INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRAIN STATEMENTS AS TO FORMER EMPLOYMENT. II. We come now to the important case generally cited in questions of this nature, and from the judgment in which some extracts have been already given-Glenny v. Smith (2 Drew. & Sm. 476). One of the employés of Thresher, Glenny, & Co., of the Strand, having left their service and opened a shop in Oxford-street, placed his own name over the door, but put on the awning and on the door-plates the words, "From Thresher & Glenny." The word "from" was in very small letters, so as not to be likely to attract the attention of customers, and on the whole case the learned judge came to the conclusion that deception was probable, and that an injunction must be granted. The fact that the defendant had cautioned one of his shopmen not to permit customers to buy under the impression that they were buying from Thresher & Glenny, so far from being regarded as favourable to the defendant, was held to be against him, as showing that he had contemplated the possibility of deception by the use he was making of his old employers' name. Very similar to Glenny v. Smith was the American case of Colton v. Thomas (7 Phila. 257), in which a person who had been in the employ of "The Colton Dental Association" set up in business on his own account as a dentist, and began to describe himself as "Dr. F. R. Thomas, late operator at the Colton Dental Rooms." The words "late operator at the" were in very small letters, so that the distinction between exemployer and ex-employé was practically obliterated, and an injunction was the inevitable result. 66 Williams v. Osborne (13 L. T. N. S. 498) was another case before Lord Hatherley, in which he held that former servants of R. Hendrie, a perfumer, were entitled to place on their shop, established after his death, the words "from the late R. Hendrie," and to style themselves on placards managers and manufacturers to the late R. Hendrie," and to use Hendrie's name on their labels in conjunction with their own, if there were no unfair or untrue statements made; but his lordship pointed out that a certain course of conduct which was begun with no fraudulent intention would be continued with such an intention if no change were made after it had been pointed out that the public were deceived. In Labouchere v. Dawson (L. R. 13 Eq. 322), the defendant was one of the vendors of a brewery business, who, after the sale, set up in business elsewhere, and endeavoured to draw away to his new business the old customers of the business he had sold. The same principle as that followed in Burrows v. Foster was adopted, and Lord Romilly held that, while the defendant was entitled to publicly advertise his business, he was not justified in seeking to destroy the value of the business he had sold by drawing away the customers to his new one. Another of the better-known cases is Hookham v. Pottage (21 W. R. 47), which came before the Lords Justices of Appeal in Chancery. There, after the firm of "Hookham & E. & S. Pottage' had been dissolved, and the last two partners paid out, so that the business was retained by the senior partner, who began to trade as Hookham & Co," S. Pottage set up near him, and placed over his shop the words "S. Pottage, from Hookham & Pottage," and as in Foot v. Lea, Glenny v. Smith, and Colton v. Thomas, the words denoting the relation between the old business and the new one-i.e., "from" and "and"-were in small letters. It was held that the defendant had acted so as to divert to himself custom intended for the plaintiff, and that an injunction must be granted, though, if he had confined himself to a fair statement of his connection with the old firm, he could not have been interfered with. The plaintiff in Robineau v. Charbonnel (V. C. M., May 4, 1876) was a Parisian confectioner, trading at the over to "Maison Boissier," and the defendants were persons who, after having been in his service, came London and opened a shop in Bond-street, and placed in the window the words "Ex 1ères de la Maison Boissier de Paris." The plaintiff having no shop in England, no injury could be done him by the defendants' conduct, and no injunction could be granted, but the words "Ex 1ères de la" were in very small letters, and the Vice-Chancellor was of opinion that, on the whole, the conduct of the defendants had not been such as to entitle them to their costs, and no order in that respect was made. In Dence v. Mason (V. C. M., Feb. 12, 1878), the Vice-Chancellor held that a former servant of Messrs. Brand & Co. would not have been entitled to represent himself as the original maker of the essence of beef manufactured by that firm, even if he had been the first to discover the recipe, since whatever essence of beef he had prepared had been made by him in the plaintiff's service; but his lordship held that the defendant was at liberty to state fairly that he had been in the plaintiff's service, and that he had become acquainted with the recipe during that period. In Selby v. Anchor Tube Company (V. C. B., July 19, 1877) the parties had been in partnership as tube manu. facturers, carrying on business at Birmingham as "The Imperial Iron Tube Company," and