recognize the existence of a tenancy on those terms · The general result of the law is, therefore, that while, in the case of leases by deed, by 32 Hen. 8, c. 34, grantees of the reversion have the same remedies against the lessees as their lessors had, and lessees have the same remedy against grantees of the reversion as they might have against the lessors, yet in the case of leases not under seal the grantee of the reversion has no remedy against the tenant unless some act has been done recognizing the continuance of the tenancy on the former terms. And while, in the case of a lease under seal, the assignee of the lease can sue the lessor upon all covenants which run with the land, the assignee of a lease not under seal cannot enforce against the landlord agreements connected with the tenancy, unless he can show that the landlord has, since the assignment, recognized the continuance of the tenaney on the former terms.

The Bill proposes to deal with this matter by providing that rent reserved by a lease, and the benefit of every lessee's covenant having reference to the subject-matter thereof, and every condition of re-entry and other condition shall be annexed to and go with the reversionary estate immediately expectant on the term in the lease, and shall be capable of being recovered, enforced, and taken advantage of by the person from time to time entitled, subject to the term, to the rents and profits of the whole or any part, as the case may require, of the land leased. The effect of this will be to enable the grantee of the reversion on a lease not under seal, to take advantage of the remedies which were open to the grantor.

The next clause proposes to annex to the reversion the obligation of a covenant entered into by a lessor with reference to the subject-matter of the lease, and to enable it to be taken advantage of and enforced by the person in whom the term is from time to time vested. And the following clause (clause 14) enlarges the provisions of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 3, by providing that, notwithstanding the severance by conveyance, surrender or otherwise of the reversionary estate in any land comprised in a lease, and notwithstanding the avoidance or cesser in any other manner of the term granted by a lease as to part only of the land comprised therein, every condition contained in the lease shall be apportioned, and remain annexed to the severed parts of the reversionary estate.

It is stated that on the 5th inst., separate motions were brought before the Master of the Rolls against no fewer than four solicitors practising in London, calling upon them to answer by affidavit charges of alleged detention of clients' moneys. The Master of the Rolls said he was shocked to find so many applications of this painful nature being made.

On Tuesday week, at the Central Criminal Court, William Henry Stephens, solicitor, pleaded guilty to forging three promissory notes for £2,000 each.-According to the statement of Mr. Poland, the prisoner was in practice for thirty years at Bedford-row, and lately as a Parliamentary agent at 45, Parliament-street, Westminster. For some time he acted as solicitor to Mr. Seth Apcar, of Lancaster-gate, Indian merchant, and one of the directors of the National Bank of India. It was this gentleman's name that the prisoner forged to the notes which he issued, defrauding the Bank of England of £40, Mr. Morris, of Regent-street, money-lender, of £1,700, and Mr. Thompson, law stationer, of Chancery-lane, of £500.-On behalf of the prisoner, Mr. Grain said he was instructed to assure the court that when the prisoner discounted the bills he fully intended to repay the money he obtained upon them, having expectations

at that time of considerable sums that would have accrued

to him in the way of business. The accused felt deeply the false step he had taken and the wrong he had done; but he besought the court in passing judgment to remember that he was now, at fifty-one years of age, utterly ruined. Being asked if he had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced against him, prisoner repeated his counsel's statement that he intended to provide the money for the bills, and that he never intended any fraud on Mr. Apcar.-The Recorder passed sentence of seven years' penal servitude.

Reviews.

STEPHEN'S COMMENTARIES.

MR. SERJEANT STEPHEN'S NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. By JAMES STEPHEN, Esq., Judge of County Courts. The EIGHTH EDITION [prepared for the press by HENRY ST. JAMES STEPHEN, Barrister-atLaw]. Butterworths.

