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COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENCE in a case tried at the recent Assizes having stated that the prisc nor's mouth THE NEW EDITION OF THE BANKERS was closed, and that he (the learned counsel) could not
BOOKS EVIDENCE ACT. give the prisoner's account of the matter, the Lord Chief In the year 1876 an Act was passed called “The Bankers' Justice interposed with the remark that he could not Books Evidence Act, 1876." Its object was to allow acquiesce in that, for counsel represented the accused, copies of bank books to be given in evidence; and the and whatever the prisoner would be entitled to say, that year of its passing was incorporated with its title, doubthis counsel was entitled to say on his behalf.” The ob- less to indicate that further legislation on the same subservation carries us back to a trial forty years ago (R. v.
ject would be required; a forecast which has proved true. Butcher, 2 Moo. & Rob. 228), where Mr. Cockburn, in
In commenting on the Act, we pointed out that its his address to the jury on behalf of a prisoner, was pro- provisions were obscure and defective, and they in fact ceeding to give an account received by him from the
were so to such a degree that the Act has been almost a prisoner of what passed—for which he eaid, he was
dead letter, and it is now wholly repealed by the 2nd compelled to rely on the prisoner's statement only, inas- section of the recent statute. It will not be worth while, much as everyone capable of explaining the transaction in respect of a piece of legislation which has had so short was included in the indictment-when he was inter- and uneventful a history, to compare in detail its prorupted by Mr. Justice Coleridge, who laid down the rule visions with those of the Act which has replaced it, but it that a prisoner's counsel could not be allowed to tell the may be convenient to state shortly the effect of the new jury any facts which he had heard from the prisoner but law. which he was not in a condition to prove. “Where,
The institutions whose books are brought under the indeed," he said, “ a prisoner is undefended, the court are obliged to hear his whole statement, and the jury must protection of the “ Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879,"
are, by section 9, banks which have " duly made a return make the best of it; but I have often insisted on the
to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue," savings banks rule where counsel were employed, and it ought to be
“certified under the Acts relating to savings banks," and followed.” Nevertheless, the rule has not invariably been post-office savings banks; and the same section contains followed, for in R. v. Haines (1 F. & F.86) Mr. Justice
regulations as to the mode of proving that the institution Crowder held that what a prisoner said before the magis- in question fulfils those conditions. As to what may be trate he might repeat through his counsel at the trial;
termed commercial banks, the fact that they have made and we hope that the observations of the Lord Chief
a return (i.e., a return under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 22, s. 2, and Justice will prevent it from being followed hereafter.
12 & 13 Vict. c. 1) may be proved by production (1) of The prisoner has, as Mr. Justice Byles once said, “the
a copy of the return verified by the affidavit of a partner option of either speaking himself or of having his
or officer of the bank, or (2) of a copy of a newspaper counsel to speak for him," and it does not seem reason.
purporting to contain " a copy of such return published able that he should be unable to state in the one case
by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. As to the veri. what he can state in the other.
fied copy, it is to be observed that there is nothing in the Act which enables the affidavit in any case tried on oral
evidence (ord. 37, r. 1) to verify the fact that it is in WE PRINT in another column an extract, forwarded to truth made by such “partner or officer,” and it would us by an esteemed correspondent, from the transactions therefore appear in strictness necessary to prove that the of the Newcastle Law Society, which may be commended deponent actually occupies that position, and in criminal to the consideration of the Corporation of London and proceedings, at any rate, it would not be safe to disregard the city companies who insist upon retaining in the
the objection. Nor, again, is it quite clear what persons hands of their officers å monopoly of conveyancing the description of "officer” will include, and whether business. It appears that formerly the Town Council of the term has the same extent and meaning as in section Newcastle-pon-Tyne were accustomed to insert in 6. With respect to the “copy of a newspaper," it is to leases a clause corresponding to that in the city of be observed that the publication of the return is to be London leases, on which we recently commented; but made by the commissioners (under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 22, s. in 1833 Mr. Clayton, then the town clerk, addressed a 21) in "some newspaper circulating within each town or letter to the secretaries of the Newcastle-upon-Tyne and county ” where the bank carries on business. There is Gateshead Law Societies, in which he asked them to nothing, however, in the words of the present Act to communicate to the profession that he had obtained the make it necessary to show that the newspaper tenconsent of the Council to omit in all future re dered in evidence
this description; it is newals of leases the clause which confined the prepara- enough if it " purports to contain a copy published tion of assignments to the town clerk; and that with by the commissioners. What is remarkable, however, respect to the existing leases he would forego the benefit is that while the defunct Act required that the return of that clause in favour of his professional brethren. should have been made “at the commencement of each We fear that high-minded generosity of this kind is rare, year” (section 2)—thus, apparently, making it necessary but it is well that this pleasant instance should be placed to show a constant performance of the duty—the present on record.