at Smethwick as "The Birmingham Patent Iron and Brass Tube Com. pany." The partnership was dissolved, and the plaintiff thereupon became entitled, under the partnership deed, to the premises at Smethwick and to the styles and goodwill of the firm, and the defendants became entitled to the Birmingham premises. The plaintiff then carried on business alone at Smethwick and also at new works at Birmingham as "The Imperial Iron Tube Company," and the defendants, carrying on business at the old premises in Birmingham, began to put out circulars headed "The Anchor Tube Company (late) the Works of and Partners and Manager in the Imperial Iron Tube Company, Gas-street, Birmingham," and to solicit the customers of the old firm. This was held to be an interference with the plaintiff's rights, and an injunction was granted. The last case to which attention need be directed is that of Fullwood v. Fullwood (26 W. R. 435), where the plaintiff was carrying on at Somerset-place, Hoxton, an annatto business, established, under the name of “R. J. Fullwood & Co.," in 1785, and the defendants, one of whom had formerly been the plaintiff's partner, but had sold his interest to the plaintiff, began to carry on a similar business under the name of "E. Fullwood & Co.," and to describe themselves in advertisements as "late of Somerset - place, Hoxton, Original Manufacturers of Liquid and Cake Annatto," and to state that their business had been "established in 1785." Mr. Justice Fry held that the course taken by the defendants would probably have the result of causing their business to be mistaken for the plaintiff's, and he granted an in junction, notwithstanding that the plaintiff had delayed commencing his action for a year and a half after he became aware of the defendants' conduct, since the period fixed by the Statute of Limitations had not expired before the action was brought, which was intended to assert a legal right. From a comparison of these cases it will be seen that the principles to which we adverted at the outset are well established in practice. Although the circumstances under which those principles have had to be applied have varied in very many particulars, effect has nevertheless been given to those principles, and while a fair use has been allowed to be made of the fact of former employment, fraudulent servants have not been allowed to appropriate their masters' business by the skilful manipulation of that fact. There is no need to establish a fraudulent intention; if the defendant has acted so as to bring about the consequences of fraud, it is sufficient, and there is no necessity to inquire further into motives. In examining the circumstances of each case, however, the motives by which the defendant has been actuated will generally be discussed, and it is impossible not to notice in how many cases differences of type have been held to weigh heavily against defendants. No doubt a retired servant is entitled to use his late master's name for the purpose of informing the public that he comes before them recommended by the fact of having been employed in an establishment of admitted reputation, but when he places that name on his door or over his window, he is bound to take special care not to let it be supposed that the name is there placed as being that of the proprietor of the shop. The safest plan in such cases would evidently be to give such words as "from,' "late with," "formerly of," in characters of equal size with those in which the name of the late firm appears. Unless probability of deception is avoided, an injunction is to be anticipated even though there has been delay, short of the period fixed by the Statute of Limitations, and if the proceedings fail on some special ground, still the wrongful conduct may be punished in costs. A former proprietor of a business which has passed to others is legally as well as morally bound not to interfere with the enjoyment of the business and its good will by the new proprietors, and the law will not allow him to regain, by private solicitations, the business with which he has publicly parted; though, on the other hand, there is nothing to prevent him from establishing a similar business, if he can do so, independently of his former connection. LAWYERS IN PARLIAMENT. THE following members of the legal profession had been elected members of the new Parliament up to Wednesday last, in addition to those whose names were given last week. The names of members of the old Parliament are given in italics : ENGLAND AND Wales. BARRISTERS. BERKSHIRE-Mr. John Walter (L) (C) CARDIGANSHIRE-Mr. Lewis Pugh Pugh (L) MONTGOMERYSHIRE-Mr. Stuart Rendel (L) SURREY, EAST-Mr. William Grantham, Q.C. (C) Bart. (C) WIGHT, ISLE OF-Hon. Evelyn Ashley (L) SOLICITORS. CAVAN-Mr. Charles Joseph Fay (HR) MONAGHAN-Mr. John Givan (L) SCOTLAND. BARRISTERS AND ADVOCATES. ELGIN BOROUGHS-Mr. Mounstuart Elphinstone Grant ROXBURGHSHIRE-Hon. Arthur Ralph Douglas Elliott (L) (L) General Correspondence. To CORRESPONDENTS.-All letters intended for publica tion in the "Solicitors' Journal" must be authenticated by the name of the writer. The Editor cannot undertake to return MSS. forwarded to him. AFFIDAVITS BY MARKSMEN. