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in his own name or in the name of any person in trust for him any new office or place of profit whatsoever under the Crown" created after the 25th of October, 1705, or to be thereafter created, and no person having any pension from the Crown during pleasure, should be "capable of being elected or of sitting and voting as a member of the House of Commons" in any future Parliament. This effectually prevented the purchase of members of the House of Commons by the multiplication of offices, but it was deemed necessary to go further to obviate another branch of the same danger. The number of places under the Crown then existing was very much greater, relatively to the work to be done, than at present; and numerous and highly-paid sinecures, which have since been from time to time abolished or absorbed in other offices, constituted a powerful engine of corruption in the hands of an unscrupulous Minister. There were obvious difficulties in the way of any extension to the holders of these offices, most, if not all, of whom were actually members of Parliament at the time, of the absolute disqualification to which the holders of new places were subjected; and so a middle course was adopted, and by section 25 it was enacted that, "if any person being chosen a member of the House of Commons" should accept any office of profit from the Crown whilst such member, his election should be void and a new writ should issue, but nevertheless such person was to be reeligible.

Under the operation of this enactment, no member returned by a popular constituency, and no nominee of a Hanoverian peer or town council, could be purchased over by the Court without being exposed to the almost certainty of losing his seat, and being thus rendered comparatively innocuous. On the other hand, the grave evil to the public service involved in the practical limitation of certain great offices of State to such members of the House of Commons as happened to have "safe" seats did not then exist; for, as we have explained, the Government of the day always had at their disposal seats enough to enable them to secure the services of anyone whom they desired. The thing to be prevented was their filling all their own seats first, and then purchasing additional strength by conferring places of profit on the holders of seats naturally belonging to the Opposition. How imminent was the danger sought to be avoided, how narrowly, in spite of all precautions, the dreaded Restoration failed of taking effect, is well known to all our readers.

The particular danger against which this Act was directed may be said to have ceased to exist by the accession of George III.; but by that time the eternal warfare about the balance of power, which never ceases under any constitutional Government, had entered upon a new phase, and one in which it was even more needful, if possible, than before to place obstacles in the way of any attempts on the part of the Crown to influence the action of Parliament. The "king's friends" were the party then felt to be dangerous, and the avowed desire of George III. to introduce an element of "personal power" into the practical working of the Constitution made it more than ever desirable to impose limitations on the introduction of placemen into the House of Commons.

But with the passing of the Reform Act of 1832, this state of things passed away entirely and for ever; the absolute supremacy, not only of Parliament as a whole, but of the Lower House, and of the popular element in that House, was conclusively established; and all this elaborate machinery for preventing undue influence on the part of the Crown became, at best, unneeded. But as soon as it became needless it became also noxious. There is no longer any reason to dread the undue multiplication of sinecure offices, the absolute and efficient control of the Commons over the public expenditure forms an ample safeguard; and the only remaining effect of the 24th section of the Act is to limit the

choice of the constituencies-whom no one desires to cripple—by incapacitating for election a great body of public servants, many of whom would be able to render most useful assistance to the House, assistance which they now have to supply inefficiently at second-hand, and often through very imperfect channels of communication.

Cessante ratione cessat ipsa lex, and we think it well worthy the consideration of Parliament whether the reason for this enactment has not so completely ceased, nay, whether there are not now such reasons to the contrary, as to render its repeal, not only proper, but desirable.

The 25th section stands in a slightly different position. Ordinarily, its obvious operation is merely to entail a certain amount of trouble and expense on all members of Parliament accepting office; the occasions on which a new Minister's re-election is challenged are very few, and those where the challenge is successful are almost unknown. Indeed, so seldom has the section any practical use that within the last week it has been declaimed against as grossly improper, almost unconstitutional, to attempt to put it in actual operation. Not the less, however, has the section an indirect operation, which is wholly mischievous. For it limits the choice of the Crown, as regards the offices within its scope, just as the 24th section limits the choice of the constituencies. It is within our knowledge that in more than one instance the man of all others most fitted for a particular post has not been appointed merely because he could not, or would not, secure his re-election; and now that an additional element of haphazard has been introduced into all contested elections by the fact that it is impossible to discover, during the polling, which candidate has the advantage, it might be so worked as to produce very serious public inconvenience. Let us suppose that Mr. Gladstone's seat for Midlothian has been won (as South Norfolk was) by a majority of 1, and that he had not, at the time, had a second seat to fall back on, would not, or might not, the risk of a renewed contest under these circumstances have prevented the acceptance of office by the only man who, at any rate by the unanimous consent of the public press of all shades of opinion, ought at the present time to be at the head of affairs? The mischievous operation of the section was greatly curtailed by the last Reform Act, which exposes a new Minister to re-election only once, instead of on every change of office. Let us hope that, by the next Reform Bill, if not sooner its total abolition will be effected.

