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thinks, to the case of a person making a bargain which includes the purchase of the negative? Now a "purchaser " is equivalent to a "vendee," and the "vendee of the negative has been already protected by express words in the section, which Mr. Williams omits to quote. To what end, then, are the words added 6. or shall be made or executed for or on behalf of any other person"? They can be of no service if the person ordering a negative of which he is to become the owner, is a "vendee" of the negative within the meaning of the statute, for, as we have said, the rights of the "vendee are carefully and expressly provided for. What has to be established, therefore, before the view of the commissioners can be pronounced “unarguable" is that such a person is not included in the description of "vendee." Mr. Watkin Williams does not attempt to argue this question; yet, until it is answered, it is premature to pronounce the view of the commissioners to be "certainly a mistake."

THE QUESTION Which has been raised by the appointment by the Chancery Division of the High Court of a receiver of property in Jersey is not a new one. A case will be found in the appendix to 10 Hare (Smith v. Smith, p. lxxi.), where an application was made to ViceChancellor Wood for an order appointing a receiver of personal estate without any exception of personal chattels which were in Jersey. A copy of a newspaper published in Jersey was produced, in which the proceeding was complained of as a violation of the privileges of the island and its civil judicature, but the Vice-Chancellor made the order asked for.

WE ARE GLAD TO LEARN that Vice-Chancellor Malins' late accident has left less serious traces than might have been anticipated. His lordship, who paid a visit to Lincoln's-inn on Wednesday, appeared to be in excellent health and spirits. He will sit for the first time in his own court at Lincoln's-inn on Tuesday next.

WE DREW ATTENTION last week to the necessity for an order re-transferring to Vice-Chancellor Malins the causes previously transferred to Mr. Justice Fry. Our readers will observe in another column a notice stating that an order for the re-transfer of the Vice-Chancellor's business from Mr. Justice Fry, is in preparation. The chancery cause-list, which will be found elsewhere, will show which of Vice-Chancellor Malins' causes will remain with Mr. Justice Fry for the purpose of trial or hearing only, when the necessary order has been made.

A correspondent writing to the Times on the Judicature Fee Stamps, says, "I have now daily to go upwards of a mile, sometimes more, to get an adhesive stamp which I may probably not require after all, or, having spent some hours in obtaining an order, may have to spend another in hunting up a stamp before the order can be delivered out to you. Only yesterday I was at a distant suburban county court, and could not obtain a simple 1s. stamp nearer than six miles-namely, Somerset House."

At the Maidstone Assizes, on Tuesday, before the Lord Chief Justice, a man named Peters was tried for burglary, and being arraigned and called upon to plead, he shook his head and was silent, and affected to be deaf and dumb. Upon this a jury was empannelled to try whether or not he was "mute of malice," and upon the evidence they found that he was so; it being shown by several witnesses that he could hear and speak very well. In ancient times, and indeed down to the latter part of the last century, prisoners in such cases were "pressed to death," but by a modern statute it is provided that in such a case silence shall be taken as denial, and a plea of "Not guilty" entered, and upon that the trial proceeded, and the man was convicted and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment, with hard labour.

THE CAUSE-LISTS IN THE COMMON LAW DIVISIONS.

THE observations by Mr. Erle, which we printed lastweek, no doubt constitute a very powerful defence of the present system of having only one list for all the common law divisions of the High Court. He maintains that under the present system there is both a more regular and a more rapid rate of progress with the business than under the old system. It seems probable à priori that this would be so. The principle involved is an obvious one. It is that the larger number of instances, the safer test an average affords. There are three elements-amount of work to be done; number of judges to do it; time during which these judges sit. On an average, so many causes take so much time to try, each requiring the services of as many judges during such time. The larger the number of cases from which you derive your average the more nearly correct it is likely to be. It would be much more difficult to say how long on an average five causes were likely to last. than two hundred. Consequently, it follows that if you have a large list for all the Divisions you can calculate more accurately when your cause is likely to be reached than when you have a smaller list for each Division separately. Again, it would seem on reflection that the · greater the number of judges available for the trial of a given number of causes, the greater the facility for calculating the average rate of progress, because the individual variations in the length of causes are equalized. If a long cause blocks the way before one or two of the judges, the shorter causes are not all hung up, but are disposed of before the other judges.

