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But in Baker v. Gray (24 W. R. 171, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 491), Vice-Chancellor Hall, whose experience in conveyancing made his opinion on such a point of great value, though he felt bimself bound by the decision, disapproved the principle on which, in their lordships' opinion, the judgment, as reported, was based. With all respect for the Lords Justices who decided Tassell v. Smith, their lordships thought they did not sufficiently consider that they were allowing a subsequent act of a vendor to defeat the right acquired by the purchaser from him. The principle laid down by their judgment would enable any settlor or vendor of an equity of redemption to throw a burden on those interested under the settlement or purchase, and practically to defeat the settlement or sale, by a subsequent mortgage of an entirely different estate to secure a sum far beyond its value, which the mortgagee would be induced to advance in reliance on his right to consolidate it with the mortgage of which the equity of redemption had been settled or sold. As a rule the present Court of Appeal ought to treat the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Chancery as binding authorities, but it was at liberty not to do so where there was a sufficient reason for overruling them. As the decision in Tassell v. Smith might lead to consequences so serious, their lordships thought that they were at liberty to reconsider and review the decision in that case as if it were being re-heard in the old Court of Appeal in Chancery, as was not uncommon. In their opinion, the principle on which the rule as to consolidation of securities was based was misapplied and, to some extent, departed from in that case. They therefore declined to follow that decision so far as it authorized a subsequent mortgage effected by a vendor to be consolidated as against a purchaser from him of the equity of redemption of another estate.

EASEMENT-WAY OF NECESSITY-RESERVATION-EXTENT OF IMPLIED GRANT.-In a case of Mayor of London v. Riggs, before the Master of the Rolls on the 23rd inst., an important question arose as to the extent of a way of necessity the court would imply as reserved to the grantor of certain land where he retained land entirely enclosed by the other land sold by him. It appeared that the plaintiffs had purchased a tract of land from the defendant Heathcote, but he had kept a small piece entirely surrounded by the land sold by him, and which, at the time of the grant to the plaintiffs, was used for agricultural purposes only. The defendant Heathcote subsequently leased the land to the defendant Riggs, who now proposed to erect a house of refreshment upon it, and so required the plaintiffs to give him a right of way for more than agricultural purposes. The plaintiffs commenced this action for a declaration that the defendants were entitled only to a way of necessity for agricultural purposes, and the defendants demurred to the statement of claim. The question was argued what right of way the defendants were entitled to-whether such a right of way as was sufficient for the necessity at the time of the grant, or to a general right of way so as to be sufficient for any purpose the defendants might put the land to. JESSEL, M.R., said that whatever his decision was, he was making new law as, notwithstanding the number of cases that had been referred to, he could not find that the point was covered by authority, or even, in fact, that it had been seriously dis cussed in any case. It was laid down in numerous cases that the only case in which a man could derogate from his own grant was in the case of a way of necessity. According to the old pleading rules, such way of necessity must be pleaded as a re-grant by the grantee, and the question was, What was the extent of the re-grant? The only scintilla of authority on the subject were some observations of Lord Cairns, in Gayford v. Moffatt (L. R. 4 Ch. 133), from which he gathered that the way of necessity must be suitable for the necessity at the time the grant was made. Trying the question on principle, and treating it as an exception to the grant, why should the exception be larger than the necessity required? The object of the presumed re-grant was that the grantee should occupy and derive the same benefit from the land as he did at the time of the grant. In his opinion, in the present case, the grantor would only be supposed to reserve himself such a right of way as would enable him to enjoy the thing as it then was, as, if he did more, the result would be to enable him to enjoy his property as if he had a general right of way over the land sold by him. If the grantor had desired to reserve to himself more than was necessary for his enjoyment of the

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property as it was, he should have made an express reservation in his conveyance, and not having done so, he was not entitled to more now. He therefore overruled the demurrer, with costs.

