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of traffic, and to prevent a proper system of induce the companies to meet the reasonable requirethrough traffic. It was, no doubt, considered that as ments of the public, though, of course, there are notable railway companies were in the nature of monopolies, exceptions. Again, the dread of competing lines fresoomething of their freedom to do what they would with quently keeps a railway company in order. However their own should be taken away in the interests of the much railway companies may be sinners in particular public. It appears to me that up to a certain point this instances, it seems to me that it is very doubtful how far is very true, but I cannot think that at the time when such a sweeping power as that which would enable the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 21 passed it could ever have been & tribunal to order companies to make structural intended to give such a sweeping power to a court of works, can stand consistently with the independent common law over the management of railways. The existence of each bodies. It seems to me that the logical provisions of the Act with regard to undue preference consequence of such legislation is to take the control of naturally grew out of the common law conception of the such enterprizes as railways from the hands of private duties of a common carrier. The carrier was not entirely adventurers, and to give it to the State as representing free to do what he would with his own. He was bound the public at large.
L to carry the class of goods in respect of which he held himself out as a carrier. The provisions of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, receiving the more limited construction, are a most natural development of this idea,
Rebiews. as also was the intrusting it to a court of law to watch over and enforce this extension of the old line of doctrine
ADVOCACY. on the subject; but to give a court of law a general power of enforcing additional structural works would | HINTS ON ADVOCACY. By RICHARD HARRIS, Barrister. have been an entirely new departure, as it seems to me. at-Law. Waterlow Brothers & Layton. The words are to give “all reasonable facilities for the A modest and unpretentious little book, full of good receiving and forwarding and delivery of traffic upon sense and just observation, set out with much humour and from the several railways and canals belonging to, and many apt illustrations. The “hints” contained in or worked by, such companies." These words seem to
it form a very complete manual of the advocate's art in me to point to the mode of using existing works, not to trial by jury, and the plain, good-humoured, and unthe erection of fresh works, and it does seem that, affected style in which they are conveyed makes them though grammatically the subsequent provisions of the
the more acceptable and the easier to digest and section are, as pointed out by Lush, J., not restrictive
assimilate. There is only one caution that the reader of what goes before, still they serve none the less to point who reads for profit should take with him. In out the scope and extent of the previous provisions.
every art, but prominently in advocacy, as in war, the They are distinctly aimed merely at preventing undue practice must be a fresh and living one ; circumstances preferences and furthering through traffic, both pointing
do not repeat themselves precisely, and an illustration, to the mode of using existing structural works. It seems however apt, is likely to lead astray one who is looking almost certain that if the Legislature had thus contem
out for an opportunity of reproducing it. Let the young plated such a sweeping enactment as the Railway Com
advocate read and re-read this little work (he will find missioners supposed, they would have used express words it to his profit), but let him allow its rules, maxims, on the subject, and enacted that the railway companies observations, and examples to rest quietly in his mind, should be bound to provide such structural works as the and guide him by an unseen influence, rather than court might order.
attempt to deck himself with them as if they were a suit The power which the judgment of Lush, J., would
of clothes. give to the Railway Commissioners would be literally The plan of the book is well conceived. It takes in enormous. It would be practically tantamount to order the successive steps of a trial, and gives hints and depriving the railway companies of their own manage. directions appropriate to each ; and a special chapter is ment, and the control of their own property, whenever appropriated to the defence in a criminal trial. It is any interested party chose to challenge their manage. true that the opening and summing up of the defend. ment of their property. If the company were successful ant's case in a civil action, which have their peculiar in any litigation on the subject, they would manage their points, are not specifically dealt with; but the chapter property in the way they did, not of their own free will,
on the plaintiff's opening and reply afford ample material but because the commissioners allowed them to do so. which common sense will easily adapt. Some specimens Such a sweeping piece of legislation as this, striking so of forensic pleading follow. Nascitur non fit is a motto entirely at the independence of railway companies, surely | which many may be disposed to apply to advocacy as to cannot have been intended to be slipped through under poetry; but in the one case or in the other the motto is such a word as “facilities." It would be a gigantic stride true only of efforts of the highest kinds, and such as in the direction of the conclusion that the railways ought result in enduring monuments of the art. With the to be the property of the State.
