their kegs of white lead "Brooklyn White Lead Company," ," the defendant at first labelled his "Brooklyn White Lead, pure, 100 lbs.," and afterwards changed this to "Brooklyn White Lead and Zinc Company," and was restrained by injunction. In this case the name lastly adopted was extremely similar to that which the plaintiffs used, and the change from the former inscription testified to the defendant's animus. Besides, the application of the name to the goods sold by the parties, introduced somewhat special considerations. In the case of The London Assurance v. The London and Westminster Assurance Corporation (Limited) (32 L. J. Ch. 664), Stuart, V.C., did not think the case was one in which he would be justified in granting an injunction; and in The Colonial Life Assurance Company v. The Home and Colonial Assurance Company (Limited) (12 W. R. 783, 33 Beav. 548), Lord Romilly, M.R., refused an injunction, and said that he considered that the real object of the motion was to obtain a monopoly of the word "Colonial." Next after these cases comes one which has already been frequently cited, and which is very much referred to in practice, that of Lee v. Haley, in which Malins, V.C. (18 W. R. 181), and Lord Justice Giffard (18 W. R. 242, L. R. 5 Ch. 155), were of opinion that a limited injunction must be granted. There the plaintiffs were coal merchants, carrying on business in Pall Mall, under the name of The Guinea Coal Company," and the defendant was a former manager of the plaintiffs', who set up business in the Strand under the name of "The Pall Mall Guinea Coal Company," and afterwards, still trading under the same name, removed to Pall Mall, a few doors from the plaintiffs' establishment. The attempt was too barefaced, and an injunction was granted, but it was thought that sufficient protection would be afforded to the plaintiffs by restricting the prohibition to Pall Mall, and the injunction was accordingly limited in that respect. In Holmes, Booth, & Haydens v. The Holmes, Booth, and Atwood Manufacturing Company, two of the principal promoters of the plaintiff company left it, and established the defendant company, under a title in which their own names were again very prominent. The circumstances connected with the formation of the defendant company could not be overlooked, and the Supreme Court of Connecticut restrained the use of the two names. The list ends with four more cases which have come before the Chancery Division within the last few months, in all of which the plaintiffs failed. In The London and County Banking Company v. The Hampshire and North Wilts Bank (June 7, 1878), the Master of the Rolls declined to restrain the defendants from changing their name to that of "The Capital and Counties Bank," thinking that deception was not probable. In The Merchant Banking Company of London (Limited) v. The Merchants' Joint Stock Bank (26 W. R. 847, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 560), after dealing with the provision in the Companies Act of 1862, which will be noticed presently, the Master of the Rolls again thought that deception was not probable, and refused the motion. And it is worthy of note that he specially adverted to the fact that the plaintiff company carried on business in Cannon-street, and the defendant company had taken premises in Bloomsbury, which went far to negative the probability of an intention to appropriate the plaintiffs' business. In fact, in this respect this case may be advantageonsly contrasted with Lee v. Haley. Then in The Army and Navy Co-operative Society v. The Junior Army and Navy Stores (Limited) (January 17, 1879), again before the Master of the Rolls, the latter was of opinion that the prefix of the word "junior" to the defendants' name was quite sufficient to prevent deception, and he laid stress on the fact, peculiar to this case, of the customers of the plaintiff society belonging to a special class, since by the rules of the society they must be shareholders, or persons introduced through shareholders, and must, therefore, be well aware of the identity of the two societies. The last case is The Australian Mortgage, Land, and Finance Company v. Australian and New Zealand Mortgage Company (January 17, 1880), in which the Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of Malins, V.C., refused to interfere with the name of the defendant company, which was not so similar to that of the plaintiff company as to be likely to cause deception, besides which it was a mere description of the business done by the company, and contained no special catchword. From this review of the cases it will be seen that the measure of success attained by plaintiff companies has been very moderate indeed, and that litigation in such cases cannot be recommended unless the circumstances pointing to fraud are unusually strong. The fact is that the choice of names by which a new company can designate itself, so as to satisfy the double purpose, of describing the character of its own operations and distinguishing itself from the companies already in the field, is necessarily very limited, and the exercise of too great stringency by the courts might