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case of his default. This was repealed, at the pressing instance of Charles the Second, by 16 Car. 2, c. 2, as being "in derogation of His Majesty's just rights and prerogative," but the repealing Act, reciting that "by the ancient laws and statutes of this realm made in the

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reign of King Edward the Third, [see 4 Ed. 3, c. 14] Parliaments are to be held very often," provided that 'the sitting and holding of Parliament shall not be intermitted or discontinued above three years at the most." The Triennal Act properly so-called, 6 & 7 W. & M. c. 2, to which William the Third for some time refused the Royal Assent, reciting that "frequent and new Parliaments tend very much to the happy union and good agreement of the King and people," provides by section 1 that "a Parliament shall be holden once in every three years at the least" (this refers to sessions), and by section 2 that writs are to be "issued within three years after the determination of Parliament for the holding of another new Parliament" (this refers to Parliaments). The 3rd section, which provides for the dissolution of any existing Parliament within three years after its being summoned, was not repealed until 1867 by the Statute Law Revision Act of that year. The two earlier sections are clearly consistent with the Septennial Act, and without them there would only be the necessities of obtaining supplies, and of keeping up a standing army, to compel the holding of a new Parliament after the Septennial Act should take effect. That Act merely provides that Parliaments "shall and may have continuance for seven years, and no longer, to be accounted from the day on which, by the writ of summons, any Parliament shall be appointed to meet."

IN THE CASE Or In re Worthington & Co., which is noted in another column, attention was called to a point in connection with the Trade-Marks Registration Acts which has not previously been much discussed. Every one knows that trade-marks, as they appear in every-day use, are made attractive by the most brilliant colours; but in the Acts which provide for and regulate the registration of trade-marks, and in the rules which were framed by the Lord Chancellor under those Acts, no mention is made of colour; and the Commissioners of Patents have, in the exercise of the authority given them by the Act of 1875, directed the registrar not to advertise or register marks offered for registration in any other colours than plain black and white. From this one of two results is likely to follow-either there will be admitted to registration two marks which may be rendered very similar by the addition of colour (which is universally employed in practice), though as advertised and registered in black and white the marks are distinct; or a mark will be refused registration, though distinct from all the marks on the register, when uncoloured, on the ground that a similarity to another mark may be produced by the addition of something-viz., colour-which the authorities who regulate the working of the Acts have advisedly resolved to disregard. In In re Worthington & Co. the Master of the Rolls and the Court of Appeal have decided in favour of the latter alternative, and (to use the language of Lord Justice Brett) the true test of probability of deception in such cases will be whether the marks will be likely to be mistaken for one another when similarly coloured. The fact that it is thus decided that circumstances which do not appear upon the face of the marks, as advertised, must be taken into consideration in determining the question of similarity, must surely give rise to a doubt whether it would not have been more satisfactory for the marks to be advertised and registered in the colours in which they are actually used. Another argument in favour of such a conclusion is afforded by the fact that it would at once appear what colours were in common use in a particular trade, as green and gold in the Turkey Red Yarn trade. The inconveniences of the existing rule have been experienced by the officials of the Registry Office themselves, for on the original appli

cation before Vice-Chancellor Hall in Orr Ewing's case, it was stated that an objection had been made by the office to the registration of what appeared, as submitted for registration, to be a mere oval blotch, though the objection had had to be withdrawn, on its being explained by the applicants that the blotch, when in practical use, shone out as a golden egg.

