged from his purof tbe payment by the defendants of the costs of the first chase, on the ground that he believed the property to be free trial, the defendants to be allowed two months to elect whether from ground-rent, and that he had been misled by the parthey would appeal or not. Against this order the defendants ticulars of sale into this belief, and into giving a much appealed to the House of Lords, and, by the direction of the larger sum for the property than he would have given had House, the question of competency was argued by one he been aware of the ground-rent. He made no inquiries counsel on each side. For the respondents, it was argued before he bought about the terms of the lease, and the conthat, both courts below baving decided that there shouldditions of salo did noi state that the lease could be inspected be a new trial, the appellants now sought merely to get rid prior to the sale, though in fact the purchaser could have of the condition as to the payment of the costs of the new seen the lease if he had asked for it. It appeared that in trial, and the appeal was brought for costs only. Lords the particulars of sale, as they were originally drawn, the SELBORNE, C., BLACKBURN, and WATSON, without calling amount of the ground-rent of lot 11 had been stated, but on the counsel for the appellants, held that the appeal that the statement was accidentally struck out in sbould be admitted, since the imposing by the Court settling the draft. On behalf of the vendors it was urged of Appeal of a condition as to the payment of the costs that, as the lease was mentioned in the particulars, the purof the first trial did not bring the case within the rule that chaser must be taken to have had constructive notice of its an appeal will not be entertained for costs only. Their lord contents, and that there had been no misrepresentation by ships, however, directed that the question of the costs of the the vendors, inasmuch as they had made no representation present argument should be reserved until after the de whatever as to the terms of the lease. It was admitted termination of the appeal.-SOLICITORS, Pew & Co.; Bischoff, that it is usual to state in the particulars of sale of leasehold Bompas, & Bischof.
property the amount of the ground-rent under which it is held, but it was said that it is equally usual, when the property
is held at a peppercorn rent, to state that fact, and thereSECURITIES FRAUDULENTLY PLEDGED BY BANKRUPT- fore it was said the omission to state anything about groundPLEDGE REDEEMED BY TRUSTEE OUT OF ESTATE-RIGHTS OF rent could lead to no inference one way or the other. OWNER OF SECURITIES.-In a case of Ex parte De Chaton And great reliance was placed on the condition ville, before the Court of Appeal on the 27th ult., some which required that the purchasers of the four leasehold lots United States Bonds had been deposited by the owner with should enter into the usual covenants to pay the rents of the some bankers for safe custody. The depositees fraudulently respective leases, and to indemnify the vendors. This, it pledged the bonds with a banking company, as security for was contended, necessarily led to the assumption that there advances made by the company to them, and afterwards was a rent to be paid in the case of each of those lots. The became backrupt. After the bankruptcy the owner of the court (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and THESIGER, L.JJ.) bonds applied to the court for an order that the trustee should held (affirming the decision of the Vice-Chancellor of the deliver up the bonds to her. The debt due to the company Lancaster court) that the purchaser must be discharged. had been paid off by means of their general lien upon other | JESSEL, M.R., admitted that he had felt great difficulty in property of the bankrupts which was in their hands, and the making up his mind. But, he said, the real question was registrar ordered the bonds to be delivered up on the terms of whether the particular of sale was a fair one, whether the the owner repaying to the trustee what the estate of the purchaser was fairly told what he was buying, or whether he bankrupts bad in effect paid to the company to redeem the might not properly infer from it, as he had sworn that he
did, that the property was not subject to any ground-rent. jurisdiotion to order the costs to be paid to the plaintiff. But, His lordship was of opinion that the fair reading of the if this was not so, be thought that the case fell within order particular was that no substantial ground-rent was reserved | 41a, the omission to provide for the costs of the motion by the lease. The condition which was relied upon did not having arisen from the accidental omission of counsel to ask necessarily lead to the assumption that all, the leasehold lots for them at the trial. His lordship accordingly made a were subject to ground-rents; it was consistent with it that separate order (following the precedent of Viney v. Chaplin) some were and some were not, and it was well known in that the costs of the motion for the injunction sbould be tsxed Liverpool that the corporation leases were generally made at and paid to the plaintiff. And, inagmuch as the plaintiff, & peppercorn rent. No doubt a careful purchaser would have before serving notice on the defendant of the motion to correct made inquiries, but the vendors had been careless themselves, the judgment, had applied to him to consent to the proposed and could not complain of the carelessness of the purchaser. alteration, his lordship gave the plaintiff also the costs of The particular was misleading, and the purchaser bad a fair that motion.-SOLICITORS, Moresby-White $ Co.; W. Y. title to be misled by it. It was not a case in which the Webster. couit, in the exercise of its discretion, ought to enforce specific performance. The court bad refused to do so, even in cases where the purchaser bad made a mistake without any
MR. WILLIAM DAVIES.