This long looked for new edition has appeared, and will doubtless before this time have found its way into the hands of numerous students. We may say at once that an examination of many parts of the book has satisfied us that it has, on the whole, been carefully brought up to the present state of the law. There are, of course, defects, but we have not found any of a very serious nature. The provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act as to fixtures ought to have been stated at p. 217 of vol. 2. A note at the foot of that page merely says, "This subject must also now be taken in connection with the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1875, in cases where that statute applies," and gives a reference to p. 513 of the first volume; but neither on that page nor anywhere else, so far as we can discover, is there any statement of these provisions of the Act. It would also have been desirable to give some account of the important general provisions of the Commons Act, 1876, instead of restricting the notice of that Act (p. 657, vol. 1) to the provisions of sections 29 and 30. The statement of the effect of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, at p. 51 of vol. 2, is imperfect, and tends to make the student suppose that the Act is intended for the protection of execu tion creditors alone. We have not found any reference to the provision of the Act-which it is certainly essential for the student to bear in mind-making instruments giving powers of distress subject to the Act. The note on p. 51 "as to the instruments included under the term 'bill of sale,' and the property to which the Act applies," should refer to section 6 as well as to sections 4 and 5. To set against these matters, however, we may observe that the whole of the part of vol. 4 relating to crimes has been carefully revised in the light of the report of the Criminal Code Bill Commission, and extracts from the observations of the commissioners are frequently given in the foot-notes. On the whole, we think the reputatation of the work will be sustained.

THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1879. THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1879, ARRANGED AND EPITOMIZED FOR READY REFERENCE BY JUSTICES AND THEIR CLERKS, &c. By EDMUND H. CHEESE, Solicitor. Waterlow Brothers & Layton.

THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1879, WITH INTRODUC TION, NOTES, RULES, AND INDEX. By H. MARTIN GREEN, Solicitor. Waterlow & Sons (Limited). THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1879, RULES, AND SCHEDULE OF FORMS, WITH NOTES. By FREDERIC GORDON TEMPLER, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Sons. Mr. Cheese's book is a cheap and convenient manual. He gives, first of all, an epitome of the Act, grouping the sections under appropriate heads, and adding occasional notes, sometimes affording useful hints to the practitioner, as, for, instance, the enumeration in the note to the civil debts sections of the chief matters falling under the new procedure. We do not, however, concur in the doubt Mr. Cheese expresses, and which we believe has been felt in other quarters, as to the construction of section 25, whether on a complaint to find sureties the defendant' can be called as a witness. The section, it and witnesses may be called, examined, and crosswill be remembered, says that "complainant, defendant, examined, and both parties shall be subject to costs as in the case of any other complaint." The words in italics, we should have thought, cannot be held to nullify the express enactment that the defendant may be called

and examined. Some of Mr. Cheese's notes criticizing the provisions of the Act may, we think, be omitted without disadvantage from a future edition. The Act is subsequently given at length, with the rules and forms, and there is a full index. Blank pages are added for noting up decisions on the Act.

Mr. Green adopts the time-honoured practice of annotating the sections in their order. Mr. Green's notes are sensible and mainly explanatory, and are more copious than those in Mr. Cheese's edition, but they are sometimes unnecessarily padded with extracts from Acts referred to in the principal Act. There are useful separate indexes to the Act and rules.

Mr. Templer's notes are brief, and consist largely of cross-references. He is wise in avoiding any lengthy introduction and, with one exception (page 18), abstaining from any expression of opinion as to the merits or otherwise of the provisions of the Act; but there is room for more explanation of the effect of some of the sections. The note on page 24 stating that the register must be in the form prescribed in the schedule is a little misleading. The form of register in part 3 of the schedule may be added to and may contain such additional particulars as magistrates or their clerks may find it convenient to enter in it, and the date of cach proceeding entered may, if desired, be inserted in an additional column instead of at the head of the page (see the Home Secretary's circular to justices' clerks of 16th December).