TRADES UNION ACT, 1871, s. 4-EXPULSION OF MEMBER OF TRADE UNION-RIGHT TO SUE-INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHT OF PROPERTY-OBJECTS OF ACT-JURISDICTION.-In a case of Rigby v. Connol, before the Master of the Rolls on the 24th inst., a question arose as to the right of a member of a trade union to sue, in respect of an alleged wrongful expulsion from the union. The plaintiff had been a member of the union for twenty-seven years, but in consequence of his son having gone to work with a certain firm, contrary, as was alleged, to the rules of the union, the plaintiff was fined, and on his refusal to pay the fine, or take his son away from the shop objected to, the committee expelled him from the union. The plaintiff now brought this action, seeking to have it declared he was entitled to participate in the benefits of the union, and for an injunction to restrain the defendants from excluding him from such participation. A preliminary objection was taken to the plaintiff's right to sue, either under the Act of 1871, or otherwise, and this question was accordingly argued. By section 3 of the Trades Union Act, 1871, the purposes of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be unlawful, so as to render void or voidable any agreement or trust. By section 4, nothing in the Act" shall enable any court to entertain any legal proceeding instituted with the object of directly enforcing or recovering damages for the breach of any agreement" (inter alia) for the "application of the funds of a trade union to provide benefits to members." JESSEL, M.R., said he must give an opinion on the construction of the Trades Union Act which he could not find was covered by any authority. The first question he would consider was what was the ground on which the courts interfered in the case of a club or society. The ground recognized in all the cases had been a right of property, which right had been interfered with. If an association, whether for social, or scientific, or charitable objects, had no property attached to it in which the members were interested, the court did not interfere at the instance of any member. The court would not, in fact, enforce any contracts which were merely personal, such as, for instance, those between master and servant. On a question of this sort, therefore, a plaintiff to succeed must show that he had a right of property which was taken away or interfered with. In the present case the plaintiff did not state in his claim that the union had any property whatever, and that of itself was a fatallobjection to his action. But even if he had alleged that the union had any property, as they in fact had, the result must have been the same. The property they had was apparently the proceeds of the subscriptions of members which were, according to the rules, applicable to two classes of purposes-first, benefit purposes; and, secondly, strictly trade purposes; and the funds were to be applied towards both. The plaintiff had undoubtedly a right to participate in the benefit purposes if he adhered to the rules. Now, in his claim he asked for a declaration of his right to participate in the benefits of the union, andthese benefits, in fact, arose from the subscriptions to the uuion-in other words, the subscriptions were its only property. The next question was, How did the Act of Parliament affect his right to sue? The object of the Act primarily was, no doubt, to give trade unions a legal status so as to enable them to prosecute their treasurers and secretaries who had defrauded them. Another object was to enable the unions to sue and also to hold property, but it was not intended that contracts entered into by the members inter se should be made legal, so as to enable the members to come into a court of law to enforce them. The result would have been to reduce workmen to a state of bondage if their contracts as to working could be enforced against them. The 4th section was intended to prevent the Act giving the court jurisdiction to entertain proceedings in reference (inter alia) to the application of the funds of a union providing benefits for members. This was exactly what the plaintiff asked by his claim, and his lordship was, in fact, asked by the plaintiff to give him specific performance of thecontract contained in the rules, and this, in his opinion, the Act did not enable him to do. Then the only remaining question was whether, as the Act did not give him the power, he had power to entertain the application inde

pendently of the Act. Without the Act, however, the union was clearly unlawful, as nearly all the provisions in their rules were in restraint of trade. Without the Act the rules were clearly illegal, and the plaintiff could not come into court for any aid to enforce an illegal contract. He did not think the Legislature had intended that any member of these trade unions should invoke the aid of the courts, and in his opinion that was not only the fair construction of the Act, but also its manifest meaning. The plaintiff's case failed on all grounds, and, he must, therefore, give judgment for the defendants, with costs.

