and ink would be good appears to be still open in England.

Should, however, the voter be a person of tremulous hand and distrustful disposition; should he even change his mind in the act of voting, and divide his cross between two opposing candidates, he may still take courage, and present himself to the presiding officer, under rule 28, as "a voter who has inadvertently dealt with his ballot-paper." Such a person may, on delivering to the presiding officer "the ballot-paper so inadvertently dealt with, and proving the fact of the inadvertence [we presume by a view] to the satisfaction of the presiding officer, obtain another ballot-paper in the place of the ballot-paper so delivered up." How many slips of this kind are allowable the statute does not say, but we presume that the whole question of "inadvertence is one for the presiding officer. By rule 36, however, ballot-papers "unmarked or void for uncertainty " are to be stored up under that head by the returning officer for use upon a scrutiny, if necessary.

So much for the mode of voting generally, but there are (see rule No. 26 of the Rules scheduled to the Ballot Act, 1872) three particular classes of voters who exercise the franchise under a special set of regulations applying to the three classes indiscriminately, and these are (1) The physically incapables; (2) if the poll be taken on Saturday, Jews; and (3) the literary incapables. Of the second class we have heard much of late, and it has been suggested not only that they may vote on a day other than that appointed, but that the saving in their case extends to other Jewish holidays than Saturday. These suggestions proceed on a misapprehension. Rule 26 is as follows:

The presiding officer, on the application of any voter who is incapacitated by blindness or other physical cause from voting in manner prescribed by this Act, or, if the poll be taken on Saturday, of any voter who declares that he is of the Jewish persuasion, and objects on religious grounds to vote in manner prescribed by this Act, or of any voter who makes such a declaration as hereinafter mentioned that he is unable to read, shall, in the presence of the agents of the candidates, cause the vote of such voter to be marked on a ballot-paper in manner directed by such voter, and the ballot-paper to be placed in the ballot-box, and the name and number on the register of voters of every voter whose vote is marked in pursuance of this rule, and the reason why it is so marked, shall be entered on a list, in this Act called "the list of voters marked by the presiding officer."

The only other rule bearing upon the subject is rule 29, which directs the presiding officer to make up into a separate packet "the list of votes marked by the presiding officer, and a statement of the number of the voters whose votes are so marked by the presiding officer under the heads Physical incapacity,' 'Jews,' and Unable to read.'"

It is clear, therefore, that Jews must vote on the appointed day or not at all, but that if the appointed day be Saturday, they need not mark a ballot-paper themselves, but get the presiding officer to mark it for them, the reason being that the Jewish religion forbids writing on the Sabbath-day, but allows dictation to a Gentile scribe. For, said Mr. Crawford, on moving the insertion of the saving for Jews in committee (see Hansard, vol. 210, p. 1957), "although the religious scruples of a Jew would be offended by his scratching out the name of a candidate on a Saturday, they would not interfere with his going to the poll and directing what names should be struck out."

LAWYER CANDIDATES AT THE GENERAL

ELECTION.

THE following is a list of the members of the legal profession, so far as can be ascertained, who, up to Monday last, were candidates for seats in the new Parliament. It is probable that several additions to the list will still be made, especially in Scotland and Ireland. The names of members of the old Parliament are printed in italics.

ENGLAND AND WALES.

BARRISTERS.

BATH-Mr. Reginald Hardy (C); Mr. Edmund Robert
Wodehouse (L)

BERWICK-Sir Dudley Marjoribanks, Bart. (L)
BEAUMARIS-Mr. Morgan Lloyd, Q.C. (L)
BEWDLEY-Mr. Richard Everard Webster, Q.C. (C)
BIRKENHEAD—)
-Mr. Arthur Williams (L)
BODMIN-Hon. Edward Leveson Gower (L)
BOSTON-Mr. Thomas Garfit (C); Mr. William James
Ingram (L)

BRIDPORT-Mr. Charles Nicholas Warton (C)
BRIGHTON-Mr. William Thackeray Marriott, Q.C. (L)
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE-Hon. Thomas Francis Fremantle