ordinary wayfarer much may be accomplished by care regard to the wider question, not whether and attention applied by practice; and the author of such sweeping powers are possessed by the railway | this little work may fairly claim the position of a commissioners, but whether they ought to be—the judicious master in the art of teaching. His circle of discussion of that does not fall 80 strietly within readers, however, will probably not be limited to those my province as the mere question of law. No doubt
who read for instruction. If any of our readers are in much might be said on both sides. It is extremely want of a little book to fill up a vacant hour, they will difficult to strike the balance between the public be secure of finding here what will engage their attention and a railway company, which, no doubt, is in the and amuse their leisure. nature of a monopoly. As a railway company must obtain statutory powers, it is fair that in return its liberty should be curtailed; but the question is to what extent. Railway companies exist partly for their own By a clerical error in our observations last week on the benefit, a fact which clamorous newspaper writers seem office of Lord Chancellor (p. 458, line 3 from top) 21 & sometimes to forget. It is doubtful whether it would | 22 Viot, c. 49 was inserted instead of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 75 ultimately be for the general public interest to make too (Office & Oath Act, 1867). hard terms with them. At any rate, it is just that those The twentieth anniversary festival of the Solicitors' who, by their enterprize, afford conveniences to the Benevolent Institution will be held on Wednesday, June 30, public should reap a reasonable profit thereby. Speaking as the Ship Hotel, Greenwich, when the Right Hon. Sir broadly, considerations of self-interest would generally | James Han nen will take the chair.
to pleadings, and could not be held to include interroga. General Correspondence. tories and answers thereto. He, however, refused to
allow me to draw up the order, on the ground that, by To CORRESPONDENTS. AU letters intended for publica the written consent which I held, I had all I required.
tion in the " Solicitors' Journal” must be authenti- I shall therefore lose the cost of the summons. cated by the name of the writer. The Editor cannot Now, Sir, my object in troubling you with this letter undertake to return MSS. forwarded to him.
is to know, for future guidance, whether or not interroga.
tories and answers thereto are or are not pleadings within AFFIDAVITS BY MARKSMEN.
the meaning of the above rule? The master's decision, [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]
if correct, might be applied to every kind of summons,
and it would be unsafe to issue any summons before Sir,-I apprehend the inquiry by "J.H." related torule having ascertained from one's opponent whether or not 17 of the New Rules, and if so, with deference, the he would consent to what it is proposed to ask thereby. reply of Mr. T. W. Braithwaite does not meet the The new rule does not, on the face of it, bear this incase.
terpretation, though I think it would be well, and would There can, as yet, be no practice in reference to the
save a great deal of unnecessary costs, if it were so new rule, and there is at present no authorized or settled extended.
A SOLICITOR. form of jurat thereunder. The third form suggested by
April 22. Mr. Braithwaite-viz., that where the affidavit is read over to the deponent by a third party elsewhere than in the presence of the commissioner-clearly will not do,
THE NEW RULES. for the new rule requires that the affidavit shall be read [To the Editor of the Solicilors' Journal.] in the commissioner's presence to the deponent.
sir,-There appears to be some discrepancy in the Under this new rule the affidavit may no doubt be read
new Rules of the Supreme Court which relate to the over to the deponent by a third party, but it must be so
charging of stock or shares and distringas, inasmuch as, read in the presence of the commissioner, and the latter
while by rule 29, it is stated that the company must also satisfy himself that the deponent “ seemed
on whom is served notice from the person in whose perfectly to understand it," and the deponent must make
name the stock specified in the notice is standing his signature in the presence of the commissioner. The
shall not be authorized without the order of the court to jurat must certify to these three facts, and seeing the
refuse to permit the transfer to be made for more than length of time all this will involve, an additional fee
eight days, there is no provision requiring the company should certainly be allowed to the commissioner.
to give notice to the person who placed the distringas on It is also to be noticed that the new rule is not con. fined to marksmen, for it speaks of the deponent making enabling him to obtain the necessary order.
the stock informing him of the proposed transfer and so his or her signature. It is much wider. It includes every deponent “who appears to the officer to be illite difficulty would it not have been advisable to bring it
If there is any provision in existence which meets this rate.” The consequence of a non-observance of the rule
into the present rules ? is that the affidavit cannot be used in evidence. The
A LAW STUDENT. rule thus demands strict attention on the part both of the solicitor and the commissioner.