General Correspondence.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S BILLS.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] SIR, Very considerable interest appears to have been taken by many papers and periodicals in the above measures. The Saturday Review of the 28th ult. (page 267) contains an article on these measures, and the writer of the article appears to draw some comfort from the proposal of the Chancellor to make deeds "short and intelligible," and then asks, if such is to be the case, "How are solicitors to live ?" Lower down in the same page I see this remark :-" Experts have long been aware that the proper method of paying solicitors lay at the root of all reforms in the language of conveyancing "—thereby suggesting that deeds will always be long while solicitors are paid according to the length of the deed. I desire to draw attention to the very insignificant part the length of the deed plays in a solicitor's bill. The ordinary form of conveyance of freeholds or assignment of leaseholds (and the Bill seems to me to be chiefly aimed at this branch of conveyancing) is from eighteen to twenty-five folios in length; the purchaser's solicitor prepares the deed, and makes a uniform charge of 1s. per folio for drawing the deed. The following are the only charges in the bill relating to the length of the deed :

Drawing deed, say folios 20 Copy for vendor's solicitors Engrossing on parchment

Supposing the purchase-money be £5,000, and that a deed of ten folios (and I do not think it could be made shorter than that) would have done, the purchaser would have been at £1 less expense. Possibly, the whole of the purchaser's costs would come to £25 or £30, exclusive of stamps, the rest of the charges being made up of items necessarily incurred in investigating the vendor's title, and having nothing whatever to do with the length of the deed. There is no real point in this question about the length of deeds, and I do not think it should be said that deeds are long simply because solicitors are paid for

County Courts Bill.

Dear Sir, I am glad to see that you are interesting yourself actively in this measure, and I gladly avail myself of the first moment of leisure to respond to the invitation in the SOLICITORS' JOURNAL of last week. The bankruptcy experience of late years has shown that not many solicitors avail themselves of the privilege of practising in the higher courts. Still, in many cases the privilege has been exercised, and beneficially.

I know of no complaint that its exercise has ever been otherwise than useful. To the utilitarian that disposes of question. It seems to me to be iniquitous and absurd to hold that he whom the law considers able and competent to urge certain arguments before "A." must be stamped as incompetent to urge the same arguments before "B." But the amendment in question is, to my mind, but a small measure of justice and reform. I notice, with pleasure, the statement that the Lord Chancellor has sent to the benchers a draft of a Bill, entitling solicitors of five years' standing to proceed to the bar on passing the bar examination. I suppose the three years' probation at an Inn of Court was intended to insure a knowledge of the law, and to satisfy the authorities of the moral and social character and standing of the students. When that knowledge is vouched aliunde, when eight, nine, or ten years' study of, and practice in, the law and confidence of clients, and the respect of the community have demonstrated a man's moral and social worth, why, in the name of fairness and common sense, I ask, should an aspirant to the bar be compelled to resign what is perhaps his only source of livelihood, and wait and pine three weary years before his call to the bar?

Though these latter observations are not called for by your letter, I trust you will forgive their expression.-Yours truly, D. F. E. SYKES, L.L.B. E. Kimber, Esq.]

On the 8th inst., in the House of Commons, Sir H. James asked whether, after the announcement which had just been made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the committees on the Bankruptcy Bill and the Criminal Code Bill would continue their sittings. The Attorney-General said that with regard to the Bankruptcy Bill, he hoped the committee would be able to finish their labours before Easter, and he saw no reason why they should not do so. As to the Criminal Code Bill, he thought it would be quite useless for the committee to go on any longer.

The annual general meeting of the Barristers' Benevolent Association will be held in the Middle Temple-hall on Wednesday next, at half-past four o'clock, when Lord Hatherley will preside and several of the judges and leading members of the bar will also be present. The following gentlemen constitute the committee of management:-Mr. E. E. Kay, Q.C., Mr. H. F. Bristowe, Q.C., Sir Henry James, Q.C., M.P., Mr. M'Intyre, Q.C., Mr. Herschell, Q. C., M.P., Mr. Cohen, Q.C., Mr. Philbrick, Q.C., Mr. Locock Webb, Q.C., Mr. G. Chance, Mr. R. E. Turner, Mr. J. C. Mathew, Mr. C. J. Murch, Mr. W. W. Karslake, Mr. A. L. Smith, Mr. H. W. Elphinstone, Mr. S. Poynter, Mr. T. N. Lawrence, and Mr. R. T. Reid.