Act only requires that the bank shall have made "a re. turn,” thus, apparently, allowing the condition to be
satisfied by the proof of any return, however old. It is THERE WAS COLLAPSE of the cause
not easy to see the occasion or necessity for defining several of the courts of the Chancery Division on
“banks” by reference to this return; but if there be a Tuesday. Vice-Chancellor Malins and Vice-Chancellor reason it can hardly be satisfied by the production of a Bacon had to rise at an unusually early hour; of the return of twenty years ago; and if not, what year's reten further considerations in Vice-Chancellor Hall's turn must be produced—that of the date of the entries, paper not one was ready to be heard, and if his lordship
or that of the time when the copy of the entries is put in had not happily had the very substantial Banda and ) evidence or is made ? Reasons of a sort might be given Kirwee case to fall back upon, he must have followed for either. If the bank was not conducted regularly the example of his learned colleagues. Neglect to when the entries were made, there is no reason why credit deliver briefs may be excusable at the commencement should be given to its accounts. If it is not conducted of the sittings, but in future care should be taken to study regularly when the evidence is required, there is no the notes in the Sittings Paper which indicate the pre
reason wby its officers and books should be privileged cedence which is given to further considerations and from attendauce. It is hard to tell which should prevail. der rrers.
Perhaps both should op ate ; and the safest course would be to assume that this view will be taken, and to apply the evidence to each period.
A further observation which we made on the old Act to discharge a duty from which no one else is similarly for reasons then stated (20 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 962) exempted. No such provision was contained in the may be repeated in the form of a query. How are the repealed Act, although litigation to which the bank was important banks which are not required to make these a party was excepted from its operation. The bankers returns to get the benefit of this Act ?
have now not only included their own cases, but withAs to the certified savings banks, their character | drawn themselves and their servants from the witness is to be proved by "an office or examined copy box. of their certificate"; that is, apparently, the cer The clause which to some degree qualifies the effect of tificate to be given on copies of their rules by these stringent provisions is section 7, which enables a the barrister appointed (26 & 27 Vict, c.87, 8. 4, party to a legal proceeding to obtain a judge's order and see 39 & 40 Vict. c. 52), one of which copies (which may be made ea parte) to inspect and take copies is to be returned to the trustees of the savings bank, of any entries in a banker's book for the purposes of and the other to be transmitted to the Commissioners such proceedings, which order (subject to special direcfor the Reduction of the National Debt. The Act of tions of the judge) must be served on the bank three 26 & 27 Vict. c. 87, does not apply to post-office savings clear days before it is to be obeyed. This provision, no banks (section 68), and these are to be proved to be such doubt, may be of great service. It materially differs by a certificate purporting to be under the hand of the from the corresponding section of the repealed Act Postmaster-General, or one of the secretaries to the Post (section 6), for by that section an application for inspecOffice.