easily result in a monopoly of various classes of business being practically secured for the old-established companies. The 20th section of the Companies Act, 1862, to which reference was made above, is in the following terms :-" No company shall be registered under a name identical with that by which a subsisting company is already registered, or so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, except in a case where such subsisting company is in the course of being dissolved, and testifies its consent in such manner as the registrar requires; and if any company, through inadvertence or otherwise, is, without such consent as aforesaid, registered by a name identical with that by which a subsisting company is registered, or so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, such firstmentioned company may, with the sanction of the registrar, change its name." This section was fully considered by the Master of the Rolls in the Merchant Banking Company's case, in which it was much relied upon by the plaintiffs. Both companies had there been registered, the defendants' name having been selected by the registrar from several submitted to him, and the Master of the Rolls laid down that, after registration, the prohibitive provision in the clause did not apply, since that was only aimed at the registration of similar names, and that where the registration had once been effected, the Act no longer applied, and the case might be treated independently of the Act, and simply with regard to the probability of deception. The section, he explained, would prevent the registration of similar names for companies, though they carried on quite different businesses, but when such cases were brought before the court apart from the Act, there would be no equity to entitle the one to interfere with the name of the other, since the companies would not clash in their operations. It seems that the name of a company may be registered as a trade-mark under the Trade-Marks Registration Act, 1875, though, when the name was not used as a trade-mark before the passing of the Act, it would have to be "printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner." By the United States TradeMarks Registration Act, 1870, the Commissioner of Patents was prohibited from receiving and recording any proposed trade-mark which was "merely the name of a person, firm, or corporation only," but this prohibition was qualified by the proviso that the section should not prevent the registry of any lawful trade-mark rightfully used at the time of the passing of the Act." Under this proviso it has been decided (In re India Rubber Comb Company, 8 U. S. Off. Pat. Gage, 905; In re Rubber Clothing Company, 10 Ib. 111) that the names of corporations may be registered when they were in actual use as trade-marks on July 8, 1870. It is true that the American Trade-Marks Registration Act has been recently declared by the Supreme Court of the United States to be void, as having been enacted out side the limits set for the Legislature by the Constitution of the United States; but it seems probable that steps will, before long, be taken by which the Act will be substantially re-enacted. Reviews. TORTS. WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES; BEING A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS. By C. G. ADDISON. FIFTH EDITION, by LEWIS W. CAVE, one of her Majesty's Counsel. Stevens & Sons. Thus, at Mr. Cave has re-arranged his matter, and by omitting the parts of the last edition which related to questions of pleading and the rights and duties of bailors and bailees inter se, the duties of carriers in conveying goods, and distress for rent, he has considerably diminished the bulk of the present edition. The arrangement of the matter on the single basis of the nature of the right infringed is an unquestionable improvement in the framework of the book; the next matter needing reform is the mode of filling up this framework. We cannot say we are altogether satisfied with the mode in which some of the recent cases have been dealt with. p. 338, Hurdman v. North-Eastern Railway Company (26 W. R. 489), is treated as if it involved the same considerations as Fletcher v. Rylands (L. R. 3 H. L. C. 330). The well-known statement of principle in the last-mentioned case is first cited: "A person who, for his own purposes, brings upon his land, and collects and keeps there, water in such quantities as to be likely to do mischief if it escapes," &c., and then follows the decision in Hurdman's case, introduced with a "Thus if any one," &c. Now, it is to be observed that in Hurdman's case the defendant did not bring upon his land, and collect and keep on his land any water. Again, on p. 333, the doctrine in Fletcher v. Rylands prefaces a statement of the decision in Firth v. Bowling Iron Company (26 Surely some attempt should have been made to point out that the bearing of this case on Fletcher v. Rylands is merely to show what may be the natural consequences of the escape of dangerous or noxious matters maintained on lands, on to a neighbour's land. Again, the case of Western Counties Manure Company v. Lawes Chemical