(C)

BURY ST. EDMUNDS-Lord Francis Hervey (C); Mr. Joseph Alfred Hardcastle (L)

CALNE-Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice (L); Mr. Ulick Ralph Burke (C)

CAMBRIDGE—Mr. Alfred George Marten, Q.C. (C); Mr. Hugh Shield (L); Mr. William Fowler (L) CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY-Right Hon. Spencer Walpole, Q.C. (C)

CAMBRIDGESHIRE-Mr. Hunter Rodwell, Q.C. (C)
CANTERBURY-Hon. Arthur Gathorne Hardy (C)
CARDIGANSHIRE- -Mr. Thomas Edward Lloyd (C)
CARLISLE Mr. Miles Walker Mattinson (C)
CARMARTHEN- —Mr. Benjamin Thomas Williams, Q.C. (L)
CARMARTHENSHIRE-Mr. John Jones (C)

CARNARVONSHIRE—Mr. Watkin Williams, Q.C. (L)
CHATHAM-Mr. John Eldon Gorst, Q.C. (C)
CHELSEA-Sir Charles Dilke, Bart. (L); Mr. Joseph
Bothamley Firth (L)

CHELTENHAM-Mr. James Agg Gardner (C)
CHESHIRE, EAST-Mr. William Cunliffe Brooks (C)
CHESHIRE, MID-Mr. George William Latham (L); Mr.
Vernon Kirk Armitage (L)

CHESHIRE, WEST-Mr. Charles Crompton (L)
CHESTER-Right Hon. Henry Cecil Raikes (C); Right
Hon. John George Dodson (L)

CHRISTCHURCH-
-Mr. Horace Davey, Q.C. (L)
COCKERMOUTH--Mr. Robert Grant Webster (C)
COLCHESTER-Mr. William Willis, Q.C. (L); Mr. Francis
Henry Jeun (C)

COVENTRY-Sir Henry Jackson, Bart., Q.C. (L); Mr.
Arthur Kekewich, Q.C. (C)
CUMBERLAND, EAST-Mr. Edward Stafford Howard (L)
CUMBERLAND, West-Mr. David Ainsworth (L)
DENBIGH-Hon. George Thomas Kenyon (C)
Denbighshire—Mr. George Osborne Morgan, Q.C. (L)
DEVIZES-Mr. Alfred Childers Meysey Thompson (L)
DEVONPORT-Mr. John Delaware Lewis (L)
DEVONSHIRE, EAST-Sir John Kennaway, Bart (C)
DEVONSHIRE, NORTH-Right Hon. Sir Stafford North
cote, Bart. (C)

DEWSBURY-Serjeant John Simon (L)

DUDLEY—Mr. Henry Brinsley Sheridan (L)
DURHAM CITY-Mr. Farrer Herschell, Q.C. (L); Mr.
Thomas Charles Thompson (L); Mr. John Lloyd
Wharton (C)

ESSEX, EAST-Mr. James Round (C)
ESSEX, SOUTH-Mr. William Thomas Makins (C)
EXETER-Mr. Arthur Mills (C)
EYE-Mr. Ellis Ashmead Bartlett (C)

FINSBURY-Mr. William M'Cullagh Torrens (L)

SOLICITORS.

CAVAN-Mr. J. Charles Joseph Fay (HR)
CORK, CITY—Mr. Nicholas Daniel Murphy (HR)
LONDONDERRY, CITY-Mr. Charles Edward Lewis (C)
MADLOW-Mr. John George MacCarthy (HR)
MONAGHAN-Mr. William Findlater (L)
PORTARLINGTON-Mr. Keating Clay (HR)

SCOTLAND.

BARRISTERS AND ADVOCATES.

