IT MAY BE HOPED that the first judicial appointment of the Government marks the introduction of a new principle of selection of county court judges-we mean the principle of selection by merit. Mr. Holroyd, the new county court judge, is, in the opinion of all who know him, eminently qualified, both by his legal attainments and his candid and upright mind, to fill a post in filling which the first of these qualities have been sometimes wholly disregarded, and the second has been supposed to accompany most certainly fiery and pugnacious partisanship.

Constitution;" and the further resolution of the House in 1858, "That it is contrary to the usage and derogatory to the dignity of this House that any of its members should bring forward, promote, or advocate in this House any proceeding or measure in which he may have acted or been concerned, for or in consideration of any pecuniary fee or reward." It may be, as the late Lord Campbell always maintained, that there is no reason, in point of law, why any member of Parliament should not at the present day insist on the revival of the old practice of payment of wages. But these wages would, of course, be payable by the constituents generally; and a proposal by a section of a member's constituents to pay a yearly sum to him for advocating their special interests rests on a totally different footing.

BUT FOR THE FALLACIES Contained in a letter on the Hares and Rabbits Bill in the Times of Thursday, signed "B.," the terseness and vigour of the style might have induced us to attribute it to a learned Lord Justice, but the legal and economic unsoundness of the reasoning makes us hesitate to ascribe it to so high an authority. The term "freedom of contract," which the writer uses, has been called by some a fetish, and without adopting that description to its full extent, the phrase certainly sometimes stands for sound without sufficient meaning. Strictly stated, what is meant by freedom of contract? Does it mean liberty to make any promise? If so the liberty exists. Does it mean liberty to bind yourself by any obligation? If so no one contends it ought to exist. Ought there to be liberty to enter into a binding obligation to be slave to another, or to do an immoral act? If not, why not? Only because the State judges such relations and acts to be mischievous, and refuses to lend its sanction to provisions for their creation and performance. If then the State is of opinion that in any other branch of contract particular obligations are mischievous, why should it not interfere to except them from the general sanction which it attaches to innocuous contracts? It is here, then, that what may be called a legal fallacy exists, because the fallacy consists in leaving out of account the fact that contracts, so far as known to the law, need to be rendered effective by the law, and are not things which stand and effectuate themselves of their own force. But it is quite a different question what contracts ought to be brought under the class of exceptions, and in this respect economic considerations have an important, often a determining, influence. Now, one consideration of this nature lies upon the surface, and is illustrated by numerous instances. Where a monopoly exists, whether created by the Legislature or the effect of natural causes, the Legislature has frequently interposed to protect the interests of the State, which mean the interests of its citizens. Whether in a particular instance the monopoly is of such a nature as to justify the limitation of the so-called freedom of contract must be decided npon particular circumstances, but the matter must not be decided by vague appeals to sounding phrases and mere abstract reasoning.

THE CASE of Jones v. Rimmer, which will be found noted elsewhere, deserves attention, although the omission against which it warns practitioners is not very likely to be made. Upon a sale by the court of leasehold property one of the lots was described as "all those four leasehold houses situated, &c., and now let at the respective rents of," &c., but the ground rent subject to which the houses were held was not stated. The purchaser applied to be discharged from his contract on the ground that the particulars of sale were misleading in not stating that the property comprised in the lot was held subject to a ground-rent of £43 a year. The Court of Appeal decided in favour of the purchaser, and the Master of the Rolls said that he was justified in conclud

ing from the particulars that the property he was buying was not subject to any substantial ground-rent. There were special circumstances in favour of this conclusion in the particular case; and it is unquestionably right that the onus should be thrown on the vendor of stating distinctly and fully what it is that is going to be sold, but one cannot help suggesting that the tendency of the decision in the recent case is somewhat dangerous, and that a purchaser who chooses to bid for a property described as leasehold, without taking the trouble to enquire whether it is or is not held at a substantial ground-rent, does not deserve much sympathy.