bare feet on the sea-shore, with a spade in one hand and a bucket in the other, the spade in each case being placed across the shoulder. The dress and attitude of the two figures were, however, different, and there were some other differences. The evidence of the defendant, which was uncontradicted, proved that his chromo-lithograph had been copied from a photograph published in New York, and that neither the defendant nor the artist whom he had employed had seen or heard of either the painting or the engraving until after the chromo-lithograph had been produced. There was no evidence to show under what circumstances the photograph had been produced in New York. FRY, J., held that the assignment to the plaintiff was either a limited SOLICITOR AND CLIENT-VERBAL RETAINER-CONFLICT-assignment of the copyright of the painting for the ONUS ON SOLICITOR.-In a case of Wilson v. Emmerson, purpose of making an engraving of one size, or a before the Master of the Rolls on the 13th inst., a question licence to copy the painting for that limited purpose arose whether a solicitor could prove his retainer under the only, leaving in the original proprietor of the copyright of following circumstances. It appeared that he had no written the painting the right to make copies of it in any other retainer, but he deposed that he had received a verbal remanner, and of any other size, a right which he could tainer, although there was, in his lordship's opinion, no assign to any other person. And, by section 11 of the Act entry in his diary or any other book referring thereto. The (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45), the registration was only made prima question arose on a motion to make the solicitor pay the costs facie evidence of proprietorship, which was capable of being of proceedings instituted by him without authority. The rebutted, and in the present case the prima facie evidence retainer was denied, and the solicitor only said that he was was rebutted by the very terms of the assignment to the instructed to take the necessary steps to protect the client's plaintiff. The plaintiff was, therefore, the proprietor only interests. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion there was of the copyright of the engraving. The evidence proved sufficient evidence of any retainer. It was the duty of every that the defendant's chromo-lithograph had been copied solicitor to take a written retainer from his client, but if he from the New York photograph, and assuming, as was very did not, it was still open to him to prove a parol retainer, probable, that the photograph itself had been copied or or to prove that his acting as solicitor came to the client's imitated from either the painting or the engraving, it might knowledge, and that be adopted it. That was decided in the have been just as well copied from the painting in which cases of Lord v. Kellett (2 My. & K. 1), and Atkinson v. the plaintiff had no copyright as from the engraving in Abbot (3 Dr. 251). Moreover, in the case of the solicitor's which he had a copyright, and the court would not, in the unsupported evidence, which was met by a specific denial, absence of evidence, assume that it had been copied from the in his opinion, credit must be given to the client. That was engraving. The plaintiff could not succeed unless he proved the effect of the cases of Allen v. Bone (4 Beav. 493), and that the photograph had been copied from the engraving, Wright v. Castle (3 Mer. 12). The retainer in this case and this he had not done. The action was accordingly entirely failed. dismissed.

PRACTICE

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ARBITRATION-RAILWAY PASSENGERS ASSURANCE COMPANY ACT, 1864-ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES.An application was made, by motion upon notice, to ViceChancellor Hall, on the 19th inst., In re Davey and The Railway Passengers' Assurance Company, for an order that a submission to an arbitrator might be made a rule of court. By the Act regulating the company (27 & 28 Vict. c. cxxv.), provisions are made for the reference to an arbitrator of disputed questions as to compensation for personal injuries, and in particular it is enacted (section 24) that the arbitrator may call for the production of documents, and examine witnesses upon oath, and (section 32) that the submission may be made a rule of court upon the application of either party. The present application was made, on behalf of the claimant, against the company, on the ground that the order asked was necessary in order to empower him to compel the attendance of witnesses. The motion was opposed upon the ground that it was altogether unnecessary to make the submission a rule of court, except for the purpose of taxation of costs, or the enforcement of the award, the practice being for the solicitor on either side to certify upon affidavit the names of the witnesses necessary for his client's case, and to file the list at judges' chambers (Common Law Division), when an order for their attendance was made as of course by a master. HALL, V.C., agreed with this statement as to the practice, and, considering the present motion to be unnecessary for any present purpose, he refused it, with costs.

COPYRIGHT-PAINTING-ENGRAVING-REGISTRATION- 5 & 6 VICT. c. 45, s. 11-25 & 26 VICT. c. 68, s. 1.-In a case of Lucas v. Cooke, before Fry, J., on the 25th inst., a question arose as to the rights of a person to whom the owner of the copyright of a painting has assigned that copyright for a limited purpose only. The owner of the copyright of a painting had assigned the copyright to the plaintiff "for the purpose of producing an engraving of one size." The plaintiff had registered himself at Stationers' Hall as the proprietor of the copyright of the painting, and had then published a steel mezzotinto engraving of the painting. The defendant afterwards published a chromo-lithograph, which the plaintiff alleged to be an infringement of his copyright, and he claimed an injunction and damages. Both the painting and the chromo-lithograph represented a young girl with