GIFT OVER ON DEATH WITHOUT CHIL

DREN.

THE fourth rule in Edwards v. Edwards (15 Beav. 337), that, in the case of a gift to A. but if he die without leaving issue or children, then to B., the gift over, if in remainder after a life interest, must be prima facie restricted to the event of death before the tenant for life, was described by Lord Justice James as "simple, intelligible, and very beneficial in the administration of testator's estates," but it was overthrown by the House of Lords in O'Mahoney v. Burdett (23 W. R. 361, L. R. 7 H. L. 388), and it is now clearly established that the construction to be given to the words" die without children" is the same whether the gift over is or is not in remainder. The words are to be taken in their ordinary and literal meaning, as indicating death without children at any time, unless a contrary intention can be collected from the context or general scope of the will. Where, therefore, there is a mere gift to A. for life, and after his death to B., and if B. dies without children, to C., and there is nothing in the context to indicate a contrary intention, the gift over to C. will take effect upon B.'s dying without children at any time. The difficulty is to ascertain what is to be considered a sufficient manifestation of a con

trary intention to restrict the gift over to death without children during the prior life estate.

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In O'Mahoney v. Burdett, Lord Hatherley pointed out that a direction in the will to pay over personalty or make a distribution among several legatees at a specified time must be deemed an indication of the testator's intention that the gift over should not operate after the time of payment or division. "In such cases," he observed," the court has said, 'We hold it an unreasonable construction of the testator's will to say that he has directed, on the one hand, that the money shall be absolutely paid and distributed into the hands of those who, having it, will spend it without further trust; and, on the other hand, that a subsequent event-viz., a certain person's dying childless after that distribution has taken place-shall divest the property, and make it necessary for the executor to take steps to recall that money, in order to hand it over to the persons entitled under the gift over. Where such circumstances exist, the court will construe the will with due regard to them, as indicating the intentions of the testator."

An instance of the application of the principle thus laid down is afforded by Ollivant v. Wright (24 W. R. 84, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 346). In this case the testatrix gave all her property (consisting of both realty and personalty) to her husband during his life to receive the rents and profits, and after his decease to be divided among testatrix's five children, share and share alike, with a gift over if any of her children should die without issue. The Court of Appeal held that the direction to divide meant that the corpus of the property was actually to be handed over, and that this was a sufficient manifestation of intention to restrict the operation of the gift over to the life of the husband. Lord Justice Mellish laid some stress upon the difference in the description as to how the property was to be enjoyed during the life of the tenant for life and afterwards, the " rents and profits being directed to be received by the tenant for life; but Lord Justice Brett said that an express direction to divide at a particular time, if not restricted or modified by any other express stipulation, will prevent the application of the principle in O'Mahoney v. Burdett.

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In Ingram v. Soutten (23 W. R. 363) Lord Hatherley indicated another test. "There is no particular period at which you can say that the [trust] funds are absolutely to be handed over, unless you arrive at the event on the occurrence of which the trust will naturally terminate

until that event happens the trust is not finished, the fund remains in the hands of the trustees, and there is no direction that it should be divided." It is obvious that the test of whether the trust is intended to cease to exist on a particular event, covers a wider ground than the test above considered. It applies wherever the language of the will shows that the person to whom the property is given, subject to a gift over, is intended on some event to take an absolute interest, and that intention cannot receive effect unless the operation of the gift over is limited to a time earlier than his death (see De Costa v. Keir, 3 Russ. 360; and the judgment of Lord Selborne in O'Mahoney v. Burdett).