THERE HAVE BEEN NO SILK GOWNS at the Scottish bar except those of the Lord Advocate and the SolicitorGeneral; hence the arrival in the Court of Session on Saturday week of a bevy of four silk-clad gentlemen who announced that they were the bearers of patents appointing them Queen's Counsel appears to have occasioned considerable embarrassment. The Lord Advocate

after informing the court that he and his companions had been appointed Queen's Counsel at the English bar, asked that the patents might be recorded "in order to give them due precedence at the bar." But the Lord President said that as there was no inner and outer bar, he did not see any reason for the court taking special cognizance of their appointment. This was somewhat depressing, but the judicial congratulations appear to have been hearty, and possibly the Scottish courts and bar may hereafter awake to the advantages of an inner bar.

ON SATURDAY LAST, the day appointed for keeping the Queen's Birthday, the judges in the courts of the Chancery and Common Law Divisions, in honour of the day, appeared in full costume, as did also all the Queen's Counsel. Thus has been at length established a happy uniformity of practice, which also extends to the sittings of the courts. In recent times, before the Judicature Acts came into operation, it was the custom in the Chancery Division for the Lord Chancellor, by general order, to make the Queen's Birthday a holiday, and since that time several of the chancery judges have kept up the custom, and last year not one of them sat on that day, except the Master of the Rolls. The latter learned judge, however, this year expressed his intention to act as his brethren should decide to act, but so benficial was the influence of his example last year that everyone of the chancery courts was this year open on the Queen's Birthday.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD that before the Chancery Paymaster removed to the Royal Courts of Justice the number of persons daily entering that building was counted and was found to be about 5,000; but since the Chancery Paymaster has had his offices in the building, the number of persons daily entering has been officially estimated at 10,000 at least.

The annual dinner of the Pitt Club was held on June 2 in the large dining-room attached to the Grosvenor Gallery Library, when the chair was occupied by Dr. Spinks, Q.C.

The members of the Northern and North-Eastern Circuits have invited Sir Farrer Herschell, Q.C., M.P., to a dinner to take place at Willis's Rooms, King. street, St. James's, on Saturday next, the 12th inst., in order to celebrate his recent appointment as Her Majesty's Solicitor-General.

TINKERING THE BILLS OF SALE ACT. THE representatives of the commercial classes having succeeded in passing, in the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, one of the most ill-considered pieces of legislation in the Statute-book, are now busily engaged in trying to "amend" it. A little Bill, covering only two sides of a sheet of paper, to which we drew attention last session, has been again introduced by Mr. Whitwell and other gentlemen. It is entitled a " Bill to amend the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, Amendment Act." We are tolerably familiar with the Act of 1878, but where is this "Amendment Act" which is now to be amended to be found? Not in the Statute-book at all events. And as the Bill provides (clause 3) that it is to be cited as "The Bills of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act, 1880," we conclude that the title of the Bill is merely a little device to bewilder the profession, like the celebrated proviso at the end of sec

tion 6 of the Act of 1878.

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Passing from this matter we come to the contents of the Bill, which consists, first, of an attempt to make into law the doctrine of the Common Pleas Division in Davies v. Goodman (28 W. R. 150). It is proposed to repeal section 8 of the Act of 1878, which, as our readers will remember, avoids an unattested and unregistered bill of sale in certain cases only; and to provide that every bill of sale to which the principal Act applies shall be duly attested, and shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of that Act within seven days after the execution thereof, and shall set forth the consideration for which it was given, and such bill of sale shall not be valid as a security or have any force or effect either at law or in equity until it has been so attested and registered as aforesaid."

First of all, let us look at the language of this curious clause. As the Bill is to be read with the principal Act (clause 2), the definition of "bill of sale" in that Act will be applicable; hence the words "to which the principal Act applies" are surplusage. The words "shall be" before "registered" are also surplusage, and moreover raise a doubt whether "duly attested" means attested as prescribed in the principal Act. The words "within seven days after the execution thereof" are inaccurate as a statement of the provisions of the Act of 1878. What that Act provides is that the bill of sale, &c., shall be presented to, and the copy and affidavit filed with, the registrar" within seven clear days after the making or giving of such bill of sale." The new clause attaches no penalty to not setting forth the consideration, and apparently a bill of sale not setting it forth is to be valid as a security, and to have force and effect both "at law and in equity." The question whether this is so or not will, however, certainly be the subject of litigation. "Such bill of sale"—that is, a bill of sale duly attested, registered, and setting forth the consideration-"shall not be valid, &c., until it has been so attested and registered as aforesaid"!! And can the draftsman who has framed the provision that "such bill of sale" shall not "have any force or effect at law or in equity" have heard of the Judicature Act?

