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RECENT DECISIONS ON DISCLAIMER BY

"TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY.

Two or three cases of considerable importance have recently been decided in the Common Law Divisions with regard to the subject of disclaimer of leasehold property by a trustee in bankruptcy. We propose, without going very deeply into the questions raised by these decisions, which would, perhaps, be beyond the compass of a short article, to place them in juxtaposition, and briefly to indicate the points decided.

The first of these decisions is Reed v. Harvey (28 W. R. 423, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 184). It was there decided that the 28th rule of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1871, which provides that the trustee in bankruptcy shall not execute a disclaimer of leasehold property without the leave of the court, does not mean that the disclaimer, if executed without such leave, shall be ineffectual, but merely that, as between the trustee and the court, it shall be the duty of the trustee to obtain such leave before disclaiming. We feel little doubt that this decision is right. The rule cannot modify, in this respect, the express provision of the Act itself, but the result might be somewhat strange. In Reed v. Harvey, the trustee disclaimed without the leave of the court, and it was held that this exonerated him from rent as though the lease had been surrendered at the time of the bankruptcy. Suppose the trustee had applied for and failed to obtain leave to disclaim? It would appear that, subject to any consequences that might follow by way of penalty upon him, he could nevertheless effectually disclaim. Of course, it would seldom happen that a trustee would venture to disclaim under such circumstances, but it does not seem to us that the state of the law in this respect is altogether satisfactory. It would be better, we should think, that the validity of the disclaimer should depend on an application to the court, with notice to all parties interested. It is curious to observe that this point might have arisen in the case, on which we commented last week, of Wilson v. Wallani (28 W. R. 597, L. R. 5 Ex. D. 155). There appears in that case to have been a disclaimer, but the parties supposed it to be ineffectual without the leave of the court, and a subsequent application for leave proved unsuccessful. It ultimately turned out that the disclaimer was a nullity as not being duly executed, quite apart from the absence of leave.

The next case to which we shall refer is Lowrey v. Barker (28 W. R. 559, L. R. 5 Ex. D. 170.) In this case various somewhat nice questions were mooted as to the position of a trustee in bankruptcy with regard to acts done by him between the time when the estate vested in him and a disclaimer of the lease. The trustee in this case retained the key of the premises for a certain period without actually using them, and then disclaimed them. It was argued that for the time of his actual retention of possession, previous to the disclaimer, he was either liable on an implied agreement to pay upon a quantum meruit for the occupation, or to pay damages as a trespasser. The court, however, held otherwise. They relied on the words of the statute which say that upon disclaimer the premises shall be deemed to have been surrendered from the date of the adjudication. The landlord, they said, might have protected himself by calling on the trustee to elect whether he would disclaim or not, under section 24 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. Bramwell, L.J., put the whole case in a few words. "It seems to me impossible to hold that a power of disclaimer, given for the benefit of the estate, can only be exercised on the terms of its trustee becoming a wrongdoer and a trespasser; nor can it be possible to imply a contract to pay for the occupation on a quantum meruit in respect of an occupation which, had there been no disclaimer, would have been as assignee of the lease."

It is a question, however, whether this case goes further than holding that where the trustee has merely retained possession while he determined whether to disclaim or not

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but has not used the premises beneficially to the estate; upon disclaimer is free from liability. Thesiger, LJ., in whose judgment Cockburn, C.J., concurred, says, I desire to guard myself against being supposed to lay down as a general principle that a trustee in bankruptcy who, after having had actual occupation of the bankrupt's leasehold premises without payment, disclaims the property, is under no personal liability. It seems manifestly unjust that the landlord should be remitted to proof in bankruptcy, and should thus be a sufferer over and above the other creditors of the bankrupt in respect of a damage to him, which, even under the powers given to him by section 24 of the Bankruptcy Act, he could not wholly prevent, and which is incurred after the bankruptcy, and for the benefit of the general body of the creditors. On the other hand there is no reason, as a matter of justice, why the bankrupt's estate should not be called upon to indemnify the trustee for what he is called upon to pay in respect of an occupation which he need not and would not have enjoyed except for the purpose of increasing that estate." It does seem very hard that in the case of a beneficial occupation by the trustee by which the estate is benefited, the landlord should be without remuneration, except by way of proof in bankruptcy, but it does seem very difficult to work out the legal relations of the parties so as to give any compensation to him, having regard to the provisions of the Act. It is difficult to imply a contract which clearly was not that under which the occupation took place, and, on the other hand, it seems still more difficult to look on the trustee as a trespasser. It would be a merely contingent contract or trespass at the time of its existencea very unsatisfactory notion-and the words of the Act are strongly against such a mode of viewing the transaction. It seems to us that the difficulties dealt with by Thesiger, L.J., ought to be settled by express statutory provision, and we hope that in any future Bankruptcy Act this may be done.

