a case the principle of In re Williams would apply. We pointed out at the time that this could hardly be supported, for as a matter of fact the attornment clause was in all cases such a device, since no actual tenancy was ever intended to be created. We observe that the Chief Judge has, in the recent case of Ex parte the Bank of Whitehaven, In re Bowes (28 W. R. 523), distinctly discarded the excessive amount of rent reserved as a test of whether an attornment clause is a fraud on the bankruptcy law. He says that in In re Stockton Iron Furnace Company "the amount of rent is passed over cursorily. No stress whatever was laid on it. No such proposition as is now contended for could be drawn from that case-namely, that the test is whether the rent reserved is a fair rent or not. I do not think that any such thing is decided in either of the cases. The monstrous amount in Williams' case struck the Lords Justices very forcibly, and was one of the elements from which they drew their conclusion. In the other case no stress seems to have been laid upon the amount, nor is there any case that I know of where it has been held that the question whether the rent is a fair rent or not affects the validity of the deed." And the learned judge adds that no disapprobation is expressed by the Lords Justices in either of the cases before them "against the extensive use of the attornment clause, unless you can find, looking at the whole transaction, that it is a fraud on the bankruptcy law." YET ONE MORE LEARNED GENTLEMAN has received the honour of silk-Mr. Edward Macnaghten, M.P., of the equity bar, who was called to the bar in Hilary Term, 1857. of absorbed interest when something is going on which they cannot, by any possibility, understand, such as an argument about the true construction of a charter-party. One theory which may account for this is that this apparent interest is the result of a half-latent consciousness that they have no business to be there at all, and an attempt to assume an appearance which may belie that consciousness. It is not within our sphere to portray the absurd or semi-pathetic characteristics of the frequenters of courts of justice, but we should wish, as far as possible, to raise our testimony (though not with very sanguine hopes) in favour of some attempt, if possible, to remedy existing evils. The class of people who, under the present system, have the free run of the courts can afford no safeguard against a corrupt or partial administration of justice, and they do seriously interfere with the convenience, and increase the danger to the health, of those who are obliged, on matters of business, to frequent courts of justice. We believe it was proposed, when the plans of the New Law Courts were before the public, that their construction should be such as to discourage the mere idler who frequented courts of justice from such motives as those we have alluded to. Of course, his position might easily be rendered as uncomfortable as possible. He might be only allowed admission to distant galleries, from which little could be heard, and which should be swept by fierce draughts. It might be so arranged that there should be as much going up and down stairs of a steep and tortuous character as possible before he could arrive at the place allotted to him. How far such excessive stringency towards him might be thought practicable or consistent with the British Constitution may perhaps be doubtful, but at any rate the arrangements should not give undue facility for his gadding about from court to court, like a bee seeking honey, or, to use a simile which we are afraid would be often more appropriate, like a SOME DESIDERATA IN CONNECTION WITH fly seeking carrion; and certainly he should have a place THE NEW LAW COURTS. THERE are certain unpleasant peculiarities generally connected with courts of justice. The connection does not, however, in all cases, seem absolutely necessary in the nature of things, and the approach of the period at which the New Law Courts will be ready for use naturally suggests to the mind a faint hope that, a new point of departure being thus taken, some slight effort may be made to modify these unpleasant features for the future. The present courts at Westminster, and in fact one may safely say most of the buildings at present used for the administration of justice, are scandalously ill contrived and insufficient for the purposes for which they are required. The accommodation for the various classes of persons whose duty calls upon them to attend courts of justice is miserable. Jurymen in waiting, witnesses, barristers' clerks and solicitors' clerks have none of them any special accommodation provided for them. They all have to hang about the passages or in the court itself, overcrowding the place, and vitiating the atmosphere. Again, it is a necessary feature of the administration of justice in this country that courts of justice should be open to the public. Practically, of course, the persons who go to courts of justice are chiefly either idlers who go there to kill time in the hope of some amusement, or who are attracted by some unusually interesting trial; or too often they are merely a wretched out-at-elbows kind of persons, who make the court a sitting-room in wet or cold weather, having no other place of resort. This last class, whose garments are generally frowsy, especially when their frowsiness is aggravated in wet weather by the warmth of the court acting upon them in a moist state, tend largely to increase the disagreeable odour which is produced to some extent in all over-crowded places. The ways and manners of these unfortunate but undesirable waifs and strays have been frequently