But not only is the intention to be collected from the context of the will, it may also, it appears, be gathered from "the general scope of the provisions of the will" (see the judgment of Lord Cairns in Ingram v. Soutten). It was on this ground that Besant v. Cox (25 W. R. 789, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 604), was decided. In that case, Vice-Chancellor Malins held that O'Mahoney v. Burdett "decides merely this, that wherever there is a gift in fee with an executory devise over upon the death of the first taker without issue, that gift over will take effect at the death of the devisee, unless a contrary intention appears by the will. But if, upon the whole will, the court collects a contrary intention, it leaves it entirely open to this court to put a construction upon it which will effectually

carry into effect the obvious intention of the testatrix." And although in the words of the will there appeared to be nothing to qualify the natural meaning of the expres. sion "dying without issue," yet the Vice-Chancellor pointed out that certain inconvenient results would follow from holding that it meant death at any time without issue, and thence collected" an obvious intention " on the part of the testatrix that the dying without issue should be restricted to the life of the tenant for life. We apprehend that it will be hardly safe to conclude that the court will ascribe to a testator an astute consideration of all the consequences which may follow from the dispositions he makes in his will. That would be to assume that, though men are often thoughtless and rash, testators are always considerate and prudent. And, since to hold that "death without children" means death at any time nearly always entails inconvenient results, the effect of the application of the Vice-Chancellor's doctrine would be to render inoperative the rule laid down by the House of Lords in O'Mahoney 7. Burdett.

General Correspondence.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.- -All letters intended for publication in the "Solicitors' Journal" must be authenticated by the name of the writer. The Editor cannot undertake to return MSS. forwarded to him.

THE NEW ORDERS.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I can confirm "One Who Would Like to Know." Only last Thursday I was before the master when a summons for time was put before him with a consent indorsed for “a weeks time, 6s. 8d costs, to be plaintiff's in any event." The master asked the clerk presenting it if he had applied to the other side before taking it out, which he said he had; the master then said, I shall make the plaintiff pay the costs of the application, and struck out the consent, and made the order accordingly. On Friday, another master asked a person applying if he had written to the other side for a consent, and on being answered in the affirmative, asked for a copy of the letter, and the person applying not having this with him, actually sent him back to his office to get the copy before he would make the order. The loss of time to solicitors under the new rules, and the trouble they give them, no one would believe who has not to go through the drudgery. I had to send in one day to two firms in the City and one at the West-end for consents, it being the last day, and out of the three I got one consent and had to take out summonses in the other two-useless trouble, besides the clerk being required on other business.

When you compare the Judicature Act and Rules with the Common Law Procedure Act and Rules, what a difference is observable. The latter are master-pieces; better Act and Rules were never drawn; but look at the Judicature Rules-there is scarcely one that has not been altered or a rider added-a mass of patchwork. If the loss to the Revenue be as your correspondent says, £30,000 per year, what must the loss be to the profession? DISGUSTED. May 10.

The Manchester Guardian is informed that a telegram has been received in Manchester stating that the new order as to the examination of the register of bills of sale has been rescinded by the Lord Chancellor.

Mr. W. Shaw, Q.C., Sir B. C. C. Pine, K.C.M.G., Mr. W. Brown, Dr. M. Č. M. Swabey, Mr. G. Francis, Mr. H Shield, M.P., and Mr. H. Cowie, have been elected benchers of the Hon. Society of Gray's-inn.

Cases of the Week.

COMPANY-WINDING UP — - FRAUDULENT TRANSFER OF SHARES STANNARIES ACT, 1869 (32 & 33 VICT. c. 19), s. 35.-In a case of In Re The Wheal Unity Wood Mining Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 7th inst., a question arose as to the construction of section 35 of the Stannaries Act, 1869. The Act relates to companies within the jurisdiction of the Stannaries Court, and section 35 provides that "a transfer of shares made for the purpose of getting rid of the further liability of a shareholder, as such, for a nominal or no consideration, or to a person without any apparent pecuniary ability to pay the reasonable expenses of working a mine, or to a person in the menial or domestic service of the transferor, shall be presumed to be a fraudulent transfer, and need not be recognized by the company or by the court on the winding up of the company, whether the company be a registered or unregistered company." In the case before the court a shareholder in a cost-book mining company in October, 1876, transferred 510 shares for £5 to a person of no means. The company accepted the transferee,