Recent Decisions.

WAY OF NECESSITY.

(Corporation of London v. Riggs, M.R., 28 W. R. 610.) An interesting point was decided in this case, apparently for the first time. Is the way of necessity implied in favour of a man who grants land entirely surrounding a close which he retains, a general right of way, or a right of way limited to the necessity at the time of the grant? In other words, if, at that time, the way is needed for agricultural purposes only, can it afterwards be used for carting materials for the erection of a house on the close retained? Looking at the matter on principle, it would seem that the right must be limited. The reason for allowing this exception to the rule that a man cannot derogate from his own grant is stated to be that otherwise the close retained would be useless; this result is obviated by implying a grant of a right of way for such purposes as are necessary at the time of the grant. This is the ground on which the Master of the Rolls decided that the right must be limited to these purposes, but we think a stronger reason might be found. Such a right may fairly be supposed to be in the contemplation of the purchaser of the surrounding land, but he can hardly be taken to anticipate all the uses to which the owner of the reserved close may desire at any future time to turn it. The purchaser may be willing to buy subject to a right of way for ascertained purposes, because he then knows the amount of detriment his land will sustain. A right to use the way for agricultural purposes only may be immaterial to him; not so a right of way which may at any time be enlarged to a right to bring over his land the building materials for a row of cottages, and a right of way for the occupants of the cottages and their children and friends

for ever. If the owner of the close retained meant to reserve such a right of way, he ought, in fairness to his purchaser, to have expressly stipulated for it.

As regards the case before the court, the decision of the Master of the Rolls seems to be unassailable, but the learned judge rather went out of his way to intimate an opinion that the same rule applies to the case where a man grants a close and retains the surrounding land. With submission, we doubt whether this is so. Surely the grantor must be taken to grant the use of the close for all purposes, and not merely for the purpose for which it is used at the time of the grant. If so, does not the rule against a man derogating from his grant apply to prevent him from practically restricting the use of the close to certain purposes, by denying a right of way for any other purposes? Considering that the purchaser of the close will certainly be under the impression that he can use his land for any purpose, is it not fair that if the vendor means to restrict the use of the land, by restricting the right of way to it, the onus should be thrown on him of doing so by express stipulation in the conveyance ?

Reviews.

COUNTY COURT PRACTICE.

By

A COMPLETE PRACTICE OF THE COUNTY COURTS; INCLUDING
THAT IN ADMIRALTY AND BANKRUPTCY, &c.
G. PITT-LEWIS, Barrister-at-Law, assisted by H. A. DE
COLYAR, Barrister-at-Law. Two vols. Stevens &
Sons.

This is by far the most elaborate treatise which has yet
appeared on County Court Practice. It opens with a sketch
of the history and constitution of the ancient county courts,
to the jurisdiction and powers of which the courts
held under the modern County Courts Acts have
succeeded (9 & 10 Vict. C. 95, 8. 3); and it
ends with a treatise on the Jurisdiction and Practice in
Bankruptcy. The amount of information given, and
the variety of subjects treated of in the intervening
chapters, can only be appreciated by a reference to the
table of contents. The mode of execution of the work
may be judged of by an examination of the chapter on
Appeals (chapter 17, book 2)—a subject which, more
than any other connected with county courts, needs
elucidation. The chapter is divided into three sec-
tions. The first discusses the question when an
appeal lies, and the second and third are devoted
respectively to the modes of appeal by special case and by
motion. Under the first section a general summary is
first given of the law relating to appeals, and this is
followed by the statement in detail of the enactments
and cases governing the right to appeal. The section on
Appeal by Special Case deals very fully and accurately
with the subject, and in the subsequent section on
Appeal by Motion, all the cases are noticed and dis-
cussed with care and intelligence. This is, as far as
have been able to ascertain, a fair specimen of the part
of the book relating to the general jurisdiction and
practice of the county courts. It is very clearly written
and is always practical. In book 5 of volume 2 there is
dealt with the most difficult, as regards satisfactory
treatment, of all the branches of county court juris-
diction-the jurisdiction and proceedings under special
statutes, and here we think the author has been re-
markably successful. He deals, first of all, with the
general practice in cases of special statutory jurisdiction,
and then groups the statutes under five heads :-Statutes
relating to penalties and forfeitures; special statutes to
recover moneys other than penalties; statutes provid-
ing for the settlement of disputed matters; statutes
conferring an administrative jurisdiction, and statutes
relating to matters of public concern. The great diffi-
culty in dealing with these Acts is to know how
much of them to reprint. Mr. Pitt-Lewis has, we i