Manure Company (23 W. R. 5) should, we think, have been made the subject of a separate head, "Slander of Goods," following Slander of Title, instead of being mentioned in the first chapter. We observe with some surprise that no mention is made of Angus v. Dalton (27 W. R. 623); this case should, at least, have been cited as supporting Bower v. Peate (L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 321). We are bound, however, to say that, on the whole, the work has been brought into a better shape than any in which we have formerly known it, and that the effect of the statutory changes has been noticed with care. W. R. 558). STONES JUSTICES' MANUAL. THE JUSTICES' MANUAL; OR, GUIDE TO THE ORDINARY DUTIES OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, &C. By the late SAMUEL STONE, Esq. The TWENTIETH EDITION. Edited by GEORGE B. KENNETT, Esq., Solicitor. Shaw & Sons. Mr. Kennett has prefixed to this edition of Stone a preface in which he deals in a very decided and useful way with some of the difficulties which have been raised on the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879. He differs from Mr. R. S. Wright's opinion that the Act has no application to rates, and points out that the Home Office is evidently of opinion that the Act extends to rates, or the circular to justices' clerks (to which we recently referred), would not have said "The Act draws distinction between the procedure for the recovery of a fines, and the procedure for the recovery of civil debts, such as rates [ss. 6, 35]; in the latter case the proceedings are of a civil nature." Mr. Kennett also, we are glad to observe, draws attention to the violation of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the Act which is involved in the appointment of the house of a magistrate as an occasional court-house. The intention of the enactment that a case shall be tried "in open court" is obviously to secure a trial in a public place where the prisoner's friends may know that he is to be tried. Turning to the body of the work, we find the provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Act carefully inserted and explained. On the subject of section 25, with regard to which some learned writers on the Act have raised a doubt whether the defendant may give evidence on oath, we observe that Mr. Kennett adopts the same view which we took, and holds that the words "as in the case of any other complaint" refer only to the liability to costs. The care and accuracy with which the book has been edited are shown by the fact that the section relating to police proceedings for penalties in relation to dogs which was embedded in the Customs and Inland Revenue Act of last session is to be found duly noticed at page 117. General Correspondence. TO CORRESPONDENTS.-All letters intended for publication in the "Solicitors' Journal" must be authenticated by the name of the writer. The Editor cannot undertake to return MSS. forwarded to him. MORTGAGE OF LAND IN NEW ZEALAND. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, As a subscriber to your journal, I shall feel obliged to you if you will inform me whether, in New Zealand, there is any land registry which requires a mortgage of land there to be registered. I am advancing to some clients in England money upon the security of their share in certain real and leasehold property in New Zealand, and am anxious to know whether, as a matter of fact, it will be necessary that the mortgage should be registered in New Zealand. The facts are that a mortgage of a share in property in New Zealand, was executed on the 20th of October, 1877, and not registered, and a further charge, indorsed on the same mortgage, was executed on the 28th of September, 1878, also not registered, and a further charge by separate deed is now about to be executed. The point is whether, if registration is necessary, the last charge can be registered without the previous mortgage and charge, or either of them, being registered. If so, what is the form required on the registration? Must there be a memorial executed here, as in registering deeds in Yorkshire, or in the Middlesex Registry, or must the original mortgages and further charges be sent to New Zealand for registration ? Manchester. 66 E. S. [The New Zealand Land Registry Act (24 Vict. No. 27) provides for the registration of mortgage deeds (section 35), and enacts (section 37) that registered charges on the same land shall take priority of all unregistered charges, and as between themselves shall rank according to the order in which they are entered in the register, and not according to the order in which they are created." It seems from the Land Registration Ordinance of 1841 that the mode of registration is to present the instrument for registration, but we can find no recent information on the subject.