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COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENCE in a case tried at the recent Assizes having stated that the prisoner's mouth was closed, and that he (the learned counsel) could not give the prisoner's account of the matter, the Lord Chief Justice interposed with the remark that "he could not acquiesce in that, for counsel represented the accused, and whatever the prisoner would be entitled to say, that his counsel was entitled to say on his behalf." The observation carries us back to a trial forty years ago (R. v. Butcher, 2 Moo. & Rob. 228), where Mr. Cockburn, in his address to the jury on behalf of a prisoner, was proceeding to give an account received by him from the prisoner of what passed-for which he said, he was compelled to rely on the prisoner's statement only, inasmuch as everyone capable of explaining the transaction was included in the indictment-when he was interrupted by Mr. Justice Coleridge, who laid down the rule that a prisoner's counsel could not be allowed to tell the jury any facts which he had heard from the prisoner but which he was not in a condition to prove. "Where, indeed," he said, "a prisoner is undefended, the court are obliged to hear his whole statement, and the jury must make the best of it; but I have often insisted on the rule where counsel were employed, and it ought to be followed." Nevertheless, the rule has not invariably been followed, for in R. v. Haines (1 F. & F. 86) Mr. Justice Crowder held that what a prisoner said before the magistrate he might repeat through his counsel at the trial; and we hope that the observations of the Lord Chief Justice will prevent it from being followed hereafter. The prisoner has, as Mr. Justice Byles once said, "the option of either speaking himself or of having his counsel to speak for him," and it does not seem reasonable that he should be unable to state in the one case what he can state in the other.

WE PRINT in another column an extract, forwarded to us by an esteemed correspondent, from the transactions of the Newcastle Law Society, which may be commended to the consideration of the Corporation of London and the city companies who insist upon retaining in the hands of their officers a monopoly of conveyancing business. It appears that formerly the Town Council of Newcastle-upon-Tyne were accustomed to insert in leases a clause corresponding to that in the city of London leases, on which we recently commented; but in 1833 Mr. Clayton, then the town clerk, addressed a letter to the secretaries of the Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Gateshead Law Societies, in which he asked them to communicate to the profession that he had obtained the consent of the Council to omit in all future re

newals of leases the clause which confined the preparation of assignments to the town clerk; and that with respect to the existing leases he would forego the benefit of that clause in favour of his professional brethren. We fear that high-minded generosity of this kind is rare, but it is well that this pleasant instance should be placed

on record.

THERE WAS A COLLAPSE of the cause papers in several of the courts of the Chancery Division on Tuesday. Vice-Chancellor Malins and Vice-Chancellor Bacon had to rise at an unusually early hour; of the ten further considerations in Vice-Chancellor Hall's paper not one was ready to be heard, and if his lordship had not happily had the very substantial Banda and Kirwee case to fall back upon, he must have followed the example of his learned colleagues. Neglect to deliver briefs may be excusable at the commencement of the sittings, but in future care should be taken to study the notes in the Sittings Paper which indicate the precedence which is given to further considerations and demurrers.

THE NEW EDITION OF THE BANKERS BOOKS EVIDENCE ACT.

In the year 1876 an Act was passed called “The Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1876." Its object was to allow copies of bank books to be given in evidence; and the year of its passing was incorporated with its title, doubtless to indicate that further legislation on the same subject would be required; a forecast which has proved true. In commenting on the Act, we pointed out that its provisions were obscure and defective, and they in fact were so to such a degree that the Act has been almost a dead letter, and it is now wholly repealed by the 2nd section of the recent statute. It will not be worth while, in respect of a piece of legislation which has had so short and uneventful a history, to compare in detail its provisions with those of the Act which has replaced it, but it may be convenient to state shortly the effect of the new law.