and entered the transfer in their books. Soon after the transfer a call of five shillings per share was made on the shareholders, which the transferee failed to pay. The company then made some inquiries about his position, but they took no steps to set aside the transfer. In February, 1877, another call of five shillings per share was made, which the transferee also failed to pay, and in April, 1877, the company sued him for the amount of the two calls, and recovered judgment against him. They issued execution on the judgment, but failed to obtain anything thereby. In June, 1877, the company passed a resolution forfeiting the transferee's shares. In March, 1879, an order was made to wind up the company. The liquidator applied to the Stannaries Court under section 35 to set aside the transfer as a fraudulent one, and to place the transferor on the list of contributories, and the Vice-Warden made an order accordingly. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) discharged the order. They held that, after what had taken place, the company would have been estopped from questioning the validity of the transfer (assuming that it was fraudulent), and that section 35 did not empower the court to set aside a transfer which the company itself could not, under the circumstances, have questioned.-SOLICITORS, J. E. Fox &Co.; Bolton, Robbins, & Busk.

COMPANY-WINDING UP-SUMMONING OFFICER OF COMPANY FOR EXAMINATION-DISCOVERY-COMPANIES ACT, 1862, s. 115-ORDER 31.—In a case of In re The Metropolitan Bank, before the Court of Appeal on the 16th inst., & question arose as to the exercise of the power given to the court by section 115 of the Companies Act, 1862, to summon for examination an officer of a company in liquidation. The liquidator of the company had brought an action against a former director of the company, claiming damages from him on the ground that he had, by misre presentation as to the pecuniary position of a person who owed a large debt to the company, induced the company to compromise their claim against that person for a very small sum. In that action interrogatories were administered to the defendant, and his answers to them were held to be sufficient upon an application by the plaintiff for a further answer. After the action had been set down for trial, the liquidator issued a summons under section 115 for the examination of the defendant in relation to the matters in question in the action. The defendant objected to answer, and Bacon, V.C., held that he was bound to attend and be examined. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) discharged the Vice-Chancellor's order. They said that the issue of a summons under section 115 was not a matter of right on the part of the liquidator, but the court must exercise a discretion. The inquisitorial powers conferred by the section must not be used vexatiously or oppressively, and, after the liquidator had used the inquisitorial power of discovery in the action which was given to him by order 31 under the Judicature Acts, and had obtained in that way what the court had held to be the fullest discovery to which he was entitled in the action, it would be both vexatious and perpossive if he was permitted to harass the defendant with a second examination in relation to the same matters

under section 115.-SOLICITORS, Harper, Broad, & Battcock; Newman, Stretton, & Hilliard.

COMPANY-WINDING UP-FULLY PAID-UP SHARESNON-REGISTRATION OF CONTRACT FOR ISSUE-TRANSFEREE FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE-SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER TO PURCHASER WITH NOTICE-COMPANIES ACT, 1867, s. 25.— In a case of In re The Stapleford Collieries Company, on the 12th inst., the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and BAGGALLAY, L.JJ.), reversed in part the decision of Bacon, V.C. (28 W. R. 270). In pursuance of a contract which was not registered, the company had issued fully paidup shares to the vendors of a mine to the company in part payment of the purchase-money. One of the vendors afterwards sold and transferred some of his fully paid-up shares to a person who had no notice of the fact that the shares had not been paid for in casb, and the company registered the transferee, and issued to him a certificate that his shares were fully paid. According, therefore, to the decision in Burkinshaw v. Nicolls (27 W. R. 819, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1004), the company were, as against the transferee, estopped from saying that the shares were not fully paid up, and he was entitled to hold the shares, notwithstanding the provisions of section 25, free from any liability to pay for them in cash. The transferee afterwards sold and transferred the shares to the other vendor, who was a director of the company, and in the winding up of the company the liquidator claimed to put the executor of the director on the list of contributories in respect of the shares thus acquired from the innocent transferee. Bacon, V.C., held that the estoppel, which applied to the transferee without notice, did not apply to his transferee who had notice that the requirements of section 25 had not been complied with. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the transferee without notice could transmit to any purchaser from him, whether he had or had not notice, as good a title as he himself had to the shares, and that consequently the executor was not liable as a contributory. JESSEL, M. R., said that the only exceptions from the ordinary rule, that a purchaser for value without notice could transmit to any one as good a title as he himself had, were when the sub-purchaser had himself been guilty of a fraud or breach of trust in relation to the property purchased. In such a case he would not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. But in the case before the court there was nothing wrong in the original sale of the shares, and nothing wrong in the purchase of them by the director.-SOLICITORS, Crossley & Burn; F. C. Greenfield.