But, notwithstanding Mr. Erle's able defence of the existing system in many respects, there are one or twopoints on which the case he makes is not quite so strong. It has been objected to the new system that it has a greater tendency to separate counsel from their cases. Mr. Erle remarks that counsel at the common law bar are in the habit of accepting briefs to appear before all sorts of tribunals, all sitting at the same time; and consequently it is impossible to arrange so that a counsel can personally attend to all his cases, and he says that this was just as much the case under the old system of separate lists as under the new system. We doubt whether he makes so strong a case here as on some other points. A counsel could formerly to some extent calculate from his knowledge of the state of things with regard to the list in each Division; he had not such rapidly shifting, and such numerous, combinations to deal with; now the combinations from day to day may vary in such a kaleidoscopic manner that no calculation is possible. A counsel, for instance, formerly knew that there was a long case part heard in such and such a court that would probably last till lunch time, and his case was next in that court. He thereupon considered that he might attend to a short case which was first in another Division. Now, while he is in the middle of his short case, suddenly it is announced that all the cases before a judge of another Division having gone off, the cause which was next after the part-heard case, and which, under the old system, would have been safe till the conclusion of the case, is called on before such judge. We think it possible that difficulties of this sort occur more frequently under the new system than the old.

It is, however, no doubt, true that, both under the old and the new arrangement with regard to the lists, it is practically impossible for any member of the common law bar with anything like a considerable practice to make sure of being able to attend to all the cases which he undertakes. This has always appeared to us to be a most unsatisfactory state of things. The difficulties in the way of devising any remedy are, no doubt, very great-so great that very little effort has been made even in the way of suggesting a remedy. The only possible remedy is the application of some expedient such as prevails in the Chancery Division—viz.,

that a leader should confine himself to one court. The great obstacle to that has been that in the case of the Common Law Divisions several courts are sitting together in the different Divisions-viz., one court in Banc, and generally two Nisi Prius courts, and also that the cases on the same circuit are in different Divisions. It does not seem to us clear that it would be altogether hopeless to attempt to devise some modification of the chancery system by which causes should be assigned to a particular judge who should deal with the cause at all stages. Then, of course, the system of a joint list for all Divisions would be impossible; but, notwithstanding Mr. Erle's forcible arguments, we cannot help thinking that the advantages he mentions are not so vastly preponderant as to outweigh all other considerations. The desirability of dispatch of business is great, but should not be allowed so to predominate as to throw entirely into the background the question how the business so dispatched is done. Suitors are often grievously injured by the absence of the counsel who have been retained to conduct their cases. They have very little power of making efficient complaint, because it is so obvious that a defeated suitor will generally grumble that their complaints are looked upon as of little weight. But we cannot help thinking that the system under which this happens is manifestly defective. It may be that the defect is difficult to remedy, but certainly no one appears very seriously to apply his mind to seeking to remedy a defect which tends to cast a stigma on the common-law branch of the profession.

SOLICITORS' CASES OF THE YEAR.

I.

THE decisions of the past legal year include several cases of considerable importance to solicitors. Fowler v. Monmouthshire Canal and Railway Company (27 W. R. 659, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 334) was a case of an uncertificated solicitor. By the Solicitors Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 68), s. 12, "no costs, fee, reward, or disbursements, on account of, or in relation to, any act or proceeding done or taken by any person who acts as an attorney or solicitor, without being duly qualified so to act, shall be recoverable in any action, suit, or matter, by any person or person whomsoever." The claimant in an arbitration under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act had been represented by a solicitor who was not then certificated. The taxing master refused to tax the claimant's costs, and the claimant obtained a rule nisi for a mandamus to compel him to do so. The Queen's Bench Division discharged the rule, pointing out that the Act of 1874 had followed closely upon the decision in In re Hope (20 W. R. 1026, L. R. 7 App. 766), that although under the Solicitors Act, 1860, an uncertificated solicitor could recover no costs, there was nothing to prevent his client if he had paid the costs to the solicitor, from recovering them from the opposite party; and the new enactment was intended to enlarge the effect of the previous Act. Lush, J., said of the Act of 1874, "The words are very wide and quite clear, and the provision applies clearly to disbursements by the client as well as those by the solicitor."