Norwood-grove, Liverpool, on the 29th alt. Mr. Davies PRACTICE-ORD. 15, R. 1-ACTION FOR ACCOUNT
was born in 1834, and was for several years engaged as a -Costs-FURTHER CONSIDERATION.-In a case of Beaney
olerk in the conveyanoing department of the Town Clerk's v. Elliott, before the Master of the Rolls on the
Office, at Liverpool. He was admitted a solicitor in 1867. 31st ult.,' a question was raised on the further con
Ten years later he was appointed by the corporation to sideration of the action, where an order for an account bad
the office of clerk of prosecutions for the boroogb, and be been made under ord. 15, r. 1, whether certain evidence
beld that office until his death. Mr. Davies's health bad required for the purpose of determining who was to
for some time been very bad, and he had recently obtained bear the costs of the action could be proved by affi
leave of absence from bis official duties. The immediate davit. Jessel, M.R., was of opinion that, under ord. 15,
cause of his death was a fit of apoplexy. A Liverpool r. 1, any matter required on further consideration as to
joorpal thus speaks of Mr. Davies's official services :costs might be proved by affidavit.-SOLICITORS, W. F.
“Be was most zealous in the diacharge of his duties, and Noakes ; Price, Bigg, & Co.
this was recogoized by steady promotion, Mr. Davies
having commenced at the small salary of £78, receiving PRACTIC — AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT — ACCIDENTAL increases until he attained £500 per annum. His luss SLIP OR OMISSION-ORD. 41A (DECEMBER, 1879).-In a case will be felt, not only in the department of the corporation of Fritz v. Hobson, before Fry, J., on the 31st ult., a with which he was connected, but amongst a large circle question arose as to the power conferred on the court by the of professional brethren, by whom he was highly renew order, 41a of December, 1879 (ante, p. 174), which pro- spected." vides that “clerical mistakes in judgments or orders, or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission,
MR. WILLIAM MACHIN INGLE. may, at any time, be corrected by the court or a judge on
Mr. William Machin Ingle, solicitor, died at Belper on motion, without an appeal.” The action was brought to restrain the defendant, who was a builder, and who was
the 29th ult. Mr. Ingle was born in 1827, and was admitted carrying on building operations on some land near to the
solicitor in 1852, when he commenced to practise at plaintiff's house, the entrance to which was in a narrow
Belper. He was sbortly afterwards appointed registrar of court or passage leading out of a street in London (this
the Belper County Court (Circuit No. 19), and more passage being the shortest out of several approaches leading
recently discharged the same duties at the Ilkeston County to the land on wbich the defendant was building), from con
Court. He was also for many years clerk to the trustees tinuing or repeating certain alleged acts of trespags, from
of the Doffield and Heage and the Cromford and Kingley obstructing by bis operations the access from the highway to
Mill Tarppike Roads. He was a perpetnal commissioner the plaintiff's house, and the access of light and air thereto.
for Derbyshire, and had a very good private business. A The plaintiff moved for an interim injunction, and an order
few years ago he retired from practice, but he retained the was made that the motion should stand over till the trial of county court registrarsbips until his deatb. Mr. Iogle the action. Nothing was said about the costs of the motion,
was buried at St. Peter's, Belper, on the 1st inst. and the order was never drawn up. Before the trial the defendant's building operations had been completed, and the
MR. FREDERICK DANBY PALMER. only question was whether the plaintiff was entitled to Mr. Frederick Danby Palmer, solicitor, died at Southdamages. Fry, J., gave the plaintiff £60 damages in town, Yarmouth, on the 28th ult. Mr. Palmer was the respect of loss of custom in bis trade by reason of the obstruc son of Mr. Frederick Danby Palmer, of Yarmouth. He tion to the access to his house from the highway, and the was born in 1834, and was admitted & solicitor in 1861. general costs of the action, less £10 for the costs of part of He first practised at 13, South-square, Gray's-ind, but a his claim which his lord ship held to be unfounded. The few years later removed to Yarmouth, where be carried plaintiff's counsel omitted to ask at the trial that the costs of on business until his death. He was a potary public and the motion should be included, and the judgment, as drawn up a perpetual commissioner for the counties of Norfolk and by the registrar and paseed and entered, made no express Soffolk, and he had a very good private practice. He provision for those costs, and tbe taxing master refused to acted as solicitor to the Noriolk and Suffolk Building allow