SOLICITOR AND CLIENT-TAXATION OF COSTS-INTEREST ON DISBURSEMENTS BY SOLICITOR-COUNTRY SOLICITOR AND TOWN AGENT-SOLICITORS ACT, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c.

28), ss. 3, 17.-In a case of Ward v. Eyre, before the Court of Appeal on the 10th inst., a question arose upon the construction of section 17 of the Solicitors Act, 1870, which prɔvides that," subject to any general rules or orders hereinafter to be made, upon every taxation of costs, fees, charges, or disbursements, the taxing officer may allow interest at such rate and from such time as he thinks just on moneys disbursed by the attorney or solicitor for his client, and on moneys of the client in the hands of the attorney or solicitor, and improperly retained by him." And by section 3" client' includes any person who, as a principal or on behalf of another person, retains or employs, or is about to retain or employ, an attorney or solicitor, and any person who is or may be liable to pay the bill of an attorney or solicitor for any services, fees, costs, charges, or disbursements." The suit was commenced in 1872 by a bill in the Court of Chancery. The plaintiff was a country solicitor, the defendants being his London agents. The bill prayed for a discovery of all the matters of business transacted by the defendants on behalf of a railway company for which the plaintiff had acted as solicitor, the defendants being his London agents from 1860 to 1867; that the defendants might deliver to the plaintiff their bills of costs of such business, and that it might be referred to the taxing master to tax any bills of costs of the defendants which the plaintiff was liable to pay. The bill prayed also that an account might be taken of all sums paid or advanced by the defendants to, or for the use, or on account of, the plaintiff; an account of all sums of money received by, or come to the hands of, the defendants, to or

for the use of the plaintiff, or otherwise in respect of any
payments or advances as aforesaid, and an account of all
dealings and transactions between the plaintiff and the
defendants. The bill also prayed payment of the balance
which might be found due from the defendants to the plain-
tiff, the plaintiff submitting to pay any balance which
might be found due from him to the defendants. The decree
made in November, 1873, contained a declaration that the
defendants were bound to account to the plaintiff as his
agents for all the matters of business transacted by them for
or on behalf of the railway company, and their receipts and
payments in respect thereof from January 1860, to September,
1867. And it was ordered that the accounts asked for should
be taken in relation to the particular matters in question,
that the balance due from either party should be cer-
tified, and either party to whom any balance might be
certified to be due was to be at liberty to apply in cham-
bers as to the payment thereof. Nothing was said about
payment of interest on the balance, and further considera-
tion was not adjourned. The defendants, in 1879, took out
a summons, asking that, in taking the general agency
account of the defendants against the plaintiff under the
decree, the plaintiff might be charged with interest on the
agency costs and payments out of pocket from the end of
each year during the period in question. Jessel, M.R.,
disallowed the claim for interest, though he expressed a
strong opinion that the law was defective in not providing
that interest should be payable. The grounds of his deci-
sion were identical with those of the Court of Appeal
(JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.), who held that
the allowance of interest was precluded by the form of
the decree, further consideration not having been reserved,
and that there had been no demand in writing within the
meaning of section 28 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42. But it was
urged that under section 17 of the Act of 1870 the London
agent was entitled to interest on the disbursements which he
had made for his principal, as being, within the meaning
of section 3, "the person liable to pay the bill" of the
London agent. The court held that section 17 applies only
to transactions between a solicitor and his client in the
strictest sense of the word, and that it does not apply as
between a country solicitor and his London agent, even
though the country solicitor might be able to obtain a
ation of his London agent's bill. The court also expressed
an opinion that the section applies only on a taxation of
costs by the taxing officer, and that it does not apply to
the taking of an account by the court in such a suit as
that before it, and also that the Act of 1870 is not retro-
spective in its operation--i.e., that it does not apply to
disbursements made before it was passed. The order of
the Master of the Rolls was accordingly affirmed.-SOLI-
CITORS, G. L. P. Eyre & Co.; Taylor, Mason, & Taylor.