BILL OF SALE OF STOCK, INCLUDING FUTURE-Acquired PROPERTY-GRANTOR LEFT IN POSSESSION AND CARRYING ON BUSINESS-POWER TO GIVE A GOOD TITLE TO GOODS SOLD IN ORDINARY COURSE OF THAT BUSINESS.-In the case of the National Mercantile Bank v. Hampson, which came before the Queen's Bench Division on February 24, the plaintiff, the grantee of a bill of sale given by a farmer, claimed to recover damages against the defendant for wheat sold by the grantor to the defendant, after the bill of sale, and included in it. The claim set out so much of the bill of sale as showed that it included the whole of the farm stock and utensils, and the future-acquired property. The grantor was left in possession, and the defendant in his defence alleged that he bought the wheat in the ordinary course of trade without notice of the bill of sale. The plaintiff demurred. The court (LUSH and MANISTY, JJ.), overruled the demurrer, on the ground that where a person takes a bill of sale from a person trading of the whole of bis stock-in-trade and the future-acquired property, there is an implied authority to carry on his trade, and therefore he can convey a good title to goods sold by him in the ordinary course of that trade.

PRACTICE-COSTS-TAXATION OF-HIGHER SCALE, NOT NECESSARILY ALLOWED BECAUSE INJUNCTION CLAIMED-ADDITIONAL RULES OF COURT, 1875, ORD. 6, R. 2.-la Chapman v. Midland Railway Company, application was made in the Queen's Bench Division on Monday, the 23rd inst., to set aside an order of Field, J., at chambers, refusing to allow the costs in the action to be taxed on the higher scale provided by the Judicature Act. The order of the judge at chambers confirmed the decision of the master. The action was for trespass to land, and the writ claimed damages and an injunction. The trespass had been committed by the defendants along an occupation road, which crossed a field of the plaintiffs'. The defendants had used this road for the cart age of materials, &c., from the high-road to their line of railway during the course of its construction. The plaintiff's obtained a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from further trespass, and the question of damages for past injuries was settled between the parties. It was conterded on behalf of the plaintiffs that the action was one for a special injunction to restrain the commission or continuance of injuries to property, and was one in which such injunction

was the principal relief sought to be obtained. It was, therefore, such an action as, by ord. 6, r. 2, of the Additional Rules of Court, 1875, entitled the parties to have the costs taxed according to the higher scale. The court (LUSH and MANISTY, JJ.), without calling on the other side, held that the case was not one in which the higher scale of costs should be allowed. The class of cases enumerated in the order were those in which an injunction was claimed to restrain the commission of an irreparable and permanent injury. In the case before them the trespass was of a temporary nature, and did not come within the class of cases contemplated. The rule did not apply to all cases in which an injunction was asked for, but only to those of that particular class. It must depend upon the facts in each case whether the case came within the class or not.

THE PRISONS ACT, 1877 (40 & 41 VICT. c. 21), ss. 4, 57— EXPENSES OF CONVEYING PRISONERS COMMITTED BY JUSTICES TO PRISON NOT TRANSFERRED TO SECRETARY OF STATE.

In the case of Mullins v. The Treasurer of the County of Surrey, which was heard in the Queen's Bench Division on the 20th inst. upon a special case, the plaintiff was a police constable, and claimed the expenses of conveying to prison two prisoners committed to prison by the police magistrate sitting at Lambeth, in the county of Surrey. One prisoner was summarily convicted, and the other committed for trial. The case was a test case, to ascertain whether these expenses which, under 27 Geo. 2, c. 3, and 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, the prisoners having no means, would have been payable by the treasurer of the county of Surrey, were now payable under the Prison Act, 1877, by the Secretary of State; section 4 of that Act providing that all future expenses incurred in the maintenance of prisons and of prisoners therein shall be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament, and section 57 defining "maintenance of a prisoner," and containing a proviso that nothing in the Act shall exempt a prisoner from payment of any costs or expenses in respect of his conveyance to prison or otherwise, which he would have been liable to pay if this Act had not passed. It was argued that this proviso was useless, unless the Act transferred these expenses, whereas, in this case, the prisoner could not pay them. The court (LUSH and MANISTY, JJ.) held that the county treasurer was still liable to pay these expenses, there being nothing to transfer them in the enacting words of the Act, which only related to expenses after the prisoner was actually in prison.