Cases of the Week.

COSTS-SET-OFF-Court of BANKRUPTCY-SOLICITOR.In a case of Ex parte Griffin, before the Court of Appeal on the 4th inst., the question arose whether costs in bankruptcy could be set off against costs in an action in the High Court. A petition for adjudication of bankruptcy had been presented by a judgment creditor against his judgment debtor, and had been dismissed, with costs to be paid by the petitioner. The judgment debtor had previously made an unsuccessful application to the Queen's Bench Division to set aside the judgment, and had been ordered to pay the judgment creditor's costs of the application. The judgment creditor applied to the Court of Bankruptcy for leave to set off the costs which the judgment debtor had been ordered to pay by the Queen's Bench Division, against the costs of the bankruptcy petition, which he himself had been ordered to pay to the judgment debtor. Reliance was placed on some cases in which, before the Judicature Act, costs in one common law court had been allowed to be set off against costs in another common law court, or against costs in the Court of Chancery (vide cases collected in Archbold's Practice, 13th ed., vol. 1, p. 643.) The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), however, refused to allow the set-off. JAMES, LJ., said that it was never the practice of the Court of Chancery to allow a set-off of costs, when it would interfere with the solicitor's lien for his costs, which, of course, it always must do, and the Court of Bankruptcy had always followed the practice of the Court of Chancery in this respect. In Hall v. Ody (2 B. & P. 28), Lord Eldon, when Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, expressed great surprise at finding that it was the practice of the Court of Common Pleas (contrary to that of the then Court of King's Bench) to allow such a set-off. He said that the practice was in direct contradiction to the practice of every other court, as well as to the principles of justice. Lord Eldon added, "In the Court of Chancery the same parties are often concerned in many suits, and I never knew the idea entertained of arranging the funds till the respective attornies were paid their costs. However, as the attorney in this case has acted with a knowledge of the practice of the court, he can have no right to claim the advantage of a more just principle."

-

He was

BANKRUPTCY-SECURED CREDITOR-SEQUESTRATION BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 12, 16-ORD. 42, RR. 2, 4— -ORD. 47. -In a case of Ex parte Nelson, before the Court of Appeal on the 4th inst., the question arose whether a creditor who had issued a writ of sequestration against his judgment debtor before the latter had filed a liquidation petition, but who had done nothing to put the sequestration in force against any specific property of the debtor, was a secured creditor within the meaning of section 16 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. Judgment for a debt was recovered in an action against the debtor in the Exchequer Division. He failed to pay the debt, and the creditor took out a judgment debtor summons against him, under section 5 of the Debtors Act, 1869, calling on him to attend and be examined as to his means of payment, and to show cause why he should not be committed to prison for his default. He made default in attending on this summons. entitled to a legacy under a will, and the creditor issued a writ of sequestration against him out of the Exchequer Division, in the form No. 10 given in Appendix F. to the Judicature Rules of 1875. Notice of the issue of this writ was given to the executors of the will, and a copy of the writ was served on them. They admitted that they had in their hands, on account of the debtor, an unpaid balance of the legacy. The debtor filed a liquidation petition, but before it was filed the creditor had done nothing more to put the sequestration in force. It was contended that the issue of the writ, coupled with the notice given to the executore, bound the balance in their hands, and gave the creditor a charge upon it. The court (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that this was not so, but that the creditor was in no better position than if he had obtained a garnishee order nisi, and had not served it on the garnishee. Their lordships also expressed considerable doubt whether a sequestration could be properly issued for the mere purpose of enforcing a judgment for a debt.

