having the conduct of the sale, in which there are, say, twenty lots, happens to be concerned for the purchasers in regard to five of those lots. In a like manner in the case of liquidation proceedings the solicitor is concerned for the trustee having the conduct of the sale, and also for some purchasers of lots at the sale. Is the solicitor, as acting for the purchaser, entitled to charge for perusing and comparing abstract with deeds, and for requisitions on title; and is he, as vendor's solici tor, entitled to charge as vendor's costs perusing re Registration Act of 1878, or even entirely account for the wave of cases which followed the general election of 1874, such important decisions, for instance, as Woodward v. Sarsons and Northcote v. Pulsford, appearing in the "addenda" only. These, and all other cases for which we have searched, we have not failed to find correctly inserted in their proper places. But we notice with not a little regret that Mr. Carter has merely transferred the note of the former editor in dealing with Woodward v. Sarsons, and has neither ventured upon any amplification of that note, nor adequately compared Wood-quisitions, and perusing draft conveyance, and all such ward v. Sarsons with the Wigtown case (2 O‘M. & H. 221). The question of the hour, however-payment of travelling expenses-is treated remarkably well, the effect of the newly-born Corrupt Practices Act of 1880 being neatly given in the text, and the statute itself, as well as a certain "Town Councils and Local Boards Act, 1880"-by which the property qualification for members of municipal corporations is abolished-being printed in the appendix. And not only has the work been kept up to date in these points, but nearly all the recent registration cases, such as Ford v. Drew (28 W. R. 137), and Hull v. Cropper (L. R. 5 C. P. D. 73), decided in November last, will be found in their proper places in the text, Mr. Carter Dispensing altogether with that pest of readers, an 'addendum." In citing the statutes, we think the short title, as "Ballot Act, 1872," "Representation of the People Act, 1867," should in each case have been given, as well as the "year of the Queen"; and although we are told in the preface that "additional references have been given to many of the cases," we think that in a work of the calibre of "Rogers on Elections," the reader is entitled to expect to find references to all the current reports. If all the reports had been duly searched, the important registration case of Pickard v. Baylis (28 W. R. 256), argued at the request of the court by counsel deputed by the Attorney-General, would not have been omitted. On the whole, however, we have no hesitation in commending the book to our readers as a useful and adequate treatise upon election law, the comprehensiveness of which may be inferred from the fact that no fewer than forty-four statutes are printed in the appendix. HANDBOOK OF THE STATUTES RELATING TO PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. BY WILLIAM MASTERMAN, Barristerat-Law. William Clowes & Sons. 1880. This collation of statutes will frequently be found useful where more comprehensive works would be out of place. The editor "trusts that no Act or even section which really bears on the conduct of an election" has been omitted, and we have not discovered any omissions. The enactments relating to registration and election petitions are excluded. The index is not quite up to the mark, the titles not being numerous enough-e.g., the titles Jews" and "Public-houses are omitted. But the tables (A.) of "Counties and boroughs returning members," and (B.) of "Persons incapable of being elected," are not only executed with great care and thought, but will often be found of great practical value. General Correspondence. COSTS OF SOLICITOR HAVING CONDUCT The solicitor for the plaintiffs in a chancery suit, charges on behalf of the vendor as if he were not acting for a purchaser; and is he at the same time entitled to charge against the purchaser the usual purchaser's costs just in the same way as if he were a stranger to the proceedings and did not know the title as vendor's solicitor ? What costs is the solicitor in these circum. stances entitled to charge, and to whom? EDWARD SHIPPEY & FIELD. 15, Cooper-street, Manchester, March 24. JUDICIAL PRECEDENCE. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-A question has arisen as to the exact "judicial precedence "of the various twenty-nine judges now forming the English bench. If you can state it definitely to me you will very much oblige. E. W. S. Great George-street, Westminster. [The following is, as far as we are able to ascertain, the precedence of the judges : THE LORD CHANCELLOR.-By 31 Hen. 8, c. 10, s. 4, placed above all dukes except Royal dukes. JUDGES OF JUDICIAL COMMITTEE.-As Privy Councillors; by letters patent, 10 Jac. 1. CHANCELLOR OF DUCHY OF LANCASTER. THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND. THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COMMON PLEAS. [Stated to be by letters patent, 10 Jac. 1.] LORDS JUSTICES OF APPEAL.-By 14 & 15 Vict. c. 83 s. 3; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77, s. 4. THE VICE CHANCELLORS.