TRADE-MARK REGISTRATION WORDS IN FOREIGN CHARACTER-TRADE-MARKS REGISTRATION Acr, 1875 (38 & 39 VICT. c. 91), s. 10.-In a case of In re Rotherham's Trade-mark, before the Court of Appeal on the 11th inst., the question arose whether a trade-mark consisting of a word in Arabic characters ought to be registered as a trade-mark. Rotherham & Sons were watchmakers at Coventry, and they supplied watches to Tod, Mullen, & Co., of Alexandria, for sale in the East. For many years Rotherham & Sons had been in the habit of stamping on the dial plate of the watches supplied by them to Tod & Co. the word "Tod" in Arabie characters. The Registrar of Trade-marks, acting under a general regulation issued by the Commissioners of Patents not to register marks comprising words in foreign characters, refused to register the mark. Bacon, V.C. (27 W. R. 503),, ordered the mark to be registered. The Court of Appeal (JAMES BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) affirmed this decision. BAGGALLAY, L.J., said that the mark came clearly within the words of section 10, "A name of an individual or firm printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner." The respondent's counsel asked that, as the registrar had not been content with the Vice-Chancellor's order, but had chosen to appeal, he might be ordered to pay costs. The COURT said that they could not give costs against a public officer.-SOLICITORS, Solicitor to the Treasury; Whately, Milward, & Whitehead.

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PRACTICE-CLAIMS AS BETWeen Co-defenDANTS-CLAIMS FOR COSTS-DEFENCE TREATED AS NOTICE-ORDER 16, R. 17.-In of Official Liquidator of Economie Benefit Building Society v. Swift, before the Master of the Rolls the 11th inst., a question was raised whether a defendant could claim costs against her co-defendant on the ground that a case was made for them on her statement of defence. An order had been made in the action that the delivery of the statement of defence to the co-defendant should be notice of her claim within the

meaning of ord. 16, r. 17. The action was one for ejectment for breach of covenant, and it was alleged by the defendant in possession, a sub-lessee, that she had been induced to take the lease from the other defendant by certain mistax-representations that no breach of the covenant in question would be committed by carrying on the business of a dressmaker. This defence had been delivered to the other defendant, and the first defendant now asked, as judgment for possession was given against the defendants, for damages for the misrepresentation, and also the costs of the action which she would have to pay. Reliance was placed JESSEL, M.R., considered he had jurisdiction to entertain the upon Bagot v. Easton, 27 W. R. 404, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 394. question having regard to the order previously made; but on

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-ACTION IN CHANCERY DIVISION TRIED BY JURY BEFORE JUDGE OF COMMON LAW DIVISIONORD. 39, R. 1.-In a case of Jones v. Baxter, before the Court of Appeal on the 12th inst., a question arose as to the proper court in which to move for a rule nisi for a new trial. The action was brought in the Chancery Division, and was set down before Bacon, V.C. Notice was given of trial before a judge and jury at Westminster, and the action was entered accordingly for trial in the general list of actions for trial there, and was tried before Hawkins, J., with a jury. The motion for a new trial was in the first instance made in the Exchequer Division, who thought that it ought to have been made before Bacon, V.C. Application was then made to the Vice-Chancellor, and he thought that the Exchequer Division was the proper court to apply to. The matter was then mentioned to the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R, JAMES and BAGGALLAY, L.JJ.), who were of opinion that the case was governed by Hunt v. The City of London Real Property Company (26 W. R. 37, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 19), and that the application should be made to the Exchequer Division. JESSEL, M.R., said that this rule would not apply to the case of an issue directed by a judge of the Chancery Division to be tried by a judge of a common law division with a jury. In such a case the motion for a new trial must be made to the judge who had directed the trial of the issue.SOLICITOR, W. Crook,

the merits he came to the conclusion no case was made for either damages or costs.-SOLICITORS, W. C. Hall; Scott, Jarmain & Trass; Davenport Knight.