No less than five cases during the past year dealt with the question of the solicitor's lien. Pringle v. Gloag (27 W. R. 574, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 676) was an action for dissolution of partnership, in which all the matters in dispute between the partners had been referred to arbitration, and in the result the arbitrator awarded a sum of £37 16s. 8d., to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs of the action, and a moiety of his costs of the reference. The defendant was also to pay three-fourths of the costs of the award, the remaining one-fourth being paid by the plaintiff. The taxing master found a balance of £52 12s. 2d. to be due from the defendant for costs. A question arose as to set-off, and it was contended that

the plaintiff's solicitor (the plaintiff himself having absconded) had a lien upon the costs payable by the defendant, and that such lien precluded the defendant from setting off against the costs due from him the sum of £37 16s. 8d. which was payable to him under the award. The Master of the Rolls, however, held that the right of set-off was clear and could not be affected by the lien; and he observed, "A solicitor has a lien only for costs payable to his client. . I think it would be a monstrous extension of a solicitor's rights to give him the right to make the party who may have been successful in the ultimate result pay the losing party's costs; and I for one decline to do so. If the solicitor says that unless he has a lien he cannot get paid, the answer is that he should not have worked for an insolvent client. He is not bound to do so."

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Leefe v. Leete (27 W. R. 921) raised the question of the right to lien upon money received for alimony. A wife who had filed a petition for a dissolution of marriage changed her solicitor after the decree nisi, and the former solicitor then claimed a lien for costs upon a sum of £31 10s. in his hands, being the balance of the amount received by him in respect of alimony payable to the petitioner. Sir James Hannen held that this sum must be paid over to the client, since by rule 94 alimony ordered to be paid to a wife must be paid either to her" or to some person or persons to be nominated in writing by her, and approved of by the court, as trustee or trustees on her behalf." In the present case (unlike Bremner v. Bremner and Brett, 15 W. R. 75, L. R. 1 P. & D. 254, which had been cited in support of the right of lien) the petitioner had not authorized her solicitor to receive the alimony, and there was no evidence of her acquiescence in his receiving it in prejudice of her rights.

In re Mason and Taylor (27 W. R. 311, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 729) and Sheffield v. Eden (27 W. R. 477, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 291) both dealt with the question of the right of lien in a mortgage transaction. In the former case a declaration of trust had been executed by a person in whom the property of a company was vested as trustee, in order to secure the payment of debentures issued by the company. The trustee died, and another deed was then executed between the devisees under his will, the company, and two of the directors, whereby the same property was vested in the two directors upon the same trusts. The second deed was prepared by the solicitors to the company, who acted for all parties concerned. The company having gone into liquidation, the trustees applied for an order for the delivery by the solicitors of all deeds, &c., relating to the company's property, but the solicitors claimed a lien for the costs of preparing the deed. Hall, V.C., disallowed the lien, and ordered the deeds to be handed over. He was unable to distinguish the case from In re Snell (25 W. R. 823, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 105), where Jessel, M.R., held that a solicitor acting for both mortgagor and mortgagee loses his lien upon the deeds, unless it is expressly reserved. Upon the principle of that decision, the trustees in the present case had a duty to hold the deeds in their hands for the purpose of performing their trust, and the object of that trust would be defeated if the deeds were kept out of their hands by the solicitor's lien. In Sheffield v. Eden the defendant had executed a mortgage to the plaintiffs, a firm of solicitors, to secure the repayment of certain advances of money on the defendant's account, the deed being prepared by the plaintiffs. In an action for redemption and foreclosure Mr. Justice Fry refused a direction establishing a lien upon the mortgage deeds, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appellants' counsel contended that, while as mortgagees they could claim principal, interest, and costs, they were, as solicitors, also entitled to a lien; but the court dismissed the appeal. James, L.J., said, "You cannot have a lien on your own property; The deeds in question being mortgage deeds, by which the client gave a charge on his property to his solicitors, never were the property of the