-By 5 Vict. c. 5, s. 25. PUISNE JUDGES of Queen's Bench Division, Common Pleas Division, and Exchequer Division, according to seniority. [Stated to be by letters patent, 10 Jac. 1; 38 & 39 Vict. JUDGE of Court of Probate. [JUDGE of Court of Admiralty.-Ed. S. J.] Cases of last Week. MORTGAGE FURTHER ADVANCES -- PURCHASER NOTICE. In a case of The London and County Banking Company . Ratcliffe, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., the question arose whether equitable mortgagees were entitled to charge, as against a purchaser of the mortgaged property from the mortgagor, further advances which they had made to the mortgagor after they had notice of the contract for sale, the purchaser having had, at the time when he entered into the contract, notice of the mortgage, which was made expressly to secure further advances. The mort deposit of title deeds, with a memorandum in writing stating gage was by a customer to his bankers, and it was made by s that the deeds were deposited as security for an existing debt due by the customer to the bankers, and all further advances which might be made by them to him, and so as to cover the ultimate balance due upon the customer's current account. The customer afterwards, with the knowledge of the bankers, entered into a contract for the sale of the mortgaged property. The purchaser had notice of the mortgage. He paid his purchase-money to the mortgagor, and the bankers, with notice of the contract for sale, continued to make further advances to the mortgagor. And, on the ultimate balance of the customer's account, a large sum was due to the bankers. The bankers brought the action against the purchaser, after the property had been conveyed to him by the customer, claiming to have a charge on the property for the balance due to them, and to foreclose the purchaser in the event of his not paying the balance which should be found due. Bacon, V.C., held that the bankers were entitled to the charge which they claimed, and made a declaration that the purchaser was a trustee of the legal estate in the property for the bankers to the extent of the charge. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) reversed this decision, and dismissed the action. JAMES, L.J., who delivered the judgment of the court, said that the question between the parties resolved itself into this, whether the bankers could, with notice of the purchaser's interest, whether legal or equitable, make further advances to the mortgagor so as to affect that interest. That question was really determined by the House of Lords in Hopkinson v. Rolt (9 H. L. C. 514). In that case there was a security exactly similar to that of the bankers in the present case, and there was then a second mortgage, and each incumbrancer had notice of the security of the other. The House of Lords held that the advances made by the first mortgagee to the mortgagor after notice of the second mortgage could not be charged as against the second mortgagee. In the opinion of their lordships it was impossible to make any sound distinction between the equitable interest of a second incumbrancer and the equitable interest of a purchaser. It might be suggested that the purchaser ought to have paid his purchase-money to the bankers instead of to the vendor. But the bankers had no charge on the purchase-money as such. Their charge was their original charge on the property, with all its incidents, for better or for worse. If the property had been increased to tenfold the value of the purchase-money, and the debt to the bankers increased tenfold, their charge, if valid, would have been a charge on the whole value of the property to the whole amount of the debt. And so, on the other hand, the court was bound by the decision in Hopkinson v. Rolt to hold that the advances made after the bankers had notice of a change in the beneficial ownership were not a charge on that ownership. And, it was clear from the bankers' accounts that all that was due at that time had long since been paid off. It was true that there had always been a large balance due to the bankers, but, according to the rule in Clayton's case (1 Mer. 572), the credits must be attributed to the debits in order of date, there being nothing special in the case to exempt it from the operation of that rule. If the bankers had been minded to substitute for a security on the property a charge on the purchase-money, it would have been very easy for them to do so by getting from the customer a direction to the purchaser to pay them the purchase-money, or getting an assignment of the purchase-money, and giving due notice of it to the purchaser. This they had not done, and they had failed to establish a charge on the property. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the action was dismissed, with costs.-SOLICI TORS, Ingle, Cooper, & Holmes; Harris, Wilkinson & Raikes. COMPANY-WINDING UP-CONTRIBUTORY-FULLY PAIDUP SHARES-COMPANIES ACT, 1867, s. 25.