AYRSHIRE, NORTH-Mr. John Blair Balfour (L)
BUTESHIRE-Mr. Charles Dalrymple (C)

CLACKMANNAN AND KINROSS-SHIRE-Right Hon. William
Adam (L)

EDINBURGH, CITY-Mr. John Hay Atholl Macdonald (C) ELGIN, DISTRICT-Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone Grant Duff (L)

HADDINGTON, DISTRICT-Sir David Wedderburn, Bart. (L)

KILMARNOCK, DISTRICT-Mr. Robert Malcolm Kerr (L) KIRKCALDY-Sir George Campbell (L)

ORKNEY AND SHETLAND-Mr. Samuel Laing (L) STIRLING, DISTRICT-Mr. Henry Campbell Bannerman (L)

WIGTOWN, DISTRICT-Mr. Mark John Stewart (C); Mr. John McLaren (L)

SOLICITORS.

DUMFRIES, DISTRICT-Mr. William Gordon (C) INVERNESS, DISTRICT-Mr. Charles Fraser Macintosh (L)

rule as to the exclusion of evidence having the effect of bastardising issue was superseded. The cases of In re Rideout's Trusts (L. R. 10 Eq. 41), and In re Yearwood's Trusts (25 W. R. 461, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 545), were relied upon in support of this contention, but Justices Grove and Lopes both observed that in the former case James, V.C., had not decided that the old rule was superseded, and that his judgment had been misapprehended by Hall, V.C., in the latter case. They held that the evidence tendered by the husband was inadmissible, the proceedings before the magistrates not having been instituted "in consequence of adultery," but rather with a view to establish the child's legitimacy, while the section relied upon seemed to refer only to divorce proceedings.

Reviews.

ELECTION LAW.

BUSHBY'S MANUAL OF THE PRACTICE OF ELECTIONS, WITH AN APPENDIX OF STATUTES AND OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE. FIFTH EDITION. BY HENRY HARDCASTLE, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Haynes.

This new edition reaches us too late for examination this week, but we observe it contains the Act which received the Royal assent on Wednesday last; printed of course from the Bill, and with Sir H. Jackson's amendment to clause 2 in a footnote. The general nature of the contents of the book may be gathered from the titles of chapters-Preliminaries to Writ; The Writ; Preparations for Election; Proceedings at and after Election; Elections at Universities, and Avoidance of Elections.

Recent Becisions.

EVIDENCE OF PARENTS BASTARDIZING

ISSUE.

(Murray v. Milner, 27 W. R. 881; Guardians of Nottingham v. Tomkinson, 28 W. R. 151, L. R. 4 C. P. Ď. 343.) Both these cases raised the question of the admissibility in evidence of the declarations of a parent tending to bastardize his child.

In Murray v. Milner the point arose under the following circumstances:-The question whether John Murray was the legitimate son of John Murray, the elder (deceased), was in issue in an administration action, and the defendants, who alleged that he was not born in wedlock, proposed to read as evidence the will of the elder Murray, by which an annuity was given to the testator's "son, or reputed son, commonly called, or known by the name of, John Murray," the same person being afterwards spoken of as "my said reputed son John Murray." Mr. Justice Fry declined to exclude this evidence, proceeding upon the distinction established by Lord Mansfield in Goodright v. Ross (2 Cowper, 591), that, while a parent's declarations are inadmissible to prove the bastardy of a child born during coverture, they may be accepted to show that the child was, in fact, born before marriage; and he added that the former rule" has nothing to do with the case in which the question is marriage or no marriage.”

In Nottingham Guardians v. Tomkinson the respondent had been summoned, under the 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122, s. 36, to show cause why an order should not be made against him for the maintenance of a child born to his wife when living separate from him. The child was born more than a year after the cohabitation had ceased, and the respondent tendered evidence to show non-access during the interval. The justices had declined to make an order, but had granted a case to raise the question of the admissibility of this evidence. It was argued that the summons was a proceeding "instituted in consequence of adultery" within the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, s. 3, and that in such a case the

Cases of the Week.

