the costs which he had to pay to the fourth. The court ultimately held that there was no power on the part of the master to make the order he made in the first instance as to costs, or on the part of the judge to make the order he made in acting upon it. The Lord Chief Justice and Justices Lush and Manisty could find no power either in the Act or Rules for the making of any order for the payment of costs to parties brought in. The Lord Chief Justice does not appear to have thought that there was necessarily any omission in the rules. He appeared to think that it being optional on the part of the third party to come in, the defendant ought not to be compellable to pay the costs; but it must be remembered that though it is in one sense optional, the third party is bound by the finding in the action if he does not come in. There may in many cases be collusion between the plaintiff and defendant-or, at any rate, if the defendant is entitled to indemnity he may not fight the case in a satisfactory way. It seems rather hard that a man should be brought into an action, and, the plaintiff failing, that he should have to pay his own costs. The failure of the plaintiff shows that there was no cause of action by the defendant against the third party; but it is obvious that he could not-at least, in many cases-safely neglect to appear, and so the result is that he is saddled with costs, though perfectly free from liability in the matter. On the other hand, it does not seem clear that the party bringing him in ought to pay his costs. His attitude is simply this. He says, "I am being sued. I claim indemnity against you if the plaintiff succeeds. I cannot tell whether he has a cause of action or not; if he has, you ought to indemnify me." It does not seem very easy to work out the justice of the case with regard to costs if the plaintiff fails. If the plaintiff succeeds, no doubt the case is much clearer. In that case it would seem that the third party, who is the defendant, ought to pay. real WE PRINTED last week a rather mysterious order stating that, "the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury, hereby gives notice that the following offices of the Supreme Court are added to Schedule B. of the Order in Council of 4th of June, 1870, viz. :-The offices of official stationers to distribute stamps and forms of the Royal Courts of Justice." The meaning of this is that the offices referred to are excepted from the operation of the order which requires examination by the Civil Service Commissioners as a condition precedent to employment in the office. It will be observed that the office to distribute forms is now a recognized part of the legal depart ments. THERE HAS BEEN SOME CORRESPONDENCE during the week upon the subject of the re-sealing of probates in respect of property in Ireland. Complaints are made of the cost and trouble attending the process of re-sealing, and of the delays which occur when the duty paid has to be increased. But none of the correspondents have pointed out the anomaly which, according to Coote (Probate Practice, p. 45) exists, and lies at the root of the whole matter. Where a testator domiciled in England at the time of his death has, in addition to his English personalty, left other effects in Scotland or in Scotland and Ireland conjointly, the whole of his personal property in the United Kingdom may be included in the probate granted by the English court. But if the testator has left property in England and Ireland only the provision as to probate for the United Kingdom does not apply, and the process of re-sealing must be resorted to. IT IS UNDERSTOOD that early in July arrangements will be made for providing a refreshment room in the Royal Courts of Justice. HOME RULE FOR EVERYBODY. A LETTER from "A Member of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society," which appeared in the Times last week, suggests considerations of no little interest. We have no intention of entering upon any discussion of the claims of any part of the United Kingdom to powers of separate legislation, whether unrestricted or of a limited nature; nor does the letter to which we refer give any support to any such claim; but it makes a suggestion which seems to us to contain the germ of a very practical and urgently-needed reform. There can be no doubt that, " obstruction" altogether apart, the work of Parliament is too great for its strength, and that some means must be devised, either by an alteration of the machinery of legislation, or by removing the necessity of parliamentary interference in certain classes of cases where it is now requisite, or both, for enabling the Legislature to keep pace with the demands upon it. Neither of the suggested courses involves any new principle; both of them have been successfully employed within the present century. The former plan was adopted to relieve parliamentary committees from the numerous and complicated investigations conBills which followed the first Reform Act, when the sequent upon the great multiplication of " Inclosure" "Inclosure Commission "-to whose duties so much extra work has since been added-was established. The commis. sioners were not intrusted with authority actually to complete any inclosure whatever; their function was simply to Parliament embodying the result of their