-In a case of In re The Barrow-in-Furness and Northern Counties Land and Investment Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., the question arose whether some shares which had been issued by the company as fully paid up had been paid for in cash, so as to satisfy the requirements of section 25 of the Companies Act, 1867. On the 14th of August, 1877, one Young signed an agreement to sell some land to Huddart for £7,713, and on the 30th of August Huddart agreed with the promoter of the then intended company to sell the land to the company, when incorporated, for £19,350. The company was registered in September, 1877, with a capital of £100,000, divided into £5 shares. The articles of association stated the agreement of the 30th of August, and provided that the directors should carry it into effect. On the 19th of September the company entered into an agree ment with Huddart, adopting the agreement of the 30th of August, but reducing the purchase-money to £12, 592. In June, 1878, an abstract of Young's title to the property was delivered to the company. Some correspondence took place between Young and the company's solicitor, in the course of which it was suggested that Young should take fully paid-up shares, of the nominal value of £2,000, in part payment of his purchase-money, and this be ultimately consented to do. The draft of the conveyance of the property to the company, as originally prepared, purported to be a conveyance by Young and some mortgagees of his to the company. It contained recitals that Young had agreed with Huddart to sell the property to him for £7,713, and that prior to a conveyance to Huddart, he had agreed with the company to assign and release to them the benefit of the contract on payment of the £7,713 by the company to Young. And Young and his mortgagees then purported to convey the property to the company in consideration of £2,800 paid by the company to the mortgagees, and £4,913 (the remainder of the £7,713) paid to Young. After Young had agreed to take £2,000 in fully paid-up shares, the draft was altered by introducing a recital of that agreement, and expressing the consideration to be £2,800 paid to the mortgagees, 400 fally paid-up shares allotted to Young, and £2,913 paid to him. On the 3rd of October, 1878, the directors of the company resolved to allot 400 shares to Young as fully paid up. On the 28th of November the conveyance was executed in accordance with the draft as altered, and the purchase was completed, £2,913 being paid to Young and the certificates of 400 fully paid-up shares being delivered to him, and his name was placed on the register of the company for the 400 shares accordingly. No written contract in respect of the shares was registered under section 25. The company having been ordered to be wound up, Little, V.C., held that Young was liable to pay the full nominal list of contributories accordingly. The Court of Appeal value of the 400 shares in cash, and placed him on the (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the transactions which had taken place between the parties would by the company against Young for calls on the shares, have supported a ples of payment in defence to an action and that, consequently, the shares had been in effect paid for in cash, and Young was not liable as a contributory in respect of them.-SOLICITORS, Coburn & Young; Robins & Peters. PRACTICE-ADJUDICATION OF BANKRUPTCY-TWO PETITIONS HEARING OF SECOND PETITION FIRST-COLLUSION WITH DEBTOR-POWER OF COURT OVER CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, R. 48.-On the 23rd ult. an application was made to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal to the House of Lords from their decision in the case of Ex parte Mason, noted ante, p. 384. The presented on the same day against the same debtor; the facts were shortly these:-Two bankruptcy petitions were first by a hostile creditor, the second by a friendly credi tor for whom the debtor's own solicitor acted. The second petition was filed with notice of the first. Before the first petition had been served, the second was served, and, without the consent of the debtor, an immediate adjudication was made upon it. After this the first petition was served. The first petition appealed against the adjudication, and adduced evidence to show that it had been obtained by collusion between the debtor and the second creditor. The Chief Judge ordered that all proceedings under the adjudication should be stayed until the first petition should have been heard and disposed of. The Court of Appeal (James, Brett, and Cotton, L.JJ.) held that the first petitioner had no right to appeal from the adjudication, but that his proper course would have been to apply to the judge of the county court to give him the conduct of the proceedings under the adjudication up to the time of the appointment of a trustee, a thing which, they said, the court had ample jurisdiction to do, if it was proved that the adjudication had been obtained by collusion. In support of the application for leave to appeal to the House of Lords it was urged that the decision was contrary to the settled practice of the London Court of Bankruptcy ever since the Act of 1869 came into operation, as well as to the practice which had prevailed long before that time. It had always been considered that the creditor who first petitioned had a vested right in the proceedings, and the practice had always been not to hear