we

think, overcome this difficulty, and has given so much of each statute, either in effect or in the words of the enactment, as explains the jurisdiction of the court. For instance, he prefaces his chapter on the Jurisdiction and Proceedings under the Charitable Trusts Acts by an outline of the constitution and powers of the Charity Commissioners-certainly an essential preliminary to comprehending the jurisdiction conferred by the Charitable Trusts Acts on the county court. The index is very elaborate, and there is an excellent tabular index to the County Courts Acts and Rules. The book appears to us to be characterized by intelligence in design and care in execution, and is likely to become the standard County Court Practice.

STAMPS.

A DIGEST OF THE STAMP DUTIES, AND OF THE JUDICIAL
DECISIONS THEREON. With Notes. By GUALTER
C. GRIFFITH, Barrister-at-Law, and of the Inland
Revenue Department. EIGHTH EDITION. Vacher &

Sons.

We have used Mr. Griffith's book for several years, and have found it of great value. In the present edition it appears in an enlarged form, containing abstracts of the Legacy and Succession Duty Acts, and considerable additions to the Notes. The new probate and administration duties are given, with the form of account now required. Looking through the Digest of Cases, we have, found all the recent decisions which occurred to us, except Fisher v. Calvert (27 W. R. 301), which should have followed Buck v. Robson at p. 204. The book will be found a most conveniently arranged digest of the stamp laws.

LAW DICTIONARY.

A NEW LAW DICTIONARY AND INSTITUTE OF THE WHOLE
LAW. By ARCHIBALD BROWN, Barrister-at-Law.
SECOND EDITION. Stevens & Haynes.

Mr. Brown has revised his Dictionary and adapted it to the changes effected by the Judicature Acts, and it now constitutes a very useful work to put into the hands of any student or articled clerk, and a work which the practitioner will find of value for reference. There are here and there headings which we should like to see enlarged-for instance, under Bills of Sale, some notice of the attestation by a solicitor should be given; but, on the whole, Mr. Brown has carried out very successfully his design of compressed statement and avoidance of itera

tion.

General Correspondence.

RULES OF APRIL, 1880.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-It may be of service to your readers to know that the Frobate Court considers that ord. 37, r. 3c., does not apply to that Division, and that all affidavits, the jurats of which are in accordance with the above rule, will be rejected. The ground of the objection is that the Probate Division is not expressly named in the rules. If the objection be well founded (which I doubt), surely there is no reason why the Probate Division should not adopt the form of jurat provided by the rule. May 22, 1880.

J. H.

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT COSTS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,--We would refer "X. & Co" to Helps v. Clayton (13 W. R. 161). D. & T. May 22, 1880.