THE TIPSTAFF of the Chancery Division appears to us to have been the victim of much unjust aspersion. He has, it is true, twice lost a prisoner who had been committed to his charge, but then it is forgotten what a wily, unscrupulous and unusual kind of prisoner this was. If we remember rightly, it was stated that he succeeded on the first occasion in inveigling the tipstaff into riding in a different part of the tramcar from that in which he took his seat, and on the last occasion he is said to have " had firearms in his pocket." The usual class of prisoners whom the tipstaff has committed to his charge are persons of a very different sort-either people prostrated by the frowns of a Vice-Chancellor, or young gentlemen who, finding the serious results of running away with a ward of court, have little inclination to run away from a tipstaff of the court. It is obvious that if prisoners of the type of Mr. Vanner should become numerous, either a chancery prison van will have to be established, or the chancery tipstaff will have to be selected with more regard to athletic capability. The office of tipstaff is one of long standing. Before 1842, when the Queen's Bench, Fleet, and the Marshalsea Prisons were consolidated by 5 Vict. c. 22, and the Queen's Bench Prison was called the Queen's Prison, the Warden of the Fleet had for more than a century had the right to appoint the tipstaff of the Courts of Chancery, Common Pleas, and Exchequer; and the Marshal of the Queen's Bench Prison, the right to appoint the tipstaff to act in the Court of Queen's Bench. By the above-mentioned Act the appointment to these offices became vested in the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench, the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, and the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer. By an order of Lord Hardwicke, made on the 28th of November, 1743, the fees to be taken by "the Deputy-Warden of the Fleet or the Lord Chancellor's tipstaff were as follows:"On every cause that is heard before the Lord-Chancellor in term time only, he is entitled to one shilling, which is paid to him by the door-keeper, out of the ten shillings which is the usual fee of the door-keeper. For every day in which he travels to execute any warrant in the country he is allowed for his expenses, to be paid him by the party at whose instance the commitment is, 6s. 8d., and for every mile that he travels upon that occasion, his fee is sixpence. When a prisoner is removed by habeas corpus from the Fleet Prison to appear in court, the said deputy is the proper officer to take care of the prisoner; and to conduct him from the Fleet Prison to the Court of Chancery and back again the fee is 6s. 8d." The Master of the Rolls also had a tipstaff whoreceived for every cause heard at Westminster, if the bill is dismissed, sixpence; for every guardian admitted in court, sixpence; for every cause heard in court at the Rolls, one shilling; for every guardian admitted in court at the Rolls, one shilling. Subsequently, in the year 1848, by 11 Vict. c. 7, it was enacted that the tipstaff should give security by bond or otherwise for the faithful discharge of the duties intrusted to him, and if he neglects or refuses to give security shall, for every such default, forfeit the sum of £100, to be recovered as the Treasury may direct. This Act is now in force, but whether it is enforced or not we cannot say. The tipstaff no longer receives fees, but is paid by a salary, and his duty is to be always in attendance when any of the Chancery Courts are sitting, and to convey to Holloway Prison all prisoners committed for contempt. These duties are not very onerous.

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Chancery prisoners committed for contempt are not numerous; they consist principally of two classes-viz., those who are guilty of contempt in open court by assaulting or insulting a judge, such as Cotgrave and Dodswell, and those who have incurred the displeasure of the court by interfering with a ward. It would be rather a high estimate to state the prisoners as averaging ten in a year.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S LAND BILLS. THE Land Bills introduced on Monday by the Lord Chancellor are not printed at the time we write, and until it is seen how the details of the plan he so lucidly expounded are finally worked out, it would be absurd to attempt any criticism. It is worth while, however, to point out that, in one respect, his speech indicates a result for which we may probably thank Mr. Osborne Morgan's Committee. From one end of the Lord Chancellor's speech to the other there was not single reference to registration of title. The notion that a system which works well in a new colony can be adapted to the complex arrangements of landowners in this country has been exploded, and we believe we shall be right in predicting that nothing more will be heard of any proposal to put Australian wine into English bottles. For the future, simplification of transfer will be sought by means of simplification of title and shortening of instruments.