a second petition without giving notice to the first creditor, and at the most the two petitions would be heard together. And it was urged that the result of the decision would be that a debtor could always, by means of the petition of a friendly creditor, prevent the making of an adjudication on the petition of a hostile creditor, and could thus get the conduct of the proceedings practically into his own hands, and control the appointment of the trustee, so as to prevent a full investigation into his affairs. The court (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), however, refused to allow an appeal, and said that the mischief which was suggested could always be prevented by means of the power of the court to give the conduct of the proceedings to the second petitioner.-SOLICITORS, Layton & Jaques; Nash & Field.. POWER OF APPOINTMENT-EXERCISE BY INFANT-PERSONALTY-On the 24th ult., the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), affirmed the decision of Jessel, M.R., in the case of In re D'Angibau (noted ante, p. 67), that a power of application over personal estate, created by a marriage settlement in favour of the wife, who was an infant at the date of the settlement, and who died while still an infant, had been validly exercised by her will. Their lordships simply affirmed the decision, and said that they would give their reasons hereafter.-SOLICITORS, Yarde & Loader; Wilkins, Blyth, & Fanshawe; Petgrave & Hodgkinson. PRACTICE ADMINISTRATION ACTION-TRIAL OF ISSUE BEFORE JUDGE AND JURY-APPLICATION FOR NEW TRIAL. Judgment was delivered by Hall, V.C., on the 24th ult., in a case of Jenkins v. Morris, which involved a preliminary question with regard to a point of practice of some novelty. The action was for the administration of the estate of an intestate, and questions had arisen in the course of the proceedings as to the validity of a certain lease pur. porting to be granted by him. The validity of the contract for the lease was impeached by the plaintiffs, on the ground that the testator was of unsound mind and incapable of managing his own affairs at the time of entering into it. By direction of the Vice-Chancellor, in whose court the action was proceeding, an issue on this point was framed, and sent down to be tried by a judge and jury at Carmarthen Assizes. The trial was held before Lindley, J., and a special jury, at the winter assizes, when a verdict was returned to the effect that the intestate was not of unsound mind at the time in question. The plaintiffs on March 4, applied to the Vice-Chancellor upon motion ex parte for a rule nisi calling upon the defendants to show cause why a new trial of the issue should not be directed, upon the ground of mistake and of the verdict being against the weight of evidence. A difficulty arose as to the practice, inasmuch as under order 39, Rules of Court, December, 1876, rule 5, and Rules of Court, March, 1879, rule la, the application for a new trial ought to be made to a divisional court, and it has always been the practice in the common law courts, independently of the last-mentioned rules, that the application for a new trial should be made in the Divisional Court of that division of which the judge before whom the action or issue was tried is a member. In the present instance the action was attached to the Vice-Chancellor's court, and nothing was known of it in any of the courts at Westminster. HALL, V.C. decided that he had jurisdiction to hear the application, on the authority of a case of Williams v. Best (unreported), where a similar motion had been heard by the present Master of the Rolls; but his lordship at the same time observed that the principle of the case was entirely opposed to that which regulated the more convenient common law practice, which was that the judge who tried the case should form one of the Divisional Court which dealt with the application. In the result the rule was refused upon independent grounds. Law Students' Journal. LAW STUDENTS DEBATING SOCIETY. The weekly meeting of this society was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, on Tuesday evening last; Mr. A. M. Ellis, LL.B. in the chair. The question appointed for the evening's discussion was the following:-"Is it desirable that Lord Beaconsfield's Government should be supported by a majority at the General Election?" and was opened in the affirmative by Mr. A. W. Stirling, B.A.; Mr. C. B. Grant followed on the negative side and was supported by Messrs. S. Garrett, M.A., and T. Bateman Napier. Messrs. F. H. R. Fargus and W. R. Lloyd-Jones spoke on the affirmative side. The debate was adjourned until the 6th proximo. UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. The society held its usual weekly meeting at Clement'sinn Hall, Strand, on Wednesday last; Mr. B. T. Bartrum in the chair. Mr. E. H. Pickersgill opened the subject for discussion which had been adjourned for the second time from the previous Wednesday: "That Lord Beaconsfield and his Government do not deserve the confidence of the country." Messrs. A. D. Acland, W. C. Owen, and B. Brown, supported; Messrs. D'A. B. Collyer, Pitt-Cobbett, and T. Clarkson opposing. Mr. W. Shirley Shirley having replied upon the whole debate, the question was put to the vote and carried by a majority of two, the house adjourning at 10.40. The Cardiff Law Students' Society was introduced into union. There will be no meeting of the society next week. BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. At a meeting of this society held on Tuesday, March 23, in the Law Library, Thos. Martineau, Esq., in the chair, a debate took place upon the following moot point:-"Should the English law which compels (1) ministers of religion, and (2) medical men to give evidence concerning matters com municated to them in professional confidence be assimilated to the laws of the Continent which protect such communica tions ?"