Cases of the Week. 2

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APPEAL- SECURITY FOR COSTS SEPARATE APPEALS FROM DIFFERENT ORDERS IN SAME ACTION.In a case of Yeatman v. Snow, before the Court of Appeal on the 25th inst., the defendants applied for an order that the plaintiff should give security for the costs of two appeals which he had presented from two orders in the action. The plaintiff had already been ordered by the court to deposit £15 as security for the costs of another appeal which he had presented from another order in the action. The plaintiff appeared in person, and urged that the three appeals ought to be heard together, and that the security which he had been ordered to give, and which he had since given, was sufficient for the costs of all the three appeals. And he stated that he had given three distinct notices of appeal because he had been told by the officer of the court that it was necessary to give a separate notice with respect to each order appealed from. Upon inquiry, it appeared that this advice bad been given by one of the junior clerks of the registrar. JESSEL, M. R., said that this was an entire mistake. Under the old practice, one petition of appeal might be presented from any number of orders in the same action, provided that the appeal was in time. And now, any number of orders between the same parties could be appealed from by one notice of appeal. And the court (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and COTTON, L.JJ.) ordered that the three appeals should be consolidated and heard together, and that the £15 already deposited should be security for the costs of all three appeals. The costs of the motion for security were to be costs of the appeals. SOLICITORS, Bolton, Robbins, & Busk; Shakespear.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-PROMISSORY NOTE PAYABLE THREE MONTHS AFTER DEMAND PROOF OF DEMAND-PAYMENT OF INTEREST.-In 8 Case of Brown v. Rutherford, before the Court of Appeal on the 25th inst., the question arose whether a debt claimed in an administration action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The claim was made in respect of a promissory note which had been given by the testator. The note bore date the 20th of May, 1857, and was in these terms: "Three months after demand I promise to pay Mr. R. Rutherford the sum of £150 for value received." The testator died in 1869. The payee of the note died in 1878, and the claim to prove was made by his executor. The note had been found after the death of the payee among his papers by his executor. On it was the following indorsement:

"Interest, 12th November, 1857, £3 15s.

Do. 12th May, 1858, £3 15s." There was no evidence whether the note had been paid or not, but the testator's executor deposed that no demand for payment had been made upon him after the testator's

death

until, after the death of the payee, the claim was made in the action by his executor. The Statute of Limitations was relied upon as a defence to the claim. In answer to this, it was urged that the statute did not begin to run until a demand for payment was made, and that there was no evidence of any demand having been made befo re the action. The reply to this was that the payment of interest, as proved by the indorsements, was evidence that a demand for payment of the principal must have been made. Hall, V.C., held that the payment of interest was not evidence of a demand, and that the lapse

of time afforded no evidence of satisfaction of the note when it was found in the possession of the payee. And his lordship admitted the claim for £150, with interest for twenty years. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES, and COTTON, LJJ.), reversed this decision. JESSEL, M.R., said that the indorsements of payment of interest were evidence of a demand for payment of the principal having been made. The natural inference from the payment of interest was that it was paid for forbearance in demanding a debt which was due. His lordship thought that the indorse

ments were evidence against both the parties to the note, though, no doubt, there had been a mistake in making the interest run from the date of the note, instead of from the date of the demand. On this ground, therefore, the statute applied. But his lordship also thought that, considering the circumstances, and especially the lapse of time, it ought to be presumed that the note had been paid, independently of the

indorsements as to interest. It was not necessary to decide that point, but it must not be supposed that the mere production of a promissory note, payable on demand, wenty years old, would entitle the holder to payment of the amount. His lordship thought that the doctrine as to stale demands would apply. JAMES, L.J., expressed his concurrence, and said that he thought the case could not be distinguished from Bamfield v. Tupper (7 Ex. 27)-SOLICITORS, Shum, Crossman, & Co.; Henderson & Buckle.

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IMMORAL BOOK-INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT RIGHT TO PROTECTION OF COURT.In a case of Dodson v. Martin, before the Master of the Rolls on the 27th inst., a motion was made for an injunc tion to restrain the publication of a book, a copy of a book published by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's book was stated to be published with the object of exposing certain alleged improper directions in relation to confession in the Church of England, and contained numerous extracts from a book called, "A Guide to the Priesthood," published for private circulation amongst priests. JESSEL, M.R., perused some of the extracts, and came to the conclusion that they were of an indecent or immoral character, if sold to be read by the public. The objection was not taken by the defendant that the book on that ground was not entitled to protection. JESSEL, M.R., overruled certain other objections to the plaintiff's right to the injunction, and in granting the same, said that there were certainly many extracts in the book which were decidedly of an immoral character, and, although the book was published avowedly with the object of checking certain alleged tendencies to immorality, he was by no means sure they would effect that object. He felt by no means clear that he ought to extend the protection of the court to such a book as the plaintiff's; but, as the point was not taken on the other side, he did not think a judge ought, mero motu, to refuse to grant the injunction. He therefore made the order asked for.-SOLICITORS, Macarthur & Son; N. Jourdain.