COVENANT IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-VALIDITY-EXTENT -REASONABLENESS.-In a case of Roussillon v. Rousillon, before Fry, J., on the 23rd inst., a question arose as to the validity of a covenant in restraint of trade. The plaintiffs were champagne merchants, at Epernay, in France. The defendant had been for many years their traveller in England and elsewhere. He had entered into an agreement with them that, if at any time he left their house for any reason whatever, he would not establish himself, nor associate himself with other persons, in the champagne trade. The plaintiffs had ceased to employ the defendant, and he had started in London as a retail wine merchant, selling champagne and other wines. He described himself in his circulars as of "Ay, Champagne," and he placed a similar brand on the corks of his bottles. He had no establishment in Champagne, but imported the champagne wine which he sold from growers in Champagne. On behalf of the defendant it was contended that there had been no breach of the agreement, and farther, that the agreement was invalid, because the restriction imposed was more than was reasonably required for the protection of the plaintiffs' trade. And it was said that, beyond that, the cases have laid down a hard and fast rule that a covenant in restraint of trade is necessarily invalid if it is unlimited in regard to space. FRY, J., held that there is no such hard and fast rule, but that the only question is that of reasonableness. Independently of authority, he thought that such a hard and fast rule would be unreasonable, for many trades are carried on over the whole kingdom, or over a still wider area, while other trades are localized. The rule would allow a complete protection to the latter class, but not to the former. it would apply to cases where a restriction unlimited as to space would be reasonable, while it would have no opera

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tion in a case where such a restriction would be unreasonable-i.e., it would operate just where it ought not, and if it was an artificial hard and fast rule, it could be evaded by making a single exception, however small, and no exception to it could be merely colourable. His lordship thought that he ought not to hold that such a rule existed, unless it was clearly established. No doubt there were cases in which it had been said that the restriction as to space must not be universal, but he thought that in most of those cases the restriction was considered an unreasonable one. No doubt, in Allsopp v. Wheatcroft (21 W. R. 102, L. R. 15 Eq. 59), Wickens, V.C., did say that the rule was a hard and fast one. But James, V.C., took a different view in Leather Cloth Company v. Lorsont (18 W. R. 572, L. R. 9 Eq. 345); and, on the whole, his lordship held that there was no such hard and fast rale. And as to the question of reasonableness, his lordship was of opinion that, as the defendant was seeking to limit the freedom of contract, the burden was cast on him of showing that obviously beyond that which the protection of the plaintiffs' the restraint imposed by the agreement was plainly and done, and therefore he should grant an injunction to reinterests required. This he held that the defendant had not strain him from carrying on the business of an importer of champagne wine for ten years from the time of his leaving the plaintiffs' employment.

THE GOVERNMENT LAND BILLS.

THE Lord Chancellor on Monday stated, as follows, the provisions of the Bill which he has introduced with reference to the sale of settled estates:-"He would at once state the powers they proposed to give to the tenant for life as incident to his estate. They proposed that, in the first place, he should have power to sell: that where there were copy holds parcel of the estate, the tenant for life should have power to sell the copyhold so as to enfranchise. They proposed to give him power to exchange, giving or receiving money for equality of estate, and also power of partitioning, giving or receiving money in the same way for equality of exchange. The Bill proposed that those powers should be guarded in the usual way adopted to secure the obtaining of the best price at sales by auction. Now, all those powers were such as would naturally be contained in any well-drawn settlement, and were given to the tenant for life, or to the tenant for life with the consent of the trustees, or to trustees with the consent of the tenant for life. It was further proposed that certain checks should accompany those powers which were conferred on the tenant for life as being incident to the estate. So also as to leases, they proposed to grant to the tenant for life power to grant agricultural leases for twenty-one years, building leases for ninety-nine years, and mining leases for sixty years; and, further, that with the consent of the court, where in any part of the country there was a special custom existing in reference to building or mining leases, as was the case in there some parts of England, should be power given to conform to that special custom. It was, of course, necessary to make provision for securing the best rent, and to add covenants as to the buildings and as to streets and open cases spaces in where building leases were granted. It was also provided that the tenant for life should have correlative powers of taking surrenders of leases, and in the case of copyholds to grant licences to the copyholder for the purposes mentioned in the Bill. He would now state what was proposed to be done with the purchase-moneys in the cases of sales, and with the capital moneys produced by the exercise of those powers. The proposal was that they should not be paid to the tenant for life, but to trustees, not being less than two, or be paid into court; and as to the purposes to which the moneys might be applied, he would take the enumeration of them from the Bill. They were-in payment of incumbrances and redemption of the land tax; payment for any improvement of the estate authorized by the Act; payment in respect of equality of value of estate, after exchange or purchase; payment for the enfranchisement of copy hold land which was settled; payment in respect of the merging of leasehold interests in the reversion; purchase of leasehold lands and copy hold which were to be settled; purchase of freehold land and of mines and minerals; payment of