COPYRIGHT OF DESIGNS ACT (5 & 6 VICT. c. 100)— ARRANGEMENT OF BRAID-REGISTRATION OF PHOTOGRAPH MANUFACTURER-NOTICE OF INFRINGEMENT-KNOWLEDGE. -In a case of Brown v. Lomas, before the Master of the Rolls on the 7th inst., a motion was made under the 7th section of the Copyright of Designs Act, 1842, to restrain the infringement of a registered design for braid. The plaintiffs had registered a design for braid by a photograph of a child's jacket, with the arrangement of the braid upon it. The defendants had manufactured jackets with an arrangement of braid said to be an imitation of the plaintiffs' design. JESSEL, M. R., said that the first question was whether the design was well registered, and, in his opinion, the design of which the photograph was a copy was well registered within the meaning of the Act. The certificate of registration merely said that the design was registered, and did not say in respect of what articles, and it might be a difficult question to say how far the design would be held to apply to articles other than jackets. That question did not arise, because the defendant had placed his braid upon an article exactly similar to that on which the braid was placed by the plaintiffs. The next question was whether the defendants, who were manufacturers, and, therefore within the the 1st sub-section of section 7, were liable whether they had notice of the infringement or not. In his opinion, manufacturers were liable whether they had notice the article was an infringement or not, and it was their duty to see that they

did not commit a piracy. The section said they were liable for "any fraudulent imitation" of the design, and it was not necessary that the piracy should be an exact copy of the original. There might be many imitations which would not be fraudulent, and, in fact, he thought the imitation intended was an imitation with knowledge, and that the same could not be unconscious. Looking at the patterns of the plaintiffs and defendants, the differences were so slight that, unless pointed out, the eye would scarcely notice them. Under these circumstances, the defendants' jacket was an imitation, and, not using the word in an offensive sense, a fraudulent imitation of that of the plaintiffs, and they were entitled to an injunction.-SOLICITORS, Paterson, Snow, & Bloxam; Torr & Co.

a jury; that the court had no jurisdiction to restrain by injunction the publication of a libel, even though it was. injurious to property, relying for this proposition on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, before the Judicature Act came into operation, in The Prudential Assurance Company v. Knott (23 W. R. 249, L. R. 10 Ch. 142), or that at any rate it could not be "just or convenient," within the meaning of section 25, sub-section 8, of the Judicature Act of 1873, to grant an injunction until the fact of the libel had been determined by a jury. It was also objected that no injunction could be granted unless the plaintiffs proved, as they had not done, that they had sustained actual damage in their trade by the alleged libel. FRY, J., held that the publication in question was a libel, and that its necessary effect was to injure the plaintiffs' trade. He held that the argument founded on Fox's Act was unway of criminal information or indictment, and it had no application to a civil action. Under the Judicature Act an action for libel might be tried like any other action. The choice of the mode of trial was in the first instance with the plaintiff, but this was subject to the right of the defendant to ask for, and the power of the court to order, a different mode of trial. No application for a trial by jury having been made by the defendants, it was now too late to take the objection. No doubt the court, in the exercise of its discretion, could order an action for libel to be tried by a jury, and Fox's Act might influence the court in the exercise of its discretion. And as to the question of damages, his lordship held that it was sufficient to prove that the libel was necessarly calculated to injure the plaintiff's trade. If it was necessary to prove that actual damage had been sustained, the preventive jurisdiction of the court would fall short of what it ought to do. In cases of trade-mark the court was in the constant habit of restraining the improper use of a mark, without proof of actual damage, if the use of it was necessarily calculated to injure the plaintiff. But the cases of Riding v. Smith (24 W. R. 487, L. R. 1 Ex. D. 91), and Thorley's Cattle Company v. Massam (28 W. R. 295), since affirmed by the Court of Appeal, were direct authorities that in such a case as the present it was sufficient to prove that the statement in question was necessarily calculated to injure the plaintiff's trade. That objection, therefore, failed. And, as to the objection that an injunction could not be granted to restrain the publication of a libel, his lordship was at a loss to see why a libel affecting property or trade was not the proper subject of an injunction. The intention of the Legislature, as shown by section 25, sub-section 8, of the Judicature Act, was to enlarge rather than diminish the power of the court as to granting injunctions. But the case of James v. James (20 W. R. 434, L. R. 13 Eq. 421) was a distinct authority for granting an injunction in such a case, though that particular part of the judgment was not the subAnd in Thorley's Cattle ject of much discussion then. Company v. Massam (28 W. R. 295), Malins, V.C., granted an injunction in a similar case, and his decision had boen affirmed by the Court of Appeal, James, L.J., who was a party to the decision of The Prudential Assurance Company v. Knott, being one of the judges who affirmed it. The injunc tion claimed by the plaintiffs must, therefore, be granted.SOLICITORS, S. Whitehead; Lee & Brocklesby.

