a platform so that there is an awkward descent, a man may fairly take the chance of trying to get down rather than be carried on perhaps 100 miles further. But if the train drew up on the edge of a precipice, and he chose to clamber down the precipice, he clearly could not re

cover.

It seems to us that there is an element in the case which a lawgiver would have to consider in determining à priori what the law should be in such cases, that the learned Lord Justice rather overlooks-viz., the general expediency of the matter having regard to the relations between railway companies and such bodies and the general public. If the plaintiff in such cases cannot recover in any case where he has voluntarily incurred risk, the general public would be without a sufficient practical remedy against defendants for the inconvenience or restriction of lawful right which they might suffer through the defendants' negligence or breach of duty. A man has a right to go on the footpath. If the only remedy for swinging bales in a negligent manner over it was an action for nuisance in respect of the damage occasioned by having to go a little distance into a muddy roadway, the owners of adjoining warehouses might, practically speaking, hoist bales over the footpaths in the most negligent manner with impunity, and the right of the public to use the footpaths in safety would be practically a nonentity. So, if a passenger in a train pulled up beyond the platform must go on to the next station, and bring his action for damages for so being carried on, in a vast majority of instances his remedy would be not worth pursuing. We might multiply illustrations of this usque ad nauseam. We fully admit that juries are constantly going wrong in their findings both as to the existence of negligence and the non-existence of contributory negligence; but we are not convinced by the learned Lord Justice's reasoning as to the unsoundness of the views which he combats. It seems to us to be generally expedient that a person towards whom there has been a breach of contract or duty should be entitled to recover in respect of damages which it may be reasonably contemplated he would incur by reason of such breach of contract or duty, even when immediately caused by his own intervening action; but it is quite right that his title to recover should be limited by the countervailing proposition that when the damages cannot reasonably be looked upon as the result of the breach of duty or contract, he should not recover-as, for instance, when they are caused by an intervening act of his own of a reckless or unreasonable character. An act of negligence or breach of contract which, through the intervening action of the party injured, causes injury, ought to give a right of action where such intervening action is that which a prudent and reasonable man would regard as a reasonably safe course of action. In such case the damage may fairly be said to spring from the negligence or breach of contract. But when the negligence or breach of duty but for the unreasonable or negligent action of the party injured would not have occasioned the injury, there should be no right of action, as the damage cannot fairly be said to have arisen from the defendant's act or default. This is, in truth, nothing more than the ordinary doctrine with regard to contributory negligence.

On consideration, we feel inclined (with due submission) to defy the learned Lord Justice to escape from the "prudent man" test that he so much objects to. It -enters into almost every case, except where the injury is the direct result of the defendant's act. In every case where intervening action of the plaintiff is a necessary -condition of the damage resulting from the defendant's negligence, you must consider the character of the plaintiff's intervening action. To take a case at random. A surveyor of highways leaves a great heap of stones in the middle of a road. A person driving along on a dark night comes to grief in consequence. He need not have driven along in the dark. You must

consider whether the act of driving along in the dark was prudent, and whether the pace at which he drove was prudent under the circumstances, and so forth. Some may say the case is obvious, but this is a mere matter of degree. If you must consider the prudence of the intervening action in one case, you must in all. It may be said that the public enjoyment of the right of transit on roads at night would be greatly interfered with by the negligence of road surveyors, if everybody driving at night was bound to take all risks. We say that precisely similar considerations, though perhaps in different degrees, apply to the cases of persons injured by platform accidents, or by bales falling on footpaths. The question whether a man is the author of his own wrong, or can be said to be damaged by the fault of another, must depend on the relation between the conduct and actions of both parties, which may vary in each particular case, and we believe that it must generally be determined by considerations substantially the same as those so forcibly criticized by Lord Justice Bramwell, though they may be capable of more accurate modes of expression than those with which he finds fault. We see no medium between this conclusion and the conclusion that no person can ever recover in an action of negligence where his own intervening act in Such a proincurring risk has conduced to the injury. position seems to us to be contradicted by hundreds of decided cases, and to be contrary to the obvious principles of expediency.