So much for the language of this clause; now let us turn to its substance. Ought the bill of sale to be made void as against the grantor if the conditions as to attestation and registration are not complied with? It does not seem unreasonable that the bill of sale should be made void as against the grantor if the provisions intended for his protection are not observed, although it may be suggested that the risk that the grantee will lose his security in case of bankruptcy or execution furnishes already a very substantial guarantee against the omission of the conditions necessary to due attestation. But the Bill proposes to go further, and to provide that "if the grantor of a bill of sale shall, within four months after the registration thereof, commit or suffer any of the acts or defaults deemed to be and included under the expression 'acts of

bankruptcy,' such bill of sale shall be void as a preferential security as against the trustee of the debtor, and shall only entitle the grantee or holder thereof to rank as an ordinary creditor against the debtor's estate." It will be observed that when once the grantor of the bill of sale has, within the four months, committed an act of bankruptcy, the bill of sale is to be void as a preferential security against a trustee under the bankruptcy of the grantor at any time afterwards. Can this be intended? The result of the enactment of such a provision will probably be to put an end to the making of bills of sale. If this is the object, it would be better to accomplish it by direct legislation, and not by a side wind.

We incline to think, indeed, that the abolition of bills of sale must be the object of the framers of the Bill, for, not content with these provisions, they propose (clause 9) that "within seven days after the registration of a bill of sale, notice thereof shall be given by the grantee by advertisement in the London Gazette, and such notice shall state the name, address, and occupation of the person by whom the bill of sale was given, and also the name of the person to whom or in whose favour it was given." Considering the wide sweep of the provisions of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, which imposed the necessity of registration as bills of sale on classes of instruments executed by persons very far removed from the class for whose protection the provisions of the present Bill are intended, this proposal seems to us to be simply outrageous.

By another clause it is provided that every bill of sale, whereby the grantee shall have power to seize "any property," shall have attached thereto, or written thereon, a schedule containing an inventory of all the goods and chattels therein referred to, "and such bill of sale shall be a security only in respect of the goods and chattels enumerated and described in the said schedule, which were the property of the grantor at the time of the execution of the bill of sale, and shall so continue during the period within which the bill of sale is a subsisting security." It is curious to speak of goods comprised in a bill of sale as continuing the property of the grantor, but reading this clause according to the natural construction, it would really appear that by selling any of the goods and chattels comprised in the schedule the grantor of the bill of sale is to be able at any time to deprive the grantee of his security. The bill of sale is to be a security only in respect of the goods and chattels described in the schedule which continue to be the property of the grantor during the period within which the bill of sale is a subsisting security. Can this really be meant? Apparently not, for a proviso immediately follows that, "in default of such schedule as aforesaid, the grantee or holder of a bill of sale shall thereby be entitled to seize or take possession of such only of the grantor's goods and chattels as were comprised in, or referred to, in the bill of sale, and were the property of the grantor at the time when such bill of sale was executed." That is to say, the clause provides (1) that there shall be a schedule, and the bill of sale shall be a security only in respect of the goods mentioned in such schedule, and which continue the property of the grantor; (2) that if there is no schedule, the grantee may nevertheless seize such of the grantor's goods as are comprised in the bill of sale, and are the property of the grantor at the time of the execution of the bill of sale. Comment appears to be needless on this

clause.

Clause 5 requires an affidavit to be made by the grantor that he is the absolute owner of all the goods and chattels described in such bill of sale or schedule, and that he has not charged, assigned, or incumbered the same; and this affidavit is to be filed with the bill of sale.