PUBLIC PARK-POWERS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY-EXCLU-tenable. That Act, he said, applied only to proceedings by SION OF PUBLIC.-In a case of Attorney-General v. Mayor of Leeds, before the Master of Rolls on the 11th inst., a question was raised whether, on the construction of section 35 of the Leeds Improvement Act, 1872, the corporation were entitled to admit the public to a public park on pay: ment of sixpence each on days when the park was closed under the section. A park was appropriated for public use and recreation under the Leeds Improvement Act, 1866, and by the Leeds Improvement Act, 1872, s. 35, the corporation had power "from time to time, and on such occasions as they think fit, not exceeding in all ten days in the year, to close" the park" against the public, and may on such occasions admit to any such park the members of any society, or of any public or private institution, or persons being attendants at or supported by any public or private institution, or such other persons as the corporation think fit, and the admission of every individual to any such park on such occasions may be either with or without pay. ment, as directed by the corporation." It appeared that the corporation had closed the park to the public, and had let the same for the day to a swimming club for a gala, the public being admitted at sixpence each, and the proceeds being divided between the club and the corporation. This information and action had been commenced to restrain the defendants from using the park in contravention of the terms of the 35th section, and it was contended there was no power to exclude the public, and, in fact, re-admit them on terms of a money payment, that, in fact, being not an exclusion. It was also contended that the paying public were not within the words "such other persons" in the section, and that those words only applied to persons of the same class as those previously mentioned. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the effect of the earlier Act was to require the corporation to allow the public a free and gratuitous user of the park, and that they could only exclude the public by reason of the powers in the Act of 1872. The first part of section 35 would scarcely confer the right of accepting payments for the user of the park, and the last part of the section was evidently passed to enable the corporation to make a profit by the closing of the park to the public.

What the informant asked him

to do was to limit the generality of the words "such other persons as the corporation think fit," and he saw no reason to do so. In his opinion the corporation did, in fact, exclude the public if they only admitted those of the public who made a money payment, and there would be such an exclusion if any special qualification was imposed on those seeking admission. The paying public came within the meaning of the above words, and, in his opinion, the corporation had committed no illegal act. The information must, therefore, be dismissed, with costs.-SOLICITORS.Paterson, Snow, & Bloxam, for Dibb, Atkinson, & Braithwaite, Leeds; Learoyd, Learoyd, & Peace, for G. Munson, Lee is.

LIBEL INJURY TO TRADE-INJUNCTION-RIGHT TO JURY -Fox's ACT (32 GEO. 3, c. 60)-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 25, SUB-SECTION 8-ORD. 36, R. 3.-In a case of Thomas v. Williams, before Fry, J., on the 7th inst., a question arose as to the power of the court to grant an injunction to restrain the publication of a libel injurious to trade. The defendants had not given any notice under rule 3 of order 36 to have the action tried by a jury. After the evidence on both sides had been taken, the defendants' counsel objected that by virtue of Fox's Act (32 Geo. 3, c. 60) the defendant to an action for libel was entitled to have the question of libel determined by

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