Cases of the Week.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-END OF TRANSIT-SUB-SALE.-In a case of Ex parte Davis, before the Court of Appeal on the 12th inst., a question arose with regard to a vendor's right of stoppage in transitu, and in the result the decision of the court amounted to an extension of the doctrine of such cases as Spalding v. Ruding (6 Beav. 376). On the 15th of November, 1877, K., of London, entered into a contract with D., of Widnes, for the purchase of 1,200 drums of caustic soda, which were to be delivered at the rate of 100 drums a month in each month of 1878. The

shipment was to be free on board at Liverpool, and the payment was to be fourteen days after each delivery. On the same day K. entered into a precisely similar contract with T., of London, for the sale to him of 1,200 tons of caustic soda, to be delivered in the same way, the only difference being that the price to be paid by T. was somewhat higher. At the beginning of November, 1878, K., in pursuance of instructions given to him by T., directed D. to ship the October delivery of 100 tons at once, for New York, on board a general ship, called The Larnaca, which was then loading in the Liverpool Docks for New York. The goods were accordingly shipped by D. on the 7th of November, and the bill of lading, which had been sent by K. to D., was tendered by D. to the ship's master for signature, and was signed by him. The bill of lading stated that the goods were shipped by T., to be delivered at New York unto order or to assigns, he or they paying freight. The bill of lading was sent by post the same evening to K. in London. But on the morning of the 8th of November, D. heard that K. had suspended payment, and he at once telegraphed to K. not to part with the bill of lading. He also gave notice of stoppage in transitu to the master, the ship being still in dock. price of the goods had not been paid either by K. to D., or by T. to K. K. soon afterwards filed a liquidation petition,

The

and it was then arranged with the trustee that the contract with T. should be carried out, and that T.'s purchase-money should be placed in medio until the rights of the parties had been determined by the court. This was done, and Mr. Registrar Pepys decided that the notice to stop in transitu was given too late, on the ground that by the bill of lading the property in the goods had passed to T., and the transitus as between D. and K. was at an end. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L. JJ.), who held that the transitus was not at an end, that the notice to stop was in time, and that D. was entitled to have the purchase-money, due to him under his contract with K., satisfied out of the fund in medio. JAMES, L.J.,

D.'s

said that the goods left D.'s warehouse for the purpose of being put on board a ship to be delivered at New York, and that transit had never been varied. It was a continuing transit to New York. There had been a complete transfer of the right of property and possession by K. to T., but no actual possession had been taken by T. The principle was accurately explained by Best, J., in Hawes v. Watson (2 B. & C. 546), thus-"The vendee has the legal right to the goods the moment the contract is executed, but there still exists in the vendor an equitable right to stop them in transitu, which he may exercise at any time before the goods get actually into the possession of the vendee, provided the exercise of that right does not interfere with the rights of third persons." In Spalding v. Ruding, and similar cases, it had been held that, though there had been a mortgage or pledge of the goods by the vendee, effect would be given to the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu, so far as it could be done without affecting the equitable rights of the mortgagee, and it appeared impossible to distinguish the case of a purchaser from that of a mortgagee. The purchaser's rights must be equally respected. In the present case effect would be given to the right of D. to stop in transitu without affecting any right of T., who had got the goods upon payment of his purchase-money. The only question was whether the purchase-money, which he had paid, was to be subject to D.'s right of stoppage in transitu. His lordship could not distinguish the case from the class of cases, such as Spalding v. Ruding, in which it had been held that the vendor's right to stop existed with respect to the surplus of the price of the goods after satisfying the claim of the purchaser's mortgagee. purchase-money must be paid out of the fund in medio, and the surplus would go to K.'s trustee. COTTON, L.J., said that the question was perhaps in some respects a novel one. The principle was that the right to stop in transitu existed so long as the goods were in the hands of a carrier for the purposes of the journey which had been indicated by the original contract. No doubt that right could be put an end to by an exercise of the purchaser's right to obtain possession of the goods; but, in the present case, when the vendor gave his notice, the goods were still on board the ship for the purposes of the journey originally indicated. It had been argued that the goods were not in transit as between the vendor and the original purchaser. If that meant anything, it must mean that possession had been taken by the original purchaser, for, if it simply meant that, at the end of the voyage, the goods would go to a subpurchaser, the original vendor's right would be defeated by a transfer of the bill of lading, even if no value was given for it. That could never be. This was not the case of possession being taken by the original purchaser, and a new transit being indicated. No actual possession was taken of the goods, and nothing was done equivalent to a taking of actual possession. The original transit was still subsisting, and the principle was that the vendor could exercise his right to stop in transitu if his doing so would not interfere with the right of a third party acquired for value. This bad been so decided in the case of a pledge or mort gage by the purchaser. In the present case there had been & sub-sale, but the sub-purchaser had not paid his money when the notice to stop was given. The vendor did not propose to defeat the rights of the sub-purchaser, but only claimed to intercept his purchase-money, and to retain out of it the original purchase-money. This he was entitled to do.