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-It may, perhaps, be useful, not only to your correspondent J. H., but likewise to others, if I mention that the question he asks having oftimes arisen I have taken pains to ascertain the practice in reference to it, and it appears that no fee whatever is allowable, on taxation, to a commissioner for reading over an affidavit to a marksman. The reading over of the affidavit by the commissioner is purely optional on his part. The several terms of jurats applicable to such cases show this. For instance, the affidavit may (1) be read over by him; or (2), in his presence; or (3), by a third party elsewhere than in his presence, in which latter case such third party would have to be sworn as a witness to the reading, &c. T. W. BRAITHWAITE. CERTIFICATES OF SEARCH FOR JUDGMENTS, &c. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-The new rules provide, by ord. 60a, r. 8, that "the Registrar of Judgments shall, on request in writing giving sufficient particulars, and on payment of the prescribed fee, cause a search to be made in the registers or indexes under his custody, and issue a certificate of the result of the search." This provision may prove acceptable to solicitors, and relieve them of much responsibility. At the same time any person is at liberty to make a search himself as heretofore. The requisition for search should be forwarded to the registrar some days before the certificate of the sition is so framed that a search can be directed to be result of search is required to be issued. And the requimade up to two o'clock on any following day, after which hour no incumbrances can be registered. WORCESTERSHIRE, EAST-Mr. George Woodyatt Hastings The object in limiting the time for registering is to (L) SOLICITORS. RADNORSHIRE-Sir Richard Green Price, Bart. (L) SUSSEX, EAST-Mr. George Burrow Gregory (C) IRELAND. BARRISTERS. ANTRIM-Mr. Edward McNaghten (C) enable a purchaser to complete his purchase without risk of execution creditors and other incumbrancers registering their charges, at the time of, or immediately before, his purchase, if such purchase takes place after two o'clock. The form of requisition for a search may be obtained gratis at the Register Office. The period stated in the form over which the search should extend is the usual search made for incumbrances in the office by solicitors. If it is required that the search should cover any other period of time, the particulars on the face of the form can be varied to meet the case, or a full indorsement cau TYRONE-Mr. John William Ellison Macartney (C); be written on the back of the requisition stating the time Mr. Edward Litton, Q.C. (L) over which the search is desired to be made. There must be a separate requisition for every person searched for. A charge for the official certificate will be made in addition to the search fee of 1s. The fee to be paid for such certificate has yet to be provided for by order. For further particulars, or forms of requisition for search, application can be made personally at the Register Office, or by letter addressed to "The Registrar of Judgments, Royal Courts of Justice, London, W.C." April 10. JAMES PASK, Chief Clerk. [The following is the form of Requisition for Search: from removing goods sold under execution; In re Stanhope Silkstone Company (27 W. R. 561, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 160)-in which case the Court of Appeal (discharging an order of Fry, J.) granted an injunction restraining a judgment creditor from further proceedings under garnishee orders. In all these cases the proceedings were pending in the Common Law Divisions. It was, no doubt, a singular construction of section 24 that, although the Chancery Division could not restrain an action pending in another Division, it could nevertheless deprive the plaintiff of the fruits of his judgment, but I do not think that the point now raised was discussed in any of the above cases. The recent decision of the Master of the Rolls will probably put an end to the Search for judgments, lites pendentes, and Crown practice of granting such injunctions, and application debts for five years ending the will have to be made in each case to the Division in which the action is pending. To the Registrar of Judgments, Royal Courts of Justice, London, W.C. 188 . The day of day of day of 188. And for annuities and executions from the year 1855 and 1864, respectively, to the said 188 in the following name :— STAYING PROCEEDINGS UNDER EXECUTION AGAINST COMPANY BEING WOUND UP. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I shall be glad if you will allow me to call attention to the decision of the Master of the Rolls in Re The Artistic Colour Printing Company (Limited), noted by you last week (ante, p. 441). The company was being wound up voluntarily, and the application was by the liquidator for an injunction to restrain a creditor from proceeding to levy execution on a judgment obtained against the company in the Exchequer Division. The Master of the Rolls held that the execution was a proceeding in the action, and that subsection (5) of section 24 of the Judicature Act, 1873, providing that no cause or proceeding pending in the High Court should be restrained, applied; and, accordingly, that he had no jurisdiction to grant an injunction, and that the proper course was to apply to the Exchequer Division to stay proceedings. Since the decision of the Master of the Rolls in Re Peoples' Garden Company (24 W. R. 40), it has been generally admitted that the Chancery Division cannot, in a winding up (under section 85 of the Companies Act, 1862, or otherwise), restrain actions or proceedings pending in the other Divisions, but the notion has existed that the issue of, or proceedings under, an execution could still be restrained. The following are a few cases in point: In re Perkins Beach Lead Mining Company (26 W. R. 164, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 371), Bacon, V.C.-sale by sheriff under fi. fa. restrained; Ex parte Railway Steel and Plant Company (L. R. 8 Ch. D. 183), Hall, V.C.ditto; Victoria and Fenton Company (Bacon, V.C., 31 May, 1876, Reg. Lib. B. 914)-issue of execution restrained; Pennesley Mining Company (M.R., 2 July, 1877, Reg. Lib. B. 1162)-ditto; Crown Match Company (M.R., 17 April, 1878, Reg. Lib. A. 680)—sheriff restrained from selling under fi. fa.; Whitwick Colliery Company (M.R., 22 November, 1878, B. 2035)-ditto; Belper Laund Company (Malins, V.C., 6 November, 1878, Reg. Lib. 1885)-sheriff and purchaser restrained Nevertheless, there can, I think, be little doubt that it is more convenient that the Chancery Division should have power to stop proceedings against a company where a winding-up petition is pending, or where a voluntary winding up is in progress, and it is to be hoped that a new rule will be made enabling the Chancery Division in such cases to stay proceedings in actions and proceedings pending in the other Divisions. Lincoln's-inn, April 13. FRANCIS B. PALMER. THE NEW FORMS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-As your readers all know, there were recently issued to the public new rules and forms, intituled "New Rules of the Supreme Court, April, 1880," the 2nd of which rules states that they shall come into operation on the 6th day of April, 1880. Rule 34 states that a summons at chambers shall be in the form H. 1 in the schedule thereto. Rule 35 states that the summons shall be prepared by the applicant or his solicitor. Having had occasion to issue summonses of a special nature in the Common Pleas Division about the 9th instant, I obtained from one of the firms of law rules, a number of printed forms of summons according stationers whose names appear upon the title-page of the to form H. 1 in the schedule, and duly filled them up, as therein directed. On my presenting one of these summonses to the clerk of the judge at chambers for issuing, he declined to issue it, and on my pressing him for his reasons he, to my surprise, said an order had been made postponing the use of the new forms for a fortnight. The consequence was that my time and expense were entirely thrown away, and I ultimately had to issue the summonses on the old forms. I have no doubt that hundreds of solicitors are under the same impression with regard to these new forms as I was, and I shall, therefore, be glad if you will insert this in your next issue in order that others may be warned, and so save themselves similar waste of time and money. A SOLICITOR. BILLS OF SALE. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I was very much pleased to see from the SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, of the 10th instant, that no person would be allowed to inspect or take any extract from any of the registers or indices of the filing of bills of sale, or any document filed in connection therewith, until he has specified in writing to the officer in charge of the register the name against which he wishes to search, and has satisfied the officer as to the object of the search. This is certainly most satisfactory, as it will, to some extent, prevent the circulation of the socalled Trade Protection circulars. A great number of the documents filed as bills of sale are, in fact, only con tracts for hiring, and it seems to me most unfair that the name of a person hiring furniture should be advertised through the land as if he had given a bill of sale over his goods. You hint at a list published by authority, but this would be only one degree better than the late practice. I think it should be left to a person about to deal with another to ascertain for himself, by search, if his goods are protected by a bill of sale or not. I trust you will excuse my troubling you on this subject. ALPHA. Bath, April 14. [See observations under the head of " Current Topics." -ED. S.J.] LEGAL WIDTH OF ROAD. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-(1) A. holds under a building lease a field, along the edge of which there is a pathway used by the public. A. being about to build a wall along the side of the field to shut off the pathway from the remainder of the field has consulted me with reference to the narrowest width of way which it is legally allowable for him to leave. (2) Under the same lease the lessor has covenanted to convert a portion of a pathway over the lessor's adjoining property into a roadway. My client, who is very precise, consults me as to the greatest width of roadway his lessor is legally compellable to allow. I am not aware that there is any very strictly defined width prescribed by law in either case, but I should feel obliged if any of your readers would have the goodness to assist me with any information on the points. A SUBSCRIBER. New Orders, Etc. JUDGES' CHAMBERS. Notice with reference to the transfer of business in chambers from Rolls-gardens to the Royal Courts of Justice. On and after Monday next, the 19th of April, all summonses, whether before a judge or master, must be attended at the Royal Courts of Justice, and not at the Judges' Chambers in Rolls-gardens. All summonses will be issued and orders drawn up on the ground-floor. The judge and masters will sit for the hearing of summonses on the court-floor. With regard to masters' summonses, in lieu of the present practice, they will be heard by separate masters according to the following alphabetical divisions:-A to F, G to N, and O to Z, and summonses will be issued and orders drawn up accordingly. Provision will be made for issuing summonses according to the above alphabetical divisions on Saturday next, April the 17th. Solicitors and their clerks attending summonses are requested to meet in the room No. 81 on the groundfloor. The room reserved for the bar is No. 100 on the court-floor. A very ingenious invention has been brought to our notice for fastening together papers. It is called McGill's Patent Single Stroke Staple Press, and consists of a small press, not unlike that used for stamping dies. In the end of the lever there is placed one of the small brass staple fasteners, of which boxes of various sizes are supplied. The corner of the papers to be fastened is placed underneath, and by a single stroke of the hand the staple is thrust through the papers, and the ends doubled back into the papers so as to preclude the possibility of the fastener coming loose or injuring the hand in dealing with the papers. There is no difficulty in securely fastening together, with great rapidity, papers of a great many sheets. The agents for the invention are Messrs. Lotz & Co., 20, Barbican, London. Cases of the Week. an FOREIGN ATTACHMENT-MAYOR'S COURT OF CITY OF LONDON. In a case of The London Joint Stock Bank v. The Mayor and Aldermen of London, before the Court of Appeal on the 8th inst., a curious question arose with reference to the custom of "foreign attachment" in the city of London. The action was brought by the bank in the Common Pleas Division, claiming a writ of prohibition, to prohibit the mayor, and aldermen, and the judge of the Mayor's Court from further proceeding in a process of foreign attachment, which had been commenced against the bank in action of debt entered in the Mayor's Court by Sarah Griessell against Thomas Griessell. Immediately after the entry of that action, the plaintiff in it issued the process against the bank, attaching the moneys of the defendant in their hands as garnishees. The bank then applied to the Common Pleas Division for a rule nisi for a prohibition, and in answer to their declaration in prohibition, the orporation pleaded the ancient custom of foreign attachment of the city of London. The plea stated the custom to be that if, in an action of debt in the Mayor's Court, the defendant should be summoned to appear to answer the plaintiff, and the serjeantat-mace should return that the defendant had nothing within the city whereby he might be summoned, and then the defendant at the same court should make default, and thereupon the plaintiff should testify that some other person carrying on business within the city had any goods of the defendant in his custody within the city, or was indebted to the defendant in any sum of money arising or accruing within the city, then the court should command the serjeant-at-mace to attach the defendant by such goods or sum of money; and then if the serjeant-at-mace certified to the court the defendant to be attached accordingly, and the defendant at that and three other courts then next severally holden, being solemnly called, did not appear, but made default, and those four defaults were recorded against him, if the plaintiff appeared at each of the four courts, then at the last of the four courts, or at any court holden after the four defaults recorded, at the petition of the plaintiff, it had been the custom for the court to command the serjeant-at-mace to warn the garnishee to appear at any court afterwards to be holden to show cause why the plaintiff ought not to have judgment and execution of the goods or debt attached. And, if the not appear, garnishee, being solemnly called, did bat made default, it had been the custom to award the plaintiff to have judgment and execution of the goods or debt attached to satisfy the plaintiff's debt, or so much thereof as they would respectively extend to satisfy, the plaintiff giving pledges to restore the same to the defendant if he, within a year and a day, came into court and disproved the debt claimed by the plaintiff. The plea alleged that all the above-mentioned preliminary proceedings in default had been taken in the action against the defendant Thos. Griessell. The Common