But the clause which needs the most vigilant attention on the part of the profession is the 7th, which proposes to provide that "a solicitor of the Supreme Court attest

ing a bill of sale shall, before the execution thereof, explain its full meaning and effect to the grantor." This is, of course, an attempt to convert into law the views expressed by Vice-Chancellor Malins in Hill v. Kirkwood (ante, p. 304). It is apparently not intended that the bill of sale shall be void if not duly explained, for clause 6, as we have seen, only provides that a bill of sale shall not be valid as a security until it has been attested "in accordance with the provisions" of the Act of 1878, and under those provisions it is sufficient if the attestation states the fact that the effect of the bill of sale has been explained to the grantor. The effect of the new clause will apparently be to render any solicitor attesting a bill of sale liable to the summary jurisdiction of the court if he does not explain the "full meaning and effect" of the instrument. Considering the length of time it takes to explain the full meaning and effect of any legal instrument to an ignorant grantor, and the probability that after all he will not comprehend the explanation, it will be seen that, if this clause becomes law, solicitors will either have to decline to attest bills of sale or to raise their fees to a sum proportioned to the length of time employed and the risk run in attesting the bill of sale.

The Bill we have been considering appears to us to be ill-considered as regards objects, and singularly defective in drafting. We hope the law societies will devote a little consideration to it, and some one of the numerous new legal members of Parliament might usefully employ himself in pointing out its defects.

CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

Fluctuations are to be expected in rules based upon the "policy of the law"-that is to say, on the opinions on certain general questions entertained by the judges for the time being; but it is not very often that these changes occur so suddenly as in the doctrine to which the case of Roussillon v. Roussillon, (28 W. R. 623) relates. Up to last month one would have said with tolerable confidence that the doctrine as to contracts in restraint of trade might be expressed in two rules-(1) such contracts if unlimited in point of area are invalid; (2) such contracts are invalid if they are unreasonable, one test of such unreasonableness being that the restraint imposed is larger than is required for the protection of the interests of the person in favour of whom the restraint is imposed. The well-known old cases in which the first of these rules was, or was supposed to be, laid down proceeded on the doctrine that no man ought to be allowed by contract to deprive the community of his industry and skill. Such contracts tend to discourage enterprize, prevent competition, and deprive the public of the services of men in the employments for which they are best fitted. On the other hand, it is obvious that, in order to dispose to the greatest advantage of a business or other property of the like nature, a man must be enabled to preclude himself from entering into competition with the purchaser. The second of the rules above mentioned seems to indicate the proper adjustment of these conflicting principles, and in Leather Cloth Company v. Lorsont (18 W. R. 572, L. R. 9 Eq. 345), Vice-Chancellor James showed a disposition to regard it as the only rule. He expressed an opinion that the previous cases had not laid down the rule that a covenant in restraint of trade unlimited as to area was necessarily invalid. But that case related practically to the non-disclosure of a trade secret, as to which it is clear that a covenant unlimited as to area is valid. Accordingly, in the subsequent case of Allsopp v. Wheatcroft (21 W. R. 102, L. R. 15 Eq. 59), Vice-Chancellor Wickens held that Leather Cloth Company v. Lorsont was no authority for a departure "from the recognized rule as to limitations of space," and since that decision, in 1872, we are not aware that the doctrine has been judicially impugned.

But in Roussillon v. Roussillon Mr. Justice Fry has denied the existence of any such doctrine. He had, he said, "to choose between two sets of cases. He adhered to those which refused to recognize this rule." "How could such a rule," he said, "be reconcileable with the different systems of trading? Many trades extended over the whole kingdom which, by their very nature, were extensively diffused; others were localized. If this rule obtained there would be complete protection for the latter class of trade, while it would prohibit complete protection to the former. The rule, if it existed, would apply to two classes of cases: (1) where want of limitation of space was unreasonable, and (2) where the universality of the contract was reasonable. In the former case, where the universality was unreasonable, the rule would operate nothing, because that was already covered by the rule that the contract must be reasonable. It would only operate in cases in which the universality of prohibition was reasonablethat was, the rule would operate just where it ought not."