BANKRUPTCY - DOUBLE PROOF-DISTINCT ESTATESBILL OF EXCHANGE-DRAWER AND ACCEPTOR-FOREIGN LIQUIDATION BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 37. - In the House of Lords on Friday, the 19th inst., the appeal of Banco de Portugal v. Waddell was decided. The question arose in the liquidation of Messrs. John Kynnersley Hooper and John Kynnersley Hooper, jun., who had traded in partnership, at Oporto, as port wine shippers, in the name of Hooper Brothers, and in London as wholesale wine and spirit merchants, in the name of Richard Hooper & Sons. The Banco de Portugal were the holders of five bills of exchange which had been drawn by the Oporto firm upon, and accepted by, the London firm. In December, 1877, Messrs. Hooper presented a petition for liquidation in the London Court of Bankruptcy, and shortly afterwards the affairs of the Oporto firm were liquidated under Portuguese law. The Banco de Portugal received in the Portuguese liquids tion property amounting to a dividend of eight shillings in the pound upon the amount of the five bills of exchange. They then tendered a proof for the same amount in the English liquidation, but the trustee refused to admit the proof until they had accounted for the dividend received under the Portuguese liquidation. Mr. Registrar Murray, sitting as Chief Judge, ordered the proof to be admitted, but only upon the condition that the bank should not receive any dividend until the other creditors should have received a dividend equal to that already received by the bank. On the 4th of April, 1879, the Court of Appeal (James, Baggallay, and Bramwell, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of the registrar (see 23, SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 461, 20 W. R. 564, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 317). On appeal to the House of Lords by the Banco de Portugal, it was argued that section 37 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, expressly gave them a right of double proof, since the respective obligations of the drawer and of the acceptor of the bills of exchange were "distinct contracts," and there were also two "distinct firms," since the insolvents carried on two separate trades in two separate countries. Ex parte Wilson, 21 W. R., L. R. 8 Ch. 914, upon the authority of which the Court of

Appeal had proceeded, was decided under the corresponding provision of section 152 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, but the words "having distinct estates to be wound up in bankruptcy" did not appear in the latter statute. Earl CAIRNS, C., Lords SELBORNE and BLACKBURN, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Independently of the statutes, there would have been a right of double proof, but as a condition precedent to the right of proof in the English liquidation, the bank must have accounted for the dividend received in Portugal. The statute had given no new right, but only removed certain difficulties in the way of the proof, and it supposed a case quite foreign to that which was before the House. Ex parte Wilson was correctly decided, and was precisely in point.-SOLICITORS, Abrahams & Roffey; Loxley & Morley.

BANKRUPTCY-SECURED CREDITOR-PROOF - DECLARATION OF DIVIDend before Realization oR VALUATION OF SECURITY-RESERVATION OF DIVIDEND-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 40, 41, 42, 43, 72-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, RR. 72, 136, 272, 311, 312, 313, 314.-In a case of Ex parte Good, before the Court of Appeal on the 18th inst., the question arose whether a secured creditor of a liquidating debtor, who has given notice to the trustee of his debt, but who has not, prior to the declaration of a dividend by the trustee, either realized his security or assessed the value of it, is entitled to have a reserve made by the trustee for the purpose of paying him a dividend, corresponding to that paid to the other creditors, when the balance of his debt, ultra his security, shall have been ascertained. The question depended upon the construction of several sections of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, and of several of the Rules of 1870. Section 40 provides that "a creditor holding a specific security on the property of the bankrupt, or on any part thereof, may, on giving up his security, prove for his whole debt. He shall also be entitled to a dividend in respect of the balance due to him after realizing or giving credit for the value of his security, in manner and at the time prescribed. A creditor holding such security as aforesaid, and not complying with the foregoing conditions, shall be excluded from all share in any dividend." Section 42-" In the calculation and distribution of a dividend it shall be obligatory on the trustee to make provision for debts proveable in bankruptcy, appearing from the bankrupt's statements, or otherwise, to be due to persons resident in places so distant from the place where the trustee is acting, that in the ordinary course of communication they have not had sufficient time to tender their proofs, or to establish them if disputed, and also for debts proveable in bankruptcy, the subject of claims not yet determined." Section 43—“ Any creditor who has not proved his debt before the declaration of any dividend or dividends shall be entitled to be paid out of any moneys for the time being in the hands of the trustee any dividend or dividends he may have failed to receive, before such moneys are made applicable to the payment of any future dividend or dividends, but he shall not be entitled to disturb the distribution of any dividend declared before his debt was proved by reason that he has not participated therein." And, of the rules relating to liquidation by arrangement, rule 311 provides that "all debts must be proved prior to the payment of dividend thereon by the trustee." Rule 312 provides that seven days at least before declaring a dividend the trustee is to gazette a notice requiring the creditors to send him "the particulars of their debts or claims; and on declaring a dividend, a sufficient reserve shall be made by the trustee for such dividend upon all debts or claims notified to him in pursuance of such notice. The trustee shall also be deemed to have notice of the debts of all creditors whose names are inserted in the debtor's statement of affairs, and (except where any such debt has been adjudicated upon prior to the declaration of the dividend) a similar reserve shall be made in respect thereof." Rule 313 provides that whenever the trustee shall reject the claim or proof of any creditor, he is to give him notice, and he is to be entitled "to exclude from dividend any such claimant or creditor whose debt he so rejects," unless the creditor shall, within fourteen days, apply to the court to admit his proof, and proceed with his application with due diligence. And by rule 314, "Except as before mentioned, the trustee shall declare dividends among such creditors only as have proved their debts up to the time of such declaration of dividend, and