F. R. P. Bedford-row, April 19.
Cages of the Queek. (To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]
COURT OF BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
TIME FOR Sir,-While thanking Mr. Braithwaite for the infor. OBJECTING TO EXERCISE— BANKRUPTCY Act, 1869, s. 72. mation that no fee is allowed to a commissioner on taxa- | -In a case of Ex parte Butters, before the Court of Appeal tion for reading over an affidavit to a marksman, I can on the 15th inst., a question arose with regard to the jurisnot concur in his reasons. He says that reading over diction of the Court of Bankruptcy, under section 72. of the the affidavit is purely optional on the commissioner's Bankruptcy Act, 1869. In November, 1878, on the applicapart, but it appears to me not to be so; for unless he tion of the trustee in the bankruptcy, an order was made by refuses to take the affidavit he“ must," in the first two
the county court at Hanley directing the trial by a jury of cases mentioned, either read it over or attend to the
issues to determine whether an agreement, which had been deponent while it is being read over to enable him to
executed by the bankrupt in April, 1873, and a mortgage,
which had been executed by him in May, 1873, had been sign the jurat, and in either case he “may” be occupied
executed fraudulently and without consideration, and with for an hour or more. Surely the framers of the rules
intent to defeat and delay creditors. On the 20th of June, ncver intended this.
1879, the issues were tried, and the jury found that both the agreement and the deed were fraudulent, and that thoy had
been executed by the bankrupt without consideration, and SUMMONSES FOR TIME.
with intent to defeat and delay his creditors. On the 26th of [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]
June the mortgagee gave notice of a motion in the county
court for a new trial. On the 10th of July the county court Sir,- I had occasion yesterday to obtain an extension of
made an order declaring the agreement and the deed to be time to file an affidavit in answer to interrogatories. Ivoid and of no effect, and directing the mortgagee to deliver accordingly issued a summons and sent it to the plaintiff's them up to be cancelled. On the 5th of August the county solicitors with a request that they would give me a con court refused the application for a new trial. Meanwhile, sent thereto. They, however, refused to accept service, the mortgagee had given notice of appeal from the order of and returned the summons and copy with a note to the the 10th of July. This appeal was heard by the Chief Judge effect that, under the new rules, such a summons was
on the 12th of January, 1880. No appeal had been brought unnecessary, but that they would consent to the exten.
from the refusal of a new trial. On the hearing of the appeal sion of time asked for by the summons. Being unwilling
by the Chief Judge, the objection was, for the first time,
taken that the case was not one in which the Court of to lose the cost of the summons, which I had issued boná fide, I applied to the master's clerk to draw up an order Bankruptcy ought to exercise the
conferred by section 72. The Chief Judge (28 W. R. thereon in accordance with thre written consent of the 280, L. Ř. 13 Ch. D. 603), allowed the objection, plaintiff's solicitors, but he referred me to the master.
and discharged the order appealed from, but without I accordingly applied to the master, showing him the costs, on the ground that the objection ought to written consent which I held, and pointed out to him that have been taken earlier. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, the new rule (ord. 57, r. 6a, April, 1880) merely referred | BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) held that the
cage was governed by Ex parte Swinbanks (27 W. R. 898, nor sball any compensation be allowed by the vendors or L. R. 11 Ch. D. 525), and that the objection even if it were purchaser in respect thereof, except such (if any) as the otherwise valid, wbich they were disposed to think it was not) judge in cbambers shall direct." It turned out that the was raised too late, after the objecting party bad taken his vendors were entitled, not to the whole of the field called chance of a decision being given in his favour on the merits. Bottlesey Green, but only to four undivided sevenths of it. And the court held that, inasmuch as the refusal of a new After the agreement for purchase bad been made, the vendors trial had not been appealed from, the finding of the jury entered into a provisional agreement with the owner of the must be taken to be right, and, that being so, no other order three-seventbs for an exchange of bis three-sevenths for could have been made on that finding than an order for the another piece of land, comprising four acres, forming another cancellation of the instruments in question. Consequently, | part of the farm the subject of the sale. Jessel, M.R., rethe order of the Chief Judge was discharged, and the order of fused the purchaser's application to be discharged from his the county court was restored. — SOLICITORS, Llewellyn, purchase. But he offered the purchaser (without prejudice to Ackrill, f Hammack; J. Burton.