The

INJUNCTION-LIGHT AND AIR-VACANT SITE OF OLD BUILDING WITH ANCIENT LIGHTS-INJURY TO SALEABLE VALUE. On the 5th inst. the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) reversed the decision of Hall, V.C., in the case of The Ecclesiastical Commissioners for City of London had been pulled down in 1879. The site of England v. Kino (ante, p. 347). An ancient church in the it was, by a recent statute, vested in the plaintiffs as trustees for sale. The defendant had recently pulled down some old buildings which had stood on some adjoining land, and was erecting new buildings which were intended to reach & considerably higher elevation than the old ones. plaintiffs claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant "from erecting or raising on the site of the old buildings any erection or building so as to darken, injure, or obstruct church, so far as such lights may occupy the same positions any lights of any building to be erected on the site of the as the ancient lights of the plaintiffs' premises, as the same were enjoyed previously to the taking down of the said old buildings." Hall, V.Č., held that the plaintiffs, not being injunction could not be granted to prevent a possible then in the actual enjoyment of their ancient lights, an injury to the saleable value of their property for building purposes. The Court of Appeal were of opinion that there was no reason why the owner of a dominant tenement, which had been pulled down, should not be entitled to an injunction to restrain an interference with the easement of light and air which he had enjoyed in respect of his former tenement, unless he had actually abandoned the easement. And their lordships said that the point was actually decided by the late Lord Justice Giffard in the case of Staight v. Burn (18 Vice-Chancellor. W. R. 243, L. R. 5 Ch. 163), which was not cited to the

MORTGAGE DEBT-INTEREST-MORTGAGE DEED WITHOUT COVENANT FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST AFTER DEFAULT IN PAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL AT TIME APPOINTED-RATE OF INTEREST ALLOWED.--In a case of In re Roberts, before the Court of Appeal on the 10th inst., the question arose what rate of interest ought to be allowed on a mortgage debt under these circumstances :-The mortgage deed contained a covenant by the mortgagor to pay half-a-year's interest on the mortgage debt, at the rate of ten per cent. per annum, at the expiration of six months from the date of the deed, and to pay the mortgage debt, with another half-year's interest on it at the same rate, at the expiration of twelve months from the date of the deed. But the deed did not contain any covenant to pay interest on the debt after the expira tion of the twelve months. The mortgagee was seeking to prove for the debt, with interest, in an action for the adminis M.R., BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the mortgagee tration of the estate of the mortgagor. The court (JESSEL, was only entitled to interest at five per cent. after the expiration of the twelve months. But their lordships did not decide whether the mortgagor could or could not have redeemed the mortgaged estate on the terms of paying interest on the debt at a less rate than ten per cent.

BANKRUPTCY-SECURED CREDITOR-FOREIGN ATTACH MENT IN MAYOR'S COURT OF LONDON-BANKRUPTCY ACE, 1869, ss. 12, 16.—In a case of Levy v. Lovell, before the Court of Appeal on the 8th inst., the question arose whether a creditor who has issued an attachment in the

Mayor's Court of the city of London, against moneys owing from a third person to his debtor, acquires thereby a security on property of his debtor within the meaning of sections 12 and 16 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. Bacon, V.C., held (27 W. R. 428, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 220) that he does. Hall, V.C., adopted the same view in In re London Cotton Mills Company (25 W. R. 109), but a contrary view was taken by Lord Romilly, M.R., in Redhead v. Walton (29 Beav. 521), and by Lusb, J., in Richter v. Laxton (27 W. R. 214). The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the latter view was the correct one, and that the attachment did not give the creditor who had issued it any security on property of his debtor. BRETT, L.J., said that the attachment could not be pleaded as a defence to an action by the debtor in one of the superior courts against the garnishee to recover the money in his hands, and Smidt v. Ogle (6 Taunt. 74) showed that the superior court would not, because of the attachment, stay the proceedings in the action before it.