no creditor who has omitted to prove his debt, or to send to the trustee the particulars of his claim, or whose name does not appear in the debtor's statement, shall be entitled to disturb any such dividend, or to make any claim in respect thereof against the trustee; but upon proof of his debt any such creditor shall be entitled to receive the same prior to the payment of any further dividend to the other creditors." And rule 272 provides that "a secured creditor, unless he shall have realized his security, shall, previously to being allowed to prove or vote, state in his proof the particulars of his security and the value at which he assesses the same, and he shall be deemed to be a creditor only in respect of the balance due to him after deducting such assessed value of the security." If the security realizes more than the assessed value, the creditor must pay the excess to the trustee; and if it realizes less than the assessed value, the creditor's proof is not to be increased. In Ex parte Good, the liquidating debtors, who were blanket manufacturers, owed a large debt to their bankers, for which the bankers held a number of bales of blankets as security. The debtors in their statement of affairs stated that the value of the security exceeded by £1,000 the amount of the debt. Immediately after the appointment of the trustees, early in July, 1878, communications took place between them and the bank respecting the bank's claim, and a suggestion was made that the trustees should pay the claim and take the blankets. On the 21st of August, the manager of the bank sent to the trustees a formal proof, being an affidavit by one of the officers of the bank which stated the amount of the debt, and the particulars of the securities held for it, but said, “The value of such securities I am unable and do not now propose to estimate." A letter to the trustees sent with the proof stated that some additions would have to be made to it in respect of payments for insurance, storage, &c., but added, "I send it in in its present state, in order that you may have an affidavit of the debt owing, as a basis for settlement." The letter also stated that the bank intended to expose the blankets for sale in a month or so. On the 22nd of August, the trustees sent a formal notice to the bank, requiring them within fourteen days to assess the value of their security. This notice purported to be sent under rule 136. On the. 3rd of September, the bank manager wrote, "We do not intend to value the securities, but to make default with regard to your notice, and to proceed at once to realize the property, unless arrangements are immediately made for taking it out of our hands and paying off the debt." On the 7th of September, the trustees gave the bank a formal notice of the rejection of their proof, on the ground that they had not valued their security pursuant to the notice to do so, and that they were therefore not entitled to prove, and that they would be excluded from dividend unless they applied to the court to prove their debt. On the 16th of September, the bank manager wrote that he thought there was no occasion for any application to the court, but "I have no objection to consent to the rejection of the proof, or to withdraw it altogether, and substitute a fresh one when our securities are realized, as I hope they shortly will be.