inquiries; to investigate the facts upon the spot, and to make a report which report, nevertheless, had no operation whatever until confirmed by Act of Parliament. By this means Parliament was relieved of all the labour of minute examinations of complicated statements of facts, without parting with any of its legislative authority; and the persons interested for or against the inclosure of the various commons throughout the country were spared the heavy expenses of proceedings in the committee rooms at Westminster, and provided with a tribunal, not only much cheaper, but also, in that it acted on the spot, more satisfactory. The other plan was that selected by Lord Cranworth for dealing with settled estates, when the Court of Chancery was given power to authorize limited owners to do all these acts which had theretofore been usually made the subject of private Bills. And so effectual did this course prove that, whereas up to the passing of the first "Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act every year's Statute-book contained a considerable num. ber of Acts of this nature, such Acts have since that time been almost unknown, while, on the other hand, the annual average in number and value of the estates dealt with has largely increased. But the relief thus obtained has been only partial; or, rather, the continual natural growth of regular parliamentary business has more than filled up the gaps thus temporarily made; and it has again become necessary to look about for some means of further relief from the excessive tax on the time and strain on the powers of the Legislature imposed by our present parliamentary system. And the required means are not far to seek. By far the heaviest part of the duties of an ordinary member of Parliament, the duty which he performs with most reluctance, and for which he is usually Committees," and these committees are, at the same most eminently unfit, is sitting upon "Private Bill time, a source of exceptionally heavy and very unnecessary expenditure. A strongly opposed Railway or Water Bill may take weeks in passing through the ordeal of the Select Committees; during all this time witnesses have to be kept in London at very great cost, men of business are frequently detained away from their homes at very considerable inconvenience, and the com. pany, if it succeeds in getting its Act, starts with a burden in the shape of "preliminary expenses" out of all proportion to the total amount of capital required for its undertaking. Add to this that the whole inquiry has frequently to be gone through twice over, before different committees having nothing in common except their unfitness adequately to deal with the subject, and the arbitrary, not to say capricious, character of their decisions-decisions, moreover, founded upon evidence ordinarily consisting in great part of the untested opinions of experts, and necessarily arrived at in the absence of a great deal of information which could, and generally would, have been forthcoming in the case of an inquiry upon the spot-and it must be clear that a reform in the system is not less urgently needed in the interest of the promoters and opponents of such Bills than for the sake of relieving the pressure upon Parliament. But great as is the evil of this system of legislation in the case of trading companies (such as railway or dock companies) which apply for exceptional powers for their own private ends, and of whom it may perhaps be said that those who seek authority to override the ordinary property rights of their neighbours for their own advantage must not complain of the inevitable attendant expense, it is ten times worse in the case of “Towns' Improvements" and other similar undertakings, promoted by public bodies, not for the private advantage of any individuals, but for the general good of the community. The late Local Government Acts have done something towards alleviating the hardship, in these cases, but the grievance still remaining is not a light one. Why should the corporation, say, of Liverpool, or Glasgow, if it wants extended powers of street improvement, or extended authority to supply the town with gas or water, have to submit to an investigation of the case in London at three times the cost, both in time and money, which would be needed for a thorough inquiry upon the spot, which latter would moreover be infinitely more effective? Why should not Parliament consent to act upon the result of such an inquiry in the same manner and to the same extent as it now acts upon the report of a select committee? We do not propose, nor would it, we think, be right, that Parliament should in these cases, as in the case of settled estates, part with any portion of its legislative authority. The discretion-(1) whether to entertain the application at all or not, and (2) whether, upon the ascertained facts, to accede to it or not-should still remain with Parliament; but we cannot doubt that the duty of ascertaining and reporting upon the facts, in the manner now done by the Select Committees, might be intrusted to an outside body with very great advantage. If Whether this body should be a permanent one, like the Inclosure Commissioners, or one, like a jury or a select committee, constituted in each case pro hac vice, is a matter of comparatively little consequence; but