In re Wilkins (L. R. 8 Q. B. 107) showed that the attachment was discharged by the surrender of the defendant before judgment in the action in the Mayor's Court, and that the defendant could only be kept in custody until judgment. And the court held that the attachment was in truth only a process to compel a defendant who was not within the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court to come in and submit himself to the jurisdiction. It was true, as Brett, L.J., said, that if the attachment was served on the garnishee, and the defendant did not appear at all, and the garnishee did not dispute that the alleged debt was due from him to the defendant, the plaintiff would obtain payment of his debt by means of the debt due from the garnishee to the defendant; but in order that there should be a security within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act it was essential that the creditor should be able to obtain payment of his debt out of his debtor's property, not merely in one event, but in all events. The case of a garnishee order nisi under ord. 45, r. 2, which, in Ex parte Joselyne (26 W. R. 645, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 327), and other cases had been held to create a security within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, differed from the present case for this reason: that rule 3 of order 45 expressly provides that service on the garnishee of the order nisi attaching debts due from him to the judgment debtor "shall bind such debts in his hands."

COMPANY-WINDING UP-DIRECTOR-LIABILITY UNDER GUARANTEE-ISSUING FALSE BALANCE-SHEET AND PROSPECTUS-MISFEASANCE-COMPANIES ACT, 1862, s. 165.-In the case of In re Railway Accident Mutual Assurance Company, before the Master of the Rolls on the 6th inst., the directors had given a guarantee for certain limited purposes, but had inserted the amount of their liability under their guarantee in certain balance-sheets and also in a prospectus issued by them, as part of the general assets of the company. The liquidator now applied that they might contribate the amount of their guarantee to the general assets, on the ground that they had been guilty of a misfeasance under the 165th section. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the directors were bound to make good the representations they had made by the statements in the balance-sheets and prospectus, and were estopped from denying their liability. He also considered that he had power to order them to pay the amount to the general assets under the 165th section. The directors, in his opinion, had, by issuing the balance-sheets and prospectus, been guilty of a misfeasance within the meaning of that section "in relation to the company." Whatever might subsequently be done with the moneys paid, he thought that he could order the sums to be paid to the general assets. He therefore made an order upon the directors to contribute the amount of their respective guarantees, and to pay the costs of the application.

SALE OF BUSINESS-SOLICITING ORDERS FROM OLD CUS. TOMERS INJUNCTION-In the case of Ginese v. Cooper, before the Master of the Rolls on the 5th inst., the defendants had sold their business to the plaintiff under an agreement by which he was to be entitled to use their names for two years, and afterwards to call himself successor to them. The business was that of stone merchants, and was carried on in several places, and had been got together by the defendants during some years. The defendants, after the two years, started in business again, though under a different name, and had solicited orders from their old customers, considering that they were only bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of their connection daring that period. When the plaintiff had purchased the business the defendants had sent out circulars stating the fact to their customers. The plaintiff now moved for an injunction to restrain them from taking any of their business from him, and relied on Labouchere v. Dawson (L. R. 13 Eq. 322). The defendants contended, on the authority of Crutwell v. Lye (17 Ves. 335) and Churton v. Douglas (John. 174), that they were not prevented from soliciting the old customers. JESSEL, M.R., said that what had been sold was the connection of the defendants' business as stone merchants, and which to a great exetnt was a business depending upon personal con

nection, and, in his opinion, what they had been doing was an attempt to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of the thing sold to him. In his view, Labouchere v. Dawson had decided they could not do so, and in a strictly personal business-e.g., that of a dentist or a photographer -he might say he thought no court would permit a man to set up in business next door, or, it might be, in the same house, and so take the whole benefit of a thing that had been sold. The authorities that had been cited for the defendants did not apply to the present case, and, in his opinion, what they were doing was a fraud upon the plaintiff, and he should therefore grant an injunction to restrain them.

PRACTICE-SOLICITOR-ORIGINAL

PETITION-PERSONAL

SERVICE OF ORDER-SERVICE OF NOTICE OF MOTION FOR ATTACHMENT.-In the matter of In re a Solicitor, before the Master of the Rolls on the 5th inst., an order had been made on an original petition for the delivery of certain documents of title by the solicitor. This order was served personally upon him, and on his disobeying the order, a motion for attachment was made, and the notice of motion was served by being left at his residence. The solicitor did not appear, but a question was raised whether the notice of motion ought not also to have been served personally. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion, following the ratio decidendi in Browning v. Sabin (L. R. 5 Ch. D. 511), that personal service even in a "matter" of the notice of motion for attachment was unnecessary, and he therefore gave leave to issue the attachment.