his right to appeal) the option of completing his purchase with the benefit of the agreement for exchange, or without the
benefit of that agreement, but with compensation. The MORTGAGE–PRIORITY—NOTICE-SOLICITOR.-In a case of
Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) The Saffron Walden Building Society v. Rayner, before the
reversed this decision, and held that the purchaser must be
discharged, on the ground that he was entitled to bave the Court of Appeal on the 16th inst., a question aroge as to the
thing which he had contracted for-the whole close—and priorities of some mortgagees of a reversionary interest. One
could not be compelled to take undivided sbares in it, or else Hardy was, under the will of bis father, entitled to a reversionary share in £5,000, subject to the life interests of his
to give compensation.-SOLICITORS, White, Borrett, & Co., mother. In 1872 he mortgaged his share to the plaintiffs. Be
E. Bromley. fore advancing the mortgage money the plaintiffs inquired of the solicitors who bad acted for the father during his life, and
APPEAL-EXTENSION OF TIME-MISTAKE-ORD. 58, P. wbo bad afterwards acted for the executors and trustees of his
15.-In a case of In re Rawlins, an application was, or will, whether the trustees had any notice or knowledge of any the 17th inst.. made to the Court of Appeal (JAMES, incumbrance by Hardy on his share. The solicitors replied
BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, LJJ.) for an extension of the that they were the solicitors for the trustees, and added, “ We have not had any notice, nor bave any knowledge, of
time for appealing, on the ground that, through an accidental
slip, a notice of appeal had not been given within the proper any incombrance by Mr. Hardy of his interest under the
time. The court refused the application, on the ground that will." The mortgage was executed on the 13th of April, and on the 15th of April the plaintiffs sent a formal potice in
it was not proved that the alleged slip bad been made. writing of their mortgage to the solicitors, the notice being
BRAMWELL, L.J., said that, if this had been proved, be should addressed to the execators and trustees” of the will.
have thought that the time ought to be extended. He thought
The d-fendants were three subsequent mortgagees, the first of the
| this ought to be done whenever the court could compensate
the other party by means of an order for the payment of subsequent mortgages, that to the defendant Rayner, having been executed in June, 1873. Before that mortgage was
costs. James, L.J., reiterated the opinion, which he has executed Rayner inquired of each of the trustees whether
often expressed before, that a mere accidental slip is not a he had bad any notice or was aware of any incumbrance
ground for an extension of the time for appealing. He on Hardy's share, and both the trustees replied that they
thought that the rules ought to be observed. BRANWELL, were not aware of any, and bad received no notice to that
L.J., agreed that the rules ought to be observed, but thought effect. After the execution of Rayner's mortgage he, by his
that the exceptions ought equally to be observed. solicitor, sent to each of the trustees a formal notice in writing of it. Similar inquiries and notices were made and given in relation to the other subsequent mortgages, the
PRACTICE-MOTION TO TAKE AFFIDAVIT OFF FILE FOR
SCANDAL-Costs—ADDITIONAL RULES OF COURT OF AUGUST, inquiries being answered to the effect that the trustees were
1875, ORD. 6, R. 18.--In a case of March v. Martin, before not aware of any incumbrance by Hardy prior to that of the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., an application had June, 1873, in favour of Rayner. Bacon, 'y.C., held (27
been made to Malins, V.C., to take off the file, on the ground W. R. 449, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 696), upon the evidence, that the notice of the plaintiffs' incumbrance, which bad been
of scandal, an affidavit which had been filed in support of a given by them to the solicitors, bad been verbally communica.
motion to remove a receiver in the action. The Vice-Chancellor
bad ordered the affidavit to be taken off, and that the party who ted by the solicitors to the trustees, and that this was enough
had filed it should pay the costs of the motion. The Court of to entitle the plaintiffs to priority. His lordship also expressed
Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., James, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) wera an opinion that the notice to the solicitors was of itself
of opinion that the affidavit was not scandalous because it sufficient, even if it was not actually communicated to the
was rerelant to the subject of the motion, and they actrustees. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and cordingly discharged the Vice-Chancellor's order. Bat they BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) reversed this decision. They were of were of opinion that the affidavit was very improperly framed, opinion, on the evidence, that it was not proved that the plaintiffs' notice had been in fact communicated to the
and, to mark their disapprobation of it, they discharged the
order without costs, and gave the appellant no costs of the trustees, and they held that the mere fact that the notice had
appeal, holding that they had power to do this under rule been given to solicitors who happened to have previously | 18 of ord. 6 of the Additional Rules of Court of August, acted for the trustees was not enough to fix the trustees with
1875.-SOLICITORS, Hores & Pattison ; Munns d Co. notice. Consequently, the plaintiffs were not entitled to priority.- SOLICITORS, Andrew & Wood; Paterson, Snow, & Bloxam; Clapham & Fitch ; Beaumont & Warren.