COPYRIGHT-RESERVATION OF RIGHT OF REPRODUCTION IN VOLUME FORM-PRODUCTION OF SERIAL-CONFLICT OF EVIDENCE INJUNCTION-BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE.-In a case of Johnson v. Egan, before the Master of the Rolls on the 26th inst., a question arose whether an infringement of copyright had been caused by the defendant under the following circumstances. It appeared that the defendant had sold the plaintiff the copyright in a novel, reserving to himself a liberty to reproduce the novel in "volume form." The novel had been published some years ago by the plaintiff in a weekly publication, and was now being republished by the defendant in a weekly form, the intention being that the novel when completed could be bound in a volume. The plaintiff moved for an injunction to restrain the defendant from publishing the book, and there was a conflict of evidence in the affidavits as to the meaning of the term "volume form" in the trade. JESSEL, M.R., said that, having regard to the conflict of evidence, he did not consider the plaintiff's title was made out sufficiently satisfactorily to enable him to grant an interlocutory application. His impression, however certainly, on the affidavits, was that the defendant was right, on the ground, to a great extent, that his witnesses distinguished the two terms, publication in a "volume" and in a "volume form." He, moreover, did not see how the plaintiff would really be injured by allowing the publication until the trial the defendant could keep an account, and the plaintiff did not state in his affidavit that he had sold many of the back numbers containing the novel, although he no doubt said that certain back numbers had been sold. To his mind affidavits to be worth anything must be precise and not couched in general terms, and therefore he could not place much reliance on the alleged injury that would be done to the plaintiff. On the other hand, great injury might be done to the defendant. He also thought there had been some sort of acquiescience in the publication sufficient at all events to disentitle the plaintiff to an interlocutory injunction. He therefore refused the injunction and reserved the question of costs until the trial.— SOLICITORS, Benham & Tindell; Allen & Son.

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At the annual general court held at the hall of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery- lane, on Thursday, the 27th of May, the following being present, viz. :-Mr. L. Desborough (chairman), and Messrs. Boodle, Burgess, Parkin, Styan, Collison, Smith, Steward, Giraud, Drew, Doyle, and others, and A. B. Carpenter (secretary), the directors' report and statement of accounts for the past year were read, and officers for the ensuing year were elected, and the ordinary general business was transacted.

The following is a copy of the report

The sixty-third report of the board of directors to the annual general board, Thursday, 27th of May, 1880, Laurence Desborough, Esq., in the chair:

1. Your directors have the pleasure of submitting to the members of the association a report of their proceedings and the accounts for the last twelve months.

2. Your directors have considered thirty cases of the primary class, and have distributed amongst them the aggregate sum of £1,362 10s.

3. They have also considered numerous applications of the secondary or non-members' class, which have come before them, and they have distributed the sum of £150 placed at their disposal amongst nineteen cases.

4. Your directors recommend to the general court that a sum of £200 be placed at their disposal for the cases of nonmembers for the ensuing year.

5. Your directors have the pleasure to report that they have received towards the funds of the association two donations, one of £5 58. from the principal and ancients of Stapleinn and one of £3 3s. from the late treasurer of the Middle Temple. They have also much pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of £484 7s. 6d., being the net proceeds of £500 consols which the executors of the late Miss Harriett Hurst bad (under the advice of their solicitors, Messrs. Cresse, Sons, & Riley) granted to the association. This amount, with a small addition from their general balance, has enabled your directors to increase the holding in £3 per Cent. Reduced from £1,380 78. 4d. to £2,000.

6. The several investments now belonging to the association are as follows, viz:

New 3 per Cents.

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3 per Cent. Consols

3 per Cent. Reduced

India 4 per Cents.

Great Indian Peninsular Railway Stock

East Indian Railway Company: (Annuity Class B).

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£22,480 11 9

£1.600 0 0 £2,000 0 0

£465 13 2

£2,500 0 0

£6,837 10 0

The dividends received last year amounted to £1,353 118. 1d.