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It will be seen from the Lord Chancellor's speech that the information we gave our readers a month ago as to the general nature of the steps to be taken in this direction was correct so far as it went. The general nature of the proposals is as follows:-The Bill "for simplifying and improving the practice of conveyancing, and for amending in various particulars the law of property, and for other purposes," ,"extends the principle of Lord Cranworth's Act; and does a good deal more than this. In the first place, certain common form conditions are to be made incident to the contract of sale, so that such a thing as an open contract will in future be unknown. Next, the principle of the Scotch "certificate of search," to which Mr. Osborne Morgan's Committee drew attention in their report, is to be applied to the searches for incumbrances. The result, we suppose, will be that the search will be made by the office, and the certificate of search will relieve a new purchaser from the necessity of a search anterior to its date. The Bill next deals with notice, and its provision was stated by the Lord Chancellor to be that a purchaser of land should not be prejudicially affected by notice of any instrument or fact unless it was within his own knowledge, or it had come to the knowledge of his solicitor while acting as such, or would have come to the knowledge of the purchaser, or his solicitor as such, if they, or either of them, had made such inquiries as they, or one of them, ought reasonably to have made.' So far as we can gather from the reports of the Lord Chancellor's speech, the next part of the Bill appears to be an attempt to resuscitate the short form Acts of 1845, which are now chiefly remembered as having been the occasion for the only gleam of (appropriately ponderous) jocularity in Mr. Dart's learned volumes. Then follow provisions as to indorsed receipts and covenants for production, and, next, the forfeiture of leases question is dealt with in a mode which we have stated elsewhere. The next part of the Bill deals with mortgages, as to which power is given to the mortgagor to inspect the title deeds, and restriction is imposed on the consolidation of mortgages. Leasing powers are also stated to be given to mortgagor and mortgagee in possession, and new powers to a mortgagee to sell and to insure and to appoint a receiver. The usual clause in wills relating to trust and mortgage estates is rendered unnecessary by a provision that such estates shall devolve on the personal representative. Next follows a clause relating to the appointment of new trustees, supplying, we presume,

the deficiencies of the existing statutory power. The next clause proposes to abolish the examination of married women and their acknowledgment of deeds; thus (as the court solemnly remarked in Lassence v. Tierney, 1 Mac. & G. 551) depriving "married women of that protection which the law has thrown around them." The remaining contents of the Bill are stated to relate to sales and leases on behalf of an infant owner in fee; to the management of infants' estates; to the recovery of rent charges and to the revocation of powers of attorney. Certain technical words in deeds for the conveyance of land are rendered unnecessary, and long terms are rendered convertible into fee simple estates. Finally, the name of the Enclosure Commissioners is changed to that of Land Commissioners.

By another Bill power is given to the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, and the three Common Law Chiefs to make rules for the remuneration of solicitors for non-contentious business by charging a commission, and it is also provided that solicitors and their clients may agree upon remuneration for non-contentious business, but if a percentage is agreed upon it must not exceed that fixed by the authorized scale. Our readers will remember that from the commencement of the payment by commission controversy, we have adhered to the opinion that payment by commission is best both for the public and the profession, and we hope that whatever happens to the other Bills this at least may pass into law. It is especially important that the profession should forthwith come to some final agreement as to the scale to be adopted, so as to be ready to urge it on the framers of the rules. We do not see why the Common Law Chiefs should be added to the framers of the rules as to conveyancing costs; these learned judges know little or nothing about the subject.

With regard to the Bill of chief popular interestthat relating to the sale of settled estates-it is difficult to give any useful outline of its provisions until we are in a position to go into details. The proposal with regard to existing settlements is to enable the court to order the sale of settled estates on the application of the tenant for life alone, after notice to all persons concerned. With regard to future settlements, the tenant for life is enabled to sell with the consent of the trustees; but if they decline to consent (as practically it may be anticipated they always will decline), then application will have to be made to the court. It is also proposed to give the tenant for life full powers to exchange, to grant agricultural leases for twenty-one years, building leases for ninety-nine years, and mining leases for sixty years, and to take surrenders of leases. The proceeds of sales, and capital moneys otherwise produced by the exercise of these powers, are to be either paid to the trustees or into court, and applied to certain specified purposes-mainly, payment off of incumbrances and the execution of improvements on any part of any land subject to the settlement, the certificate of the Enclosure Commissioners being previously required.

The general scheme of the measures deserves hearty support. As to the mode of carrying them out in detail we reserve our opinion until they are before us in their complete state.