claim of any person having power to give an absolute discharge; payment of the charges incident to the exercise of the powers of the Act. Until these payments were made the money was to be invested on such security as the trustees were authorized to invest the trust money in, with powers to vary the settlement, but subject to the directions given by the settlement. These were the general purposes to which the moneys might be applied. With regard to improvements, the second of the purposes named, he would not go into them at any length, but he might state that they were twenty in number, and he believed they comprised every improvement it would be desirable to execute on any land, and their lordships would understand that these were not improvements upon particular land, but upon almost any part of any land subject to a settlement; so that the money, although arising from one portion of settled land, might be employed upon any other part of the land. The next provision in the Bill related to improvements of a different kind. It might be convenient to a tenant for life to execute improvements with his own money, and it was proposed that if he did so he might charge the land with the money so laid out, to be raised after his death and disposed of by his will. In that case it was provided that there should be a certificate of the Inclosure Commissioners to the effect that the improvements had been properly executed and were worth the money expended on them, and further, that they were continuing improvements on the land. The mention of the Inclosure Commissioners reminded him to state the provision made in one of the Bills with respect to them. The Inclosure Commissioners were board at present a having three names under Acts of Parliament-they were Inclosure Commissioners, Copy hold Commissioners, and also Tithe Commissioners; and he was sure that not one of those names represented properly the greatest amount of business they now discharged. They proposed to get rid of all those three names, and that the commissioners should in future be called Land Commissioners. The next provision of the Bill related to the settlement money at present in the Chancery Division. It was of very considerable amount-trust-money which had arisen from land taken by railway companies or for other public undertakings, money which was subject to settlement, but had not been re-invested. It was proposed that such money might be used for any of the purposes for which, if it had remained settled land, the money produced by the sale of such land might be applied to. He would state the qualifications or checks on these powers. First of all, with regard to the mansion-house on any settled land usually occupied therewith, it should not be sold or leased without the consent of the trustees of the settlement or an order of the court to that effect. There should not be, as a matter of course, the right to sell or lease under the Bill. That should not be dealt with by lease or sale without the authority of the court; and wherever the court, under this Bill, was to be invoked, a summary application should be made, and the court should, if necessary, communicate with the Land Commissioners, and the court would not give its sanction to leasing and selling the mansion-house without notice to the parties interested. Next, with regard to improvements, the check proposed was this-that none of the capital money arising under the Act was to be employed in paying for any im

provement without the certificate of the Land Commissioners, certifying that it was an improvement authorized by the Act, and that it was properly executed. He would now state the difference between existing settlements and future settlements. With regard to existing settlements, he proposed that some of the powers he mentioned should exist, but they should not be exercised without an order of court, acting with due regard to all parties concerned, and giving notice to all whom it was necessary to bring before it. In the first instance, the court should hear what the trustees had to say, and, further, notice should be given to other persons. The check with regard to future settlements was this -He proposed that the tenant for life, when about to exercise any of the powers, should inform the trustees of the settlement what he was about to do. If the trustees made no objection, the power might be exercised; if, on the other hand, they objected, the court, under a summary proceeding, would decide the question. That was a general tatement of the powers conferred by the Bill."

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We have noticed elsewhere the leading provisions of the Bill "for simplifying and improving the practice of conveyancing, and for amending in various particulars the law of property, and for other purposes. With regard to the Bill relating to the remuneration of solicitors, the Lord Chancellor said, "The next Bill related to the remuneration of sclicitors, who would no longer be paid according to the length of the deeds they prepared, a mode of remuneration as absurd as that of paying a physician according to the quantity of medicine he supplied. It was felt that it would be inexpedient to abolish one system of charging and to provide nothing in its place. It was therefore provided by the third Bill that there should be a power on the part of the Lord Chancellor, of the Master of the Rolls, and of the three chiefs of the Common Law Divisions, to make rules for the remuneration of solicitors for non-contentions business, such as settlements, by charging a commission or percentage, so that solici tors might be remunerated in the way that brokers and Such a others were upon the sale and transfer of shares. plan would be very desirable for solicitors and also for the public. Nothing could be more satisfactory to the person who was going to buy an estate than to know that if it cost £50,000 he could tell beforehand what he should have to pay a solicitor for his costs. The Bill also provided that solicitors and their clients might agree upon the remuneration for non-contentious business, but if it was a percentage it was not to exceed that fixed by the authorized scale."