there are considerations of some weight which seem to point to the former as the preferable alternative. such an inquiry is to be of any use in lightening the labours of Parliament, it must be such that Parliament can accept its results with at least so much confidence as to preclude any further investigation of the facts; and for this purpose it must be so conducted as to give satisfaction, not only to the Legislature, but to the parties interested in the question. It is true that, in the majority of cases, the Select Committees do not possess this latter qualification, but their constitution prevents alike improvement and complaint. It is very certain that no outside tribunal would be tolerated whose decisions were as fluctuating, as incapable of being referred to any fixed principles, as those of the committees; which are acquiesced in, not because they give satisfaction, but because any complaint of their action would be nugatory, being practically made to themselves. But an outside body like the proposed Commission of Inquiry should not only act upon fixed and definite principles, but be capable of expressing those principles, and applying them, in their report, to the circumstances of the case, so as effectively to guide the discretion of those in whose hands the ultimate authority lies. And this function, which is essentially of a judicial nature, would be much more efficiently performed by permanent officials fitted by previous training for this particular duty than by any casual jury, however intelligent, or any board of arbitration got together for the nonce, however distinguished the individuals of which it consisted. And, indeed, the greater the individual weight of the members of such a board of arbitration the less likely would it be that the decisions of different boards would proceed upon a common principle, and thus the very efficiency in other respects of such a board would tend to aggravate that uncertainty of decision which is so serious an evil in the present system. To such a tribunal, however constituted, every private Bill should be referred as soon as it has been read a second time in either House; and as soon as the referees have reported, it should be taken up again, "upon consideration of the report," without passing through any committee either of the whole House or otherwise, though of course it should be open to any member, as now, to propose amendments either on the report or the third reading. When such a Bill had passed one House it should be similarly proceeded with in the other, save only that no further reference to the commissioners would be necessary, the same report serving for the purposes of both Houses. It should be the duty of the commissioners to go through every Bill, opposed or unopposed, and to point out everything which, in any case, seemed to them to require notice "in the interests of the public;" and it should further be incumbent on them, in the case of every opposed Bill, to conduct the necessary inquiry on the spot, or at the nearest town containing the requisite accommodation (in no case more distant than the nearest assize town) in the same manner as is now done by the judges in the case of election petitions. The commissioners should also be required to conduct the inquiry themselves, and not in any case to delegate any part of it (except perhaps matters of account) to any subordinate or assistant-the want of some provision of this sort has sadly marred the usefulness both of the Inclosure and the Endowed Schools Commissions-and they should be severally, and not collectively, responsible for their report, so as to throw on any commissioner not agreeing with the majority the duty of expressing and explaining his dissent. What number of commissioners there should be, how qualified, and whether all bound to act together, or subject to a quorum, are questions of detail which may perhaps be conveniently left for determination if and when the project is more matured. But for the purpose of trying the experiment-and it would be well to proceed tentatively at first-the necessary machinery is at hand. The Railway Commissioners, with perhaps the addition of a "person of great experience in" engineering, or other scientific expert, would form a tribunal very efficient for the purpose, and might, without any undue pressure upon their time, or any interference with their normal duties, be advantageously employed in relieving the Legislature from a burden too heavy for it to bear, and at the same time in affording to every locality in England, Ireland, and Scotland the truest and least equivocal of the blessings of Home Rule. A "Clerk to Justices" writes to the Times as follows:During the recent elections many members of Parliament and the officials conducting elections must have been much troubled to decide what was the correct time to open and throughout England, but it appears that Greenwich time olose the poll. Greenwich time is now kept almost is not legal time. For example, our polling booths were opened, say, at 8.13 and closed at 4.13 p.m. This point as to what is legal time often arises in our criminal courts, but has hitherto escaped a proper discussion and decision. Will not some new M.P. take up this point and endeavour to get an Act passed making Greenwich time legal time? ARE EXPENSES OF