The Hon. John C. Stephen, her Majesty's Second Judge or Deemster for the Isle of Man, was found dead in bed on Tuesday morning. Mr. St phen was appointed to the judgeship in 1855. He presided over a court in Ramsey on Monday, and then appeared to be in his usual health.

At the meeting of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce on Wednesday a memorial to the Home Secretary in favour of effecting amendments in the Copyright of Designs Act, extending the time during which designs can be registered and the time for which regis ration extends, as well as for providing for a less complicated system of stamping, was adopted. The memorial also asks that priority of registration shall be deemed a rightful title to ownership.

THE JUDICIAL STATISTICS AS TO CRIME. The returns for 1877-78 recently issued show a decrease, with a trifling exception, in the number of the criminal classes at large, and known to the police; but in the number of houses of bad character there is an increase

of 328, or 7.9 per cent. As compared with 1876-77 an increase appears in the number of indictable offences reported by the police authorities; as also in the number of persons for trial at assizes and sessions; and in the number of commitments to prison, as well as in the number of persons summarily proceeded against before justices, an increase has taken place; but the number of convictions for murder in 1878 was but 20, as against 34 in the previous year.

The strength of the police and constabulary force in England and Wales, during the years ending the 29th of September, 1877 and 1878, respectively, was as follows:

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30,673

Detective officers

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Total police and constabulary The number for 1878 thus shows a net increase of 657, or 2.18 per cent. as compared with that for the previous year; and gives 1 for every 740 of the population according to the census of 1871, or 1 for every 811 of the population estimated for the middle of the year 1878. Of the additional constables, appointed for special duty, 311 belong to the counties, 58 to the boroughs, and 60 to the city of London. In the total number, as given above, are included 766 of the Metropolitan police employed at her Majesty's dock-yards and military stations; and 384 paid for by public offices and private individuals; but the Liverpool Dock and River Police, 308 in number, are excluded; and the River Tyne Police, the police at Birkenhead, and the constabulary at Ramsgate, Tunbridge Wells, and Hove, are appointed under local Acts. In 1878 the constables of boroughs appointed under the Municipal Corporation Act of 1835, and the constables appointed under local Acts numbered 8,736; the county constables appointed under the Constabulary Acts of 1839 and 1840 numbered 10,612; the Metropolitan police appointed under the Police Act of 1829, including the number employed in her Majesty's dock yards, &c., numbered 10,498; and the constables for the city of London appointed under the City Local Act of 1839, numbered 827. The total cost of the police in 1878 was £2,980,592, as against £2,902,635 in 1877; showing an increase in every item except that for clothing and accoutrements, which gives a decrease of £7,720, the net increase for the year being £77,957. The total includes the expenses of the additional constables, and of the police employed at her Majesty's dock yards, and by public offices and private persons; but these costs are repaid. For special services rendered by the Metropolitan police in the year ended the 31st of March, 1879, the amount repaid to the receiver was £127,411 9s. 1d. The average cost per man for the whole of the police and constabulary in 1878 was £97 3s. 5d., as against £96 14s. in 1877, and the total costs of the separate forces in 1878 were as follows:-borough police, £768,520; county constabulary, £1,031,559; metropolitan police, £1,088,230; and city of London police, £92,283. the aggregate amount, £1,182,013 was contributed from he public revenue.

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The returns relating to the criminal classes show that the number of known thieves, receivers of stolen goods, and suspected persons at large in 1878 was 40,626, as against 40,860 in 1877, and 56,584 in 1868. of the total for 1878, 5,683 were under 16 years of age; and of these 4,496 were males, and 1,187 females. Of the adults, there were 27,087 men, and 7,856 women. As compared with the numbers for the preceding year, those for 1878 show a decrease under each of the three classes In the known thieves and depredators, there is a decrease of 21, or 0.1 per cent. ; in the receivers, a decrease of 1 only; and in the suspected persons, a decrease of 212, or 0.9 per cent. A comparison of the returns for the two years shows that in the metropolis the number of the criminal classes has decreased by 169, or 6.2 per cent.; but in agricultural towns, the commercial ports, the seats of the woollen and textile fabrics, and the eastern, southern, and south-western counties, there has been a slight increase. The proportion of the criminal classes to the whole population is as 1.78 to 1,000. Besides those members of the criminal classes who were at large, there were in 1878, 17,625 in local prisons (excluding debtors and military and naval prisoners); 10,358 in convict prisons; and 4,883 in reformatories; making a total of 73,492, as compared with 74,491 in 1877, and showing a decrease of 999.