commented on by humorous writers in descriptions of courts of justice. One peculiarity exhibited by some of them is an appearance quite apart from that allotted to those who really have business to do. The number of these latter is really quite sufficient to ensure the due and necessary publicity to the administration of justice so as to prevent corruption or partiality. We are disposed to think, however - we must confess reluctantly, having regard to the sort of people who most frequent courts of justice as spectators, the idleness of their motives, and the annoyances they cause-that, in a free country, an opportunity ought to be given to persons who wish to see the administration of justice to be able to do so, and. there is great difficulty in separating the class of persons who wish to do so from respectable motives from the mere idlers and those who use courts of justice merely as shelters. One may often see respectable country people who come obviously from a desire to see, with their bodily eyes, one of the institutions of the land, and who inquire of junior counsel of accessible demeanour, in an awe-stricken whisper, the names of the judges. Such a desire is legitimate, though troublesome, and we think there is a certain amount of political good worked by its gratification. These are not the class of persons who come and sit in a torpid state for hours, creating effluvia, or who flock with open mouths and staring eyes to hear some case of a prurient character. most earnestly there were some means of separating these classes from one another. But we fear the discretion of the ordinary policeman is hardly equal to the task of discriminating between them, and in the nature of things there will be persons on the borderland between the two classes. At any rate, in the new courts it is to be expected that proper waiting-rooms will be provided for witnesses, jurymen, and others in attendance. It should likewise be the duty of policemen or other persons in attendance to summon and marshal them about as they are wanted. It adds to the bustle and confusion greatly to have jurymen and witnesses unfamiliar with the place hanging about unable to find We wish out when and where they are wanted. The advantages of providing special places for these different classes of persons where they may be found, and whence they may be summoned when required, would then become obvious. While we are upon these topics there are certain mysteries connected with the courts at Westminster we should like to see solved. There are certain dark and mysterious dens in which consultations take place, for the use of which pecuniary considerations are paid by the parties. Whether these fees are perquisites of some under-official, or whether they are accounted for to the State, the system seems to us objectionable. If they go to some official, it seems to us an abuse; if they go to the State it seems to us that such charges ought to be inincluded in the court fees. Rooms are provided in connection with the assize courts in places like Leeds and Manchester for consultations for which we believe no special charge is made. We do hope that this kind of holeand-corner abuse will not be perpetuated in the New Law Courts. Again, some system should be established by which cheap and good refreshments should be provided within the building. It ought not to be made the perquisite of some under-official's relations to supply them. A monopoly-which is a perquisite of that sortgives rise to obvious mischief. A good firm ought to receive a concession dependent upon their giving satisfaction. We have pointed out a few matters which seem to us to call for alteration. The only mode of getting these things altered is by agitating on the subject. Unless a new system is enforced when the New Law Courts open, the old traditions will establish themselves, petty vested interests will soon spring up, and all hope of any alteration will be lost. CAN THE RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS ORDER COMPANIES ΤΟ ERECT STRUCTURAL WORKS? [COMMUNICATED.] THE recently-decided case of the South-Eastern Railway Company v. The Railway Commissioners (L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 217) is one of really transcendent importance to railway companies. The question was whether the Railway Commissioners have power to order a railway company to erect structural works such as new stations, or enlargements of existing stations, for the purpose of affording additional conveniences to the public when the traffic may require it. The section upon which this question turns is the 2nd section of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 31), which enacts as follows:-"Every railway company, canal company, and railway and canal company, shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable facilities for the receiving or forwarding and delivering of traffic upon and from the several railways and canals belonging to or worked by such companies respectively, and for the return of carriages, trucks, boats, and other vehicles." The section then proceeds to enact certain provisions directed against undue preference to particular persons or descriptions of traffic, and with regard to giving facilities for through traffic. The question is really a very short one, though the considerations involved are of such moment. It is simply whether "facilities" includes structural works, so that it is made a duty enforcible by the public as against the railway company to provide such works. The Railway Commissioners had advised the company to enlarge their station at the town of Hastings, and to provide a better booking-office, waiting-room, refreshment-room, and