tion could only be made by a party who had received The "copy of a newspaper" is the readiest way of the notice (which, under that Act, was necessary) of his proving the “return,” but may not be always easy for opponent's intention to adduce copies of the bank books Litigants to procure. Banks, which desire to save them. in evidence. No such notice is now required, and, on selves trouble, and to avoid the payment of costs, would the other hand, it is open to a party at any stage, and do well to keep a supply of such copies on hand; for without any preliminary condition, to apply for an order the proof in any case, whether of the return" or the to inspect any banking entries which may be material to " certificate," must, practically speaking, be obtained the case, and if the bank has interposed unreasonable from the bank, and those who wish to use the Act should delays or difficulties it may be made to pay the costs of make early application to the bank authorities, for, unless the application (section 8). That a special order may by order of a judge, no other evidence than a copy can be made on a banker or bank officer to produce the books now be required (section 6).
or to give evidence (section 6) has been already pointed It must not be supposed, however-and this is a car out; the section stands in place of the 7th section of the dinal difference between the present Act and its prede- repealed Act, which authorized an order excluding copies cessor—that the litigant is some person other than the from being put in evidence. bank. By the final clause of 39 & 40 Vict. c. 48, s. 3, Upon the whole this Act is a great improvement on its the Act had no application to proceedings to which the slovenly and cumbrous predecessor; its provisions are bank was a party. A contemplation of the beneficial more business-like, and they are expressed in much effects which would have been produced if the repealed clearer and terser language; it is only to be regretted Act had been really operative, and a conviction of what that they are not so complete as to give us confidence experience (if there had been any) would have justified, that we have yet seen the end of this legislation, and has encouraged the Legislature now to omit the limita- that they are so wide as to give us an uneasy sense of tion. And there can be no doubt that such cases will what bankers can do for themselves when they pull form the great majority of those in which the Act will together. be applied. The books, of which copies are to be admitted in
UNSATISFACTORY WITNESSES. evidence, are all books “used in the ordinary business of the bank ;” and, in order to make the copy admis It must have frequently occurred to those who have sible, three things must be proved-(1) that the book had occasion to frequent courts of justice that the was, at the time of the making of the entry, one of the majority of persons do not make good witnesses. The ordinary books of the bank; (2) that the entry was behaviour of many witnesses is positively exasperating made in the usual and ordinary course of business; and to those whu may have to examine them or to record (3) that the book is in the custody or control of the their testimony. And very few indeed come up to the bank, all which may be proved either orally or by standard of what we should call a good witness. affidavit by a partner or officer of the bank (section 4). There are various causes for this. The nervousness
The copy itself must further be proved to have been which naturally results from the situation is one of them, examined with the original entry and to be correct; The over-eagerness which is very closely connected with which proof may also be given either orally or by nervousness is another. Conceit and the tendency to afidavit by the person examining it (section 5).
partizanship inherent in human nature have likewise With respect to these provisions the remark may be their share in the matter. Positive dishonesty lies some. repeated that (as under section 9) no provision is made what apart from the scope of the remarks we are now for proof by affidavit of the position of the “partner or making, because it would not be unsatisfactory that a officer,” and, having regard to ord. 37, r. 1, this proof positively dishonest witness should make a bad witness. should not be neglected even in civil cases, and certainly The unsatisfactory circumstance is that so many witnot in criminal.