PRACTICE-JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION-ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF LAND-DECLARATION OF TITLE-RULES OF COURT, 1875-Ord. 17, R. 2.-In the case of Gledhill v. Hunter, before the Master of the Rolls on the 5th inst., a motion was made by the defendant to stay all further proceedings in the action, on the ground that the causes of action had been improperly joined under ord. 17, r. 2, without the leave of the court. By the writ the plaintiffs claimed a declaration that, as trustees of a will, they were entitled to the rents and profits of certain freehold premises, a declaration that any lease of the premises had been executed under a mistake of title, for a receiver of the rents, an injunction to restrain the defendant from receiving the same, for an account and payment of past rents, costs, and general relief. The defendant, in support of his motion, relied on Whetstone v. Dewis (24 W. R. 93). JESSEL, M.R., in reference to that case, said that it could not be taken to be a final exposition of the law on the point, as it was merely an application for leave to join the causes of action; it was made ex parte and within three weeks after the new Act had come into operation, and before its provisions had been fully considered, and he must decline to treat it as a binding judgment. In his opinion, an action for the recovery of land was entirely distinct in character from one for a declaration of title, and he thought that the various provisions in the rules as to the former action were simply to replace the peculiarities and difficulties in reference to the old action of ejectment. This was clear from the provisions of ord. 13, rr. 7, 8; ord. 30, r. 11; ord 19, r. 15; ord. 29, rr. 7, 8; ord. 12, rr. 18-21; which all applied to the old action of ejectment. In the forms of indorsements of writs in the fourth schedule of Appendix A., there was a distinct form for the action to recover possession of land, called in the margin an action of ejectment and an action to establish title to lands and to recover rents, and there was, moreover, a note that the two latter forms might be joined together, showing that an action for a declaration of title was not treated as an action for the recovery of land within the rule. Forms 24 and 25 of the pleadings given in Appendix C., were the only forms given for the recovery of land, and these were simply for possession of the land. It was clear from the general scope of the rules and forms that an action for the recovery of land was simply an action for the possession of land or the old action of ejectment, and, therefore, that an action for a declaration of title did no fall within the rule. He therefore refused the motion, with costs.