general accommodation therein; to lengthen and deepen the existing platforms, and to provide additional platforms, and to do a variety of other things of a similar nature. Cockburn, C.J., and Manisty, J., held that the order of the commissioners was ultrà vires. Lush, J., dissented from the judgment of the majority. Two sorts of considerations arise as grounds for a conclusion in this case. One, the sort of considerations arising from the convenience of the thing and the consequences of a decision either way; the other sort arising from analysis of the words used by the statute in the enactment itself and the context. The judgments of all the judges deal very minutely with the expressions of the statute as bearing upon the question whether the wider or narrower construction should be given to the word facilities," but your space will not allow me to do justice by way of summary to these considerations, and I must confess that the argument either way, so far as it is based upon them, seems to me to be rather fine, and not very satisfactory considering the largeness of the interests at stake. I do not see my way very clearly to any very strong opinion arising from the context of the statute, a fact which seems to me of itself to tell rather in favour of the company. Of course, if from any other provision of the statute it appeared by necessary inference that "facilities" in section 2 must include structural works, the question would be easily soluble, but that it does not so appear is pretty well shown by the difference of opinion in the court. I am rather disposed to think, notwithstanding the fact that very long arguments may be spun out of the other provisions of the statute, that the question comes back to this, What is the reasonable construction of the word "facilities," having regard to the subject-matter and the previous history of legislation thereon ? I entertain a very strong opinion that the conclusion of the majority of the court is the sounder conclusion, though I am very far from denying that the other is a very possible conclusion. The word "facilities" is unquestionably ambiguous. Etymologically it would A structural work certainly include structural works. which is useful for the traffic is a facility for the traffic. But it is a matter of every-day expression that in con. struing language you must limit the generality of words employed by reference to the subject-matter. It should be remembered that the question is not exactly what powers there ought to be of interfering with railway management in the interests of the public, but what powers there are. If it can be shown that the balance of the considerations derived from convenience and justice is not in favour of giving the Railway Commissioners these sweeping powers, then there is a strong argument against construing the words of the statute in their favour; but the converse does not hold good. It may be that the commissioners ought to have these powers; and yet, giving the sounder legal construction to the words of the statute, they may not have them. Another very important point to remember is that the powers were not given to the Railway Commissioners in the first instance. They were given to one of the common law courts, and subsequently transferred to the Railway Commissioners. It may well be that if the provisions had been contained in an Act whereby the Legislature were creating a body containing other than legal members to act as a sort of tribunal of arbitration to say what, as between the public and the Railway Commissioners, ought to be done, these provisions would bear a somewhat different complexion. But could it be intended to give to an ordinary court of law such a function as the power to interfere with the management of all railways in the kingdom so far as their structural works were concerned? I must confess that this argument seems to me of almost overwhelming force in favour of the conclusion at which the majority of the court arrived. I am disposed to think that if the history of this legislation were looked at it would be found that the mischief intended to be corrected was the working of the existing works of railways so to unduly prefer certain persons or classes of traffic, and to prevent a proper system of through traffic. It was, no doubt, considered that as railway companies were in the nature of monopolies, something of their freedom to do what they would with their own should be taken away in the interests of the public. It appears to me that up to a certain point this is very true, but I cannot think that at the time when the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 21 passed it could ever have been intended to give such a sweeping power to a court of common law over the management of railways. The provisions of the Act with regard to undue preference naturally grew out of the common law conception of the duties of a common carrier. The carrier was not entirely free to do what he would with his own. He was bound to carry the class of goods in respect of which he held himself out as a carrier. The provisions of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, receiving the more limited construction, are a most natural development of this idea, as also was the intrusting it to a court of law to watch over and enforce this extension of the old line of doctrine on the subject; but to give a court of law a general power of enforcing additional structural works would have been an entirely new departure, as it seems to me. The words are to give "all reasonable facilities for the receiving and forwarding and delivery of traffic upon and from the several railways and canals belonging to, or worked