The rule is, no doubt, an arbitrary one, and the other rule that a contract in restraint of trade must be reasonable would seem to be in theory more just. But has not the learned judge overlooked the litigation which the adoption of this as the only rule would occasion? If there is no rule requiring these contracts to be limited as regards space, the tendency will be to make them all unlimited, and then it will have to be settled by judicial decision whether the contract is or is not reasonable. How judges may differ on this point is well shown by comparing the decision of Vice-Chancellor Wickens in Allsopp v. Wheatcroft with that of Mr. Justice Fry in the present case. In the former case the Vice-Chancellor held that an agreement, unrestricted as to area, entered into by a traveller for the Burton firm, not to sell or procure orders for any Burton ale other than that brewed by Allsopp for two years, was void because it went beyond anything that was required for the plaintiff's protection; for "it could not have been held necessary for the plaintiff's protection to prevent the defendant from soliciting orders for the ale of other Burton brewers in places where Burton ale had never been sold or heard of." In the recent case Mr. Justice Fry held that an agreement, unrestricted as to area, entered into by a traveller for French champagne merchants, not to represent any other champagne house for two years was valid, because, "looking at the extent of the plaintiffs' trade and its diffusion over England, looking at the facilities of communication which now existed, he could not say that it was made plain to him that this contract exceeded in extent that which the plaintiffs were entitled to for the protection of their trade." It may perhaps be questioned whether, on the whole, the public would be gainers by the substitution of the expensive process of obtaining the varying opinions of judges on each particular case for the rule which compels the limits of the area of restriction to be ascertained by the parties at the time of the contract. regards authority, Ward v. Byrne (5 M. & W. 548) and Hinde v. Gray (1 Man. & Gr. 195) have been understood to lay down, and do lay down, the rule which Mr. Justice Fry rejects. We need hardly point out that, until the doctrine enunciated in the recent case has been reviewed by the Court of Appeal, it will not be safe to assume that a contract in restraint of trade unrestricted as to area can in any case be valid.

As

The American legal journals record the death of Mr. Sanford E. Church, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. Judge Church, says the Albany Law Journal, suffered from the worst infliction to which a judge can ever be subjected-namely, the constant use of his name as a contingent candidate for the Presidency, but in spite of this, it is due to his memory to declare that he has gone to his grave with the reputation of an honest and unprejudiced magistrate.

Recent Decisions.

THE AUTHORITY OF PREVIOUS DECISIONS. (Osborne v. Rowlett, M. R. 28 W.¦R. 365, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 785.)

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We took occasion some time ago to comment on various expressions which fell from the Master of the Rolls with regard to the extent to which previous decisions of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction are binding. We observe that in the present case he again expressed similar views to those on which we commented. He is by the report of that case made to say, Now, I have often said, and I repeat it, that the only thing in a judge's decision binding upon a subsequent judge is the prin ciple upon which the case was decided; but it is not sufficient that the case should have been decided upon & principle if that principle is not itself a right principle or one not applicable to the case, and it is for a subsequent judge to say whether or not it is a right principle; and, if not, he may himself lay down the true principle. In that case the previous decision ceases to be a binding authority."

We feel some doubt whether we quite clearly appre hend the meaning of this, or whether the real intention of the learned judge has been expressed in the reports. There is frequently great difficulty in extracting the exact result from the expressions used by a judge in an unwritten judgment. It is customary for judges to abuse the reporters if the idea they had in their minds is not quite clearly expressed, but only those behind the scenes in this respect, from having been reporters or having had to do with reporting, can tell the difficulty there often is in making unwritten judgments into entirely definite and clear propositions without running the risk of substituting the ideas of the reporter for those of the judge. The truth is that no one in speaking extempore is always quite accurate in his language. If the reports are correct, however, the doctrine thus propounded seems remarkably sweeping. It appears to amount to this:-No case can ever be binding except, so far as the subsequent judge (to use the somewhat compendious expression of the report) thinks that the principle which the previous judge applied to the case was correct, and was applicable. If the principle was correct, but inapplicable, then the case is not an authority. If the principle, though applicable, was not correct, then, also, the case is of no authority. This doctrine for enabling a judge to escape from the fetters of previous decisions reminds one of the jester's answer in "All's Well that Ends Well," and the barber's chair that suited all customers. We do not see how any previous decision can escape from it.