BANKRUPTCY-DEFAULTER ON STOCK EXCHANGE RIGHTS OF TRUSTEE-PROPERTY OF BANKRUPT-DifferENCES ON STOCK EXCHANGE CONTRACTS-RULES OF STOCK EXCHANGE-MISTAKE OF LAW-PAYMENT TO WRONG PERSON-RIGHTS OF REAL OWNER.-In a case of Ex parte Grant, before the Court of Appeal on the 12th inst., a question arose as to the right of the trustee in the liquidation of a member of the Stock Exchange, who had been declared a defaulter there, to recover certain differences on contracts for the purchase and sale of stocks and shares which the defaulter had entered into with members of the Stock Ex. change, and which differences had, in accordance with the rules of the Stock Exchange, been paid to a person, called the official assignee, appointed by that body. According to the rules of the Stock Exchange the contracts of a member who was declared a defaulter were closed by the official assignee at the prices of the various stocks and shares, the

subject of the contract's at the time of the declaration of default, and not, as would have been the case if the contracts had been carried out as they would have been if the defaulter had remained solvent, at the prices on the next settling or account day on the Stock Exchange. Those members from whom, on the footing of this closing of the defaulter's con-tracts with them, differences would become due, were, by the rules of the Stock Exchange, bound to pay those differ ences to the official assignee, and he was bound to distribute the amount thus received by him in payment rateably of those members to whom, upon the closing of their contracts with the defaulter on the same footing, differencesshould be due. In Ex parte Grant the trustee in the liqui dation of the defaulter claimed the sum which had been in this way received by the official assignee for differences from members of the Stock Exchange, on the ground that it formed part of the debtor's assets distributable among his creditors generally. Mr. Registrar Hazlitt decided in favour of the trustee's claim, holding that the case was governed by the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Tomkins v. Saffery (26 W. R. 62, L. R. 3 App. C1s. 213). The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.), reversed this decision, and held that the official assignee was entitled to retain what he had collected. JAMES, L.J., said that the official assignee claimed the fund hostilely to the trustee in the liquidation, and could not say that the assignee had received it to his use. Therefore, if the payment had been wrongly made to the assignee, that fact could give the trustee no right to recover the money from the assignee. If the persons who had paid the money had paid it to the wrong man, the payment would not discharge them. BAGGALLAY, L.J., said that the distinction between the present case and Tomkins v. Saffery was very marked. In that case a defaulter on the Stock Exchange had given a cheque for the balance at his bankers to the official assignee for distribution among his Stock Exchange creditors exclusively, and it was held that that transaction was a fraud on the bankrupt law. In the present case there was no handing over of the defaulter's private assets to the Stock Exchange assignee, but a fund was collected by virtue of the Stock Exchange Rules from members of that body to be applied in a particular way. That fund was no more part of the defaulter's assets than if it had arisen from a voluntary contribution by members of the Stock Exchange for the purpose of paying the defaulter's Stock Exchange creditors. No injury could be done to the defaulter's outside creditors, for the trustee would have a right to disclaim all his contracts which would result in a loss, and he could not insist on the carrying out of those which would result in a profit, because the debtor had, before the time came for their fulfilment, declared himself not ready and willing to fulfil them. COTTON, L.J., said the fund in question was an artificial fund created for particular purposes, and, if the trustee had any right at all to it, it could only be after satisfying those purposes. Leave was given to appeal to the House of Lords.