by, such companies." These words seem to me to point to the mode of using existing works, not to the erection of fresh works, and it does seem that, though grammatically the subsequent provisions of the section are, as pointed out by Lush, J., not restrictive of what goes before, still they serve none the less to point out the scope and extent of the previous provisions. They are distinctly aimed merely at preventing undue preferences and furthering through traffic, both pointing to the mode of using existing structural works. It seems almost certain that if the Legislature had thus contemplated such a sweeping enactment as the Railway Commissioners supposed, they would have used express words on the subject, and enacted that the railway companies should be bound to provide such structural works as the court might order. The power which the judgment of Lush, J., would give to the Railway Commissioners would be literally enormous. It would be practically tantamount to depriving the railway companies of their own manage. ment, and the control of their own property, whenever any interested party chose to challenge their management of their property. If the company were successful in any litigation on the subject, they would manage their property in the way they did, not of their own free will, but because the commissioners allowed them to do so. Such a sweeping piece of legislation as this, striking so entirely at the independence of railway companies, surely cannot have been intended to be slipped through under such a word as "facilities." It would be a gigantic stride in the direction of the conclusion that the railways ought to be the property of the State. With regard to the wider question, not whether such sweeping powers are possessed by the railway commissioners, but whether they ought to be-the discussion of that does not fall so strictly within my province as the mere question of law. No doubt much might be said on both sides, It is extremely difficult to strike the balance between the public and a railway company, which, no doubt, is in the nature of a monopoly. As a railway company must obtain statutory powers, it is fair that in return its liberty should be curtailed; but the question is to what extent. Railway companies exist partly for their own benefit, a fact which clamorous newspaper writers seem sometimes to forget. It is doubtful whether it would ultimately be for the general public interest to make too hard terms with them. At any rate, it is just that those who, by their enterprize, afford conveniences to the public should reap a reasonable profit thereby. Speaking broadly, considerations of self-interest would generally induce the companies to meet the reasonable requirements of the public, though, of course, there are notable exceptions. Again, the dread of competing lines frequently keeps a railway company in order. However much railway companies may be sinners in particular instances, it seems to me that it is very doubtful how far such a sweeping power as that which would enable a tribunal to order companies to make structural works, can stand consistently with the independent existence of such bodies. It seems to me that the logical consequence of such legislation is to take the control of such enterprizes as railways from the hands of private adventurers, and to give it to the State as representing the public at large. L Reviews. ADVOCACY. HINTS ON ADVOCACY. BY RICHARD HARRIS, Barristerat-Law. Waterlow Brothers & Layton. A modest and unpretentious little book, full of good sense and just observation, set out with much humour and many apt illustrations. The "hints" contained in it form a very complete manual of the advocate's art in trial by jury, and the plain, good-humoured, and anaffected style in which they are conveyed makes them the more acceptable and the easier to digest and assimilate. There is only one caution that the reader who reads for profit should take with him. In every art, but prominently in advocacy, as in war, the practice must be a fresh and living one; circumstances do not repeat themselves precisely, and an illustration, however apt, is likely to lead astray one who is looking out for an opportunity of reproducing it. Let the young advocate read and re-read this little work (he will find it to his profit), but let him allow its rules, maxims, observations, and examples to rest quietly in his mind, and guide him by an unseen influence, rather than attempt to deck himself with them as if they were a suit of clothes. The plan of the book is well conceived. It takes in order the successive steps of a trial, and gives hints and directions appropriate to each; and a special chapter is appropriated to the defence in a criminal trial. It is true that the opening and summing up of the defendant's case in a civil action, which have their peculiar points, are not specifically dealt with; but the chapter on the plaintiff's opening and reply afford ample material which common sense will easily adapt. Some specimens of forensic pleading follow. Nascitur non fit is a motto which many may be disposed to apply to advocacy as to poetry; but in the one case or in the other the motto is true only of efforts of the highest kinds, and such as result in enduring monuments of the art. With the ordinary wayfarer much may be accomplished by care and attention applied by practice; and the author of this little work may fairly claim the position of a judicious master in the art of teaching. His circle of readers, however, will probably not be limited to those who read for instruction. If any of our readers are in want of a little book to fill up a vacant hour, they will be secure of finding here what will engage their attention and amuse their leisure. By a clerical error in our observations last week on the office of Lord Chancellor (p. 458, line 3 from top), 21 & 22 Vict. c. 49 was inserted instead of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 75 (Office & Oath Act, 1867). The twentieth anniversary festival of the Solicitors' Benevolent Institution will be held on Wednesday, June 30, at the Ship Hotel, Greenwich, when the Right Hon. Sir James Hannen will take the chair. General Correspondence. TO CORRESPONDENTS.