nesses who are not positively dishonest should be bad If, however, the above conditions are complied with, witnesses. If only positively dishonest witnesses were no banker or officer of a bank is compellable to pro. bad witnesses, it would not be so difficult to judge where the duce any banker's book, or to appear as a witness to truth lies as it often is. But short of positive dishonestyprove the matters, transactions, and accounts therein re by which we mean in other words perjury or intention corded unless by order of a judge made for special cause to keep back the truth-there is a certain amount of (section 6). This provision seems to be altogether ex dishonesty which frequently very much diminishes the cessive. There may be sufficient reason why copies of effect of testimony which in the main is honest. A man bank books should be made primâ facie evidence of the has come to speak the truth, but he has to soune extent matter recorded in the books, and this is done by become a partizan, or his pugnacity has been aroused, section 3. Such a provision would meet all the just and the consequence is that he shuffles or fights with requirements of the case, and would leave either party at the cross-examining counsel, and thus succeeds in throwing liberty, if he thought it necessary, to summon the bank some discredit on the testimony which he has truthfully officers as witnesses. But it is not so clear why this class given. of persons should require a special order to compel them It is rarely that a judge can safely say much
by way of admonition to a witness except in cases directly. Conceit and natural pugnacity, as we have said, where he suspects positive perjury, because remarks by are the cause of the downfall of many a witness. A a judge to a witness may have an unfair effect with witness who goes into the box prepared to pit himself the jury; but we should think, from the hints that against counsel in an encounter of wits, unless he is a judges sometimes let fall, that they must often feel man of peculiar ability (but then, unfortunately, many sorely tempted to give a witness what would be popu. witnesses think too highly of themselves), is generally larly termed a good blowing up. It is a favourite topic preparing his own confusion, because a counsel, from among persons who are not of the legal profession to the nature of the situation, has a great advantage over & insist upon the browbeating and badgering tendencies of witness in that frame of mind. There is no frame of counsel and judges, but we wish some non-professional mind in which a cross-examining counsel would more writer, in whose judgment the public would have con desire to have a witness. fidence, and of impartial temperament, could carefully These matters are, perhaps, truisms, but it is perfectly watch the demeanour of a fairly-selected, average lot of amazing, obvious as they are, how seldom witnesses act witnesses, and then give the public the result of his upon them. It is not the persons among whom one observations. We think that his verdict would be that would naturally look for a fair amount of intelligence, witnesses, to a very large extent, had only themselves to. coolness, and judgment that always make the best blame for their troubles. In the case of the merely witnesses. Take, for the sake of example, a country nervous witness, we think the public might, perhaps, doctor. He is too often over-eager, and we will not say make out their case to some extent. Neither judges conceited (something less than this does the mischief), nor counsel are altogether without blame in respect of but only over-conscious of technical knowledge that the this class of witnesses, but their humanity is not perfect, lawyers do not possess. He drags in technical terms more especially in the hurry of business and under the when there is no occasion--says, for instance, that a leg pressure of extremely anxious responsibilities, and is ædematous instead of swollen, and talks of contusionsnervous witnesses are sometimes particularly irritating. instead of bruises, and so on. He will try to show what It is extremely painful for counsel and judge when a the truth of the case is in his professional opinion without witness cannot be got to speak above a whisper, not- attending strictly to the questions asked of him. He withstanding repeated entreaties. And, in truth, wants to dogmatize as he would do to a class of pupils nervousness is frequently complicated with the other on the symptoms, gets a little angry or confused under causes we have mentioned which do not entitle the hostile treatment, and in the end is broken down and witness to the same consideration.