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client." Baggallay, L.J., said, "Directly these deeds were executed they remained in the possession of the solicitors, not in their capacity of solicitors to the mortgagor, but as their own property as mortgagees." Thesiger, L.J., also observed that, “although there may be a contingent right of redemption in the mortgagor, it would be unreasonable to imply a lien from such a right, and reasonableness is the foundation of all the legal doctrine of lien."

Lawrence v. Fletcher (27 W. R. 937) was a case of great professional interest, since it involved the extent of the town agent's lien. The limits of this right were thus explained by Mr. Justice Fry, "The lien of the town agent on deeds is, as against the country solicitor, general; : as against the client, his lien is only particular; in other words, as between the country solicitor and the agent, the latter's lien extends to all costs for agency business, and disbursements due to him from the former; but as between the client and the agent, the latter's lien extends only to the costs of the particular suit." His lordship added that, as regarded the lien against the country solicitor, he could see no reason why there should be a difference in the extent of a charging lien and a retaining lien, and there would be considerable inconvenience in introducing a distinction between the extent of these two liens.

General Correspondence.

THE SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION AND THE LAW ASSOCIATION. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, Will you kindly permit me through the medium of your columns to make known publicly to the profession the purport of an answer given by me at the halfyearly meeting of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association at Cambridge, in reply to a query raised by a member present as to what had been done towards an amalgamation of that association with the Law Association. I then stated that I had endeavoured to bring the same about, and that my course of proceeding was-first, to apply to the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, who are members of one or both of the societies, some of them directors, to act upon a committee for the purpose; and the result of such application was that I had obtained the signatures of all the town members and most of the country ones; that I then applied to, and obtained the assent of all or nearly all (all I had applied to) of the directors of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association; but that upon making a like request to the directors of the Law Association I was met with the

cold shoulder, the answers I obtained not encouraging me to proceed further in that quarter, and that such answers came in some cases from those who I had un

derstood were favourable to the project. Such dissent is, I believe, in direct opposition to the wishes of the members at large of the Law Association, and I should be glad if such members would address me with their views on the subject.

It is unnecessary to remind the profession that we have had your kind and able advocacy in the matter; or, further, that at the annual festivals of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association all the learned judges who have presided and touched upon the subject have unhesitatingly recommended such amalgamation.

The general feeling in the profession is that such an amalgamation should be brought about; and there can be no doubt that one representative society with a fund of £70,000 would be capable of doing much more good than two with funds of about half of that amount each. If I were not afraid of occupying too much of your space there would be no difficulty in showing that we as a profession have not, in comparison with other professions and callings, such a representative charity as our position calls for.

In conclusion, let me say that I am quite willing to give time and attention to this matter, and shall be glad to receive communications on the subject. Furnival's-inn, E.C., Oct. 29. EDWIN HEDger.

THE SALE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC PORTRAITS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, The Royal Commissioners upon Copyright, in setting forth in their report (1878) the existing law in relation to paintings, drawings, and photographs, have been guilty of a serious inaccuracy, which, unless I am mistaken, has been the source and origin of much prevailing misconception as to the respective rights of the artist and his customer in the case of a photographic portrait made in the usual and ordinary course of busiThe language of the report (section 102) is as

ness.

follows:

"The author of every original painting, drawing, and photograph has the sole right of copying, engraving, and reproducing it, unless it be sold or made for a good or valuable consideration, in which case the artist cannot retain the copyright unless it be expressly reserved to him by agreement in writing."