PRACTICE UNDERTAKING INJUNCTION-POWER OF COURT. In a case of Smith v. Davy, before the Court of Appeal on the 18th inst., the appeal was brought by the defendant from an injunction granted by Hall, V.C., on an interlocutory application, restraining the defendant until judgment in the action from continuing to raise a wall which, it was alleged, would obstruct the plaintiff's ancient lights. The defendant's counsel in opening the appeal, stated that he had offered by his notice of appeal to give an undertaking to pull down any buildings which the court at the trial might be of opinion he ought to pull down. Whereupon COTTON, L.J., observed that without an undertaking anything done after the commencement of the action was under the control of the court. And JESSEL, M.R., said that, in the absence of an undertaking, the court had jurisdiction at the trial to order the pulling down of any buildings erected after the commencement of the action, or, indeed, after notice of the intention to issue the writ. JAMES, L.J., agreed as to the jurisdiction, but said that he preferred the giving of an undertaking, because the undertaking then remained as evidence of a contract made by the defendant with the court. In the result the court discharged the order for an injunc-tion, on the terms of the defendant giving the undertaking' which he had offered to give.

BILL OF SALE-VALIDITY-ATTESTATION-EXPLANATION TO GRANTOR-SOLICITOR-BILLS OF SALE ACT, 1878 (41 & 42 VICT. c. 31), ss. 8, 10, SUB-SECTI ON 1. The question which has been so much discussed of late, whether the omission to comply with the requirements of section 10 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, renders the bill of sale void as between the grantor and grantee, came before the Court of Appeal on the 13th inst., in a case of Hill v. Kirkwood. The 1st sub-section of section 10 provides that "the execution of every bill of sale shall be attested by a solicitor of the Supreme Court, and the attestation shall state that, before the execution of the bill of sale, the effect thereof has been explained to the grantor by the attesting solicitor." In the recent case of Davies v. Goodman (28 W. R. 159, L. R. 5 C. P. D. 20, ante, p. 109), as our readers will remember, the Common Pleas Division held that, unless a bill of sale is ex plained to the grantor by a solicitor, and attested by him, it is void even as between the grantor and grantee. An appeal from this decision has, we understand, been set down. In Hill v. Kirkwood the action was brought by the grantor against the grantee of a bill of sale, who had taken possession of the property, claiming an injunction to restrain the grantee from remaining in possession, and Malins, V.C., upon an interlocutory motion for an injunction, held that the bill of sale was void as between the parties to it, on the grounds-(1) that the solicitor who attested the execution of it was not a solicitor within the meaning of the Act, because, though he had been admitted as a solicitor, he was not in practice on his own account, but was acting as a managing clerk to some other solicitors, and also because the solicitors for whom he acted were the solicitors of the grantee; (2) that the evidence showed that the effect of the deed had not been properly explained to the grantor; and his lordship granted the injunction asked for. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGOALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.) reversed this decision, on the ground that it was contrary to the practice of the court to deprive a mortgagee of his security on an interlocutory application, except on the terms of the whole amount claimed by him as due upon his security being brought into court. JAMES, L.J., said that, considering that Davies v. Goodman was under appeal, he was far from satisfied that the Act was intended to apply as between grantor and grantee. Nor was he prepared to say that the solicitor who attested the execution of the deed was not a solicitor within the meaning of the Act because he was the managing clerk of another firm of solicitors, and those solicitors had acted for the grantee. Nor was he satisfied that, when the attestation clause stated that the effect of the deed had been explained to the grantor by the attesting solicitor, the court was entitled to go into the question what amount of explanation there had been. None of these points were so clear as to justify the court in turning a mortgagee out of possession by an interlocutory injunction, and exposing him to the risk of losing his security altogether. BAGGALLAY, L.J., said that he desired not to express any opinion upon the decision in Davies v. Goodman, though he should wish to consider the question very fully before he concurred in that decision. COTTON, L.J., said that the Vice-Chancellor might, perhaps, have been right in considering himself bound by Davies v. Goodman, but the Court of Appeal stood in a different position. Without hearing the point argued fully, his lordship was not disposed to treat that decision as a binding authority, though he would not say what he thought the result of the appeal would be. With regard to the attestation, he thought that the court had no power, and that it was not its duty, to add to the words of the Act. If the Act had meant that the attesting solicitor was only to be a solicitor practising on his own account, or an independent solicitor, it would have said so. If, by virtue of the Act, a man was to be entirely deprived of his security, this could only be by virtue of clear words to that effect.