I am unable at the present moment to assess the value until I have an opportunity of determining the same by actual sale." He asked whether the trustees had given any notice of their intention to declare a dividend, "as in the event of the whole estate being about to be shortly distributed, I should, of course, rather adopt a forced valuation than allow the bank to be excluded from the chance of participating in a dividend, although, at the same time, I have no reason to believe that we shall ultimately have occasion to lodge a claim at all." He added, however, that, by withdrawing the proof, or consenting to its rejection in its present form, we in no way preclude ourselves from lodging a fresh one, should we at any future time find ourselves in a position requiring us to do so." The trustees replied that they should reject any further proof which the bank might tender. The bank manager repeated his notice that the bank had a claim upon the estate, a proof for which they would submit as soon as they should be in a position to do so. Some further correspondence took place, and ultimately the trustees, on the 3rd of January, 1879, without giving any express notice to the bank, declared a dividend of 3s. 6d. in the pound, payable on the 15th of January. On the 16th of January the bank, having realized all their securities, except some blankets, the value of which they assessed at £50, sent to the trustees a formal proof for the unpaid

balance of their debt, and the manager wrote asking when a dividend was likely to be declared. The trustees replied that the proof was received after the dividend had been declared, and that the bank were not entitled to receive dividend on any proof not sent in previous to the declaration of dividend. After some more correspondence the bank applied to the county court for a personal order against the trustees for payment of a dividend of 38. 6d. in the pound in respect of their proof. The judge made the order asked for, and his decision was affirmed by the Chief Judge (28 W. R. 278), on the ground that the trustees had had express notice of the claim of the bank, and that therefore rule 312 applied, and the trustees were bound to make a sufficient reserve for dividend on the claim. The order was discharged by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.). JAMES, L.J., said that the order proceeded entirely upon the footing of making the trustees personally liable for a misfeasance. But beyond all question the dividend was declared before any proof, or anything which was even alleged to be a proof in compliance with the requirements of the Act and the Rules, had been sent in by the bank. It was admitted that the so-called proof which was sent in in September was sent in only for the purpose of the negotiation which was then going on between the trustees and the bank. Why, then, were the trustees to make any reserve to meet the bank's claim? The only debt to the bank "proveable in bankruptcy" was the balance which might remain due to them after the property which they held as security had been realized, or after deducting from their whole debt the amount of the valnation which they might choose to put on their security at their own risk. There was, therefore, no debt "proveable in bankruptcy" in respect of which the trustees could have retained anything. The words "debts proveable in bankruptcy, the subject of claims not yet determined," at the end of section 42, did not enlarge the meaning of the words "proveable in bankruptcy." They referred to cases in which the trustee had reserved the admission of a proof for further consideration, or where he had decided adversely to a creditor and the creditor had applied to the court to reverse the decision. The section did not apply to the case of there being something which might at some future time result in a debt proveable in bankruptcy. There was nothing to show that the trustees had misled the bank in any way. It was a mere question of the legal rights of a secured creditor who did not choose either to realize or to value his security before a dividend was declared. There might, no doubt, be cases in which a secured creditor was taking steps to realize his security-e.g., by means of an action in the Chancery Division-and was prevented from doing so before the declaration of a dividend, and injustice might occur if a reserve were not made by the trustee for the purpose of paying him a dividend. But such a case as that was fully met by section 72 of the Act, which gave the Court of Bankruptcy full power to remedy every wrong which might otherwise arise in the administration of an estate in bankruptcy, and to give effect to every just claim.

Under that section a secured creditor could apply to the court to order the trustee to make a proper reserve for the purpose of paying him a dividend. In the present case this bank had not, before the dividend was declared, placed themselves in the position of having a "debt proveable in bankruptcy" in respect of which the trustees ought to have reserved a dividend. BRETT, L.J., said that the first proof sent in by the bank was in effect withdrawn. The question was whether, in order to bind the trustee to make a reserve, it was enough for the creditor to give him notice that a proof would be sent in at some future time, or whether it was not necessary that a claim should be made in such a form that, if the trustee admitted it, it would amount to a proof. His lordship was of opinion that a secured creditor could not prove till he had either realized or valued his security. If the trustee wished to dispute the amount which the creditor asserted that his security had realized, or the accuracy of his valuation, then, if he declared a dividend, he must make a sufficient reserve in respect of the creditor's claim, and, if he did not do that, he would fail in his duty. But, before he could be called upon to say whether he would allow or disallow the creditor's claim, the security must have been either realized or valued. The difficulty which might arise in a case in which, though the creditor was bound either to realize or value his security, yet practically he was unable to do so, was met by