This ignores the statutory distinction between the negative of the photograph and the photograph itself, and places the latter, so far as copyright is concerned, upon the same footing as paintings and drawings, and leads the reader to suppose that, as the law stands, when the photograph is executed for another for a valuable consideration, the artist fails to acquire the copyright unless it is expressly reserved to him. This is certainly a mistake.

Take an ordinary example :-You go to a photographer to have your photograph taken. You are informed upon inquiry that the charge is two guineas, for which twenty cartes-de-visite will be supplied. You enter the studio. Several negatives are taken; one proves successful; in course of time the twenty cartes are sent and the money paid. The question now arises, has the artist in such a case the right, without your leave and against your will, to multiply and sell copies of your photograph? To this I answer unhesitatingly that he has such right; and if the language of the statute upon which alone the question turns is carefully looked at, and considered in relation to the preexisting law, the contrary will be seen to be utterly unarguable. The matter stands thus. By the common law no one has a copyright in the picture of himself; and, further, no author of a painting, drawing, or photograph had a copyright in his work. In order to remedy this latter defect, and in the interests of artists, the statute (25 & 26 Vict. c. 68) enacted that "the author have the sole and exclusive right of copying and multiplying of every original painting, drawing, or photograph shall such painting, or such photograph and the negative thereof." Thus was conferred upon the artist, primâ facie and as the general rule, the exclusive copyright in every original photograph made by him, and also in the negative thereof, which is thus pointedly distinguished from the photograph. But then comes an exception, introduced by way of proviso, as follows:-" Provided

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* Mr. Williams omits to quote the full words of this proviso, which, so far as they relate to photographs, are as follows:"Provided that when the negative of any photograph shall for the first time after the passing of this Act be sold or disposed of, or shall be made or executed for or on behalf of any other person for a good or a valuable consideration, the person so selling or disposing of, or making or executing the same shall not retain the copyright thereof, unless it be expressly reserved to him by agreement in writing signed at or before the time of such sale or disposition by the vendee or assignee. . . of such negative of a photograph, or by the person for or on whose behalf the same shall be so made or executed, but the copyright shall belong to the vendee or assignee. of such negative

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of a photograph or to the person for or on whose behalf the same shall have been made or executed." [It will be seen, on reference to our remarks under the head of Current Topics, that the omitted words are of great importance.-ED. S.J.].

that when any painting or drawing, or the negative of any photograph, shall be made or executed for or ou behalf of any other person for a good or valuable consideration, the person so making or executing the same shall not retain the copyright thereof unless it be expressly reserved to him," &c.; but in such case "the copyright of such negative shall belong to the person for whom it shall have been made." The result is that the copyright in every original photograph is vested absolutely by the statute in the artist, except in those cases where the negative of the photograph, as distinguished from the photograph, has been made for another person for a valuable consideration. The issue in each case, therefore, is brought back to this simple question of fact-whether, when the original photograph was ordered and the price agreed upon, the bargain really extended to and included the negative of the photograph or merely the photograph itself. The price and the particular circumstances of each case may determine this question of fact either way; but for all practical purposes it may be safely said that the customer orders the photographs only, and that the negative is not made for him for a valuable consideration.

It follows, therefore, that a person having his photograph taken in the usual way and upon the ordinary terms is powerless to prevent the multiplication and sale of his portrait by the photographer.

It is scarcely necessary to add that this difficulty applies only to past photographs ordered unwarily, without foreseeing the danger. Once forewarned, the remedy for future photographs is simple, being merely a question of price.

Lord John Manners's Bill to consolidate and amend the law of copyright, brought in but not proceeded with last session, proposed to declare and amend the law upon this branch of the subject as follows:

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Clause 34.-"The copyright in a photograph shall belong to the proprietor of the negative from which the photograph is printed. Where the photograph has been made on the order of any person for a valuable consideration, the proprietor of the copyright shall not be entitled to sell, expose for sale, or exhibit any copy of the photograph without the consent of that person, and that person shall have the same right of preventing the selling, exposing for sale, or exhibition of any copy of the photograph, and, if the copyright is infringed, of taking proceedings in respect of the infringement, as if he were the proprietor of the copyright."