7. There are now 251 annual subscribers, the amount received from whom for the past year has been £514 108., which sum, added to the dividends received from the above investments, makes the income for the year £1,868 18. 1d. 8. Your directors report with regret the deaths of six members during the past year, viz:-Mr. E. F. Burton, Mr. Thomas Burgoyne, Mr. C. U. Price, Mr. R. B. Follett, Mr. H. S. Law, and Mr. George Carlisle. During the same period thirteen new members have joined the association, of whom two are life members, and eleven are annual subscribers.

Your

9. The names of above 4,000 solicitors appear in the Law List for 1880, as practising within the metropolitan district (where the operations of the society are carried on), but there are only 400 members of the association. directors feel that it only needs a little personal effort on the part of individual members in explaining the objects of the association, and in inviting professional friends and neighbours to become subscribers, to obtain a large addition to the list of members, and thus enable the directors to comply with more of the numerous applications made to them for assistance.

10. By the regulations of the association, the president, vice-president, treasurers, directors, and auditors for the ensuing year are to be elected at the present meeting.

(By order of the board) A. B. CARPENTER, Sec.

Law Students' Journal.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

HONOURS EXAMINATION.-April, 1880.

At the examination for honours of candidates for admission on the roll of solicitors of the Supreme Court, the examination committee recommended the following gentlemen as being entitled to honorary distinction :—

FIRST CLASS. (In order of merit.)

1. George Francis Huggins, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Rowlands, Bagnall, & Co., of Birmingham. 2. John Oakden Swift, who served his clerkship to Mr. T. Swift, of St. Helen's, Lancashire.

SECOND CLASS. (In alphabetical order.) Arthur Belfield, who served his olerkship with Messrs. Tozer & Geare, of Exeter; and Messrs. Geare & Son, of Lincoln's-ion-fields.

Ernest Bevir, who served his clerkship to Mr. R. Ellett, of Cirencester; Mr. H. Bevir, of Wootton Bassett; and Messrs. Peacock & Goddard, of London.

John Burgess, who served his clerkship to Mr. W. Dampier Jeans, of Warrington; and Messrs. Field, Roscoe, & Co., of London.

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Alfred C. Champney, who served his clerkship to Messrs. D. & A. H. Russell, of York; and Mr. G. W. Haines, of Gloucester.

William Postlethwaite, B.A., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Miller, Son, & Stevens, of Norwich.

Edwin Welsh, who served his clerkship to Mr. J. Welsh, of Wells, Somerset; and Messrs. Prior, Bigg, Church, & Adams, of Loudon.

Sydney White, B.A., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Duncan, Warren, & Gardner, of London.

THIRD CLASS. (In Alphabetical Order.) Henry Edward Donner, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Shirley, Atkinson, & Shirley, of Doncaster; and Messrs. A. F. & R. W. Tweedie, of London.

Ephraim Ellidge, who served his clerkship to Mr. J. Molesworth, of Rochdale.

Henry George Underwood Elliott, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Oldman & Iveson, of Gainsborough, and Mr. A. R. Oldman, of London.

William Henry Gater, B.A., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Wilson, Thring, & Wilson, of Salisbury; and Messrs. Taylor, Hoare, & Taylor, of London.

Raymond Guy Paze, who served his clerkship to Mr. J. Edell, of London.

William Guthrie Tully, who served his clerkship to Mr. S. Kewney, of North Shields.

Joseph James Whowell, who served his clerkskip to Mr. James Grundy, of Bolton.

The council of the Incorporated Law Society have accordingly given class certificates, and awarded the following prizes of books:

To Mr. Huggins, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clement's-inn, value 10 guineas.

To Mr. Swift, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clifford's-inn, value 5 guineas.

The council have given class certificates to the candidates in the second and third classes. The number of candidates examined was forty. (By order of the council)

E. W. WILLIAMSON, Secretary. Law Society's Hall, Chancery-lane, London.

COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION. TRINITY EXAMINATION, 1880. GENERAL EXAMINATION of STUDENTS of the INNS of COURT, held at Lincoln's-inn Hall, on the 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th of May, 1880.

The Council of Legal Education have awarded to George Baird Burnham, of the Middle Temple, a studentship in jurisprudence and Roman law, of one hundred guineas, to continue for a period of two years; and to Alfred Crooke, of the Middle Temple, and Robert Furse McMillan, of the Inner Temple, studentships in jurisprudence and Roman law, of one hundred guineas, for one year.