PRACTICE-COMMISSION TO TAKE EVIDENCE ABROAD PRIOR DETERMINATION OF QUESTION OF LAW-ORD. 34, R. 2
-FORMAL PARTY - Costs. - In a case of Thompson v. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE Wilding, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., & MISDESCRIPTION-COMPENSATION.-In a case of Arnold v. 1 question arose as to the issue of a commission to take the Arnold, before the Court of Appeal on the 17th inst., a evidence of witnesses resident abroad. The action was purchaser at a sale under the direction of the court, sought brought by the next of kin of a deceased married woman, to be released from bis contract, on the ground that the claiming to be entitled to her personal estate, notwithstanding vendors could not give him that which he had contracted to the fact that sbe bad, by her will, disposed of it in favour of buy. The property was described in the particulars of sale her husband. It was alleged that the husband, knowing of as a compact small farm, containing 41a. 3r. 35p., divided the will in his favour, bad mordered the wife in a foreign as follows." The names of the different fields were then country, in order to obtain possession of the property. He stated in one column, and in another column was stated, had been tried by the court of the foreign country, and had opposite the name of each field, the acreage of that field. One been found guilty of the murder, and bad been sentenced to of the fields was described as “Bottlesey Green, containing a long term of imprisonment. The plaintiffs desired to take 71. 1r. 27p.," and opposite to it, in the column of quantity, the evidence of some witnesses who resided at the place where was inserted “4a. Or. 38p. One of the conditions of sale the murder was alleged to have been committed, for the provided that, “if any error, mis-statement, or omission in the purpose of proving the murder in the action. Malins, V.C. particulars be discovered, the same shall not annul the sale, refused the application for a commission, on the ground that
before it was issued, the question of law ought to be tried before the Court of Appeal (ante, p. 144), were whether, assuming the alleged facts to be true, the husband authorities that the agreement to refer could not be was disentitled to the benefits given to him by the wife's revoked. JESSEL, M.R., said he thought the point was will. His lordship was of opinion that rule 2 of ord. 34 decided by Piercey v. Young, but if it were not be should -authorized him to direct this question of law to be tried first. certainly hold that an agreement to refer could not be The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and James, and revoked any more than any other clause in partnership BAAMWELL, L.JJ.) were of opinion that there was no reason articles. Under the circumstances he considered there why the plaintiffs should not be allowed to prepare for the was no case made by the plaintiff why the matter should trial of the action by taking the evidence of witnesses who
not be referred, and he would, therefore, make the usual were not likely to come to England, and who might possibly order for reference.-SOLICITORS, Blunt, Tebbs, f Lawdie before the trial could take place. Their lordships thought ford; Waltuns, Bubb, g Walton. that the issuing ol the commission was almost a matter of course in such circumstances. A question as to costs also arose. The executors of the will were served with notice of VENDOR AND PURCHASER-LogS BY FIRE AFTER CON. the appeal, and they appeared by counsel and asked for their TRACT BUT BEFORE COMPLETION-INSURANCE BY VENDORcosts. The court refused to allow their costs. Jessey, M.R., Right to POLICY MONEYS.-In a case of Rayner v. Preston, said that it was not right that merely formal parties, who before tbe Master of the Rolls on the 19th inst., a question could have no interest in the question in dispute, should arose whether, on a contract of sale, and where the property appear by counsel for the sole purpose of asking for their was insured by the vendor and was partly burnt down costs.
after the date of the contract and before completion, the
purchasers were entitled to the money paid by the inRECEIVER-PRIOR INCUMBRANCER IN POSSESSION
surance company to the vendors. The question was RECEIVER—ATTORNMENT.-In a case of Hewett v. Mansel, and Purchaser Act, 1874, but on the suggestion of the
brought before the court on a summons ander tbe Vendor before the Master of the Rolls on the 16th inst., a question Master of the Rolls that it was more properly a case for was raised whether in an action for equitable execution of a
an action, an action had been commenced for a doclaration judgment, in which a receiver was appointed at the plaintiff's instance, the usual attornment clause should be
that the plaintiffs, the purobasers, were entitled to the iuserted in the order. It appeared that a receiver had been
moneys received from the company, or to have the same already appointed at the instance of some prior incumbrancers,
laid out in reinstating the premises. JESSEL, M.R., said and that such receiver was in possession of the property.