WATKIN WILLIAMS.

The Lord Chancellor will receive the judges, Queen's Counsel, benchers of the Inns of Court, and the registrars and masters of the several divisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature at his lordship's residence, 5, Cromwellhouses, on the 3rd of November (the first day of Michaelmas Sittings), at twelve o'clock.

The Daily Telegraph states that at the Belfast Municipal Revision Court, the Mayor presiding, Messrs. E. W. Cronbelm and H. A. Johnston, barristers-at-law, were present as deputy-assessors. At the opening of the court, the deputy-assessors said they had not been paid for last year's services, and they declined to go on with the inquiry unless they were paid for last year, and guaranteed payment for the present occasion. After a good deal of discussion, the proceedings were adjourned till Friday.

At the Guildhall Police-court, on Tuesday, Edward Froggatt, who was described on the charge-sheet as of no occupation, was charged on remand "for that he being trustee of certain property, to wit £3,920 guaranteed stock of the East India Railway Company, and £4,140 guaran. teed stock of the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company, for the benefit of one Kate Walsh Fitzroy, did in the said city unlawfully with intent to defraud, convert, and appropriate the same to and for his own use and benefit contrary to the statute. After Mrs. Fitzroy and two other witnesses had given evidence, the case was again remanded for a week.

Obituary.

SIR RICHARD KINDERSLEY.

He

The Right Hon. Sir Richard Torin Kindersley, knight, who was for many years a Vice-Chancellor, died at the Clyffe, Dorchester, on the 22nd ult., at the age of eightyseven. The deceased was the eldest son of Mr. Nathaniel Edward Kindersley, of the Madras Civil Service, and be was born at Madras in 1792. He was educated at Haileybury College for the Civil Service of India, and proceeded thence to Trinity College, Cambridge, where he graduated as fourth wrangler in 1814. He was subsequently elected a fellow of his college, and in February 1816 was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn. selected the Court of Chancery, where he was very successful in obtaining business. He became a Queen's Counsel in 1835, and for many years enjoyed a large share of the leading business in the Rolls Court. In 1846 he was appointed Chancellor of the County Palatine of Durham, and later in the same year became one of the masters in chancery. Some surprise was manifested at his accepting this appointment, as he was thought to be destined for a higher position, and in 1851 he received George Turner and Mr. James Parker being appointed at from Lord Truro an appointment as Vice-Chancellor (Mr. the same time), and he received the honour of knighthood. Sir R. Kindersley achieved for himself a very high judicial reputation, as well from his accurate knowledge of legal and equitable doctrines as from the care and patience with which he applied himself to the investigation of every case which came before him. His judgments (which are reported in Drewry, and Drewry & Smale, and in the first two volumes of the equity series of the Law Reports) are all carefully composed and well reasoned. Among the most important cases decided by him may be mentioned Lord v. Colvin (7 W. R. 250, 4 Drew. 36), a domicil case (in which the delivery of the judgment occupied the whole day), and Churton v. Frewen (15 W. R. 490, L. R. 2 Eq. 634), which involved the right of the lord of a manor to use of a chancel in a church, and which was much relied upon in the recent Arundel case. In 1866, after fifteen years of judicial service, he retired on a pension, and was Sworn a Privy Councillor, but his growing deafness prevented him from giving much assistance to the Judicial Committee. Sir R. Kindersley was the oldest bencher of Lincoln's-inn, having been treasurer of the society in 1853. He was married to the daughter of the Rev. John Leigh Bennett, of Thorpe, Surrey, but was left a widower in 1864.

MR. HENRY MESSITER.