PRACTICE FORECLOSURE ABSOLUTE POWER OF ATTORNEY.-In a case of Hart v. Hawthorne, before the Master of the Rolls on the 13th inst., a motion was made to make a judgment for foreclosure absolute, and it was stated that the solicitor's clerk, on behalf of the mortgagee attended at the Rolls Chapel, the place appointed for payment of the money, during the whole of the appointed time, but that he had not with him any power of attorney on the part of the mortgagee to receive the money. one had appeared on behalf of the mortgagor, and the

No

Master of the Rolls was now asked to make the foreclosure absolute on the authority of a case, before Malins, V.C., of Cox v. Watson (L. R. 7 Ch. D. 196), which case it was stated had been followed by Hall, V.C. JESSEL, M.R., said he would make the order absolute on the production of an affidavit that there was a power of attorney by the mortgagee, although the clerk had not had it with him when he attended to receive payment of the money.

CHARITY-ALTERATION OF SCHEME-APPOINTMENT OF NEW TRUSTEES-FOUNDER'S WISHES.-In a case of AttorneyGeneral v. Weguelin, before the Master of the Rolls on the 16th inst., a point arose as to whether the court would alter a scheme settled in 1871 making provisions for the appointment of new trustees of a charity. By the founder's will the trustees, on death, were to be chosen, failing certain other specified bodies, from the aldermen of the city of London. The scheme made provisions for appointments on death, resignation, or other vacancy, but did not require the trustees to be aldermen. On a vacancy by resignation a trustee was appointed not an alderman, and this information was subsequently instituted to have the founder's will construed for the amendment of the scheme, and to displace the new trustee. JESSEL, M.R., said that the founder's will did not provide for a vacancy by resignation, as offices were then always held for life, and such a mode of retirement was not contemplated by him. It was clear, however, that he intended, failing certain other classes of persons, that the trustees should always be aldermen of the city of London. The Charity Commissioners had, in his opinion, disregarded the founder's wishes as to the persons to be trustees, and, although the court would not lightly alter a scheme, still he thought this error an important one and deserving of alteration. He therefore amended the scheme by providing, in effect, that the new trustees should always be aldermen of the city of London. He declined to interfere with the appointment already made, considering he had no jurisdiction to do so.

PRACTICE THIRD-PARTY NOTICE ORD. 16, R. 18MOTION OR SUMMONS. In the case of Standish v. Taylor, before the Master of the Rolls on the 13th inst., a motion was made ex parte by a defendant for leave to serve a third-party notice, under ord. 16, r. 18, following form 1 in schedule B. to the Judicature Act, 1875, as he claimed a right of indemnity from the person mentioned in the notice. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the notice was quite regular, but that the application, instead of being by notice, should have been by summons in chambers, which should be served on the plaintiff. He therefore directed the application to be made in that way.

PRACTICE-SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION-CAUSE OF ACTION-PRIMA FACIE CASE-COSTS.-In a case of Hardingham v. Rowan, also before the Master of the Roils on the 13th inst., leave had been given to serve the writ out of the jurisdiction, and the defendant had entered a conditional appearance, and now moved to discharge the leave obtained by the plaintiff. JESSEL, M. R., considered that the affidavit filed on behalf of the plaintiff was sufficient. All he had to see on a motion of this sort was whether the plaintiff made out a primâ facie case of something to trysome case, in fact, on which a verdict might result for the plaintiff. There were difficulties, no doubt, in the way of the plaintiff's case, but they might be got over at the trial and it was not for him to try the action now. He considered on the affidavits that this was a case which could be properly tried in this country, and therefore he must refuse the motion. The plaintiff had not been very candid in his affidavit, and therefore the costs would be costs in the action.

PRACTICE-ORD. 29, RR. 2, 4-ACTION ON REPLEVIN BOND JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT-WHERE CLAIM IS FOR A DEBT OR LIQUIDATED DEMAND, THE JUDGMENT IS FINAL, WHERE FOR DAMAGES, INTERLOCUTORY.-In Dix v. Groom and another, application was made to a Divisional Court on the 18th inst. to set aside an order of Denman, J., under

the following circumstances :-The action was on a replevin bond, and the amount claimed was indorsed on the writ. The defendants did not appear to defend. The plaintiff thereupon entered an interlocutory judgment, and a writ of inquiry was issued to the sheriff. The defendants, who were ready to pay the amount claimed on the writ, applied to the district registrar for a summons to strike out the interlocutory judgment and all subsequent proceedings, on the ground that, inasmuch as the amount claimed in the action was a liquidated sum, the plaintiff should have entered final judgment, and not have forced upon them the expense of the writ of inquiry. The registrar refused to grant the application, and on appeal to Denman, J., the judge supported the decision of the registrar. The defendants appealed to the court, and contended that, neither according to the practice before the passing of the Judicature Acts, nor by the procedure under those Acts, was the plaintiff justified in entering an interlocutory judgment. They relied upon Middleton v. Bryant (3 M. & S. 155), and on ord. 29, rr. 2, 4, of the Judicature Acts; and argued that even if the old practice with regard to replevin bonds was superseded, under the present procedure, where the claim in an action which went by default was for a debt or liquidated demand, the plaintiff should enter final judgment, and such was the case in the present action. The defendants contended that the amount claimed was unascertained, and,