LEAVING PORT OF THE decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of court below, is not altogether removed by its language. Expressions have been used in the cases from which it might appear that the real question is whether, when the ship is safe in port and the goods, therefore, are no longer in danger of being lost at sea, the carrying on of the goods on the same ship is necessary for the profitable prosecution of the venture so far as they are concerned. It has been argued in fact, that is the main argument for the cargo owner-that when once the goods are in port they are safe, and consequently no further expenses incurred can be incurred in respect of a peril in which they share. But the answer suggests itself that if, on their being safe in port or landed, there is no means of profitably disposing of them, except by carrying them on in the same ship, they are not safe in the practical sense of the term. No one would say that the venture of the goods owner was safe in any practical sense of the term, if the goods were at a place where they could not profitably be sold, and whence there was no means of transit to any place where they We had supposed from the language of the judgment of the Chief Justice that these considera could be so sold. Further expenses were incurred for pilotage and other charges paid in respect of the ship leaving port and proceeding on her voyage. It was not disputed that the putting into the port of refuge for repairs was a general average sacrifice, and the defendants, as owners of a part of the cargo, were contented to pay contribution in respect of the expenses of discharging cargo, but it was contended on their behalf that the expenses of warehousing and re-shipping and the pilotage and other charges-in fact, the expenses of leaving the port and resuming the voyage-were not general average. The defendants' contention was based on what was found to have been the practice of average adjusters for eighty years. But it appeared that the average adjuster who had acted in this case, a man of great eminence in his profession, had formed the opinion that this practice was wrong, and that all the expense incurred up to the time of the vessel's being at sea again was general average, and ought to form the subject of contribution on the defendant's part, and he had accordingly drawn up the average statement on that footing. The case was stated for the opinion of the court to test the validity of the statement so framed. The majority of the Queen's Bench Division, Cockburn, C.J., and Mellor, J., decided in favour of the plaintiffs, that all these expenses were general average, Manisty, J., dissenting. The dissentient judge based his opinion upon the practice of the average adjusters, but the Court of Appeal treated such practice as immaterial, on the ground that it was admitted not to be in the nature of a mercantile usage, but to have obtained merely because average adjusters had supposed it to be the law. In this view the matter is thrown back on the principles of the law relating to general average. The peculiar interest of the case lies in the fact that the English law has been supposed to differ in this respect from the law of most Continental nations and the law of the United States, the law of other nations recognizing these expenses general average. The sympathies of the Chief Justice tend towards following the logical principles of jurisprudence rather than precedent when the two are at variance, and, in a long considered judgment, with which Mr. Justice Mellor agreed, he arrived at the conclusion that the law of this country was not in accordance with the practice of average adjusters, and agreed with the law of other nations. as This view has now been declared correct by the Court of Appeal. It seems to us that, as is not unfrequently the case, the further discussion which the case received in the Court of Appeal has tended to bring out the true principle involved in a clearer and more definite shape. The ground of the decision in the court below was that the expenses were all incurred in furtherance of the common purpose of prosecuting the adventure. This is no doubt true in one sense, but there is a possibility of a confusion of idea on the subject which, though perhaps not created by the judgment in the tions were material to the view taken in the court below. It is over and over again urged in the judgment that the expenses of resuming the voyage were incurred for the benefit of the cargo as well as the ship, and in furtherance of the common purpose. We must confess that we thought when making our former observations on this case that the meaning of this was that the expenses were general average because it was to be presumed that the resumption of the voyage was as much in the interest of the cargo as of the ship. We doubt now, on considering the case by the light of what took place în the Court of Appeal, whether this was so. We think now that the meaning may have been that the putting into the port of refuge, being for the common interest, all the expenses that necessarily followed ought to be considered as incurred in the common interest. However this may be, it seems to us that the judgment of the Court of Appeal goes on a ground to which the question whether it was for the cargo owner's interest