The council have also awarded to William Ebenezer Grigsby, of the Inner Temple, the Barstow Law Scholarship,

and to Joseph Gatey, of the Middle Temple, and William Ebenezer Grigsby, of the Inner Temple, certificates of honour of the second class.

The council have also awarded to the following students certificates that they have satisfactorily passed a public examination:-Henry Arden Adderley, Henry Milly Beevor, William Robert Bousfield, Wilfred Brinton, Edward Balcombe Brown, George Cave, Alfred Clayton Cole, Thomas Woodrock Denman, Arthur Havelock East, Charles Hardman Grafton, Hon. Hebert George Henry Hanbury. Tracey, Richard Willian son Harper, James Hay, William Hodgson Horsfall, Colin Jamieson, Francis Amboor Keating, Francis Palmer Kemp, Arthur McArthur Kingsmill, James Arthur Lees, Alfred Milner, Edward Fanecourt Mitchell, Nicholes Lower Paliologus, John Henry Peartree, Mervyn Lloyd Peel, Thomas Robert Redfern, Latham Gallup Reed, William Snowdon Robson, Charles Harington Scafe, Harry Scarlett, Charles Read Seymour, William Edward Thompson Sharpe, Charles Coombe Tennant, and Charles Oakley Walker, of the Inner Temple; William Redhead Edmund Barker, John Thomas Blazè, George Paris Bradshawe, Dolatray Surbhai Desai, Francis Cuthbert Fishbourne, Thomas Dale Hart, Henry William Forsyth Harwood-Harwood, William Augustus Hobson, John Watson Loxdale, Simon John Fraser Macleod, Alexander McMicking, Henry Charles Hannam Man, Michael John Michael, Frederick Hardyman Parker, Alfred Vanwaters-Choodt Lucie Smith, George Herbert Statfield, Herbert William Trenchard, Harold Wright, and Samuel Wilberforce Hartley Wyke, of the Middle Temple; Henry Leopold Ashton, Edwin Foulkes Ball, John Frederick Bean, Richard Rideout Beard, Amaury Robert Macnamara Bouchier, John Henry Chapman, Frank Chesshire, Charles, Arthur Close, Percy Dawson, Maurice Des Graz, Reginald Fairbairn, Joshua Leslie Field, Thomas Olver Harding, Charles Alexander Harris, John Duffus Harris, Henry Mather Jackson, Harry Johnson, Joseph John Talbot Lamb, Samuel Henry Leonard, Joseph Renner Maxwell, Francis Hamilton Mellor, William Ingham Shaw, Samuel Woodall Smith, William Pulteney Smith, George Abbott Streeten, George James Suckling, Henry Spenser Wilkinson, Thomas Wood, and George Burgess Lancaster Woodbourne, of Lincoln'-inn; and Frederick William Batchelor, Frank Dodd, and Charles Paget Moore, of Gray's-inn, E-qs.

The following students passed a satisfactory examination in Roman law:-Ernest Henry Ainslie, James Henry T. Broadwood, William Martin Burn, George Anson Byron, George Herbert Capron, George Cawston, Fredtrick Francis Daldy, Frederic John Dryhurst, Frederick Brandstrom Fletcher, Arthur Addleshaw Hartley, Abraham Hebron, Charles Pelham Huggins, Frederick John Francis Wootton Isaacson, Edulgee Jamsetjee Khory, William Edward Law. son, Gilbert Metcalfe, James Dennistoun Mitchell, William Anthony Byam Musgrave, John Linson Nash, Cyril Francis Oliphant, Carl Pearson, Dudley David Pontifex, John Davenport Rogers, Martin John Sarkies, Henry John Stanyon, William Arnold Statham Arthur Horace Todd, and William Toynbee, of the Inner Temple; Charles Halman Beard, Richard Robert Cherry, Jonn Lambert C. Gooden, John Carey Hall, William Bold Hurry, Robert Donald Douglas McLean, Edward George Macleod, Joseph Sidney Merton, William Thomas Raymond, Thomas Crossley Rayner, Ernest Sutton Saurin, John Howard Thomas, and John Wertheimer, of the Middle Temple; Edward William Bather, Charles Fortescue Brickdale, James William Greig, Howard Hodgkin, Kai Ho, George Peterson Francis Keogh, Robert Stewart Menzies, Walter John Napier, Charles Parsons, and Gordon Smith, of Lincoln's-inn; and Henry Loader Beddy, and John Lenton Pulling, of Gray's-inn, Esqs.