-ED. S. J.] Cases of the Week. GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT BY WILL-EXERCISE BY WILL OF PRIOR DATE-WILLS ACT (1 VICT. c. 26), ss. 24, 27. In a case of Boyes v. Cook, before the Court of Appeal on the 12th inst., the question arose whether a general power of appointment by will, created by a deed, had been executed by a will of prior date. In October, 1860, a husband made a will by which he devised and bequeathed his real estate and the residue of his personal estate to trustees, upon trust for the benefit of his wife and children In April, 1861, differences having arisen between the husband and wife, a separation deed was executed, by which the husband vested the bulk of his property, real and personal (the real estate to be converted into money) in trustees, upon trusts for the benefit of himself, his wife, and children. The trust as to one-third of the settled property was, to pay the income to the husband for his life, and after his death to hold that one-third upon trust for such persons as he should by will appoint. The husband died in 1875, without having revoked or altered the will of 1860, and the question arose whether that will was an exercise of the power given by the settlement. Malins, V.C., held that the power had not been exercised by the will. He was of opinion, following his own decision in the case of In re Ruding's Settlement (20 W. R. 936, L. R. 14 Eq. 266), that the court ought to have regard to the circumstances existing at the time when the settlement was executed, and that those circumstances showed that the testator could not have intended the will to be an exercise of the power. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), held that, in construing the will, the only surrounding circumstances which could be looked at were circumstances existing at the time when the will was executed, and they reversed the Vice-Chancellor's decision, holding that the will had exercised the power; thus in effect overruling In re Ruding's Settlement. -SOLICITORS, Munton & Morris; Lewis & Indermaur ; Saunders & Baker. BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE - ADJUDICATION OF Two PETITIONS HEARING OF SECOND PETITION FIRST-COLLUSION-POWER OF COURT OVER CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGSAPPEAL "PERSON AGGRIEVED 99 - BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 71-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, R. 48.-In a case of Ex parte Mason, before the Court of Appeal on the 11th inst., a question arose as to the practice in bankruptcy when two or more petitions are presented by different creditors against the same debtor. Rule 48 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, provides that "where two or more petitions are presented to the same court against the same debtor, the petition which was first presented shall be heard first; and where such first petition shall not have been served, or where the debtor shows cause against the petition, or where delay will be avoided, any other petition which has been served may be heard, and, if the court makes adjudication thereon, the court shall, after the expiration of the time allowed for appeal against the adjudication, dismiss all the other petitions upon such terms as to costs as it shall deem just.' Two bankruptcy petitions were presented in a county court against a debtor on the 18th of December, both petitions alleging as the act of bankruptcy that the debtor had filed a liquidation petition, the proceedings under which had proved abortive. The petition which was filed first was presented by a hostile creditor; the second petition was presented by a creditor for whom the same solicitor acted who had acted for the debtor in the liquidation proceedings. When he filed the second petition he knew of the filing of the first. The registrar appointed the 8th of January for the hearing of both petitions. The first petition was not served on the debtor till late in the evening of the 18th of December. Meanwhile, the second petition was served, and the debtor, under the provisions of rule 42, consented in writing to an immediate adjudication, and an adjudication was accordingly made on the second petition before the first petition had been served. The first petitioner appealed to the declaration that the order of adjudication was not to prejudice the right of the appellant to prosecute the first petition, and ordered that all proceedings under the adjudication on the second petition should be stayed until after the first petition should have been heard and disposed of. A trustee had been appointed before the appeal was heard by the Chief Judge. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held the county court judge had full jurisdiction, under rule 48, to hear the second petition first, and to make an adjudication on it. And they said that the first creditor had adopted an entirely wrong course of procedure. He had no right to appeal against the adjudication. He was not a person aggrieved by the order of adjudication within the meaning of section 71. An adjudication was the very thing he was asking for himself. What he was really aggrieved by was that the conduct of the proceedings under the adjudication up to the appointment of a trustee would be in the hands of the second petitioner and his solicitor. But that did not give him a right to appeal against the adjudication, His proper course would have been to apply to the county court judge to give him the conduct