The ways in which judges in the interests of the law sometimes wriggle out of previous decisions are mar vellous and manifold. Sometimes they say that the principle was wrong, and that the facts being different in some particular (albeit immaterial to the principle), they will not follow the case. They will only treat it as binding with regard to the very same facts. The tendency has, however, generally been to regard a case exactly on all fours as concluded by a previous decision. According to the Master of the Rolls this is quite a mistake. In his view you must regard, not the actual decision as to given facts, but the principle. It would seem that the only cases in which the Master of the Rolls would treat previous decisions as authorities are cases where the facts are the same, and the principle laid down was applicable to these facts. But when one comes to consider it, the question whether the principle is applicable to the facts and whether the decision is correct are generally in substance convertible questions. The differences of judges on questions of principle are comparatively few. The practical effect of the Master of the Rolls' view would, if logically carried out, as it seems to us, be that very few previous decisions would be binding

on a judge if he thought them wrong. If you are bound only by the principle and not by the application of it, it can nearly always be shown that it is inapplicable to the facts if a judge thinks it wrong. This may be a desirable result, but it is certainly hardly in accordance with the ideas that have been hitherto prevalent.

It is worth noting that one of the most curious features of our system of judge-made law-viz., that a judge does not hold himself bound by a precedent if another judge has ventured to disregard it-will be found to be curiously illustrated in the case to which we have referred. If Vice-Chancellor A. decides so and so, ViceChancellor B. ought ex concessis to follow the previous decision, but if he does not Vice-Chancellor C. is altogether at large. It is, no doubt, necessary occasionally to temper the system of judge-made law, and evade previous decisions by pious frauds on the part of the judges; but we must say that the Master of the Rolls seems to go rather far in this respect, and if there is an admirable absence of judicial fraud, there is likewise a certain absence of judicial piety about his proceedings.

Cases of the Week.

APPEAL FOR COSTS-Order for NEW TRIAL-VARIATION OF CONDITION-COSTS OF FIRST TRIAL-In the House of Lords, on the 28th ult., in the case of Metropolitan Asylums District Board v. Hill, a question was argued as to the competency of an appeal. The action was brought to recover damages for a nuisance alleged to have been caused to the plaintiffs by the erection and maintenance of the Hampstead Small-pox Hospital, and for an injunction. At the trial, all the issues were found in favour of the plaintiffs, and Pollock, B., after argument of the case on further consideration, entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and granted an injunction. The Queen's Bench Division made absolute a rule for a new trial, the costs of the first trial to await the event of the second trial. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Queen's Bench Division as to the new trial, but varied the order by directing that the new trial should be granted on condition of the payment by the defendants of the costs of the first trial, the defendants to be allowed two months to elect whether they would appeal or not. Against this order the defendants appealed to the House of Lords, and, by the direction of the House, the question of competency was argued by one counsel on each side. For the respondents, it was argued that, both courts below having decided that there should be a new trial, the appellants now sought merely to get rid of the condition as to the payment of the costs of the new trial, and the appeal was brought for costs only. Lords SELBORNE, C., BLACKBURN, and WATSON, without calling on the counsel for the appellants, held that the appeal should be admitted, since the imposing by the Court of Appeal of a condition as to the payment of the costs of the first trial did not bring the case within the rule that an appeal will not be entertained for costs only. Their lordships, however, directed that the question of the costs of the present argument should be reserved until after the determination of the appeal.-SOLICITORS, Few & Co.; Bischoff, Bompas, & Bischoff.