PUBLIC NUISANCE-PARTICULAR DAMAGE TO INDIVIDUAL -OBSTRUCTION OF HIGHWAY-INTERFERENCE WITH ACCESS TO HOUSE DAMAGESLoss or CUSTOM IN TRADEREMOTENESS-DAMAGES ACCRUED AFTER ISSUE OF WRITLORD CAIRNS' ACT (21 & 22 VICT. C. 27), s. 2.-In a case of Fritz v. Hobson, before Fry, J., on the 4th inst., the question arose whether damages could be recovered for loss of custom in the plaintiff's trade, resulting from an obstruction to the access to his shop from the highway in front of it, which had been occasioned by some building operations carried on by the defendant. The action was commenced while the defendant's operations were in progress, and the plaintiff claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from obstructing the access to his shop, and damages for loss of custom in his trade, which, as he alleged, had resulted from the acts of the defendant. Before the trial the defendant's operations had been completed. Upon the evidence FRY, J., held that the defendant had made an unreasonable use of the highway, and had improperly obstructed the access to the plaintiff's shop, and that the plaintiff's trade had suffered in consequence. But it was urged, on behalf of the defendant, that damage resulting from the loss of possible customers was too remote, reliance being placed on the case of Ricket v. The Metropolitan Railway Company (15 W. R. 937, L. R. 2 H. L. 175), as an authority to that effect. FRY, J., held that, whether on the ground that the plaintiff had suffered particular damage by a public nuisance, or on the ground that his private right of access from the public highway to his house had been improperly interfered with, the plaintiff was entitled to succeed. He said that the cases of Rose v. Groves (5 M. & G. 613) and Lyon v. The Fishmongers' Company (25 W. R. 165, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 662) were authorities in favour of the latter view, and Iveson v. Moore (1 Lord Raym. 486) and Benjamin v. Storr (22 W. R. 631, L. R. 9 C. P. 400) in favour of the former. The case of Ricket v. The Metropolitan Railway Company was only an authority that, when the obstruction was at a considerable distance from the plaintiff's house, and was merely of a temporary nature, and the injury which he suffered was suffered only in common with a large number of other persons, he could not recover damages for a loss of possible customers. It was no doubt essential, as was said by Brett, J., in Benjamin v. Storr, that the injury should not be merely fleeting or evanescent, but substantial. It was perhaps not easy to say what the meaning of "fleeting" was. But his lordship thought that nothing could be fleeting which resulted in substantial damage. The injury was to be measured by its effect rather than by its duration. Another question was whether the plaintiff could recover all the damages which he had sustained down to the trial, or whether he could recover only the damages which he had sustained down to the time when the writ was issued. FRY, J., said that it was unnecessary for him to say whether, in an ordinary case, the court could assess damages accrued after the issue of the writ. In the present case the court had jurisdiction, under section 2 of Lord Cairns' Act, to give damages in substitution for an injunction, and no damages could be an adequate substitute for an injunction unless they covered the whole area which would have been covered by the injunction. There was no difficulty in ascertaining the amount of damages, inasmuch as the nuisance had come to an end before the trial. It would be highly inconvenient, as well as inconsistent with the Judicature Act, to leave the plaintiff to bring a second action for the damages accrued since the issue of the writ. His lordship thought that the case of Davenport v. Rylands (14 W. R. 243, L. R. 1 Eq. 302) was a distinct authority that, in such a case, the court could assess damages down to the time of the determination of the wrong, and he should gladly follow it. Accordingly his lordship awarded the plaintiff £60 damages for the injury to his trade by loss of customers.

The Scottish Journal of Jurisprudence announces that Mr. Norman Macpherson, advocate, LL.D., has been appointed Sheriff of Dumfriesshire and Galloway, in room of the late Mr. Mark Napier. Mr. Macpherson was called to the bar in 1851, and has frequently been called on to fill important though temporary appointments, such as secretaryships and chairmanships of Royal Commissions and such like. In 1865 he was elected by the Faculty of Advocates Professor of Scots Law in the University of Edinburgh, the duties of which he still continues to discharge.

Return compiled from the judicial statistics of the several years from 1866-1878, showing the number of equity suits and proceedings in county courts, and the amount of the money at stake, and the costs and fees.

F

349

7769606336999

12029065

£

1866

814

126,260

4,988

1867

601

79,963

5,902

1868

679

87,101

5,192

1869

93,779

4,898

1870

87,804

4,849

1871

116,602

4,499

1872

103,491

5,199

1873

91,972

129 1 6

4,355

3,086

1874

98,287

5,738

3,383

1875

104,794

4,030

,014

1876

94,928

3,776

1877

85,950

3,801

97,953

4,035

2,400

Year.

F

PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION

DUTIES.

THE following are the resolutions agreed to by the House of Commons on Friday week in Committee of Ways and Means, on the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, upon the subject of stamp duties on probate, letters of administration, and inventories :

"1. Resolved, That, towards raising the supply granted to her Majesty, in lieu of stamp duties now payable upon probates of wills and letters of administration in England and Ireland, and upon inventories to be exhibited and recorded in any Commissary Court in Sootland, there shall be charged and paid the following duties (that is to say):

"Where the estate and effects for or in respect of which a probate or letters of administration shall be granted, or whereof an inventory shall be exhibited and recorded, exclusive of what the deceased shall have been possessed of or entitled to as a trustee for any other person, and not beneficially, shall be