of the proceedings under the adjudication, and there was full jurisdiction to do that in a case where a second petitioner had procured the hearing of his petition first by collusion, just as the Court of Chancery was in the habit of giving the conduct of an administration decree to a creditor who had first instituted a suit, when a creditor, who had come into the field later, had obtained the applied to adjudications of bankruptcy. But, a trustee having decree by collusion with the executors. The same principle been now appointed, it was too late to give the conduct of the proceedings to the first creditor. And, as he had adopted a wrong course, he must pay the costs of both appeals. The first petition must be dismissed, but the costs of it would be allowed out of the estate of the bankrupt.-SOLICITORS, Layton & Jaques; Nash & Field. OWNER OF FORESHORE-RIGHT TO REMOVE SHINGLEDEFENCE OF THE REALM AGAINST THE SEA-PREROGATIVE AND DUTY OF CROWN.-In a case of The Attorney-General v. Tomline, before the Court of Appeal on the 13th inst., an important and apparently novel question arose with regard to the right of the owner of the foreshore to remove a natural bank of shingle which protects the adjoining land from the inroads of the sea, and as to the prerogative and duty of the Crown to preserve the realm from those inroads. The action, which was an information by the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown, and an action by the Secretary of State for War, as plaintiff, arose thus:-The Secretary for War was the owner in fee simple, in trust for the Crown, of the site of a martello tower and the inclosure surrounding it. This land immediately adjoined on one side the shore of the estuary of a tidal river. The defendant was the lord of the manor, and the owner of the foreshore. The plaintiff's land was below the level of the sea at high-water in spring tides. The land was protected from the inroads of the sea by a natural bank of shingle which formed part of the foreshore. The defendant had been removing shingle from this bank, and, sequence of the removal, the sea had overflowed the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff claimed an injunction to restrain the further removal of shingle by the defendant so as to endanger Chief Judge against the adjudication, alleging himself to be the plaintiff's land or to expose it to the inroads of the sea. a person aggrieved by it. There was evidence that the Fry, J., was of opinion (28 W. R. 76, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 214) adjudication had been obtained by collusion between the that it is part of the prerogative of the Crown, and that it is debtor and the second creditor. The Chief Judge made a consequently the duty of the Crown, to preserve the realm con from the inroads of the sea. The law must take cognizance of this duty of the Crown, though it could not enforce the performance of the duty. But, if this duty existed, it was impossible to suppose that the subject should be at liberty to destroy that which the Crown was bound to protect. His lordship, therefore, granted the injunction claimed. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), affirmed the decision on the same ground. JAMES, L.J., said that in his opinion it was the duty rather than the prerogative of the Crown to preserve the realm from the encroachments of the sea, and, if so, it was its duty to protect the land, not only by erecting artificial walls where that might be necessary, but also by keeping up the natural protection of a bank of great geological antiquity. The bank in question was, therefore, under the protection of the Royal prerogative in this sense, that any person removing the bank, so as to prevent the Crown from performing its public duty, would be doing an unlawful act, in the same way as it would be an unlawful act to interfere with an artificial sea wall which it was the duty of the Crown to maintain. Such an act would be in the nature of a nuisance, and any person who was injured by it was entitled to call upon the court to restrain it. It had been contended before Fry, J., that the defendant was only making a natural use of his land, and that, by analogy to the cases relating to mining operations, a neighbouring landowner could not complain of such a use of the defendant's land, even though the result of it was to divert water on to the plaintiff's land. And in this point of view Fry, J., was disposed to think that the defendant was justified in what he was doing. But JAMES, L.J., said that he thought the authorities as to the legal rights and liabilities of landowners in relation to subterranean works threw no light upon the case of a visible bank operating as a protection against the inroads of the ocean. The two matters were so remote that the authorities relating to the one did not supply any safe analogy as to the other. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.-SOLICITORS, W.Tindal Perkins; W. F. Stokes. 