hopelessly discredited with the greatest ease by a very But for the fact that, after all, it is but a small minority moderate cross-examiner, though his testimony is really of persons who are ever called upon to be witnesses, we the truth. There is, no doubt, great difficulty involved should think it well worthy of consideration whether in the position of such a witness, for which considerable the proper mode of giving testimony ought not to be allowance ought to be made. He has to give testimony of made a branch of education. We doubt, after all, I a scientific nature to an ignorant tribunal, and one neces-whether the mental training involved would not be sarily easily taken advantage of by a clever advocate who useful even in the case of persons who might never be can twist the witness's expressions about in a plausible called upon to give testimony in a court of justice. way; but, notwithstanding all this, he is often chiefly to There are many cases in ordinary life in which the habit blame for the result himself. Had there been less fussi. of mind produced by such an education would be in. | ness and eagerness to justify an opinion once pronounced ; valuable. The first thing that anyone attending a court less readiness to assume that the questions of the judge of justice must have noticed is the difficulty that is and the counsel are nonsense, because they are not found in getting witnesses in cross-examination to answer experts ; less tendency to go beyond the function of categorically the questions asked. Of course, in cases witness, and usurp that of judge of the facts, all would where the witness is really seeking to avoid answering, the have been well. People continually destroy the effect of reason is obvious, and truy cross-examining counsel their own testimony by the things which they do with a naturally suggests that this is the reason; but anyone view to enhancing it. We give the case of the country familiar with courts knows that in many cases the reason doctor by way of example, as one class of witnesses is not that the witness is desirous of concealing the truth. who are too often unsatisfactory. There are, of course, Witnesses frequently do not listen carefully to the ques. other classes of witnesses who have their peculiar faults, tion or attempt to weigh its terms accurately. Again, such, for instance, as policemen, but we have not space they think they can answer more clearly than by a direct for discussion in detail. answer, and in a manner that will advance the truth | Leaving the subject of the unsatisfactory mode in better. If a class of pupils were to be instructed in the which testimony in the main honest is often given, let proper mode of giving testimony-of course, we are as- | us turn for a moment to the subject of downright dissuming that our proposed branch of education would honest witnesses. It is something horrifying to any one only be in the art of giving truthful evidence-the first not rendered callous by custom to think of the amount and most cardinal rule that ought to be drummed in the of perjury that must be committed in courts of justice. ears of the pupils, usque ad nauseam, would be that in Every one familiar with an assize court knows how often cross-examination the question should always be directly it happens that case after case is tried in which there is answered in the terms in which it was put. The witness such a conflict of evidence that the witnesses, on one ought not to be over-anxious about the effect of the side at least, must be committing perjury. We rememanswer. Explanations can be offered after the question ber one of the present Lords Justices cf Appeal, at an is answered, and there is a re-examining counsel whose assize town in the country, expressing his thankfulness, business it is to put the matter straight if the question is with almost a sigh of relief, at coming to a case involving unfair. Witnesses constantly try, instead of answering a pure point of law, after several days of hard-swearing the questions directly, to state something which would cases. We remember, too, though much longer ago, qualify the effect of an answer favourable to the ques an apparently honest-looking farmer getting into a rail
way carriage in a northern county-they swear hard in Again, another precept that ought to be emphatically the North, as any one who has been at a Yorkshire assize inculcated would be that a witness who loses his temper knows-and, in the course of a few remarks, casually ex. and allows himself to be provoked by a cross-examining plaining to his fellow travellers that he had just been counsel is, in most cases, making a fool of himself. It is up to the assizes to “do a bit of swearing” in the the very thing that the cross-examiner desires, and most interests of a son who was engaged in some law matterpeople, one would have thought, would have the sense to whether civil or criminal we forget. Of course, he did see that; and yet again and again one sees that witnesses, not use the word “perjury," but it was implied. He both of high and low degree, lose their temper almost made the statement in a partly apologetic manner, but
indicated that he thought that any little difficulty he master. Baines v. Wormsley (27 W. R. 36) turned upon might feel with his own conscience was a sacrifice de the construction of ord. 6, r. 18 of the same rules; and manded imperatively of any decent father by the ties of Jessel, M.R., held that the taxing master is bound, paternal affection. We are afraid that a great many without any special direction, to exercise the jurisdiction persons do not realize the guilt of perjury, and tend in given to him by that rule of inquiring whether any of their secret hearts towards sentiments more or less in the costs have been improperly incurred, and that he is sympathy with those of our friend the farmer. Prosecu- none the less bound to do so in an action where an order tions for perjury are, unfortunately, very apt to fail, has been made for a stay of proceedings upon payment though the defendant is presumably guilty.
of costs. “The Pupa de Rossie" (27 W. R. 367, L. R. Mistake, forgetfulness, and such like matters may 3 P. D. 163) was an admiralty action, and Sir R. Phillioften be plausibly suggested by way of defence, and more held that ord. 6, r. 26, does not apply to taxation where there is conflict of testimony, as there must often of costs between solicitor and client, and that, therefore, be in perjury cases, it is very difficult to obtain a convic. it is not competent for the registrar upon such a taxation tion. At the same time we know of no legislative to consider whether any charges ought to be disallowed measure that could tend to reduce this evil, which is one on the ground that they have been incurred through the of very considerable dimensions.