Mr. Henry Messiter, solicitor, died at Wincanton on the 9th ult. Mr. Messiter was born in 1803, and was admitted a solicitor in 1826, and had practised at Wincanton for over half a century. He had been for several years associated in partnership with Mr. George Messiter, and with his son, Mr. Herbert Messiter. He was elected county treasurer for Somersetshire in 1848, and he held that office until his death. He was also clerk to the Lieutenancy for the county, Mr. George Messiter being registrar of the Wincanton County Court, and the firm being joint clerks to the county magistrates and to the Commissioners of Taxes for the Wincanton Division. He was a perpetual commissioner for Somersetshire, and the private business of his firm was very extensive. He was also steward and treasurer of the Bruton Hospital. At the Somersetshire Quarter Sessions, held a few days after Mr. Messiter's death, the magistrates unanimously agreed to a resolution expressive of their sense of Mr. Messiter's valuable services for thirty-one years as treasurer of the county, and Mr. Herbert Messiter was appointed to act as treasurer till the next quarter sessions. Mr. Messiter was buried at Wincanton on the 16th ult.

MR. SAMUEL LEECH.

Mr. Samuel Leech, solicitor. died at his residence, Chetwynd House, Derby, on the 18th ult., after a long illness. Mr. Leech had raised himself by his own exertions from a humble position in life. He was born in 1828, and was

educated at the Derby National School. He was originally a clerk in the office of Mr. John Moss, solicitor, and was next employed by Mr. William Eaton Mousley, and afterwards by Mr. John Huish. He was ultimately articled to Mr. Edward Gamble, and was admitted a solicitor in 1860. He was for a few years in partnership with Mr. Gamble, but subsequently practised alone. Mr. Leech had at one period an extensive criminal business, and he was solicitor for the defence in the celebrated Townley case. He acted as local solicitor for the Great Northern Railway Company, and was for several years under-sheriff of Derbyshire. He was a commissioner for oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature, and a perpetual commissioner for Derbyshire. Mr. Leech had for many years taken an active part in corporation business. From 1861 till 1877 he was a town councillor for the Castle Ward, and he was Mayor of Derby for the year 1871-2. He had also been for several years one of the borough aldermen. He warmly supported all public improvements, including the extension of the borough boundaries, and the purchase of the waterworks by the corporation. His politics were Liberal, and he had acted as agent in several elections for Derby and for South Derbyshire. A few years ago he was solicited to become a candidate for the borough of Nottingham, but he declined the honour. Mr. Leech leaves a widow and several children. He was buried at Derby on the 23rd ult. Among those present at the funeral were Lord Scarsdale, Mr. Bass, M.P. for the borough, Mr. Evans, M.P. for South Derbyshire, and many members of the corporation.

Appointments, Etc.

Mr. HENRY BEAUMONT, solicitor, of Grantham, has been elected Coroner for the Grantham District of Lincolnshire, in succession to Mr. Robert Azlack White, resigned. Mr. Beaumont had acted for several years as deputy-coroner. He was admitted a solicitor in 1852, and is also town clerk, clerk of the peace, and clerk to the Commissioners of Taxes for the borough of Grantham.

Mr. CHARLES ELTON LONGMORE, solicitor (of the firm of Sworder & Longmore), Hertford, has been appointed Treasurer to the Eastern Division of the county of Hertford.

Mr. BENJAMIN BRIDGES HUNTER RODWELL, Q.C., M.P., has been elected President of the West Suffolk Chamber of Agriculture for the ensuing year.

Mr. WILLIAM SLOCOMBE, solicitor, of Reading, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for Oxfordshire and Berkshire for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women. Mr. Slocombe has also been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP.

HENRY MOORING ALDRIDGE and RISDON DARRACOTT SHARP, solicitors, Bournemouth (Aldridge & Sharp). October 7. (Gazette, October 28.)

Companies.