that the voyage should be resumed is quite immaterial. Whether it was the interest of the cargo owner that his goods should be carried on in the same ship from the port of refuge or not-assuming even that they could have been carried on by another ship at half the rate of freight-still the expenses of re-shipment, &c., would be general average. The principle is that all the consequences of a general average sacrifice are general average. The policy of the law relating to general average is clearly this. In order to encourage the sacrifice of a a part, that the whole venture may be saved, the law gives the owner of the part sacrificed compensation. If the owner of the ship had no compensation for the cutting away of his topmast, he might be tempted to hold on to the risk of the whole venture. If he knew that the owner of goods jettisoned must bear the whole loss, he might feel some compunction at throwing it upon him, or unwillingness to offend him, and might endeavour to ride through the storm without the sacrifice, thus unduly risking the whole venture. It necessarily follows from this that, if the expenses of entering the port of refuge are general average, the expenses of leaving it must be. The shipowner is entitled to carry on the goods to the port of destination, and receive freight for so doing. If the result of his going into the port of refuge for repairs were that he must unship part of the goods, and the expense of re-shipment were thrown on those particular goods, and the pilotage and other charges of coming out of port were thrown on the freight, he might be tempted to say, I will not diminish my profits by incurring these charges, or I will not saddle the owner of the goods which would need unshipment with these charges. I will try to accomplish the voyage without bearing up for a port of refuge. Both the Court of Appeal and the Queen's Bench Division discussed the authorities at considerable length. This we have no intention of doing. There seems to have been some little difficulty in entirely reconciling all that has been said on the subject, but in the end the court came to the conclusion that there was no decision that prevented their following the course plainly pointed out by logical principles. We are very glad that this has been the result, the more so, as Lord Justice Thesiger says, because the law of England is thus placed on a footing which more nearly assimilates it, in matters in which assimilation is desirable, to the law obtaining in other mercantile and maritime communities. other words, the Court of Appeal held that, notwithstanding the Act of 1869, the old law as to election applied to charge the trustee' who had elected with liability upon the covenants; does not this imply that the same law still exists to discharge from liability a trustee who was not elected ? If Stephen, J. is right in his view, the question as to the effect of the taking possession by the trustee need not have been discussed in Ex parte Dressler; not having disclaimed he was' liable for rent and upon the covenants of the lease. Recent Decisions. LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY FN RESPECT OF THE BANKRUPT'S LEASEHOLDS. General Correspondence. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT COSTS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors" Journal.]' Sir, Our client, A. B., had a daughter, C. D., who at the age of twenty-six became engaged to marry E. F. C. D. had no property of her own, E. F. having only a small estate, expectant on the decease of his parents. A. B. instructed us to appoint to C. D. part of a portion refund, charged on his settled estate, and to have it settled on the lady and her husband and their children in the usual way. He also instructed us as to the settlements which he required to be made by the gentleman upon his daughter. The settlements were consequently prepared [E. F. having a separate solicitor], executed by the father and the lady and gentleman, and the latter were subsequently married in 1878. (Wilson v. Wallani, Ex. D., [Stephen J.] 28 W. R. 597). This case decides a new point of considerable practical importance. According to Ex parte Dressler, In Solomon (27 W. R. 144, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 252), a trustee in bankruptcy who has taken possession of the bankrupt's leaseholds, and does not disclaim when called upon to do so, becomes personally liable for the rent and upon the covenants of the lease. This decision was founded upon the principle (originally laid down in Ex parte Davis, In re Sneezum, 25 W. R. 49, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 463) that the bankruptcy law, except in so far as it has been expressly altered by the Act of 1869, remains as it was before the passing of that Act. The taking possession of the leaseholds amounted, under the former law, to an election to take the lease, rendering the assignee liable for rent and upon the covenants of the lease, and the Court of Appeal were of opinion that there was nothing in the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, to alter this rule. In the present case the trustee in bankruptcy had not (so Stephen, J., held) done anything which would have amounted to an election to take the lease under the old law, and had not disclaimed. Was he personally liable