In Watson v. Rodwell (27 W. R. 265, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 150) a question arose as to the taxation of a bill of costs
more than twelve months after its delivery, and the SOLICITORS' CASES OF THE YEAR. Court of Appeal (affirming the decision of Malins, V.C.,
26 W. R. 524, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 625) held that exorbitant THERE have been some important decisions during the
charges form“ special circumstances," within 6 & 7 year as to charging orders. Lloyd v. Jones (27 W. R.
Vict. c. 73, s. 37, which may justify the court in re655), was a partition action, and a decree had been made
ferring a bill of costs to taxation, even where more than by which the plaintiffs were declared entitled to one un
twelve months have elapsed since its delivery and paydivided third part of the hereditaments, and to an
ment; also that allegations of undue influence and the account and payment by the defendants of one-third of
absence of proper independent advice, would be taken the rents and profits, and the premises were ordered to
into account in considering whether the solicitor's bill be sold, the plaintiff's costs up to and including the
should be taxed after payment, and the accounts rehearing to be costs in the action. While the accounts
opened. were being proceeded with, and before sale, the plain
In re Leadbitter and Harvey (27 W. R. 267, L. R. 10 tiffs threatened to change their solicitors, and to com
Ch. D. 388), was a case where property mortgaged by a promise the action, without providing for payment of
1 person who subsequently became bankrupt bad been their costs, which amounted to a sum in excess of the
sold, the mortgagees being parties to the conveyance, and value of the plaintiffs' interest in the property. The
the trustee in the bankruptcy had paid the costs of the
mortgagees' solicitors out of the purchase-money. The plaintiffs' solicitors, who had acted throughout the par
bankrupt, having obtained his discharge, applied for an tition proceedings, thereupon presented a petition asking for a declaration that they were entitled to a charge in
order, under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 39, upon the respect of their costs (under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 28)
mortgagees' solicitors for the delivery for taxation of upon the whole of the property. Fry, J., held that,
a bill of the costs paid to them by his trustee, but the since there had been no order for payment of the costs
Court of Appeal (affirming the decision of Bacon, V.C., out of the proceeds of the sale, he could not by anticipa
26 W. R. 267) refused the application, holding that the tion give the solicitors a charge upon the whole property,
trustee in bankruptcy was not a “trustee" within the but could only treat them as having a lien upon the third
section, and was not “chargeable" with the costs, and part which had been recovered, and he therefore declared
also that the bankrupt was not, until all his debts were the petitioners entitled to a charge for their costs upon
paid, “a party interested in the property" out of which the plaintiffs one-third share in the hereditaments and
the costs were paid, within the section. rents and profits, and restrained the plaintiffs from
Other cases involved questions as to the parties perreceiving money in the action, by way of compromise
sonally liable for payment of costs. In Ex parte Gush,
In re Pratt (27 W. R. 712), a solicitor who had been or otherwise, without notice to the solicitors. Hamer v. Giles (27 W. R. 834, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 942)
appointed at a meeting of creditors to register a resoluwas a partnership action in which the defendant's solici.
tion for a composition applied for an order directing that
his costs incident to the registration should be taxed, tors had obtained on summons a charging order for their
and paid by the debtor. The county court judge recosts upon all sums coming to the defendant on taking the partnership accounts. Jessel, M.R., held that, since
fused the application, and Bacon, C.J., affirmed his the solicitors would have a lien upon the money re
decision, saying that there was no jurisdiction to make covered, independently of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, the de.