Pleas Division, upon a demurrer by the bank to the plea, decided that a corporation was not within the custom, and that the attachment could not be enforced against them by means of a fi. fa. (vide L. R. 1 C. P. D. 1). The Court of Appeal, when the case first came before it, was of opinion that the facts did not sufficiently appear, and referred it to an arbitrator to state the facts in a special case. By the case thus stated it appeared that the practice relating to foreign attachment had, for the last two centuries at least, been entirely different from that which was alleged by the plea. The practice had been for the plaintiff simply to enter his action against the defendant. No process was issued against the defendant, and no notice was given to him of the action or the attachment, but the plaintiff made an affidavit of debt and gave information that the defendant had goods or money in the hands of a garnishee within the jurisdiction. A notice was then served on the garnishee, attaching the goods and moneys of the defendant in his hands to answer the plaintiff, and warning him not to part with them with. out licence of the court. A scire facias was then issued, calling on the garnishee to appear and show cause why the plaintiff should not have execution of the goods or moneys of the defendant in his hands. This was served on the garnishee, and, if he did not appear, judgment for the plaintiff was given against him by default. If he did appear, the appearance was recorded, and then a record was made up which stated, not only the proceedings which had actually taken place, but also all the preliminary proceed ings by default against the defendant, which were set forth in the plea, but which never in fact now took place. The special case stated that "there is no doubt that the preliminary proceedings thus fictitiously alleged have, for at least two centuries past, ceased to be more than formal, but it cannot be ascertained at what precise period they became 80." Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) held that the plea of the corporation had not been proved, and that on this simple ground the bank were entitled to judgment in prohibition. The corporation had pleaded a certain custom, and had averred that it had been followed. It now appeared that the alleged preliminary proceedings against the defendant were all a fiction, and that nothing of the kind had taken place. The plea was, therefore, not proved. JAMES and BRAMWELL, L.JJ., intimated an opinion (though not a final one) that the Common Pleas Division was right in holding that the custom did not extend to a body corporate, but BAGGALLAY, L.J., said that, as at present advised, he was not disposed to agree with that decision.-SOLICITORS, Clarke, Rawlins, & Clarke; T. J. Nelson. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-LEASE BY COMMITTEE OF LUNATIC SIGNATURE IN COMMITTEE'S OWN NAME-VALIDITY— CONDITION OF SALE-EVIDENCE OF PERFORMANCE OF COVENANTS IN LEASE-PRODUCTION OF LAST RECEIPT FOR RENTCONTINUING BREACH OF COVENANT.-In a case of Lawrie v. Lees, before the Court of Appeal on the 8th inst., a question arose as to the validity of a lease by the committee of a lunatic. The demised property belonged to three partners in trade, one of whom was a lunatic. The Court of Lunacy had authorized the committees of the estate of the lunatic, in the name and on behalf of the lunatic, to execute the lease. The lease purported to be made by the lunatic by the committees (naming them) and the other partners, but the committees each signed the lease in his own name (not in the name of the lunatic), and a seal was placed opposite the name of each of them. The attestation clause stated that the deed was signed, sealed, and delivered by the committees, naming them as individuals, not as committees. The action was brought by a purchaser of the lease against his vendor claiming to have the contract for sale declared void, or, in the alternative, specific performance of the contract if it should appear that the defendant could make a good title to the property. Hall, V.C., held that the lease had not been duly executed by the committees, and that on this ground a good title had not been shown to the lease. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.) reversed this decision, and held that the lease had been duly executed. There was nothing, BRAMWELL, L.J., said, to show that the seal was not that of the lunatic. Another objection to the title taken in the Court of Appeal arose in this way :-One of the conditions of sale provided that "the production of the last receipt for rent paid shall be taken as conclusive evidence of the due and satisfactory performance of the lessee's covenants contained in the lease, or the waiver of any breaches of the same covenants up to the time of the completion of the purchase, whether the lessor shall be cognizant of such breaches (if any) or not." The lease contained a covenant by the lessee to use the whole of the premises as a publichouse or in connection therewith, and it appeared that he had in fact underlet a part of the premises, and that this part was used for another purpose. The purchaser contended that there being thus a continuing breach of the covenant, the condition was not binding on him and a good title was not shown. Another condition provided for the production of the lease at the sale, and the particulars of sale expressly stated the fact of the underletting of a part of the premises. The court held that the purchaser was bound by the condition, and overruled the objection.