The number of houses of bad character, exclusive of brothels and places of ill-fame unless known to be the resorts of the criminal classes, was 4,440 in 1878, against 4,112 in 1877, showing an increase of 328, or 7.9 per cent. There were 1,082 houses of receivers of stolen goods; 922 houses the resort of thieves and suspected persons; and 2,436 other houses of suspicious character: and of the total, 1,359 were in counties, 2,846 in boroughs, and 235 in the metropolis, including the city

of London.

In accordance with established rule, all larcenies reported to the police, when the value is above five shil. lings, are in the first instance recorded as indictable. When offenders are brought before the magistrates, in any case which is summarily dealt with, the record is amended, and the case is omitted from the table of indictable offences: and larcenies under five shillings value are not included in the returns. The total number of indictable offences in 1878 was 54,065, or 3,222 more than in 1877 and in respect of these 24,062 persons were apprehended, as against 23,545 in 1877. There were 18,444 males, and 5,618 females. For want of evidence, 5,731 were discharged, and for want of prosecution, 1,511; 138 were discharged on bail for further appear ance if required; 1,602 were bailed to appear for trial; 41 were committed for want of sureties; and 15,039 were committed for trial. The numbers of the principal offences in 1878 and 1877 respectively were as follows:

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1878. 1877. 2,869 3,006

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In the two years respectively there were 159 and 138 murders; 82 and 81 attempts to murder; 254 and 239 cases of manslaughter; 246 and 224 rapes; 3.700 and 2,342 burglaries; 2,248 and 1,597 cases of breaking into shops, warehouses, &c.; 660 and 525 robberies and attempts with violence; 355 and 264 cases of horsestealing; and 37,024 and 36,434 larcenies, &c.; showing an increase under each head in 1878. The cases, however, of shooting at, wounding, and stabbing, decreased by 31; those of concealment of birth by 19; unnatural offences by 14; assaults with intent by 54; assaults by 66; cases of cattle-stealing by 5; and cases of

sheep-stealing by 46. In 1878 there were 944 cases of attempted suicide as against 879 in 1877.

The number of persons committed or bailed for trial for indictable offences during the year ending 29th of September, 1878, was 16,820; and of this number it may be computed that 12,615 (75 per cent. being the usual proportion) would be convicted. To this number, in order to show the total convictions during the year, may be added 538,232 summary convictions before the magistrates, making together 550,847, being an increase upon the number for 1877 of 18,704, or 3.5 per cent. The total number of persons summarily proceeded against in 1878 was 676,773, or 548,418 males and 128,355 females; of whom, as above noticed, 538,232 were convicted, while 138,541 were discharged. The magistrates inflicted various periods of imprisonment by way of punishment in 106,891 cases; 369,586 offenders were fined; 1,548 whipped; 18,386 were ordered to find sureties or to enter into recognizance; 4,197 were delivered up to the army or navy; and 37,624 were otherwise dealt with. There were 12,583

summary proceedings for offences against the game laws, as against 13,521 in 1877; for drunkenness and drunkenness and disorder, 194,549, as against 200,184; for other offences under the Licensing Act of 1872, 10,341, as against 15,906; for breaches of the peace, &c., 20,709, as against 20,749; for offences under the vagrant laws, 43,764, as gainst 40,051; for offences under local Acts and borough bye-laws, 47,781, as against 45,435; for offences under the highway, turnpike, railway, and carriage laws, 31,122, as against 30,858; for offences under the Police Acts, 20,592, as against 18,217; for offences under the Weights and Measures Act, 4,246, as against 3,979; for offences under the Mutiny Acts, 6,736, as against 6,929; for offences under the Poor Law Acts, 11,373, as against 10,943; for nuisances and offences against health, 11,969, as against 12,493; and under the Prevention of Crime Act, 1871, s. 7, 349, as against 276.