8 16 Vict. c. 83, s. 54. The question, therefore, was to be determined upon the true construction of the letters patent themselves. It was upon that construction that Elmslie v. Boursier was decided. Their lordships saw no reason to doubt the conclusions there arrived at-viz., that the sole right granted by the Crown to make, use, exercise, and vend the invention within the United Kingdom, and the right to have and enjoy the whole profit, benefit, commodity, and advantage accruing and arising by reason of the invention, included a monopoly of the sale in this country of products made according to the patented process, whether made in the realm or elsewhere. Any other construction would, in the case of any really valuable invention of a process, render the whole privilege granted by the Crown futile. At the time when patents extended only to England, an imitator would only have had to establish his factory on the other side of the border, and now such an imitator would only have to establish his factory at Boulogne or Ostend, and he would effectually deprive the inventor of the "whole profit, benefit, commodity, and advantage" of his invention. And, the more valuable the invention the more certain it would be that the prohibition in the letters patent would be thus indirectly avoided-that, is evaded. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. - SOLICITORS, Lumley & Lumley; Van Sandau & Cumming. PRACTICE-SERVICE OUT OF THE JURISDICTION-CONTRACT MADE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION-MORTGAGE OF SHIPORD. 11, R. 1.-On the 17th inst., the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Bacon, V.C., in the case of McStephens v. Carnegie (28 W. R. 385). The question was as to the propriety of an order which had been made in chambers, giving the plaintiffs leave to serve notice of the writ in the action upon some defendants who were foreigners out of the jurisdiction. The plaintiffs, McStephens & Co., were the first mortgagees of a British ship. The defendant Carnegie was the second mortgagee. In June, 1877, the ship arrived at Antwerp from the Mediterranean, with a cargo consigned to some merchants there, and after she had discharged her cargo she came to London. The consignees refused to pay the freight, and the master of the ship, on behalf of the owners, sued them in the Belgian court. An order for payment was made, and in July, 1878, the freight was paid to Ruys & Co., of Antwerp. The plaintiffs said that it was paid to Ruys & Co. as the ship's brokers; the defendant Carnegie said that it was paid to them as his agents. In June, 1877, the master of the ship had commenced an action against the owners in the Admiralty Division for wages and disbursements incurred by him on the voyage. McStephens & Co. intervened in this action, and in September, 1877, the ship was sold, and, after satisfying the claim of the master, the balance was gage. A considerable balance, however, remained due to the freight to them. They had also paid a sum of £220 for them. Their mortgage contained no express assignment of wages of the crew of the ship. By the present action they unpaid balance of their mortgage debt, and in payment of claimed to have the freight paid to them in further discharge of what they had advanced for wages. Ruys & Co. claimed to The Vice-Chancellor held that the plaintiffs were seeking to retain the freight, and satisfy a debt due to them by Carnegie. enforce a contract made within the jurisdiction, and that, therefore, rule 1 of order 11 gave jurisdiction to allow service (JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that on Ruys & Co. out of the jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal the plaintiffs' claim was not founded on contract at all, but ship, which was an incident of their ownership as mortwas founded either on their right to take possession of the gagees, or on an equitable right to contribution in respect of what they had paid for wages, and on an equitable right to the marshalling of securities. Consequently, rule 1 of order 11 did not apply. The order for service was accordingly discharged. SOLICITORS, Lyne & Holman; W. W. Wynne. PATENT-INFRINGEMENT-SALE IN ENGLAND OF GOODS MANUFACTURED ABROAD.-In a case of Von Heyden v. Neustadt, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., a uestion as to the infringement of a patent arose apparently for the first time in that court. The plaintiff was the owner of an English patent, and he manufactured and sold in England goods made according to the patented process. The defendants imported from Germany, and sold in England, goods made according to a process which was, as the court held upon the evidence, an infringement of the plaintiff's patent. Bacon, V.C., granted an injunction to restrain the defendants from thus infringing the plain-paid to McStephens & Co. in part discharge of their mortth's patent. In the course of the argument of the appeal the court suggested a doubt whether, if an English patent is granted for a process only, and that process is imitated abroad, the importation of the product so made abroad and the sale of it in England is an infringement of the patent. In delivering the judgment of the court (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), JAMES, L.J., said that it had already been decided by himself, when Vice-Chancellor, in