that had the matter been res integra, and whatever The registrar had drawn up the order in the form given in
arrangements he might tben have felt himself constrained Seton, at p. 414, and as made in Wells v. Kilpin (L. R. 18
to make so that the purchasers might have the benefit of Eq. 298). In that case the receiver was appointed without
the policy moneys, it was quite clear that, at the present prejudice to prior incumbrancers, and the tenants were
time, he was compelled by the authorities to hold that “subject as aforesaid, to attorn." It was contended that
the vendors as against the purchasers were perfectly enthis form was wrong, and that as an attornment must always
titled to retain the policy moneys. He must therefore be absolute, if the first receiver was in possession there
dismiss the action with costs.-SOLICITORS, F. Penn & Son, ought to be no attornment clause inserted in the order.
ior Quinn, Liverpool ; Torr & Co., for Anthony & Im lach, JESSEL, M.R., agreed with this view, and directed the order Liverpool. to be drawn up without any attornment clause.-SOLICITORS, Nelson, Son, & Hastings; Simpson & Cullingford.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT-NOT TO ERECT OR USE BUILDING AS “ PUBLIC-HOUSE, TAVERN, OR BEERSHOP
"-SALE OP COMPANY-WINDING-UP ORDER MADE_STAY OF PRO.
BEER TO BE CONSUMED OFF THE PREMISES.-In a case of CEEDINGS ON ORDER PENDING APPEAL-RIGHT OF COMPANY
The London and Suburban Land and Building Company TO APPLY.-In a case of In re Automatic Button Com
(Limited) v. Field, before the Master of the Rolls on the pany, before the Master of the Rolls on the 16th inst., a
19th inst., a question arose whether the carrying on of a motion was made by the company to stay all proceedings business under the usual excise licence for the sale of beer under a winding-up order that had been made pending an
to be consumed off the premises was a breach of a covena:16 appeal. The application was made by the conipany, and
net to build ang.." public-house, tavern, or beershop,” or a preliminary objection was taken that the company had permit any building to be converted to such a use. 20 right itself to apply, as it was in fact dead after the
contended that at the time when the deed of covenant was winding-up order had been made, and reliance was
executed, and according to the definitions in Burns' Jusplaced upon a dictum of James, LJ., in the case of
tice of the Peace, a public-house simply meant an inn, that The Diamond Fuel Company (L. R. 13 Ch. D. at
a tavern was a place where wine was sold, and that a beer.p. 405). JESSEL, M,R., said that, reading James,
shop was really a beer-house-a place where beer was cutL.J.'s, observations at p. 412, in conjunction with his
sumed on the premises. The licence by the defendant ha i previous remark at p. 405, be most treat the case as an
been taken out under section 4 of the Intoxicating Liquor authority that the company could sue, although any
Licensing Act, 1828, and section 31 of the Licensing Act, application would, of course, be entertained, if necessary,
1874, and the amending Acts. JESSEL, M.R., was of for security for costs. He, however, said he was by no
opinion that the case of Bishop of St. Albans v. Batter by means sure that the company could move under section 89
(26 W. R. 679), was an express authority upon the of the Companies Act, 1862, for a stay of the proceedings
point that a beershop meant really a place where beer w48 under the winding-op order, and he therefore directed that
sold, and therefore that a breach of the covenant had been
committed. He did not think that case conflicted with the the motion should stand over to enable a creditor or con.
case before James, V.C., of London and North-Western Railtributory to be joined as party to the application. He presumed nothing would be done in the meantime.
way Company v. Garnett (18 W. R. 246), and he should
therefore simply follow the Queen's Bench case.-SOLICITORS, SOLICITORS, Walter Webb; Goldberg f Langdon.
Shum & Co.; J. W. Rogers.