Of the persons apprehended for indictable offences, and of those summarily proceeded against in 1878, 14,062 males, and 3,962 females were known thieves; 22,459 were prostitutes; 19,620 males, and 4,042 females, were vagrants, tramps, &c.; 37,971 males, and 6,566 females, were suspicious characters; 32,177 males, and 12,126 females, were habitual drunkards (not included under the above heads); 275,810 males, and 37,694 females, bore previous good character; and the characters of 187,222 males, and 47,124 females were unknown.

The number of appeals against the decisions of justices in summary proceedings in 1878 was 154, against 172 in 1877. In 89, or 577 of the cases in 1878 the convictions were affirmed, and in the remainder quashed. Of the appeals, 49 were in cases of bastardy orders, and in 32 cases the convictions were affirmed. The summary convictions, exclusive of those in bastardy cases, were 534,881. There was therefore one appeal for every 5,094, and one reversal of the judgment for every 11,143 of the convictions. In the cases of disobeying bastardy orders there was one appeal for every 68, and one reversal of the judgment for every 197 of the convictions.

On the 23rd inst. the Queen's Bench Division (Lush and Manisty, JJ.), on the occasion of an application for time to move for a new trial in a case tried on the Northern Circuit which ended on Tuesday, stated that in their view of the new rule, which allowed seven days from the end of the circuits (not "the circnit," but "the circuits"), the time allowed was seven days from the end of the last or latest of the circuits-that is, not the circuit where the cause was tried, but the circuit which last closed. That, on this occasion, was the Midland, which closed on Saturday, so that the time allowed for moving a case from any circuit was seven days from last Saturday.

Reviews.

EXAMINATION BOOKS.

THE FINAL EXAMINATION DIGEST; CONTAINING A DIGEST OF THE FINAL EXAMINATION QUESTIONS IN MATTERS or LAW AND PROCEDURE, &C., AND ON THE LAW OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND THE PRACTICE OF CONVEYANCING. By EDWARD HENSLOWE BEDFORD, Solicitor. Stevens and Sons.

Mr. Bedford regards this as the crowning stone of the fortifications he has reared against the Incorporated Law Society's examiners. He has arranged alphabetically in the order in which the subjects are laid before the candidate the final examination questions, and has appended answers to them which, in the cases we have examined, are concise and fairly accurate. There are, however, some errors of the press which should be corrected. For instance, we do not recommend the candidates for the examination to say much about "Lord Lonsdale's" decision in Meggison v. Moore (2 Ves. jun. 632).

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We are glad to see a second edition of this valuable text-book. Mr. Taswell Langmead has always seemed to us to meet very well the requirements of the student. He is concise, comprehensive, and careful, and his style is so easy that the general reader will find the book by no means unattractive. In the present edition, the chapter on the Succession to the Crown has been remodelled, and the last chapter largely added to. As it now stands, we should find it hard to name a better text-book on English Constitutional History.

General Correspondence.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.-S. D. A. S.-A list of the manors in which the custom of Borough English prevails will be found in Robinson on Gavelkind, p. 391, but we have not yet succeeded in discovering any list of the boroughs where it obtains. Further inquiries will be made.

E. K.-Too late for this week.-BEE.-H. G.-Under consideration.

Cases of the Week.