WINDING-UP NOTICES.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

ANGLESEA (PENMON) MARBLE QUARRIES COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Oct 21, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall on Nov 7. Philpot and Son, Bedford row, agents for Morrell and Son, Oxford, solicitor for the petitioner PATENT LIGNO MINERAL PAVING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Oct 18, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall on Nov 7. Bischoff and Co, Gt Winchester st, solicitors for the petitioners

TOWYN PIER COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Oct 20, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall on Nov 7. Steele, College hill, solicitor for the petitioner

[Gazette, Oct. 24.] EQUITABLE SPINNING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up presented Oct 7, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall on Nov 7. Cunliffe and Co, Chancery lane, agents for Darbishire and Tatham, Manchester, solicitors for the petitioner

LLANDUDNO BRICK, LIME, AND STONE COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Oct 8, directed to be heard before theM.R. on Nov 8. Walker and Co, Gresham buildings, Basinghall st, agents for Field and Weightman, Liverpool, solicitors for the petiMOKA PLANTATION COMPANY, LIMITED.- Petition for winding up. presented Oct 23, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall on Nov 7. Maples. and Co, Frederick's place, solicitors for the petitioner

Lioners

NEW CITY CLUB COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Oct 14, directed to be heard before the M.R. on Nov 8. Glynes and Co, Mark lane, solicitors for the petitioners STANSFIELD PRINTING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Oct 27, directed to be heard before V.C. Bacon on Nov 8. Milne and Co, Harcourt buildings, Temple, agents for Slater and Co, Manchester, solicitors for the petitioners TRAMWAYS CORPORATION, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Oct 27, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall on Nov 7. McDiarmid, Old Jewry Chambers, solicitor for the petitioners

[Gazette, Oct. 28.]

UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY. CHESTERFIELD AND NORTH DERBYSHIRE BANKING COMPANY.-Petition. for winding up, presented Oct 14, directed to be heard before V.C. Hall on Nov 7. White and Sons, Bedford row, agents for Shipton and Hallewell, Chesterfield, solicitors for the petitioners

MUTUAL SOCIETY.-Petition for winding up, presente1 Oct 21, directed to be heard before the M.R. on Nov 8. Linklater and Co, Walbrook [Gazette, Oct. 24.J

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED. COVENTRY WATCHMAKERS' INSTITUTION, Rose Inn, Moat st, Coventry. Oct 21 NORTH SHIELDS LOYAL STANDARD BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, Hudson st, North Shields. Oct 21

PRINCE OF WALES LODGE, Stroud District, a Branch of the Independent Order of Oddfellows, Manchester Unity, George Hotel, Nailsworth, Gloucester. Oct 21

WALFORD UNION BENEFIT SOCIETY, Spread Eagle, Walford, Hereford. Oct 21

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LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY. The first meeting of this society for the ensuing session last, the 28th ult., Mr. A. M. Ellis, L.L.B., in the chair. was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, on Tuesday Mr. Barry, in the absence of Mr. Royle, opened in the affirmative the subject for the evening's debate: "Is the policy of the Government in Afghanistan justified by recent events?" An interesting and warmly-conducted debate followed, in which Messrs. Streeten, Stirling, Jones, Helmsley, Heppell, and Neal supported the affirmative side of the question; while Mr. MacColla and Mr. T. Bateman Napier opposed it. Eventually the question was decided in favour of the Ministry by a very large majority. The society in the course of the evening elected delegates to attend the contemplated Congress of Law Students' Societies to be held on the 7th and 8th inst. The representatives chosen were Messrs. Indermaur, Ellis, and Bateman Napier.

UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.

At the meeting of the above society, held on Wednesday last, the following formed the subject for discussion: "That emigration supported by the State is the proper remedy for our excessive population." Mr. J. S. Rubinstein opened, and was followed by Messrs. Templer, McColla, and Warburton. Mr. Kelke opposed. Mr. Rubinstein having replied, and the chairman (Mr. W. C. Owen) summed up, the motion was put to the vote and carried by a majority of two. The society appointed three delegates to attend the approaching Law Students' Congress.

BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY.

A meeting of this society was held on Tuesday evening, October 21. Mr. S. Royle Shore, jun., in the chair. After the election of five new members and the appointment of Messrs. Edwards and Rogers as delegates to the Congress of Law Students' Societies to be held in London in November, a debate took place on the following moot point :-(1) “ Is a contract completed when a letter of acceptance is duly posted, though such letter, through the fault of the Postoffice, is never delivered to the person to whom it is ad

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