The fourth and last Bill, the Lord Chancellor added, related to a somewhat different subject, the limitation of actions. In 1874, a measure was passed which made considerable change in the periods of limitation as regarded actions for the recovery of land. He proposed that an alteration should be made in the terms of limitation in other cases. An action for recovery against the administrators of an intestate's estate was now limited to twenty years, and he proposed to reduce the term to twelve. He proposed a similar reduction in the case of specialty debts, such as actions arising upon instruments under seal. The period of limita. tion in the case of simple contract debts was that fixed in the reign of James I. Considering the diffusion of knowledge, the increased facilities of communication, and the increased facilities for recovering debts by legal procedure, he thought the period of limitation might well be reduced from six years to three years. Other questions of detail were dealt with by the Bill.

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don.

3. Martin James Greener, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Dibb, Raley, & Clegg, of Barnsley; Messrs. RichardCrossman, & Prichard, of London. son & Byron, of Harrogate; and Messrs. Shum, Crossman,

to Messrs. Fairfoot & Webb, of London. 4. Richard Archer Henry Julian, who served his clerkship

5. Rhodes Kennedy Calvert, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Rawson, Best, & Son, of Leeds.

SECOND CLASS. [In alphabetical order.] Henry Benwell, B.A., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Marchant & Purvis, of London.

James Cochrane, who served his clerkship to Mr. Francis Willowes Topham, of West Bromwich.

Arthur Ross Dagg, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Duncan, Warren, & Gardner, of Londor; and Messrs. Longmore & Sworder, of Hertford.

Frederic Hall, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Freer, Hett, & Hett, of Brigg; and Messrs. Collyer-Bristow, Withers, & Russell, of London.

Frank Howl, who served his clerkship to Messrs. H. & J. E. Underhill, of Wolverhampton; and Messrs. Wilkins, Blyth, & Fanshawe, of London.

Philip Smeiton Maclagan, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Sanderson & J. R. Weatherhead, of Berwick-uponTweed; and Mr. David Wilson Darling, of the same place. William Henry Moore, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Moores & Romney, of Tewkesbury; and Messrs. Duignan & Smiles, of London.

Nicolai Christian Schou, jun., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Earle, Son, Orford, Earle, & Milne, of Manchester; and Messrs. Orford & Milne, of Manchester.

Reginald Gwynne Templer, who served his clerkship to Mr. R. W. Templer, of Teignmouth; and Messrs. Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle, of London.

THIRD CLASS. [In alphabetical order.] Alfred Cornett, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Goffey & North, of Liverpool.

John Alexander Ellerton, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Ellerton, of London; and Messrs. Withall & Comp

on, of London.

Charles Hodgkinson, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Ascroft & Sons, of Oldham.

John Mill, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Palmer, Bull, & Fry, of London.

Beaufoi Alfred Raun Drogheda Moore, who served his clerkship to Mes-rs. Roberts & Barlow, of London.

John Bamford Slack, B.A., who served his clerkship with the late Mr. Samuel Leech, of Derby; and Mr. Francis Charles Greenfield, of London.

Henry Layton Staffarth, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Whyley & Piper, of Bedford; and Messrs. Speechly, Mumford, & Co., of London.

The Council of the Incorporated Law Society have accordingly given class certificates and awarded the following prizes of books -

To Mr. Neale, the prize of the Honorable Society of Clement's-inn. Value 10 guineas.

To Mr. Gould, the prize of the Honorable Society of Clifford's-inn. Value 5 guineas.

To Mr. Greener, the prize of the Honorable Society of New-inn. Value 5 guineas.

To Mr. Julian and Mr. Calvert prizes of the Incorporated Law Society. Value 5 guineas each.

The council have given class certificates to the candidates in the 2nd and 3rd class S.

The number of candidates examined was thirty-six.
By order of the council,

E. W. WILLIAMSON, Secretary.
Law Society's Hall, Chancery-lane, London.

Mr.

LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY, The weekly meeting of this society was held at the Law Institution on Tuesday evening last, Mr. Bowen in the chair. The subject appointed for the evening's debate was, "Is it desirable to increase the number of national holidays?" and was opened by Mr. Barry in the affirmative. Neale opposed the motion, and was followed by Mr. Cooper in the affirmative. Messrs. Kirke, Napier, Bedford, Chant, Hobrow, Wright, and Ellis then spoke in the negative, and Mr. Lloyd Jones in the affirmative. question being put to the meeting was decided in the negative by a large majority.