COURT OF APPEAL-JURISDICTION-RE-HEARING-BANKRUPTCY APPEAL-PENDING APPEAL TO HOUSE OF LORDS -JUDICATURE ACT. 1873, ss. 17-19-JUDICATURE ACT, 1875, s. 9-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 71.-In a case of Ex parte Banco de Portugal, before the Court of Appeal on the 23rd inst., the court was asked to re-hear pro formâ an appeal from the London Court of Bankruptcy, which had been heard and dismissed in April, 1879, for the purpose of inserting in the order of dismissal a document, as having been read to the court, which had not in fact been read to it on the hearing of the appeal. The object of the applica tion was to enable the appellants to adduce the document in evidence upon the hearing of an appeal which they had presented to the House of Lorde, and which was pending. It was urged that the principle of the decision in Flower v. Lloyd (25 W. R. 793, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 297), that the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to rehear an appeal from the Chancery Division of the High Court, inasmuch as the original jurisdiction of the old Court of Appeal in Chancery has been transferred by the Judicature Acts, not to the present Court of Appeal, but to the High Court, does not apply to the re-hearing of an appeal

in bankruptcy, because, by section 18 of the Judica tare Act of 1873, all the jurisdiction of the former Court of Appeal in Bankruptcy has been transferred to the present Court of Appeal, and not merely its appellate jurisdiction, and, by section 71 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, the Court of Appeal in Bankruptcy had an express power of re-hearing conferred upon it. The court (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) said that it was unnecessary to decide whether they would have had jurisdiction really to re-hear the appeal upon new evidence, though BRETT, L.J., was inclined to think that there would have been such a power. But there were two fatal objections to the present application. If the document in question was inserted in the order without altering the date of the order, the court would be telling the House of Lords that the document was before it on the bearing of the appeal, when, in fact, it was not-in other words, the court would be making an untrue record. If, on the other hand, the date of the order on the appeal was to be altered, the order would be made to bear a date subsequent to that of the presentation of the appeal to the House of Lords. The application was accordingly refused.

TRADE-MARKS REGISTRATION ACT, 1875-OPPOSITION TO MARK PROPOSED FOR REGISTRATION-COLOUR-TEST OF

SIMILARITY. In a case of In re Worthington & Co., Ex parte Bass, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th inst., the question was with reference to the registration of a trade-mark, which Messrs. Worthington & Co. had sent in for registration, but which had been opposed by Messrs. Bass & Co., on the ground that the proposed mark so nearly resembled their well-known red triangle as to be calculated to deceive. As advertised for registration and registered, Messrs. Bass & Co.'s mark was represented as a triangular black blotch, colour not being allowed by the Commissioners of Patents to appear on the register of trade-marks. The mark sent in by Worthington & Co. was a new mark, and consisted of a triangular border, bearing the words, "Beccles Brewery, established 1830," and within the border was a representation of a church, stated to be the church at Beccles, where Worthington & Co.'s business was carried on. The present appeal was brought from a decision of the Master of the Rolls by which he restrained Messrs. Worthington & Co. from proceeding with the registration of the mark. The principal question discussed on the hearing of the appeal was whether, in estimating the degree of resemblance between the two marks, they were to be looked as they appeared in the advertisement in the Trade-Marks Journal, in black and white, or whether the probable adoption of colour in actual practice was to be taken into consideration. In affirming the judgment, JAMES, L.J., said that the words "calculated to deceive" in the 6th section of the Act of 1875 ought to be construed liberally, so as to advance the remedy and repress the mischief. There might be a substantial difference if the marks were used in black and white, but the Act said nothing of colour, and if both marks were in practice coloured in the same way, the differences might disappear. BRETT, LJ.. was of the same opinion, and said that the proper test of similarity was to suppose both marks to be registered, that each proprietor was ignorant of the other's mark, then would any fair use be calculated to deceive, without taking into consideration the possibility of a fraudulent design on the part of one of the proprietors. If the first mark might be used in any colour, the second could, so that the question was, supposing both marks to be used in practice in the same colour, without intent to deceive, would the one be likely to be taken for the other? In the present case if the two marks were similarly coloured, deception would be probable, though if they were not coloured, it would not be. COTTON, L.J., doubted whether the proper way of considering the question was not to look at the marks as they appeared in black or white, leaving out of consideration the possibility of one of the marks being subsequently coloured in the same way as the other one had previously been, in which event the unfair use of the second mark might probably be restrained in an action grounded on fraud.