such an order, and that payment of the costs should have fendant could create no charge which would take
been provided for either by the resolutions or the deed priority of their claim. Some objections were
of covenant executed by the debtor. taken to the form of the order, but the Master of the Rolls held that there was nothing in the statute to render it necessary that the order should be entitled
The supplement to the London Gazette, dated March 1, in the matter of the Act as well as in the action;
1877 (21 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 358), containing a list of over and he also held that the order could be made either
2,000 causes, &c., to the credit of which funds were stand
ing at the Chancery Pay Office on the lst of September, on petition or on summons. In the more recent case of Brown v. Trotman (41 L. J. N. S. 179) Fry, J.,
1875, the greater part of which are still unclaimed, has
been republished. described a petition as the proper and usual practice in such cases, and also decided that an application for a
The Western Jurist says that Mr. Bradford, of Pueblo, charging order upon the defendant's interest in a fund
some time ago, was defending a case before a judge whom
he took a dislike to. In the course of his remarks, in refer. ought not to be served upon the plaintiff.
ring to the judge, he said he reminded him “of an ass There have been several cases relating to the taxation
trying to monch hay.” The court called the attorney to of costs. In Corticene Floor Covering Company v.
order and fined him 5dols, for contempt, bat remarked at Tull (27 W. R. 373) the Court of Appeal held that the the same time that it would remit the fine provided the discretionary authority given to a judge by ord. 6, r. 3, attorney would apologize. Mr. Bradford went carefully of the rules of the Supreme Court (Costs), as to allowing through his pockets, and finding but half the amount costs upon the higher or the lower scale, must be exer- required, said: “ Abem! ahem! I'll take down the hay cised by himself, and cannot be delegated by him to the / but will copper the agg. Here are 2.50dols. judge."
distress, with appeal to quarter sessions, with removal Rebie ws.
by certiorari, with the statement of case under 20 & 21
Vict. c. 43, and with actions against justices ; the DOMICIL.
Summary Jurisdiction Acts and other leading statutes
being given in an appendix, which also contains THE LAW OF DOMICIL, AS A BRANCH OF THE LAW OF
a valuable collection of forms alphabetically arENGLAND, STATED IN THE FORM OF RULES. By A. V. |
ranged. The cases are gone into with great-perDICEY, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Sons.
haps too great-fulness, and it sometimes happens Mr. Dicey's work is a contribution of considerable that the statutes under which they were decided value to what is commonly known as privato interna- have been, and are stated to be, repealed (see, tional law. It is not limited, as might be surmised for instance, R. v. Martyr, decided on the repealed Basfrom the title, to the nature of domicil and the rules for tardy Act 49 Geo. 3, c. 68). The cases are, however, well ascertaining it. The larger half of the work is devoted put together, and the style is as easy and flowing as is to what the author calls the legal effects of domicili.e., compatible with the nature of the subject, except in the the extent to which a person's domicil influences the cases where Mr. Paley's great learning betrayed him choice of the law to be applied to transactions in which (see, for instance, page 224, and the note thereto) into he is concerned. It thus embraces a very large propor. something like pedantry. tion of the questions dealt with in treatises on private With regard to the manner in which the present international law, such as Story's Conflict of Laws, and edition has been executed, it is open to question Mr. Westlake's and Mr. Foote's treatises.
whether the Rules under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, The form of the work is a series of rules, each 1879, ought not to have been waited for. To have accompanied by a commentary, in which the rule is waited for them, however, would have delayed the work explained, and the authorities bearing upon it discussed. for many months, and the statute itself is not only Mr. Dicey expresses himself well, and he is acute in printed in the appendix, but incorporated in the text analyzing decided cases, and suggesting new points to be wherever it is applicable. Subject to this criticism, we considered. On the whole his rules seem to us to repre- gladly welcome this good edition of a good book. sent, with as much accuracy as could be expected, the law as at present received by English courts, but there are
SETON ON DECREES. some parts of his subject, particularly that relating to the status of infants and married women, upon which
FORMS OF DECREES, JUDGMENTS, AND ORDERS IN THE
High COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL, HAVING ESPECIAL the English authorities are very limited in number, and accordingly some of the rules rest on a single case or
REFERENCE TO THE CHANCERY DIVISION. With PRAC
TICAL Notes. By the late Hon. Sir H. W. Seron. even on a single dictum-e.g., Rules 26, 27, 31.