that, therefore, they were entitled to an interlocutory judgment. The court (LUSH, J., and POLLOCK, B.) were of opinion that the interlocutory judgment and writ of inquiry had been unnecessary. The plaintiff's claim was for a liquidated amount, and the defendants having allowed the claim to go by default, the plaintiff was entitled to final judgment, under the provisions of ord. 29, r. 2, of the Judicature Acts. They ordered the interlocutory judgment to be set aside, and final judgment to be entered; and granted the defendants the costs of all the applications to set aside the interlocutory judgment.

THE PROVISO FOR RE-ENTRY.

ON Monday evening a meeting of solicitors, representatives of building societies, and others, was held at the Inns of Court Hotel, Lincoln's-inn-fields, to consider the Bill to amend the law relating to leases, introduced by Mr. Marten, Q.C. The chair was occupied by Mr. C. E. Lewis, M.P.

The CHAIRMAN said that it would not be disputed that they had met, not only upon a very important, but a very practical matter. He knew sufficiently from experience that there had been many cases in which the law operated with great oppression and great injustice. That, however, was not sufficient as a bare proposition to justify alteration in the law, unless it were of an extreme character, and they must recollect that in this law-abiding country they were not disposed to favour anything like a ruthless attack on contracts on the one hand, whilst on the other hand they were accustomed to look at such matters in a common-sense light, and with a view to obtain justice between man and man, whatever their legal relations. The meeting had been called to consider and discuss whether the state of the law as between lessor and lessee which gave power to the lessor to invoke the authority of the law, and the jurisdiction of the courts for the purpose of obtaining the forfeiture of leases, was not only capable of being injuriously carried out, but, as a matter of experience, was frequently unjustly exercised. With regard to both these questions, those present who had had any practical experience would be compelled to answer in the affirmative. Besides many letters he had received on the subject, his own experience was fruitful in evidence that some alteration-not violent, but prudent and moderate -might be of advantage to lessees, and not injurious to lessors. It would be well to consider, not any petty details or questions of alterations of proposed Bills in any minute form, but the general question. They were met to decide whether some alteration in the law was necessary, and whether in the main they were prepared to give their support to the Bill indorsed by Mr. Marten, himself, and others, which stood for second reading on Wednesday. They were called together by the Building Society's Protection Association, which represented a class of investments and people who felt very grievously the exercise of any arbitrary or unjust power of forfeiture on the part of lessors, but it was a question