ing to the same mortgagor under different mortgages, is entitled to consolidate the two mortgages as against the purchaser of the equity of redemption of Whiteacre, when the mortgage of Blackacre was created after the sale of the equity of redemption of Whiteacre. Bacon, V.C., on the authority of Tassell v. Smith (2 De G. & J. 713), held that the right to consolidate existed in such a case. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.) reversed the decision, thus, in effect, overruling Tassell v. Smith. COTTON, L.J., who delivered the judgment of the court, said that the rule as to consolidation of mortgages is founded on the equitable principle that a court of equity would not assist a mortgagor in getting back one of his estates unless he paid all that was due to his mortgagee, though secured on a different estate. The mortgagor was coming into a court of equity to obtain its assistance in getting back an estate which at law belonged to the mortgagee, and it was held to be inequitable to allow him to get back an estate of more value than the debt charged on it, and to leave the mortgagee with an estate charged with a debt due by the mortgagor of larger amount than the value of the estate. Moreover, as a mortgagor could not be allowed to prejudice the rights of his mortgagee by any dealings with the equity of redemption of the estate in mortgage, it had been held that a purchaser or mortgagee of one of two estates already in mortgage was, as regarded the consolidation of the mortgages, in the same position as the original mortgagor-that is, the purchaser of an equity took subject to all the equities affecting the person through whom he claimed. In their lordships' opinion, independently of authority, this principle could not apply where one of the mortgages which it was sought to consolidate was not created till after the mortgagor had sold the equity of redemption of the estate owned by the person who was claiming to redeem. If it did apply, the result would be to affect in equity, and by virtue of a rule the creation of equity, the rights of a purchaser by the subsequent act of his vendor. The principle which allowed as against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee the right of consolidation was that the mortgagor could not by any dealing with the equity of redemption prejudice the rights of his mortgagees. This could only apply to rights already given or arising from acts already done by the mortgagor. The same principle would prevent the mortgagor from throwing a greater burden on the purchaser of his equity of redemption by any act done subsequently to the sale or mortgage of this estate. It was true that a mortgagee of one estate might get in and consolidate the mortgage on another estate against a purchaser of the equity of redemption of one of the estates, even though at the time of the purchase the two mortgages were vested in different persons, provided both the mortgages existed previously to the sale of the equity of redemption of the estates sold. But this equity arose out of acts done by the vendor of the equity of redemption previously to the sale; and the act after the sale necessary to give effect to the right of consolidation-namely, the union of the mortgages on both estates in one person-was an act of persons who were no parties to the sale of the equity of redemption and not bound to the purchaser by any contract inconsistent with the claim to consolidate. In their lordships' opinion, the purchaser of an equity of redemption took subject to such equities as arose from acts previously done by his vendor. He was subject to those equities, though acts of persons other than the vendor might be necessary to give rise to the equity. But in their lordships' opinion he was not subject to any equity arising from acts done by his vendor subsequently to the sale, and therefore, as against a purchaser of the equity of redemption of an estate, there could be no consolidation of a mortgage subsequently created on another estate. Tassell v. Smith had been relied on as an authority the other way. But the reasons given by the judges in that case for their decision were very short, and there might have been special circumstances which influenced their judgment. But, as reported, the case was an authority in favour of the defendant's contention, and the real question was whether that decision ought to be followed. It was not a decision MORTGAGE-CONSOLIDATION-REDEMPTION.-In a case of on which the titles to real estates depended. Even if Mills v. Jennings, before the Court of Appeal on the 14th Tassell v. Smith had been in practice followed, no title inst., an important question arose with reference to the docwould be rendered bad by a decision overruling that case. trine of the con solidation of mortgages-viz., whether the With the exception of the present case none had been mortgagee of two estates, Whiteacre and Blackacre, belong-quoted in which Tassell v. Smith had been followed.

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