under the covenants of the lease? Applying the principle laid down in the cases mentioned above, Stephen, J., examined the Act of 1869 to see whether it contained any. thing to alter the earlier law under which an election by the assignee was necessary in order to render him liable, and he came to the conclusion that this rule was altered and that an election to take the lease is no longer a condition precedent to the liability of the trustee upon the covenants of the lease. His reasons for this decision are these. The Act of 1869 vests the leaseholds absolutely in the trustee subject to his right to disclaim; it repeals the provision of the Act of 1849 relating to election by the assignee, and neither expressly gives nor recognizes any such right in the trustee in bankruptcy. "It thus appears to me," the learned judge concluded, "that the power of election conferred by the Act of 1849 being repealed by the express words of the Act of 1869, and the estate being vested in the trustee by the express words of the Act of 1869, he has no power to get rid of it except by following the express words of section 23. Upon the whole I hold that the lease was vested in the trustees on their appointment, and that they are personally liable upon the covenante, unless they make a valid disclaimer. I think Ex parte Dressler is an express authority as to their personal liability, assuming the lease to be vested in them absolutely." With much deference we venture to question the correctness of this last statement. The ground of the decision in Ex parte Dressler was not simply that the leaseholds were vested in the trustees absolutely, but that under the old law an assignee who took possession of the bankrupt's leaseholds thereby elected, and upon such election became personally liable for the rent, and that there was nothing in the Act of 1869 to alter this rule. In Our costs in connection with the settlement were in due time forwarded to the solicitor of E. F. for approval and payment. The solicitor has no objection to the account, but E. F. does not pay, and we shall probably have to enforce payment, but against whom? In our experience, which is a long one, we have never had to enforce payment of marriage settlement costs, though we have been always under the impression that they were recoverable from the gentleman. Under the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, Amendment Act, 1874, the husband and wife may be jointly sued for a debt of the wife contracted before marriage, and if this is not a debt due from her it would not seem that the husband is liable at all. Our instructions were received from the father, but so they are in ninety-nine out of every hundred settlements, where the father is alive, and the daughter is young or has no estate of her own. Can he be considered as agent for the daughter, or has she by her execution of the settlements under which she derives benefit adopted all her father's acts leading to the settlements, or is the father liable as having given instructions? These are points on which if your readers can throw light we shall be obliged. May 20. X. & Co. New Orders, Etc. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT. 1. These rules may be cited as the "Rules of the Supreme Court, May, 1880," or each separate rule may be cited as if it had been one of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and had been numbered by the number of the order and rule mentioned in the margin. 2. These rules shall come into operation on the 15th day of May, 1880. ORDER XXXV. District Registries. 3. Ord. 35, r. 16.-(a.) So much of Order XXXVII., Rule 3d., as requires affidavits to be filed in the Central Office shall not apply to affidavits required to be filed in a district registry. 5 Ord. 60a, r. 8a.-Order LXa., Rule 8, is hereby annulled, and the following shall stand in lieu thereof: 48. The Clerk of Enrolments and each of the following Registrars, namely The Registrar of Bills of Sale, The Registrar of Certificates of Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women, and The Registrar of Judgments, shall, on a request in writing giving sufficient particulars, and on payment of the prescribed fee, cause a search to be made in the registers or indexes under his custody, and issue a certificate of the result of the search. SOLICITORS ACT, 1877. According to the terms of an order issued on the 1st of this month under the Solicitors Act, 1877, by the Lord Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Rolls, the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer, the Moderations examination of St. David's College, Lampeter, will be taken as equivalent to the preliminary examination required by the Solicitors Act; and any student who has passed Moderations at St. David's College may be admitted a solicitor after four years' <rvice under articles of clerkship. 