FOURTH EDITION, by R. H. LEACH, Esq., Senior Mr. Dicey, in his preface, says that he has treated his subject solely as a branch of the law of England, and
Registrar of the Chancery Division, F. G. A.
WILLIAMS, Esq., and JAMES EASTWICK, Esq., Barristersdisclaims any attempt to ascertain whether the rules ad. ministered by English courts are the same as those ad.
at-Law. Vol. 2, part 2. Stevens & Sons. ministered by foreign tribunals. He has, fortunately,
We have here the completion of this work, containing not followed this up by citing only English decisions.
| the much wished for general index. Referring first of He recognizes that the decisions of English courts are in
| all to this, we may remark that the index is very full, fact influenced by foreign authorities, such as Story
covering 278 pages. The references under some of the and Savigny, and the judgments of foreign tribunals ;
headings are necessarily long, but they are alphabetically and accordingly he cites them to a limited extent. But,
arranged, and we confess to a preference for this simple apparently, he fails to see that this is only what English
mode of construction over that adopted by certain incourts ought to be encouraged to do ; that it is desirable
genious gentlemen who have of late devoted their energies that the rules administered by English courts, on a ques
to index making, and who have introduced a practice of tion, say, of domicil, should, as far as possible, agree
not only multiplying absurdly the leading headings, but with those which a foreign tribunal would apply to the
arranging the references under numerous sub-headings. same question, and that, therefore, English text-writers
Unless this is done with care and judgment the result is on domicil, and other legal subjects of an international
embarrassing. There are, of course, sub-headings in this character, ought to furnish advocates and judges with in
index, but they are sparingly introduced. formation as to the rules which foreign courts would
The present volume comprises parts 5, 6, and 7. Part apply to such subjects.
5 is devoted to the statutory jurisdiction of the Chancery Division so far as it has not been dealt with in the
previous volumes, except the jurisdiction as to winding SUMMARY CONVICTIONS.
up under the Companies Acts, which has been omitted PALEY'S LAW AND PRACTICE OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS.
on the ground that the forms of orders can occasion no Sixth EDITION. By WALTER H. MACNAMARA, Esq. difficulty to the practitioner, and that the law has been London: H. Sweet; Stevens & Sons; W. Maxwell &
fully dealt with by text-writers of eminence. Part 6 Sons; Butterworths. 1879.
deals with “rectifying and completing proceedings," and
part 7 contains “orders relating to procedure." The This work, of which the third edition appeared so far
notes in this volume are many of them models of accurate back as 1838, has long held a high position. The fourth
conciseness; we may instance as specially excellent in and fifth editions were brought out by the late Mr. Mac
this respect the notes on the Lands Clauses Act. The namara before his appointment to the post of Railway | notes on the Settled Estates Act are also very terse, Commissioner, and the present edition, which, as we are practical, and complete. Of the whole work we may say told in the preface, was intended to be the work of the
that the editors appear to have kept steadily before them editor of the last two editions and his son, “had been
the original design, and we think no one who has used proceeded with to a considerable extent when Mr. Mac
the book will doubt that of all the editions of Seton this namara's illness and subsequent death occurred.” With is the best. regard to the book itself, it will be found to deal, in a remarkably scientific and elaborate manner, with the jurisdiction of justices in general, with the general effect
BILLS OF COSTS. of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, and in detail | PRECEDENTS OF BILLS or Costs. By WILLIAM FRANK with the enactments of that statute as to laying an in
SUMMERHAYS, Solicitor, and THORNTON TOOGOOD. Third formation, issuing a summons, examination of witnesses, Edition. Stevens & Sons. &c.; " with the qualities of convictions in general," with In the present edition the authors have supplied a the form of a conviction, with procedure on warrant of | deficiency, to which we drew attention in our notice of