the power given to the court by section 72, which would enable it to order the declaration of a dividend to be postponed. COTTON, L.J., said that rule 136, which had been relied upon, had, he thought, no application to the case. It applied only to the case of a creditor who desired to give credit for the value of his security in order to entitle him to a dividend in respect of the balance of his debt. In such a case the trustee, if he was dissatisfied with the value put by the creditor on the security, might require the security to be realized, but the rule did not empower the trustee to make that requisition in any other case. The bank had the right to ascertain the value of their security, and then to come in and prove for the balance of their debt. If the trustee then disputed it, he must, if he declared a dividend, have made a reserve for them. But it would require very strong words to show that a reserve ought to be made for a person who might or might not turn out to be a creditor, and who had it in his own power to fix the amount for which he claimed to be a creditor. The order of the county court was accordingly discharged, but without prejudice to any application by the bank to be paid in priority, out of any assets to be hereafter realized by the trustees, a dividend on the balance of their debt equal to that which had been paid to the other creditors.-SOLICITORS, Walker & Co.; Bischoff, Bompas, & Bischoff.

DISCOVERY OF BANKRUPT'S PROPERTY - SUMMONING WITNESSES FOR EXAMINATION-APPLICATION BY CREDITOR -DISCRETION OF JUDGE-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 96 -BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, R. 171.-In a case of Et parte Nicholson, before the Court of Appeal on the 18th inst., a question arose as to the right of a creditor to have witnesses summoned for examination, under the power conferred by section 96, with a view to the discovery of the bankrupt's dealings and property. Section 96 gives the power to the rule 171 says that, court (in terms) only "on the application of the trustee," but "Where the application is not made on behalf of the trustee the grounds upon which the application is made shall be verified by affidavit"-thus, by implication, authorizing the making of such an application by a creditor. In Ex parte Nicholson the application was made by a creditor who had previously asked the trustee to authorize the use of his name, which the trustee had refused to do. Notice of the application was given to the trustee only. The creditor filed an affidavit stating the grounds of bis application, and said that he was willing to bear the expense of the investigation, and to put the depositions on the file for the use of the trustee. The trustee filed affiPepys refused the application. davits in opposition to the application. Mr. Registrar He said that all investigations into the affairs of a bankrupt ought to be made by or through the trustee, until it was distinctly shown that his interests were adverse to those of the general body of creditors, or that he was incapable of conducting the examination. On the simple suggestion of one creditor that he was entitled to pursue this course, the registrar did not think that he ought to open the door to an extent which would allow an investigation to be made by every creditor as to every imaginable debt of the bankrupt. Every credi tor, who might think himself in some way aggrieved, might indulge in this luxury, not for the benefit of all the creditors, and might summon witnesses from any part of the country, and harass them by examining them before the court for hours. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) affirmed the registrar's decision. JAMES, L.J., said that the appeal was brought from an exercise of the judicial discretion of the registrar. His lordship quite agreed with the observations of the registrar. It would be a sad, a monstrous thing if any one who claimed to be a creditor should be entitled, ex debito justitiæ, to summon any one he chose for examination as to the property and dealings of a bankrupt. It was difficult to see what the end of it would be. The provisions of section 96 were inquisitorial enough, but the trustee was a person who filled a responsible position. If the trustee declined to put in force the powers given to him by the section, a creditor who wished to avail himself of them must make out to the satisfaction of the court a prima facie probability that some benefit would result to the estate by allowing him to do so. In the present case the registrar thought that such a case had not been established. He had exercised his judicial