them to the plaintiff on taxation. The judgment Society, to the Gorleston Gas Company, and to the Yar. expressly reserved liberty to either of the parties to apply to month Traders' Association. He was also secretary to the the court. The plaintiff then moved before Fry., J., that Yarmouth Volunteer Drill Hall Company, steward of the the judgment might be varied or corrected by giving the Mapors of Hales Hall and Loddon Hall, clerk to the Yarplaintiff the costs of, and occasioned by, the adjourned motion, mouth Board of Guardians, Assegement Committee, and including the evidence used opon it. The defendant's counsel Rural Sanitary Authority, and superintendent registrar for raised the preliminary objection that the plaintiff was in effect the distriot. asking the court to re-hear the action, a thing which, as was decided in In re The St. Nazaire Company (27 W. R. 854, L R. 12 Ch. D. 88), it bad no jurisdiction to do. Fry, J., Messrs. Fox & Bousfield offered for sale at the Mart on Wedwas of opinion on the merits that the plaintiff was entitled to nesday last, the valuable freehold property in Lincoln's-innthe costs in question. And he held that the case of Viney fields formerly the premises of the Society for Promoting v. Chaplin (3 De G. & J. 282), showed that under either the Christian Knowledge. The property was put up in three liberty to apply reserved by the judgment, or the liberty to lots. Lot 1, comprising 67, Lincoln's-inn-fields and 77, Great apply implied in the order that the motion should stand over Queen-street, was not sold ; lot 2, 76, Great Queen-street, to the trial (for he was of opinion that every order carries realised £4,300, and lot 3, 72 and 73, Great Queen-street, within it in gremio liberty to apply to the court), he had was sold for $6,200.
Mr. ALAN HENRY BELLINGHAM, barrister, who has been
WINDING-UP NOTICES. elected M.P. for the county of Louth in the Home Rule interest, is the oldest son of Sir Alan Edward Bellingham,
JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. baronet, and was born in 1846. He was educated at Harrow
LIMITED IN CHANCBRY. and at Exeter College. Oxford, and was called to the bar at | CIVIL SERVICE MEAT SUPPLY AssociATION, LIMITED.-Petition for
winding up, presented May 25. directed to be heard before the Lincoln's-ino, in November, 1875.
sitting judge at the court of V.C. Bacon on June 5. Vanderpump, Mr. CHARLES STANHOPE BURKE BUSBY, solicitor, of Ches.
Gray's inn square, solicitor for the petitioner
JAMES THORN AND COMPANY, LIMITED.-By an order made by V.O. terfield, has been appointed by the Duke of Devonshire,
Malins, dated May 14, it was ordered that the company be wound Lord-Lieutenant of Derbyshire, to the office of Clerk of the
up. Bolton and Co, Temple gardens, Temple, solicitors for the Peace for that county, in succession to Mr. John Barber, petitioner
LLAN BERIS COPPER MINING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winddeceased. Mr. Busby is coroner for the Hundred of Scars
up, presented May 20, directed to be heard before the M.R. on dale. He was admitted a solicitor in 1838, and is in part June 5. Carr and Co, Rood lane, solicitors for the petitioner nership with his son, Mr. Charles George Busby.
MADEIRA AND MAMORE RAILWAY COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for
winding up, presented May 27, directed to be heard before the Mr. WILLIAM EAston, solicitor, of 13, Clifford's-inn, and M.R. on June 5. Clements, Gresham House, Old Broad st, soliCamberwell, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner citor for the petitioners
SYDENHAX STORES, LIMITED.--Petition for winding up, presented for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married
May 27, directed to be heard before the M.R. on June 5. Badham, Women for the Connties of Middlesex and Sarrey, and for Salters' hall ct, solicitor for the petitioner the Cities of London and Westminster.
[Gazette, May 28.] Mr. JAMES FUNSTON, solicitor, of 4, Finsbury-pavement,
EASTBOURNE HOTEL, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in May 28, directed to be heard before the M.R., On June 12. Lowless the Supreme Court of Judicature.
and Co, Martin's-lane, Cannon-street, solicitors for the petitioner
GRAFENBERG House (BARNET) HYDROPATHIC ESTABLISHMENT, Mr. HENRY HOLROYD, barrister, who has been appointed
LIMITED.-The M.R, has fixed June 10, at twelve, at his chambers, Judge of County Courts for Circuit No. 26, in succession to for the appointment of an official liquidator Mr. William Spooner, deceased, was called to the bar at the
SLATE COMPANY LIMITED.-The M.R. has by an order, dated Dec 19,
appointed Mr Alfred Audrey Broad, Walbrook, to be official Middle Temple in Trinity Term, 1853. He has practised
liquidator on the Oxford Circuit, and at the Stafford and Lichfield
[Gazette, June 1] Sessions, and he has been for several years a revising barrister.
FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED.
BACK BONB FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Wellington Arms Inn, Naylor st, Mr. JOHN ROBERTS JONES, solicitor, of Bala, has been ap St Helens, Lancaster. May 22 pointed Clerk to the Bala Board of Guardians, Assessment WIDOWS' AND ORPHANS' PENSION FOND OF THE LOYAL King's
LODGE FRIENDLY SOCIETY OF THE IMPROVED ORDER OF OLD Committee, and Rural Sanitary Authority. Mr. Jones was
FRIEXDS, Old Compton st, Soho. May 26 admitted a solicitor in 1869.
[Gazette, May 28.] Mr. LAYTON,' solicitor (of the firm of Paines, Layton, Cooper, & Pollock), of Gresham House, has been appointed a Com.
to ROYAL FOREST OF DEAN SICK AND BORIAL SOCIETY, Dean Forest
Christ Church Jubilee School, Gloucester. May 28 missioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of
FGazette, June 1.] Judicature.
Mr. FREDERICK ARTHUR LAKE, solicitor (of the firm of Day & Lake), of Runcorn, has been appointed a Notary Public.
Societies. Mr. PHILIP PROTHEROE SMITH, solicitor, mayor of Truro, has received the honour of Knighthood in commemoration of ASSOCIATED PROVINCIAL LAW SOCIETIES. the recent visit to Truro of the Prince and Princess The following are extracts from the report of the com. of Wales. Sir P. Smith is the son of Mr. Thomas Smith,
mittee for the year 1879:of Bideford, and brother of the Right Hon. Sir Montague
The association consists at present of twenty-two Smith. He was admitted a solicitor in 1832, and is in part.
members, as against twenty-three at the date of the last nership with Mr. Robert Maclean Paul. He is secretary
report, the Denbighshire and Flintshire Law Society having to the Vice-Warden of the Stannaries, and an alderman for
ceased to be a member. the borough
Two new law societies have been formed during the Mr. William HENRY TOLLER, solicitor and notary, of
year-the Scarborough Law Society, whose hon. sec. is Barnstaple, has been appointed Deputy-Registrar of the Mr. J. S. Kitching; and the Shropshire Law Society, Archdeaconry of Barnstaple. Mr. Toller is clerk to the whose hon. sec. is Mr. Henry J. Osborne, of Shifnal. Barnstaple Board of Guardians, and superintendent regis
These societies have not yet joined the association. The trar. He was admitted a solicitor in 1864, and is in partner.
total number of country law societies is thirty-three, ship with his father, Mr. John Henry Toller, clerk of the
twenty-two of whom are members of the association. A peace for Barnstaple.
list of these societies, in continuation of former liste, Mr. WilLIAM VENN, solicitor (of the firm of Venn & accompanies this report. No law societies have yet been Woodcock), of 15, New-ind, has been appointed a Commis established at Derby, Darbam, Ipswich, Norwich, Oxford, sioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judi or Yarmouth, or in the districts to which those towas cature.
The committee in its last report ventured to express the
hope that the council of the Incorporated Law Society, in DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP.
exeroising the powers vested in them by their supplemenWALTER CASH CLENNELL and JAMES FRASER, solicitors, tal charter, wonld have special regard to the position of 6, Great James-street, Bedford-row, London. May 31, 1880. the several societies whose presidents might be elected
(Gazette, June 1, 1880.) extraordinary members of council. It is gratifying to add
tbat at the last election of extraordinary members this principle was acted upon, and that the selection then made leaves little to be desired, the members having been chosen from the societies of Birmingham, Bristol, Gloucegtershire, Kent, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Notting
ham, Sheffield, and Sussex. WILD FOWL.
LAND REGISTRATION. The Home Secretary has, under the provisions of the Wild Real Property Amendment and Conveyancing Bills. The Fowl Preservation Act, made an order varying the close time sobject of ibe amendment of the law of real property was for wild fowl in the Parts of Holland, in the county of examined and discussed by the president of the IncorpoLincoln, so as to be from the 15th of March to the 31st of rated Law Society, Mr. N. T. Lawrence, and by Mr. Dees, August inclusive in each year.
I in two most valuable and suggestive papers read by them
New Orders, Etc.