ARBITRATION-AGREEMENT TO REFER-REVOCATIONCOMMON Law PROCEDURE ACT, 1854, s. 11.-In the case of Christie v. Noble, before the Master of the Rolls on
Societies. the 16th inst., a motion was made to stay all farther pro. ceedings in the action, and tbat all matters in dispute might be referred to arbitration under section 11 of the
SOLICITORS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATIO.V. Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, pursuant to a clause The usual monthly meeting of the board of directors to that effect in the partnership articles entered into of this association was held at the Law Institution, Chan. between the parties. The plaintiff objected to the refer. cery-lane, London, on Wednesday, April 14 last, the direcenoe, on the ground that he had revoked the agreement to tors present being Messrs. Asker (Norwich), Brook, Gregory, refer, and be relied on Rouse v. Meier (19 W. R. 438). For M.P., Hedger, Hunter, Janson, Keen, Paterson, Penthe defendant it was contended that Randell v. Thompson nington, Pidcock (Woolwich), Rickman, Roscoe, Rose, (24 W. R. 665), and a recent case of Piercey v. Young, Smith (in the chair), Styan, and Woolbert (Mr. Eiffe, secre
tary). A sum of £325 was distributed in grants of relief to “ Can the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Hallelt necessitous solicitors, and the necessitous widows and families be regarded as sound?”—In re Hallett (28 W. R. 321). of deceased solicitors ; two new members were added to the (For the case in the Court of Appeal, see SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, association, and other general business was transacted. February 11, 1880, p. 288. See articles in Law Times,
March 20, 1880 ; SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, February 21, 1880, p. 305 ; Law Journal, February 14, 1880, p. 66.) The speakers in the affirmative were Messrs. Edwards, Pope, and
Steere, and on the negative Messrs. Smith, Marshall, and Law Students' Journal. . Barber. After a careful summing up by the chairman the
question was put to the meeting and carried in the affirmative
by one vote. A vote of thanks to the chairman concluded LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY. the meeting. The weekly meeting of this society was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, on Tuesday evening last, Mr.
CALLS TO THE BAR. J. A. Neale, B.A., in the chair. A paper was read by the secretary, Mr. T. Bateman Napier, on the Liability of The following gentlemen were on Wednesday called to the Employers for Injuries to their Servants. After the paper had | degree of barrister-at-law :been read a discussion ensued, in which Messrs. Raymond, AT LINCOLN'S-INN.-Ralph Hawtrey Deane, B.A., Oxford"; Barker, Kirk, Ellis, Green, Hemsley, Bartlett, Lewis, George Frederick Roumieu, M.A., Cambridge ; Thomas Lea Rendell, and Brown took part. Mr. Napier having replied, Higgins, B.A., Oxford ; John Hartley Sandwith, Captain a vote of thanks was passed to him for his paper, and the Royal Marines ; Arthur John Wright, M.A., Oxford ; Arthur meeting terminated.
Christopher Capel, Penang, Straits Settlements; Edward
Trinity College, Cambridge ; Mohammed Husseim Hakim, UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. Bombay University ; William Craddock Bolland, B.A., A meeting of the above society was held at Clement's.
Cambridge ; John Entwistle ; and Samuel Moss, B.A., inn Hall, on the evening of Wednesday last, when the
Oxford, Esqs. subject debated upon was “ That the principle of the
AT THE INNER TEMPLE :—Herbert Edward Harris, B.A.,
Oxford ; Frederick Arthur Hyndman, B.A., Oxford ; Permissive Bill sbould be adopted.” Mr. F. N. Sypnot
Christoffel Joseph Brand; Hans Mark Hamill-Stewart, B.A., opened the debate in the negative, and was sapported by
Dublin; Radolf Chambers Lehmann, B.A., Cambridge ; Megers. W. H. Kekel, R. Gwynne Templer, Clarkson, P.
Edmund Wilson Barnes, B.A., Cambridge ; St. John Mott, Whitehouse, E. Robinson, Harvey, and Collyer, whilst
Stephen,'B.A., Cambridge ; Richard Neville, B.A., LL.B., Mesers. McKay, Stevenson, Pickersgill, Fithiad, and
Cambridge ; John Digby Gordon, B.A., Cambridge ; Henry Cartis took the side of the affirmative. Mr. Synoot then
William Paget Hoskyns, B.A., Oxford; James Kenyon replied, and the chairman, Mr. E. H.Quioke, having sommed
Bourne, B.A., Cambridge ; Ralph Staveley M Kerrell, B.A.