-Powell on Evidence, 4th ed. pp. 129-130; Best on Evidence, 5th ed. pp. 724-729; Taylor on Evidence, 7th ed. pp. 737, 770, and references in note 3,771, and references in note 5. See also the remarks of Jessel, M.R., in Anderson v. Bank of Columbia (1876) L. R. 2 Ch. D. at p. 650; Bentham's View of Rationale of Evidence, ch. xx. § 85; Works edited by Bowring, vol. vi. pp. 98-9. The speakers in the affirmative were Messrs. Rogers, O'Connor, Steere, and W. C. Taylor, and on the negative Messrs. Hooper, Ludlow, Jones, Barrows, Mason, Crockford, Davis, and King. The chairman summed up and put the question, which was nega tived on both heads, though the number of votes in favour of a change in the law as to ministers of religion was considerably larger than the number given in favour of a change in the law as to medical men. A vote of thanks to the chairman concluded the meeting. LIVERPOOL LAW STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION. A meeting of this association was held at the Law Library, M.A., president of the association, in the chair. Fifteen Union-court, on Monday, March 22, Wm. Stone, Esq., new members were elected. Mr. Richard Lowndes (author of a "Treatise on General Average," &c.) read a paper on "The Principles of the Law of General Average." The paper traced the gradual admission of the custom of general average into the legal systems of ancient countries, and its slow development in our own. It was pointed out that not until the present century was the custom, even in its simplest form, recognized by the English courts, and that even now the Court of Appeal is engaged in considering the validity of some of its leading principles. The paper was a most able and instructive one, and was listened to through out with the greatest attention. At its conclusion, a very hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Lowndes for his kindness in preparing and reading it was passed, on the motion of the chairman, seconded by Mr. A. Wilson. A debate then took place on the following question :-"When a ship is obliged to put into an intermediate port for the common safety, do the principles of the law of general average require that the expenses of coming out from such port, in continuation of the voyage, should be admitted as, or excluded from, general average?" The discussion was opened by Mr. Č. A. M. Lightbound in favour of the exclusion of such expenses, and was continued by Messrs. Dawbarn, Winshurst, A. Wilson, and Rogers. The case chiefly referred to was Attwood v. Sellar, L. R. 4. Q. B. D. 342, which has been recently argued before the Court of Appeal, judgment being reserved. On the votes of the meeting being taken, the question was decided in favour of the admission as general average of the expenses referred to, by a majority of eleven. There were forty-five members present. A course of lectures on criminal law is being delivered to members of this association, on Wednesdays, by Mr. Segar, barrister. The average attendance of articled clerks up to the present time has been forty-seven. Appointments, Etc. Mr. EDWARD BYGOTT, solicitor, of Wem, has been ap pointed a Perpetual Commissioner for Shropshire for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women. Mr. JAMES JERMAN, solicitor, of Exeter, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for Devonshire and the city of Exeter for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women. Mr. BENJAMIN SCOTT CURREY, solicitor, of Derby, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Derbyshire (Colonel Francis William Newdigate), to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Currey was admitted a solicitor in 1852, and is deputy clerk of the peace for Derbyshire. His partner, Mr. John Barber, is clerk of the peace for the county. Mr. ROBERT DAWBARN, solicitor, of March and Wisbeach, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire (Mr. Robert Catling) to be UnderSheriff of those counties for the ensuing year. Mr. Dawbarn is registrar of the March County Court, clerk to the county magistrates, and treasurer for the Isle of Ely. He was admitted a solicitor in 1846, and is in partnership with Mr. Frederick John Wise. Mr. JAMES HEGEN DOUGLASS, solicitor, of 9, John-street, Adelphi, and Market Harborough, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Leicestershire (Mr. Joseph Trueman Mills) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Douglass was admitted a solicitor in 1856, and is clerk to the magistrates and the