'C. T. B." writes on the subject of the re-sealing of robates:-" :-" I have just had a case of a testator whose will was proved in the Principal Registry in England, and who held stock in three public companies in Ireland. Before these companies would register the English probate in their books, and, therefore, before the property could be dealt with, it became necessary to get the probate re-sealed in the Principal Registry in Ireland, and this at a cost of something like £25. I had to furnish proof by affidavit of the testator's English and Irish personal property (of Scotch, he had none), distinguishing each separately, and this after I had passed the testator's residuary account at Somerset-house and paid all the duties! It would reflect credit upon any Government to get rid of this monstrous anomaly; meanwhile it should be a caution to investors who have a knowledge of the above facts how they make investments in other parts of the United Kingdom than that in which they actually reside. Cases of last Week. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU END OF TRANSIT-CONSTRUCTIVE Delivery-SUB-SALEUNPAID PURCHASE-MONEY OF SUB-PURCHASER-RIGHTS OF ORIGINAL VENDOR.-In a case of Ex parte Falk, before the Court of Appeal on the 13th inst., a question arose as to the right of stoppage in transitu. While goods were on their voyage from Liverpool to Calcutta, in a ship chartered by the purchaser, his agent at Calcutta sold them to a subpurchaser there. Before the ship arrived at Calcutta the purchaser filed a liquidation petition. The purchase-money had not been paid, and the vendor's agent at Calcutta (by the vendor's instructions sent by telegraph) served notice of stoppage in transitu on the master of the ship. Part of the cargo had then been delivered to the sub-purchaser, who had obtained a delivery order in exchange for the bill of lading. The sub-purchaser's purchase-money had not been paid to the purchaser, and the freight for the goods had not been paid to the shipowner. In this state of things the court (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) held, as was held in Ex parte Cooper (23 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 336, 27 W. R. 518, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 68), that, as the shipowners had not lost their lien for freight on the undelivered part of the cargo, they still held that part as carriers, and that consequently there had not been a constructive delivery of the whole cargo, and the transit was not at an end when the notice to stop was given. The notice, therefore, if there had been no sub-sale, would have been given in good time as between the original vendor and the original purchaser. And, though the result of the sub-sale was that the original vendor could not stop the goods, to which the sub-purchaser had acquired a right, yet, in accordance with the recent decision in Ea parte Davis (ante, p. 307, 28 W. R. 481, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 628), the original vendor had an equitable right to intercept the unpaid purchase money of the sub-purchaser. Another point in the case arose thus:-The vendor in the first instance (before telegraphing to his agent in Calcutta) gave notice of stoppage in transitu to the owner of the ship in England, and it was urged that this was a sufficient notice, and that it was the duty of the shipowner to communicate the notice by telegraph to the master. BRAMWELL, L.J., expressed an opinion that no effectual notice of stoppage in transitu could be given to any one but the master of the ship, who had the actual custody of the goods, and that there was no duty upon the shipowner to communicate to the master the notice which he had received. His lordship thought it would be monstrous to hold that telling someone else to stop goods in transitu amounted to a stoppage in transitu. Leave was given to appeal to the House of Lords, on the ground that Ex parte Davis amounted to a novel extension of the doctrine of stoppage in transitu. -SOLICITORS, Field, Roscoe, & Co.; Ashurst, Morris, & Co.. APPEAL IN BANKRUPTCY LOCUS STANDI-"PERSON AGGRIEVED "-REFUSAL OF COURT TO ACT ON COMPTROLLER'S REPORT AGAINST TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCYBANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 20, 48, 57, 71-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, R. 251-In a case of Ex parte Sidebotham, before the Court of Appeal on the 14th inst., a question arose as to the right of appeal from the refusal of the judge of s county court to act upon a report made to him by the Comptroller in Bankruptcy that the estate of a bankrupt had lost a large sum of money by the misfeasance, neglect, or omission of the trustee. The comptroller had required the trustee to make good the money to the estate, and he had failed to comply with the requisition. The matter was then brought before the judge, who declined to make any order. The comptroller did not appeal from this refusal, but the bankrupt appealed to the Chief Judge, alleging that he was a "person aggrieved" by the refusal. The Chief Judge held that he had no locus standi to appeal, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.). It was urged that the bankrupt was "aggrieved" by the decision, because he had an interest in swelling the amount of his assets, so that a dividend of not less than ten shillings in the pound might be paid to his creditors, and he might be able to obtain his discharge. And reliance was placed on Ex parte Ditton (23 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 337, 27 W. R. 401, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 56), as showing that a creditor of the bankrupt was entitled to appeal from such a refusal. JAMES, L.J., said that by the proceed |