SECURITIES FRAUDULENTLY PLEDGED BY BANKRUPT PLEDGE REDEEMED BY TRUSTEE OUT OF ESTATE-RIGHTS OF OWNER OF SECURITIES.-In a case of Ex parte De Chatonville, before the Court of Appeal on the 27th ult., some United States Bonds had been deposited by the owner with some bankers for safe custody. The depositees fraudulently pledged the bonds with a banking company, as security for advances made by the company to them, and afterwards became bankrupt. After the bankruptcy the owner of the bonds applied to the court for an order that the trustee should deliver up the bonds to her. The debt due to the company had been paid off by means of their general lien upon other property of the bankrupts which was in their hands, and the registrar ordered the bonds to be delivered up on the terms of the owner repaying to the trustee what the estate of the bankrupts had in effect paid to the company to redeem the

bonds. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, COTTON, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) reversed this decision, and ordered that the bonds should be unconditionally given up to the owner. They said though, as the bonds were negotiable instruments, the company would, on the principle of the decision in Goodwin v. Robarts (24 W. R. 987, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 476), have had a valid lien upon them as against the true owner, yet, as the company had been paid off, neither the fraudulent bankrupts he true owner. JAMES, L.J., said that the case might have nor their trustee could have any lien on the bonds as against been different if the trustee had advanced moneys of his own to redeem the bonds.-SOLICITORS, R. S. Taylor, Son, & Humbert; Truefitt & Gane.

MISLEADING PARTICULARS OF SALE-OMISSION TO STATE VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

THAT LEASE IS SUBJECT TO GROUND-RENT.-In the case of Jones v. Rimmer, before the Court of Appeal on the 2nd inst., the question arose whether a purchaser of leasehold property at a sale under the order of the court ought to be discharged from his purchase under the following circumstances. The property in question was lot No. 11 at the sale, which took place in Liverpool. Lot 11 was situate in Liverpool, and was described in the particulars of sale as four leasehold houses and a yard, respectively let at rents the amounts of which were mentioned, "the whole held for the residue of a term of seventy-five years from the 16th of September, 1845. This lot is offered for sale subject to a mortgage for £500, bearing interest at five per cent." It was not stated whether the property was subject to any ground-rent. Lots 8, 9, and 10 also consisted of leasehold houses in Liverpool. Lot 8 and lot 9 were stated to be held under the corporation of Liverpool. Nothing was said as to a ground-rent in the case of either of those lots. Most of the property in Liverpool which is held under the corporation of Liverpool is let at a peppercorn rent. This fact is well known in Liverpool, and the purchaser was aware of it. One of the conditions of sale provided that "the respective purchasers of lots 8, 9, 10, and 11 respectively, shall, by the respective assignments to them, enter into the usual covenants for paying and performing and observing the rents, covenants, and conditions of the respective leases, and indemnifying the vendors therefrom." After the sale the purchaser discovered that lot 11 was subject to a groundrent of £43, and he sought to be discharged from his purchase, on the ground that he believed the property to be free from ground-rent, and that he had been misled by the particulars of sale into this belief, and into giving a much larger sum for the property than he would have given had he been aware of the ground-rent. He made no inquiries before he bought about the terms of the lease, and the conditions of sale did not state that the lease could be inspected prior to the sale, though in fact the purchaser could have seen the lease if he had asked for it. It appeared that in the particulars of sale, as they were originally drawn, the amount of the ground-rent of lot 11 had been stated, but that the statement was accidentally struck out in settling the draft. On behalf of the vendors it was urged that, as the lease was mentioned in the particulars, the purchaser must be taken to have had constructive notice of its contents, and that there had been no misrepresentation by the vendors, inasmuch as they had made no representation whatever as to the terms of the lease. It was admitted that it is usual to state in the particulars of sale of leasehold property the amount of the ground-rent under which it is held, but it was said that it is equally usual, when the property is held at a peppercorn rent, to state that fact, and therefore it was said the omission to state anything about groundrent could lead to no inference one way or the other. And great reliance was placed on the condition which required that the purchasers of the four leasehold lots should enter into the usual covenants to pay the rents of the respective leases, and to indemnify the vendors. This, it was contended, necessarily led to the assumption that there was a rent to be paid in the case of each of those lots. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and COTTON and THESIGER, L.JJ.) held (affirming the decision of the Vice-Chancellor of the Lancaster court) that the purchaser must be discharged. JESSEL, M.R., admitted that he had felt great difficulty in making up his mind. But, he said, the real question was whether the particular of sale was a fair one, whether the purchaser was fairly told what he was buying, or whether he might not properly infer from it, as he had sworn that he