Elmslie v. Boursier (18 W. R. 665, L. R. 9 Eq. 217), that such an importation and sale was an infringement, and that decision was approved of, adopted, and followed by the Court of Exchequer in Wright v. Hitchcock (L. R. 5 Ex. 37). Those decisions had never been questioned, and their lordships saw no ground for dissenting from them. It was true that the Statute of James only mentioned "the sole working or making of any manner of new manufacture within this realm." But that statute gave no right to the monopolies, and the 6th section, under which the Crown inventor; it was a statute for abolishing and forbidding from the operation of the Act certain patents or grants of drted in granting patents, was a mere proviso excepting privileges, which were to be "of such force as they should be if this Act had never been made, and of none other." Every | prerogative of the Crown thus saved and preserved. What patentee derived his monopoly from the ancient power and PRACTICE ARBITRATION-- AGREEMENT FOR SUBMISSION TO BE MADE A RULE OF DIVISIONAL COURT-RULE "QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION MOTION IN CHANCERY DIVISION TO SET ASIDE AWARD.-In a case of In re Lomax's Arbitration, before the Master of the Rolls on the 12th inst., an agreement was made between the parties by which all that statute, was shown by the uniform tenor of the letters patent which had been since issued, the validity of which had never been called in question, and that form of letters patent bad now been expressly authorized by the Act 15 & matters in difference were referred to an arbitrator, and it was agreed that he should exercise all the powers given by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, to a sole arbitrator, and it was provided that the submission should be made a rule "of any divisional court of the High Court of Justice." By an order made on the 31st of January, 1880, and entitled "In the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division," it was ordered that the agreement should "be made an order of this division." The arbitrator having made his award, a motion was now made before the Master of the Rolls to set it aside, and the preliminary objection was taken that the motion should have been made in the Queen's Bench Division. In support of the motion reliance was placed upon the statute, which enables the parties to agree that their submission may be made a rule of any court of record, and it was submitted that there was no court of record except the High Court of Justice, and, therefore, that the motion would rightly be made in any branch of the High Court. JESSEL, M.R., said that though the agreement would have been more properly worded if it had provided that the submission should be made a rule of the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, still that the objection to the motion was a good one, and that the parties, under the Judicature Act, could make the submission a rule of any division which they thought fit. As the submission had been made a rule of the Queen's Bench Division, he considered the application to set aside the award ought also to be made in that division, and he therefore refused the motion. As it was intimated that the motion would now be made in the Queen's Bench Division, he said he should dismiss the motion, with costs, except the costs of the evidence. -SOLICITORS, Dollman & Pritchard (for Boote & Edgar, Manchester); Pritchard, Englefield, & Co. PRACTICE-TAXATION-COSTS TO BE THOSE OF SUCCESSJUL PARTY IN ANY EVENT-INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS. -In a case of Jackson v. Wood, before the Master of the Rolls on the 12th inst., a motion was made seeking to discharge an order for discovery of certain letters alleged to be privileged, on the ground that they had been written by the plaintiff to an intended witness for the purpose of getting up evidence for his case. JESSEL, M.R., refused the motion with costs, on the ground that the affidavit in opposition to the summons for discovery was not sufficient to bring the case within Anderson v. Bank of Eritish Columbia (24 W. R. 624, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 644). It was asked by the defendant that the costs might be immediately taxed and paid, as a previous summons by the defendant had been dismissed, with costs to be at once taxed. JESSEL, M.R., said that the previous order must have been drawn up inadvertently, as his practice was now, except under special circumstances, to make the costs of all interlocutory applications those of the successful party "in any event," so as to avoid more than one taxation. The costs of the present application would, therefore, be the defendant's "in any event."