Commissioners of Taxes at Market Harborough. Mr. GEORGE FELL, solicitor, of Aylesbury, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for Buckinghamshire for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women. Mr. GEORGE FREDERICK HILL, solicitor, of Cardiff, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for Glamorganshire for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women. Mr. HENRY LEE, solicitor, of Whitchurch, Shropshire, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Cheshire (Mr. Cudworth Halsted Poole), to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Lee was admitted a solicitor in 1861, and is in partnership with Mr. William Lee Brookes. Mr. HENRY NEWBALD, solicitor, of Newark, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Nottinghamshire (Mr. William Henry Coope Oates) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Newbald was admitted a solicitor in 1843, and is clerk to the Newark Highway Board. His partner, Mr. Evelyn Sherard Falkner, is clerk to the county magistrates. The Hon. DAVID ROBERT PLUNKET, Q.C., M.P., Paymaster-General of the Forces, has been sworn a member of the Privy Council. Mr. CHARLES WILLIAM REES STOKES, solicitor, of Tenby, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Pembrokeshire (Mr. John Frederick Lort Phillips) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Stokes was admitted a solicitor in 1864, and is in partnership with Mr. John Gwynne, town clerk of Tenby. Mr. FREDERICK ROWLAND ROBERTS, solicitor, of Aberystwith, has been appointed by the High Sheriff of Cardiganshire (Mr. George Ernest John Powell) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Roberts is clerk of the peace for Cardiganshire. Mr. FRANCIS SMITH, junior, of Henley-upon-Thames, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature. Mr. W. O. WEDLAKE, solicitor (of the firm of Wedlake & Letts), of 3, Mitre court, Temple, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Married Women for the county of Middlesex and the cities of London and Westminster, in lieu of for the counties of Surrey and Kent. DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP. WILLIAM THURGOOD and RICHARD DRIVER THURGOOD, solicitors, Saffron Walden (William & Richard Driver Thurgood). March 20. (Gazette, March 26.) Companies. WINDING-UP NOTICES. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. LIMITED IN CHANCERY. ANGLO-VIRGINIAN FREEHOLD LAND COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Mar 9, directed to be heard before V.C. Malins, on Apr 9. Beall, Queen Victoria st, solicitor for the petitioner FURNESS PAPER COMPANY, LIMITED.-V.C. Bacon has, by an order dated Mar 20, appointed Samuel Robert Bigg, Ulverston, to be official liquidator NORTH WALES CARRIAGE AND WAGON COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Mar 24, directed to be heard before V.C. Malins, on Apr 9. Heritage and Co, Clement's lane, solicitors for the petitioners VICTORIA MANSIONS, LIMITED.-V.C. Malins has fixed Apr 9 at 12, at his chambers, for the appointment of an official liquidator [Gazette, Mar 30.] COUNTY PALATINE OF LANCASTER. PRESTON VICTORIA LOAN, DISCOUNT, AND DEPOSIT COMPANY, LIMITED. By an order made by V.C. Little, dated Mar 22, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the above company be continued. Cooper, Preston, solicitor for the petitioner [Gazette, Mar. 30.]. ORDER XII. (c.) Garnishee orders, 5. Appearances in central office-Ord. 12, r. 1a.] Appear-shall, unless the court or a judge otherwise order, be taken in the district registry. ances entered in London shall be entered in the central office. In probate actions notice of appearances entered shall forthwith be given by the central office to the probate registry. 6. Notice of appearance-Ord. 12, r. 66.] Order 12, rule 6b, of the Rules of the Supreme Court is hereby annulled and the following shall stand in lieu thereof: A defendant shall enter his appearance to a writ of summons by delivering to the proper officer a memorandum in writing dated on the day of its delivery, and containing the name of the defendant's solicitor, or stating that the defendant defends in person. He shall at the same time deliver to the officer a duplicate of the memorandum, which the officer shall seal with the official seal, showing the date on which it is sealed, and then return to the person entering the appearance, and the duplicate memorandum so sealed shall be a certificate that the appearance was entered on the day indicated by the seal. A defendant shall, on the day on which he enters an appearance to a writ of summons, give notice of his appearance to the plaintiff's solicitor, or, if the plaintiff sues in person, to the plaintiff himself. The notice may be given either by notice in writing served in the ordinary way at the address for service, or by prepaid letter directed to that address and posted on the day of entering appearance in due course of post, and shall in either case be accompanied by the sealed duplicate memorandum. ORDER XVI. Parties. 7. Service of notice on infant or person of unsound mindOrd. 