which affected all London, and, in fact, all England. W her they reflected how this great city was built up, what a vast amount of property, which was held by all classes of societ in large as well as small amounts, was affected by the question, they must be driven to the conclusion that it was one which deserved very serious attention even on the part of those who were not prepared to move a step in advance towards the action which the meeting wished to take. Under the auspices of the Protection Association, several efforts at legislation had been made in that direction during the last few years of the present Parliament, and one Bill having for its main object that which the meeting desired to accomplish had passed the House of Commons, but it was ultimately strangled in the Upper House. It had been said that it was impossible to alter the law of contracts, and that a bargain once made should be a bargain for ever and a day. He would not support any proposition for a violation of the law of contracts or any revolutionary reform. It might in times gone by have been possible to take up such a ground, but it was utterly impossible now with their legislative experience and the statute-book before them. He would not be wrong in contending that the law of bankruptcy was a breach A., who contracted to pay 20s., should not be bound to pay of the law of contracts, for that law intervened so that it, and gave him the mode of evading it. Parliament before now had sanctioned the alteration of the law of contract, and Leonards. He (Mr. Lewis) thought that after those transan Act for that purpose had been obtained by Lord St. actions, and after they knew the great Act passed in 1870 with reference to land in Ireland, it was hardly fair that, in respect of such a just and common-sense thing as that proposed by their Bill, they were to have the old bogey of the law of contract thrown up before them in their faces, and be told that that was a sufficient reason why they should not seek that justice should be done. What they asked was that power should be given to the courts to prevent a breach of covenant. It was not an unjust interference with the law of property that they asked. They were not going to give leave to every lessee to break covenants. What they desired to accomplish, with the assistance of the Legislature, was to prevent sacrifice of the entire property of an individual in a particular lease by reason of a breach which could be compensated fairly by damages. If the Bill now before the House of Commons should ultimately reach the House of Lords, there was not the remotest prospect of its passing that House, except it was placed in such a shape as would be consistent, not only with the elements of natural justice, but with the requirements of their business life, and also in accordance with the highest notions of law and equity, for there never was a time when in the House of Lords there was a larger number of law peers who were certain to give their attention to a Bill of that sort, and who would take care that they would not pass anything unjust or of a violent form. He would say a word with regard to the covenants of a very ugly character which they frequently saw in leases issuing from long-established companies and charities, represented by the higher order of solicitors-viz., with reference to the sub-instruments and other matters being prepared by particular solicitors. There was the greatest possible evidencethat all the parties concerned were ashamed of that. However much discussion there might have been about the main question, there had not been a word said in favour of that most selfish-not to say iniquitous-covenant. It savoured of the most audacious monopoly in the world; it savoured of that sort of grabbing system of other people's property in business connections and profits which was not worthy of the smallest and the youngest member of any profession. He thought he might be permitted to say that if a certain institution, not far from that building, had done itself the credit which it might have done, that provision would long since have been eliminated from every new lease that was made. It was beyond all controversy that a doctor might just as well endeavour to fix a family with the perpetual obligation to call in his noodle of a son, provided he succeeded to his father's business, as to suggest that they should be bound to give the appointment to some noodle of a fellow because he happened to be the successor of his father in the solicitorship of some well-known charity or company. When he was asked by Mr. Marten what the profession would think of the annihilation of that monopoly, he (Mr. Lewis) said that he knew what they would think of it as a body, and what those would think who put it into their leasesthey would hide their diminished heads, and not propose again to insert it in their leases, and, the sooner they assumed

that high-toned respectability and purity which ought to be the foundation of every professional man's life, the better. Mr. WALTERS (Walters, Deverell, & Walters) moved the following resolution:-"That it is desirable to give power to the High Court of Justice to restrain the enforcement of provisions of forfeiture and re-entry in leases or other instruments, in all cases in which such power can, in the opinion of the court, be exercised without injury to the lessor, and on such terms as regards damages or otherwise, as the court may think fit." The resolution set forth the pith and substance of clause 2 of the Bill proposed in the House of Commons. They were clearing up the law, and doing that which people had all along intended. They were only asking for that which in substance had been granted by the court in other cases-for that which was real justice.

Mr. ADDISON (Linklater & Co.), in seconding the resolution, stated that to support it, it was necessary to show-(1) that there was a mischief requiring to be remedied; (2) that legislation to effect such remedy was desirable; and (3) that the power of apply. ing the remedy should be vested in the courts of law. He pointed out that the condition of ro-entry was probably originally framed at a time when leasehold interests were comparatively unimportant and little regarded by the law; and that, unfortunately, instead of modifying our documents to meet the vast changes which had taken place, both in regard to the nature and value of interests created under leases, we had imported the condition into transactions to which it was wholly inapplicable. It was impossible to suggest that with regard to mining leases, where hundreds of thousands of pounds might be laid out-building leases, where costly houses were erected on ground of little value-leases in consideration of premiums and many similar transactions, such a penalty should be applied. In many cases it was improper and unjust, and in all it produced great and unnecessary inconvenience. It was probably a correct statement that in the metropolis the leasehold interests in real property represented half of the value, and the freehold interest the other half; and it was not too much to say that the leasehold interest was absolutely at the mercy of the owners of the freehold. The speaker gave several instances in which he had personally known gross injustice to be done by landlords under the powers of re-entry clauses. He also pointed