-SOLICITORS, Bower & Cotton; Layton & Jaques. At PARTY-WALL-RIGHTS OF ADJOINING OWNERS-TRESPASS. -In a case of Watson v. Gray, before Fry, J., on the 11th inst., a question arose as to the meaning of the term "party-wall," and the rights of two adjoining landowners with respect to a wall which had been thus designated. The plaintiff and the defendant were the owners in fee of two adjoining houses. Each of them had acquired his property by purchase from the same common owner of both, the conveyance to the plaintiff being the earlier in date. the back of each of the houses was a yard, and the two yards were divided by a wall. The conveyance to the plaintiff contained a declaration that this wall should be and remain a party-wall. The plaintiff had commenced building a shed in his yard, and had, for the purpose of supporting the roof of this shed, placed some new brickwork on the top of the party-wall. The defendant had knocked down this brickwork. The plaintiff claimed an injunction and damages. FRY, J., said that the term "party-wall' might mean one of four things-(1) a wall of which the two adjoining owners were tenants in common; (2) a wall divided longitudinally into two moieties, one belonging to each adjoining owner; (3) a wall belonging exclusively to one of the owners, but subject to an easement in the other to have the wall maintained as a dividing wall between the two tenements; (4) a wall divided longitudinally into wo moieties, belonging to the two owners respectively, each moiety being subject to a cross-easement in favour of the other owner. If the second meaning was given to the words, this difficulty would arise, that each owner would be entitled to pare away his own moiety of the wall, and the moiety that was left might be of very little use to the other owner. And, even if the wall belonged to the two as joint tenants, it might be partitioned longitudinally, and then the same difficulty would arise. However, the cases of Wiltshire v. Sidford (1 Man. & R. 404) and Cubitt v. Porter (8 B. & C. 257) showed that the first was the primary and ordinary meaning of the words, and his lordship had come to the conclusion, on the construction of the convey. ance, that the words were used in that sense in the present case, and that being so, the cases of Cubitt v. Porter (8 B. & C. 257) and Stedman v. Smith (8 E. & B. 1) showed that the plaintiff was not entitled, without the consent of the defendant, to raise the height of the party-wall, and that the defendant's only remedy was to knock down the new brickwork. The plaintiff was therefore not entitled to the relief which he claimed.-SOLICITORS, E. Peacopp; Hope & Co. PRACTICE-NOTICE TO THIRD PARTY BY DEFENDANTORDER FOR DIRECTION-POWER OF MASTER AS TO COSTSORD. 16, RR. 18, 19, 21.-In The Yorkshire Wagon Company v. The Newport, &c., Coal Company, application was made on the 15th inst., to set aside an order of Lush, J., under the following circumstances:-The action was brought to recover possession of certain railway wagons. The defendants, on the action being brought, gave notice, under ord. 16, r. 18, of the Judicature Act, to a third party, from whom they (the defendants) had purchased the wagons, that they should hold them liable. The third party appeared, and an order was made by a master under ord. 16, r. 21, directing, amongst other things, that "all costs should be left to the discretion of the judge at the trial." The third party subsequently gave notice to a fourth party, from whom the third party had purchased and who appeared, and a similar order was made by the master with regard to the fourth party. The fourth party thereupon gave notice to a fifth party, from whom the fourth party had purchased, who likewise appeared and with regard to whom the master again made a similar order. At the trial a verdict was taken for the defendant on the evidence of the fifth party, who proved a bona fide sale to himself of the wagons by the vendor to the plaintiff, anterior to the sale of them to the plaintiff, which was a fraudulent act tried, made an order, at the trial, that the costs of the of the vendor. Lush, J., before whom the action was fourth and fifth parties should be borne by the third party. Subsequently, on the application of the third party, the learned judge made an order that the defendants should pay all the costs of the third party, including those costs of the fourth and fifth parties, which they had been previously ordered to pay. Against this order the defendants now appealed, and contended that it was ultrà vires, and if not it was wrong on the merits. The court (COCKBUKN, C.J., and LUSH and MANISTY, J.J.) granted the application, on the ground that the orders of the master leaving the question of costs to the judge at the trial, and from which he derived his jurisdic tion, were ultrd vires. The master had no power under ord. 16, r. 21, to make terms imposing costs on others than those who applied in each case under that order.-SOLICITORS, Keighley & Gething; E. Doyle; Hunt & Sons. Obituary. MR. JOHN OSTELL. Mr. John Ostell, solicitor, died at his residence, 3, Cavendish-place, Carlisle, on the 9th inst. Mr. Ostell was a native of Carlisle, and was born in 1829. He served his articles with the late Mr. Silas Saull, of Carlisle, and was admitted a solicitor in 1851. He had practised in the city of Carlisle for about twenty-eight years, and had a very good business. A few years ago he succeeded the late Mr. Daniel McAlpin in until his death. His accurate legal knowledge and the soundthe office of clerk to the city magistrates, and held that office |