The

UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. The annual meeting of this society was held on Wednesday evening at St. Clement's-inn Hall, Strand; Mr. Farrer Herschell, Q.C., M.P., in the chair.

The report of the committee for 1879 congratulated the members on the prosperous position of the society, and mentioned that sixty-one new members had been added to the list. The Davis Prize, for the best essay on the "Law of Joint-Stock Companies," had been awarded to the secretary, Mr. W. C. Owen.

The CHAIRMAN said that the great advantage of a debating society was that it cultivated readiness of speech, but there was danger of not developing the other faculties which Lord Bacon mentioned-that it was apt to sacrifice "fulness while it developed "readiness," and it was important also

not to lose sight of the third quality-namely, accuracy, which Lord Bacon specified. The importance of accurate thought and accurate expression could not be overrated. But in such subjects as the society was in the habit of dealing with, it was eminently adapted to cultivate accuracy and fulness as well as readiness. In politics and social questions much heat and personal feeling were present, but such elements could hardly be imported into the discussion of legal questions. The society also did useful work in promoting the examination of questions of jurisprudence as well as of existing law. They thus became accustomed to consider what the law ought to be as well as what it was. We should not be satisfied with the law as it is until it became what it ought to be. There was no study more beneficial than the comparison of our own law with that of other civilized countries. In each country there were points superior to the systems of other countries. He therefore recommended the comparison in particular cases of our own law with that of other countries; he would instance the law of bills of exchange. A great advantage of this society was that it embraced both branches of the profession, and brought them into contact with each other. He believed there was, notwithstanding its unpopularity, no class of the community more useful than the legal profession. No greater boon than an incorruptible and speedy administration of the law could be conceived. Each member, therefore, of the profession ought to have a high notion of his duties as an important trust committed to his charge.

Mr. DIGBY SEYMOUR, Q.C., in moving the first resolution, "That the meeting of practitioners and students of both branches of the profession is much to be encouraged, since by the discussion of subjects of both legal and general interest qualities are developed which are in the highest degree necessary for the practice of the profession," paid a tribute to the high position of Mr. Herschell in the profession. He referred to the historic interest attaching to the ball in which he spoke. He dwelt on the advantages to be derived from a codification of the law, and upon the reforms necessary in the laws of real property; questions which had a political as well as a legal bearing, and the importance of becoming acquainted with the principles of which would lead to a satisfactory solution of all the difficul ties involved in those questions. He would also recommend the study of legal biography as an incentive to energy and effort.

Mr. MONTAGUE COOKSON, Q.C., in seconding the resolution, referred to the loss the society had sustained by the death of Mr. Serjeant Parry.

Mr. WILLIS, Q.C., in speaking to the resolution, dwelt on the necessity of simply saying what one thought and believed and what was necessary to say, and of by all means avoiding mere eloquence and flights of oratory and of not minding the opinions of others. He recommended his audience to cultivate the habit of thinking upon their legs and avoiding prepared essays and artificial language; in fact, most of what was said in our day.

He

Mr. EDDIS, Q. C., moved a resolution that it was desirable to maintain an organized communication between the different law students' societies in the country, especially as the tendency in these days to the localization of the administration of justice might lead to a divergency of thought and even of legal decision of possibly disastrous consequence. Mr. Locock WEBB, Q.C., seconded the resolution. referred to the existence of nineteen thriving associations in connexion with the London Society. He spoke of the society as continuing the ancient practice of moots or debates in the Inns of Court and in Clement's-inn, and the other Inns of Chancery, all of which, as Coke had said, formed a legal university.

Mr. F. H. JANSON supported the resolution.

Mr. SNAGGE and Mr. BUSK having also spoken, a vote of thanks to the chairman was proposed by Mr. W. C. OWEN and seconded by Mr. Dowson.

The proceedings then terminated.

MANCHESTER LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING

SOCIETY.

The ninth meeting of the session of this society was held on Tuesday week, at the Law Library, Cross-street Chambers, when the chair was taken by Mr. Wm. Lawrence Chew, solicitor. The minutes of the last meeting having been read by the hon. secretary and passed, the chairman called upon Mr. Millar to open the debate in favour of the affirma

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