, ap, the motion was put to the vote, wben the “Noes it by a majority of seven. The debate was animated and
Cambridge; Orlando Bridgeman Martyn, B.A., Oxford ;
Pearry Lall Roy, Cambridge; Edward Allvey Jennings, well sustained, and the attendance of members and visitors
B.A., Cambridge ; Keith Maitland, B.A., LL.B., Camvery good.
bridge; John Blackburn Fergusson, LL.B., Cambridge ;
Frederick Mote, LL.B., B.A., Cambridge; Benedietus de MANCHESTER LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.
Fitz Hardinge Robert Bayfield Liebenrood; Charles
Robert Southwell Dimsdale, B.A., Cambridge ; Alfred Charles The twelfth and last meeting of the session of this society Richard Emden; Reginald Edwin Morris, Cambridge ; was held on Tuesday evening, the 13th inst., at the Law Abul Fazl Mahomed Abdur-Rahman ; Harry Duff, B.A Library, Cross-street Chambers, when the chair was taken Oxford, Esqs. by Mr. Alexander C. Maberly, M.A., barrister-at-law. The AT THE MIDDLE TEMPLE.-John Maurice Mabon, M.A. ; mioutes of the last meeting having been read by the hon. Archibald James Forman, B.A., Worcester College, Oxford ; secretary (Mr. T. W. Millar) and passed, the chairman called Jerome Albergo, M.A., St. John's College, Cambridge ; upon Mr. Hardman to open the debate in favour of the Francis Robert Winn Sampson, Trinity College, Camaffirmative. The subject for discussion was as follows : bridge; George Frederick Vernon; Julien Adrien Hilaire “A. makes his will, devising real estate to B. and C. on Louis, F.R.G.S. ; Oliver Armstrong Fry, B.A., St. Cathartrust for sale, the proceeds to be held on trust for certain ine's, Oxford; John Walter Jones, Worcester College, persons in the will named, and dies.
B. and C. accept the Oxford ; Alfred William Stanfield, J.P.; Abdul Haleem, trusts, but C. takes no active part in carrying them into Calcatta University ; Mahomed Serajuddin, Calcutta Uoi. effect, and leaves the management thereof to B. B. and C. versity ; Abul Hosen Khan; John Lloyd, J.P.; Geoffrey employ D. as their solicitor in the trust, and certain parts Peter St. Aubyn ; William Edward Johnston, barrister-atof the estate are sold by auction. D., at the request of law of the Supreme Court of Judicatore, Melbourne, VicB. and C., receives the deposit money, and pays anctioneers' toria, bolder of a first-class scholarship of 100 guineas in and sale charges thereout. D. afterwards, out of the re
international law, granted by the Middle Temple, and of mainder of such deposit, without the authority of C., pays a studentship in jurisprudence and Roman law of 100 to B. various sums, taking receipts signed by B. “for self guineas for two years, Esqe. and co-trustee,' wherein it is also stated that such sums are received for the purposes of the trust. B., who misapplies the money, was not authorized by C. to receive the same or to sign the receipts. Do the receipts discharge D. from liability in respect of the sums paid by him to B. and so In a case of Cannon v. Johnson, tried by Mr. Justice misapplied ?" Mr. Hardman was followed by Messrs. Manisty and a common jury on the 15th inst., it appeared Peacock, Hawkins, Rycroft, J. C. Wilson, and Price. Mr. that there was a counter-claim which would necessitate an Norton argued the negative side of the question, and was nvestigation of some length into matters of account. His followed by Messrs. Č. M. Smith, Attkins, Solly, Hyslop, lordship said that a question of this kind could not be tried and Rayner. Mr. Hardman having replied, the chairman by a jury, and that it was unfortunate that the case should summed up, and the question was decided in the negative by have been brought down to trial, and the costs thus incurred a large majority. A vote of thanks to the chairman, pro thrown away. It was stated that a summons had been posed by Mr. Hodgkinson, seconded by Mr. Rayner, brought taken out to refer the action, but that the learned master at a most successful meeting 10 a close.
chambers refused to make an order, saying that since a recent decision of the Court of Appeal the practice at
chambers had been not to refer actions without the consent BIRMINGHAM LAIV STUDENTS SOCIETY.
of both parties. His lordship said that this practice mast
be based on some misapprehension, and that he should, At a meeting of this society held on Tuesday, April 20, without hesitation, bave made an order to refer the action. in the Law Library, Mr. H. Lakin Smith, B.A., in the If such actions were brought down to trial, the costs of chair, a debate took place on the following moot point : coming down to trial would be disallowed.