- All letters intended for publication in the "Solicitors' Journal" must be authenti cated by the name of the writer. The Editor cannot undertake to return MSS. forwarded to him. AFFIDAVITS BY MARKSMEN. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I apprehend the inquiry by "J. H." related to rule 17 of the New Rules, and if so, with deference, the reply of Mr. T. W. Braithwaite does not meet the case. There can, as yet, be no practice in reference to the new rule, and there is at present no authorized or settled form of jurat thereunder. The third form suggested by Mr. Braithwaite-viz., that where the affidavit is read over to the deponent by a third party elsewhere than in the presence of the commissioner-clearly will not do, for the new rule requires that the affidavit shall be read in the commissioner's presence to the deponent. 66 Under this new rule the affidavit may no doubt be read over to the deponent by a third party, but it must be so read in the presence of the commissioner, and the latter must also satisfy himself that the deponent seemed perfectly to understand it," and the deponent must make his signature in the presence of the commissioner. The jurat must certify to these three facts, and seeing the length of time all this will involve, an additional fee should certainly be allowed to the commissioner. It is also to be noticed that the new rule is not con fined to marksmen, for it speaks of the deponent making his or her signature. It is much wider. It includes every deponent "who appears to the officer to be illiterate." The consequence of a non-observance of the rule is that the affidavit cannot be used in evidence. The rule thus demands strict attention on the part both of the solicitor and the commissioner. F. R. P. Bedford-row, April 19. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-While thanking Mr. Braithwaite for the information that no fee is allowed to a commissioner on taxation for reading over an affidavit to a marksman, I cannot concur in his reasons. He says that reading over the affidavit is purely optional on the commissioner's part, but it appears to me not to be so; for unless he refuses to take the affidavit he "must," in the first two cases mentioned, either read it over or attend to the deponent while it is being read over to enable him to sign the jurat, and in either case he "may" be occupied for an hour or more. Surely the framers of the rules never intended this. J. H. SUMMONSES FOR TIME. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I had occasion yesterday to obtain an extension of time to file an affidavit in answer to interrogatories. I accordingly issued a summons and sent it to the plaintiff's solicitors with a request that they would give me a consent thereto. They, however, refused to accept service, and returned the summons and copy with a note to the effect that, under the new rules, such a summons was unnecessary, but that they would consent to the extension of time asked for by the summons. Being unwilling to lose the cost of the summons, which I had issued bonâ fide, I applied to the master's clerk to draw up an order thereon in accordance with the written consent of the plaintiff's solicitors, but he referred me to the master. I accordingly applied to the master, showing him the written consent which I held, and pointed out to him that the new rule (ord. 57, r. 6a, April, 1880) merely referred to pleadings, and could not be held to include interrogatories and answers thereto. He, however, refused to allow me to draw up the order, on the ground that, by the written consent which I held, I had all I required. I shall therefore lose the cost of the summons. Now, Sir, my object in troubling you with this letter is to know, for future guidance, whether or not interrogatories and answers thereto are or are not pleadings within the meaning of the above rule ? The master's decision, if correct, might be applied to every kind of summons, and it would be unsafe to issue any summons before having ascertained from one's opponent whether or not he would consent to what it is proposed to ask thereby. The new rule does not, on the face of it, bear this interpretation, though I think it would be well, and would save a great deal of unnecessary costs, if it were so extended. A SOLICITOR. April 22. THE NEW RULES. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-There appears to be some discrepancy in the new Rules of the Supreme Court which relate to the charging of stock or shares and distringas, inasmuch as, while by rule 29, it is stated that the company on whom is served notice from the person in whose name the stock specified in the notice is standing shall not be authorized without the order of the court to refuse to permit the transfer to be made for more than eight days, there is no provision requiring the company to give notice to the person who placed the distringas on the stock informing him of the proposed transfer and so enabling him to obtain the necessary order. If there is any provision in existence which meets this difficulty would it not have been advisable to bring it into the present rules? April 21. A LAW STUDENT. Cases of the Week. FOR COURT OF BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION TIME OBJECTING TO EXERCISE-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 72. -In a case of Ex parte Butters, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., a question arose with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy, under section 72 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. In November, 1878, on the application of the trustee in the bankruptcy, an order was made by the county court at Hanley directing the trial by a jury of issues to determine whether an agreement, which had been executed by the bankrupt in April, 1873, and a mortgage, which had been executed by him in May, 1873, had been executed fraudulently and without consideration, and with intent to defeat and delay creditors. On the 20th of June, 1879, the issues were tried, and the jury found that both the agreement and the deed were fraudulent, and that they had been executed by the bankrupt without consideration, and with intent to defeat and delay his creditors. On the 26th of June the mortgagee gave notice of a motion in the county court for a new trial. On the 10th of July the county court made an order declaring the agreement and the deed to be void and of no effect, and directing the mortgagee to deliver them up to be cancelled. On the 5th of August the county court refused the application for a new trial. Meanwhile, the mortgagee had given notice of appeal from the order of the 10th of July. This appeal was heard by the Chief Judge on the 12th of January, 1880. No appeal had been brought from the refusal of a new trial. On the hearing of the appeal by the Chief Judge, the objection was, for the first time, taken that the case was not one in which the Court of Bankruptcy ought to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred by section 72. The Chief Judge (28 W. R. 280, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 603) allowed the objection, and discharged the order appealed from, but without costs, on the ground that the objection ought to have been taken earlier. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) held that the case was governed by Ex parte Swinbanks (27 W. R. 898, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 525), and that the objection (even if it were otherwise valid, which they were disposed to think it was not) was raised too late, after the objecting party had taken his chance of a decision being given in his favour on the merits. And the court held that, inasmuch as the refusal of a new trial had not been appealed from, the finding of the jury must be taken to be right, and, that being so, no other order could have been made on that finding than an order for the cancellation of the instruments in question. Consequently, the order of the Chief Judge was discharged, and the order of the county court was restored. SOLICITORS, Llewellyn, Ackrill, & Hammack; J. Burton. MORTGAGE-PRIORITY-NOTICE-SOLICITOR.-In a case of The Saffron Walden Building Society v. Rayner, before the Court of Appeal on the 16th inst., a question arose as to the priorities of some mortgagees of a reversionary interest. One Hardy was, under the will of his father, entitled to a reversionary share in £5,000, subject to the life interests of his mother. In 1872 he mortgaged his share to the plaintiffs. Before advancing the mortgage money the plaintiffs inquired of the solicitors who had acted for the father during his life, and who bad afterwards acted for the executors and trustees of his will, whether the trustees had any notice or knowledge of any incumbrance by Hardy on his share. The solicitors replied that they were the solicitors for the trustees, and added, "We have not had any notice, nor have any knowledge, of any incumbrance by Mr. Hardy of his interest under the will." The mortgage was executed on the 13th of April, and on the 15th of April the plaintiffs sent a formal notice in writing of their mortgage to the solicitors, the notice being addressed "to the executors and trustees of the will. The defendants were three subsequent mortgagees, the first of the subsequent mortgages, that to the defendant Rayner, having been executed in June, 1873. Before that mortgage was executed Rayner inquired of each of the trustees whether he had had any notice or was aware of any incumbrance on Hardy's share, and both the trustees replied that they were not aware of any, and had received no notice to that effect. After the execution of Rayner's mortgage he, by his solicitor, sent to each of the trustees a formal notice in writing of it. Similar inquiries and notices were made and given in relation to the other subsequent mortgages, the inquiries being answered to the effect that the trustees were not aware of any incumbrance by Hardy prior to that of June, 1873, in favour of Rayner. Bacon, V.C., held (27 W. R. 449, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 696), upon the evidence, that the notice of the plaintiffs' incumbrance, which had been given by them to the solicitors, had been verbally communica. ted by the solicitors to the trustees, and that this was enough to entitle the plaintiffs to priority. His lordship also expressed an opinion that the notice to the solicitors was of itself sufficient, even if it was not actually communicated to the trustees. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) reversed this decision. They were of opinion, on the evidence, that it was not proved that the plaintiffs' notice had been in fact communicated to the trustees, and they held that the mere fact that the notice had been given to solicitors who happened to have previously acted for the trustees was not enough to fix the trustees with notice. Consequently, the plaintiffs were not entitled to priority. SOLICITORS, Andrew & Wood; Paterson, Snow, & Bloxam; Clapham & Fitch; Beaumont & Warren. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCEMISDESCRIPTION-COMPENSATION.-In a case of Arnold v. Arnold, before the Court of Appeal on the 17th inst., a purchaser at a sale under the direction of the court, sought to be released from his contract, on the ground that the vendors could not give him that which he had contracted to buy. The property was described in the particulars of sale as a compact small farm, containing 41a. 3r. 35p., divided as follows." The names of the different fields were then stated in one column, and in another column was stated, opposite the name of each field, the acreage of that field. One of the fields was described as "Bottlesey Green, containing 7a. 1r. 27p.," and opposite to it, in the column of quantity, was inserted "4a. Or. 38p. One of the conditions of sale provided that, "if any error, mis-statement, or omission in the particulars be discovered, the same shall not annul the sale, nor shall any compensation be allowed by the vendors or purchaser in respect thereof, except such (if any) as the judge in chambers shall direct." It turned out that the vendors were entitled, not to the whole of the field called Bottlesey Green, but only to four undivided sevenths of it. After the agreement for purchase had been made, the vendors entered into a provisional agreement with the owner of the three-sevenths for an exchange of his three-sevenths for another piece of land, comprising four acres, forming another part of the farm the subject of the sale. Jessel, M. R., refused the purchaser's application to be discharged from his purchase. But he offered the purchaser (without prejudice to his right to appeal) the option of completing his purchase with the benefit of the agreement for exchange, or without the benefit of that agreement, but with compensation. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) reversed this decision, and held that the purchaser must be discharged, on the ground that he was entitled to have the thing which he had contracted for-the whole close-and could not be compelled to take undivided shares in it, or else to give compensation.-SOLICITORS, White, Borrett, & Co.; E. Bromley. APPEAL-EXTENSION OF TIME-MISTAKE-ORD. 58, R. 15.-In a case of In re Rawlins, an application was, on BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) for an extension of the the 17th inst., made to the Court of Appeal (JAMES, slip, a notice of appeal had not been given within the proper time for appealing, on the ground that, through an accidental time. The court refused the application, on the ground that it was not proved that the alleged slip had been made. BRAMWELL, L.J., said that, if this had been proved, be should have thought that the time ought to be extended. He thought this ought to be done whenever the court could compensate the other party by means of an order for the payment of costs. JAMES, L.J., reiterated the opinion, which he has often expressed before, that a mere accidental slip is not a ground for an extension of the time for appealing. He thought that the rules ought to be observed. BRAMWELL, .J., agreed that the rules ought to be observed, but thought that the exceptions ought equally to be observed. PRACTICE-MOTION TO TAKE AFFIDAVIT OFF FILE FOR SCANDAL-COSTS-ADDITIONAL RULES OF COURT OF AUGUST, 1875, ORD. 6, R. 18.-In a case of March v. Martin, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., an application had been made to Malins, V.C., to take off the file, on the ground of scandal, an affidavit which had been filed in support of a motion to remove a receiver in the action. The Vice-Chancellor had ordered the affidavit to be taken off, and that the party who had filed it should pay the costs of the motion. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., JAMES, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) were of opinion that the affidavit was not scandalous because it cordingly discharged the Vice-Chancellor's order. But they was revelant to the subject of the motion, and they acand, to mark their disapprobation of it, they discharged the were of opinion that the affidavit was very improperly framed, appeal, holding that they had power to do this under rule order without costs, and gave the appellant no costs of the 18 of ord. 6 of the Additional Rules of Court of August, 1875.-SOLICITORS, Hores & Pattison; Munns & Co. PRACTICE-COMMISSION TO TAKE EVIDENCE ABROADPrior. DeterminATION OF QUESTION OF LAW-ORD. 34, R. 2 FORMAL PARTY - COSTS. In a case of Thompson v. Wilding, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst., a question arose as to the issue of a commission to take the evidence of witnesses resident abroad. The action was brought by the next of kin of a deceased married woman, claiming to be entitled to her personal estate, notwithstanding the fact that she had, by her will, disposed of it in favour of her husband. It was alleged that the husband, knowing of the will in his favour, had murdered the wife in a foreign country, in order to obtain possession of the property. He had been tried by the court of the foreign country, and had been found guilty of the murder, and had been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. The plaintiffs desired to take the evidence of some witnesses who resided at the place where the murder was alleged to have been committed, for the refused the application for a commission, on the ground that purpose of proving the murder in the action. Malins, V.C.. |