By order of the council,

(Signed) JAS. ANDERSON, Chairman, pro tem. Council Chamber, Lincoln's-inn, May 24.

In answer to Mr. Norwood, on the 24th inst., the Attorney-General said that the Government were and are most anxious to facilitate measures to improve the law of bankruptcy; but that they had not had sufficient time to bring in a Bill for that purpose to the satisfaction of the House. But he understood that his hon. friend the member for Kendal intended to introduce a Bill, and if a committee should be appointed on that Bill the Government would be anxious to facilitate the labours of that committee; but what the result of those labours would be must depend on the time available for its sittings.

Obituary.

MR. WILLIAM SPOONER.

Mr. William Spooner, judge of county courts, died at his residence. Waiton Lodge, Staffordshire, on the 19th inst. Mr. Spooner was the eldest son of the Rev. William Spooner, archdeacon of Coventry, and was born in 1811. He was educated at Oriel College, Oxford, where he gradu ated second class in classics in 1832. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Michaelmas Term, 1837, and formerly practised on the Oxford Circuit, and at the Staffordshire and Worcestershire Sessions. He had a fair share of business at the assizes and sessions, and was for some time a revising barrister. In 1863, he was appointed by Lord Westbury to be judge of county courts for Circuit No. 26, comprising Stafford, Lichfield, and most of the towns in the Potteries district. Mr. Spooner was a magistrate for Staffordshire. He was married to the youngest daughter of Mr. John Wilson, of Seacroft Hall, Yorkshire, and leaves two sons and three daughters. One of his sisters was the late Mrs. Tait, wife of the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Appointments, Etc.

Mr. HORATIO ALFRED ADAMSON, Solicitor, of North Shields, has been appointed Registrar of the North Shields County Coart (Circuit No. 1), in the place of Mr. James Henry Ingled w. Mr. Adamson was admitted a solicitor in 1863, and has been for several years town clerk of Tynemouth and clerk to the Urban Sanitary Authority.

Mr. RICHARD BROUGHTON, solicitor (of the firm of Haworth & Broughton), of Accrington, has been appointed Clerk to the Magistrates for that borough. Mr. Broughton was admitted a solicitor in 1878.

Mr. THOMAS CUTHBERT BURN, solicitor, of Cockermouth, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. HARRY FINDEN DAVIES, solicitor, of Weston-superMare, has been appointed Registrar of the Weston-superMare County Court (Circuit No. 54), in succession to Mr. William Henry Davies, deceased. Mr. H. F. Davies was admitted a solicitor in 1870.

Mr. ALGERNON FLETCHER, Solicitor, of Northwich, has been elected Clerk to the Northwich Board of Guardians, Assessment Committee, and Rural Sanitary Authority, and Superintendent Registrar for the district, in succession to Mr. Christopher Cheshire, deceased. Mr. Fletcher was ad mited a solicitor in 1867.

Mr. WILLIAM MACKINTOSH, advocate, has been appointed Procurator to the Church of Scotland. Mr. Mackintosh was admitted a member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland in 1865.

Sir FRANCIS SMITH, knight, has been appointed to administer the Government of Tasmania during the absence of the Governor, Mr. Weld. Sir F. Smith is the eldest son of Mr. Francis Saith, of Lindfield, Sussex, and was born in 1819. He was educated at University College, London, and graduated B.A. of the University of London in 1840. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Easter Term, 1842, and was appointed Solicitor-General of Tasmania in 1849, and Attorney-General in 1854. He was appointed a puisne judge of the Supreme Court of the Colony in 1860, and received the honour of knighthood in 1867. Sir F. Smith became Chief Justice of Tasmania in 1870.

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP.

JOHN CHRISTOPHER PAWLE, CHARLES TATHAM FEARON, and GEORGE JOHN COLDHAM, solicitors, No. 11. New-inn, Strand (Pawle, Fearon, & Coldham). May 8, 1880. (Gazette, May 25, 1880.)

The Hereford election petition is to be heard on the 14th of June before Mr. Baron Pollock and Mr. Justice Hawkins.

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