-SOLICITORS, C. F. Yorke; Hunters, Gwatkins, & Haynes. her own use and benefit, according to the nature and quality thereof. And in the event of her decease, should there be anything remaining of the said property, or any part thereof,” the testator gave "the said part or parts thereof" to B. The wife survived the testator, and afterwards died, having made a will by which she gave the residue of her real and personal estate to H. The question was whether certain leasehold property of the testator passed under the will of the widow to H. Hall, V.C., held that, under the will of the testator, the widow took a life interest, with a power of disposition only during her life, but that she had no power of disposition by will, and that, consequently, the leasehold property in question passed to B. and to H. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ.), who also intimated an opinion that the widow took nothing but a life interest, though it was not necessary to decide that point, because she had not attempted to dispose of the property by deed in her life-time.SOLICITORS, Thomson & Edwards; Brownlow & Howe. BOOTY OF WAR-GRANT BY ROYAL WARRANT FOR DISTRIBUTION-TRUST-RIGHT TO SUE IN HIGH COURT.-In a case of Kinloch v. The Secretary of State for India in Council, before the Court of appeal on the 13th inst., a question arose as to the right to sue one of the responsible Ministers of the Crown for an account of booty taken by the military forces of the Crown, which had been by a royal warrant granted to him for distribution among the persons entitled thereto. The booty in question was captured in India in the course of the war which followed on the mutiny in 1857. By an order in council, made in 1864, under the Act 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, the Queen referred it to the judge of the Court of Admiralty to determine the persons who were, and the proportions in which they were, entitled to share in the booty, The judge having determined this, her Majesty, by a royal warrant in November, 1866, granted the booty to the Secretary of State for India in Council, in trust for distribution by him, or by any other person or persons whom he might appoint among the persons who, according to the judgment of the Court of Admiralty, were entitled to share in it. And the warrant further directed that, in case any doubt should arise in respect of the distribution of the booty or any claim thereto, it should be determined by the Secretary of State, or such persons to whom he should refer the same, which determination was to be final unless within three months, 66 we shall be pleased otherwise to order, hereby reserving to ourselves the right to make such order therein as to us shall seem fit." The plaintiff brought the action on behalf of himself and all other persons who under the royal grant were entitled to share in the booty, and he claimed an account of the booty, and of all sums of money paid or applied under the provisions of the grant, and direction for the distribution of any balance remaining undisposed of in the defendants' hands in accordance with the provisions of the royal grant. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had still in his hands a large part of the property which he refused to distribute or account for. The Secretary of State demurred to the statement of claim. HALL, V.Č., overruled the demurrer, on the ground that, by the royal warrant, a trust had been created, and that the Secre tery of State was liable to be sued as a trustee. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and BRAMWELL, L.JJ), reversed this decision, and allowed the demurrer, holding that no trust, in the legal sense of the word, had been created by the warrant, which was nothing more (as JAMES, L.J., said) than a direction by the sovereign authorizing her servant having possession of her money to deal with it in a certain way. He was to deal with the money as the agent of the Crown, under his responsibllity to Parliament, and subject to the liability to account to the Crown and the Parliament. It would be a violation of legal principle for a municipal court to take upon itself to enforce directions which the Crown was minded to give to one of the great officers of State. The only appeal from his decision was to the Queen herself.-SOLICITORS, Whitakers & Woolbert; H. Treasure. WILL-CONSTRUCTION-LIFE INTEREST-POWER OF DISiOSITION.-In a case of In re Thomson, before the Court of Appeal on the 9th inst., a testator had, by his will, given real and personal estate to his wife "for the term of her natural life, to be disposed of as she may think proper for PRACTICE-MOTION TO COMMIT-COSTS FIXED BY JUDGE. -In a case of Re Fyfe, before the Master of the Rolls on the 9th inst., a motion was made to commit the defendant, an executor, for non-payment into court of a sum in his bands |