The

out that, but for the introduction in all conditions of sale of a provision that the last receipt for rent should be conclu. sive evidence of the performance of the covenants in a lease (which in truth it was not), it would practically be impossible to force the sale of any lease upon a purchaser Moreover, purchasers under such conditions constantly bought leases, of which, if the landlords exercised their strict rights, they might be dispossessed the next day; and the same or worse difficulties beset lenders of money on mortgage. He would have been glad to think that the remedy could be applied by a change in the practice of the profession, without recourse to legislation; but reflection had satisfied him that this could not be. usage was too inveterate and wide spread to give place to mere argument or pressure, and, moreover, under various private and other Acts of Parliament, under wills, settlements, and other instruments, the condition was made necessary. The speaker mentioned several private Acts in which he had met with the requirement, even to the granting of building leases. It was clear, therefore, that nothing short of the power of the Legislature could afford an effectual remedy. To the objection that such an enactment would in terfere with the contract between the lessor and lessee, his answer was that, on the contrary, it would give effect to the real intention of the parties; that it was impossible, for instance, to suppose that the bargain between a person paying a premium for a lease and his landlord was, that for every infraction of a covenant, however trifling, the lessee should lose his lease. Neither landlord or tenant meant any such thing. The truth was, that were it not that the conduct of lessors was more honest, and more in accordance with the real intention of the parties, than the provisions of the documents drawn up for them by their solicitors, the hardships produced by forfeiture clauses would long since have become wholly intolerable. It being therefore clear that there was a mischief, and that a legislative remedy was necessary, he thought no better mode of applying the remedy could be suggested than through the medium of a court of law which

could mould its orders so as to suit the justice of each case. The Bill would require to be very carefully drawn up, and the power to relieve must be invoked within a very limited period.

The motion was discussed and supported by Messrs. Stephens, Peard, Coverd, Shaw, Selway, and others, and carried unanimously.

Mr. N. LEAROYD (Learoyd, Learoyd, & Peace) moved:"That this meeting approves the principle of Mr. Marten's Leases Bill, now before Parliament, and recommends that all persons present should urge members of Parliament to support the same, and that petitions in favour thereof should be presented forthwith." If they would pass this Bill during the present session they must be precise and definite in their effort. They had adopted in this Bill a fair and equitable basis. They asked that the court might, in all cases of breach of covenant not going to the root of the covenant, give relief. The Bill ought to be passed in the present session; and if they used their influence it might be so passed.

Mr. J. N. MASON seconded the resolution, which was supported by Mr. SHAEN, and carried with two dissen

tients.

After some further remarks, a vote of thanks was accorded to the chairman on the motion of Mr. HIGHAM, who requested that the undermentioned petition should be signed as extensively as possible:

"To the hon. the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled, "The humble petition, &c.' sheweth :"That a Bill has been introduced into your honour House to amend the law relating to leases.

"That it has become a growing practice of lessors to insert numerous oppressive and objectionable covenants in leases, whereby the liability to forfeiture is greatly increased, and many cases of hardship have arisen therefrom.

"That your petitioners are aware that it is not usual for the owners of large estates to take advantage of breaches of covenant where no serious damage has occurred, but it has frequently happened that persons have become the owners of property, and have taken advantage of the breach of covenant to claim the whole of the property when little or no damage has been sustained.

"That several cases have been before the law courts, in which the judges have expressed great regret at their inability to grant relief.

"That the object sought to be attained by the Bill before your hon. House is not to interfere with contracts entered into between lessor and lessee, except to give the courts power to assess damages, instead of decreeing absolute forfeiture of property.

"Your petitioners therefore humbly pray that the said Bill may be passed into law."

Obituary.

MR. JOHN DRANSFIELD.

Mr. John Dransfield, solicitor, died at his residence, Mr. Oxspring House, near Penistone, on the 4th inst. Dransfield was born in 1808, and was admitted a solicitor in 1830, and shortly afterwards commenced business at Penistone, where he continued in practice until his retirement about two years ago. Daring the latter part of his professional career he was associated in partnership with his sons, Mr. John Ness Dransfield, who was admitted in 1862, and Mr. William Dransfield, who was admitted in 1870. He was a commissioner to administer oaths, and a perpetual commissioner for the West Riding of Yorkshire; and he had an extensive private practice. Mr. Dransfield had also held several important appointments, having been clerk to the Wortley and Penistone Boards of Guardians, Assessment Committees, and Rural Sanitary Authorities, superintendent registrar, clerk to the Trustees of the Penistone Grammar School, and clerk to the Penistone Local Board and Burial Board, and to the Ecclesfield and Bradfield District Highway Board. Several of these appointments are now held by Mr. John Nege Dransfield.