16, r. 12a.] Notice of a judgment or order pursuant to the Act 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 42, on an infant or person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition shall be served in the same manner as a writ of summons in an action. 8. Parties to administration proceeding-Ord. 16, r. 12b.] In any cause for the administration of the estate of a deceased person, no party to the cause other than the executor or administrator shall, unless by leave of the judge, be entitled to appear either in court or in chambers on the claim of any person not a party to the cause against the estate of the deceased in respect of any debt or liability. The judge may direct any other party to the cause to appear, either in addition to or in the place of the executor or administrator, upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as he shall think fit. ORDER XXXIV. 9. Agreement as to payment of money and costs-Ord. 34, r. 6.] The parties to a special case may, if they think fit enter into an agreement in writing, which shall not be subject to any stamp duty, that on the judgment of the court being given in the affirmative or negative of the question or questions of law raised by the special case, a sum of money, fixed by the parties, or to be ascertained by the court, or in such manner as the court may direct, shall be paid by one of the parties to the other of them, either with or without costs of the action, and the judgment of the court may be entered for the sum so agreed or ascertained, with or without costs, as the case may be, and execution may issue upor such judgment forthwith, unless otherwise agreed, or unless stayed on appeal. 10. Application of order, &c.-Ord. 34, r. 7.] This order shall apply to every special case stated in an action, or in any proceeding incidental to an action. No special case shall hereafter be stated under the Act 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35. ORDER XXXV. Proceedings in District Registries. 11. Proceedings necessary or incidental to judgment—Ord. 35, r. 3a.] Where an action proceeds in a district registry, all proceedings relating to the following matters, namely,(a.) Leave to issue or renew writs of execution, (.) Examination of judgment debtors for garnishee purposes, ORDER XXXVII. 12. Form of affidavits-Ord. 37, r. 3a.] Every affidavit shall be drawn up in the first person, and shall be divided into paragraphs, and every paragraph shall be numbered consecutively, and as nearly as may be shall be confined to a distinct portion of the subject. Every affidavit shall be written or printed bookwise. No costs shall be allowed for any affidavit or part of an affidavit substantially departing from this rule. 13. Description and address of deponent to be stated.Ord. 37, r. 3b.] Every affidavit shall state the description and true place of abode of the deponent. 14. Affidavits made by two or more deponents—Ord. 37, r. 3c.] In every affidavit made by two or more deponents the names of the several persons making the affidavit shall be inserted in the jurat, except that if the affidavit of all the deponents is taken at one time by the same officer it shall be sufficient to state that it was sworn by both (or all) of the "above-named deponents. 15. Affidavit to be filed-Ord. 37, r. 3d.] Every affidavit shall be filed in the central office. There shall be appended to every affidavit a note showing on whose behalf it is filed. 16. Alterations in affidavits—Ord. 37, r. 3e.] No affidavit having in the jurat or body thereof any interlineations, alteration, or erasure shall without leave of the court or a judge be read or made use of in any matter depending in court unless the interlineation or alteration (other than by erasure) is authenticated by the initials of the officer taking the affi davit, or, if taken at the central office, either by his initials or by the stamp of that office, nor in the case of an erasure, unless the words or figures appearing at the time of taking the affidavit to be written on the erasure are re-written and signed or initialled in the margin of the affidavit by the officer taking it. 17. Affidavits by illiterate persons—Ord. 37, r. 3f.] Where an affidavit is sworn by any person who appears to the officer taking the affidavit to be illiterate, the officer shall certify in the jurat that the affidavit was read in his presence to the deponent, that the deponent seemed perfectly to understand it, and that the deponent made his or her signa ture in the presence of the officer. No such affidavit shall be used in evidence in the absence of this certificate, unless the court or a judge is otherwise satisfied that the affidavit was read over to and apparently perfectly understood by the deponent. 18. Stamping of affidavits and use of office copies-Ord. 37, r. 3g. In cases in which by the present practice an original affidavit is allowed to be used, it shall before it is used be stamped with a proper filing stamp, and shall at the time when it is used be delivered to and left with the proper officer in court or in chambers, who shall send it to the central office. An office copy of an affidavit may in all cases be used, the original affidavit having been previously filed in the central office, and the copy duly authenticated with the seal of that office. |