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The institutions whose books are brought under the protection of the "Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879," are, by section 9, banks which have " duly made a return to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue," savings banks "certified under the Acts relating to savings banks," and post-office savings banks; and the same section contains regulations as to the mode of proving that the institution in question fulfils those conditions. As to what may be termed commercial banks, the fact that they have made a return (i.e., a return under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 22, s. 2, and 12 & 13 Vict. c. 1) may be proved by production (1) of a copy of the return verified by the affidavit of a partner or officer of the bank, or (2) of a copy of a newspaper purporting to contain " a copy of such return published by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. As to the verified copy, it is to be observed that there is nothing in the Act which enables the affidavit in any case tried on oral evidence (ord. 37, r. 1) to verify the fact that it is in truth made by such "partner or officer," and it would therefore appear in strictness necessary to prove that the deponent actually occupies that position, and in criminal proceedings, at any rate, it would not be safe to disregard the objection. Nor, again, is it quite clear what persons the description of "officer" will include, and whether the term has the same extent and meaning as in section 6. With respect to the "copy of a newspaper," it is to be observed that the publication of the return is to be made by the commissioners (under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 22, s. 21) in some newspaper circulating within each town or county" where the bank carries on business. There is nothing, however, in the words of the present Act to make it necessary to show that the newspaper tendered in evidence answers this description; it is enough if it "purports to contain a copy published by the commissioners. What is remarkable, however, is that while the defunct Act required that the return should have been made "at the commencement of each year" (section 2)—thus, apparently, making it necessary to show a constant performance of the duty-the present Act only requires that the bank shall have made "a return," thus, apparently, allowing the condition to be satisfied by the proof of any return, however old. It is not easy to see the occasion or necessity for defining "banks" by reference to this return; but if there be a reason it can hardly be satisfied by the production of a return of twenty years ago; and if not, what year's return must be produced-that of the date of the entries, or that of the time when the copy of the entries is put in evidence or is made? Reasons of a sort might be given for either. If the bank was not conducted regularly when the entries were made, there is no reason why credit should be given to its accounts. If it is not conducted regularly when the evidence is required, there is no reason why its officers and books should be privileged from attendance. It is hard to tell which should prevail. Perhaps both should operate; and the safest course would be to assume that this view will be taken, and to apply the evidence to each period.

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A further observation which we made on the old Act for reasons then stated (20 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 962) may be repeated in the form of a query. How are the important banks which are not required to make these returns to get the benefit of this Act?

As to the certified savings banks, their character is to be proved by "an office or examined copy of their certificate"; that is, apparently, the certificate to be given on copies of their rules by the barrister appointed (26 & 27 Vict. c.87, s. 4, and see 39 & 40 Vict. c. 52), one of which copies is to be returned to the trustees of the savings bank, and the other to be transmitted to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt. The Act of 26 & 27 Vict. c. 87, does not apply to post-office savings banks (section 68), and these are to be proved to be such by a certificate purporting to be under the hand of the Postmaster-General, or one of the secretaries to the Post

Office.

The "copy of a newspaper' is the readiest way of proving the "return," but may not be always easy for litigants to procure. Banks, which desire to save themselves trouble, and to avoid the payment of costs, would do well to keep a supply of such copies on hand; for the proof in any case, whether of the "return" or the "certificate," must, practically speaking, be obtained from the bank, and those who wish to use the Act should make early application to the bank authorities, for, unless by order of a judge, no other evidence than a copy can now be required (section 6).

It must not be supposed, however-and this is a cardinal difference between the present Act and its predecessor-that the litigant is some person other than the bank. By the final clause of 39 & 40 Vict. c. 48, s. 3, the Act had no application to proceedings to which the bank was a party. A contemplation of the beneficial effects which would have been produced if the repealed Act had been really operative, and a conviction of what experience (if there had been any) would have justified, has encouraged the Legislature now to omit the limitation. And there can be no doubt that such cases will form the great majority of those in which the Act will be applied.

The books, of which copies are to be admitted in evidence, are all books "used in the ordinary business of the bank ;" and, in order to make the copy admissible, three things must be proved—(1) that the book was, at the time of the making of the entry, one of the ordinary books of the bank; (2) that the entry was made in the usual and ordinary course of business; and (3) that the book is in the custody or control of the bank, all which may be proved either orally or by affidavit by a partner or officer of the bank (section 4). The copy itself must further be proved to have been examined with the original entry and to be correct; which proof may also be given either orally or by affidavit by the person examining it (section 5).

With respect to these provisions the remark may be repeated that (as under section 9) no provision is made for proof by affidavit of the position of the "partner or officer," and, having regard to ord. 37, r. 1, this proof should not be neglected even in civil cases, and certainly not in criminal.

If, however, the above conditions are complied with, no banker or officer of a bank is compellable to produce any banker's book, or to appear as a witness to prove the matters, transactions, and accounts therein recorded unless by order of a judge made for special cause (section 6). This provision seems to be altogether excessive. There may be sufficient reason why copies of bank books should be made prima facie evidence of the matter recorded in the books, and this is done by section 3. Such a provision would meet all the just requirements of the case, and would leave either party at liberty, if he thought it necessary, to summon the bank officers as witnesses. But it is not so clear why this class of persons should require a special order to compel them

to discharge a duty from which no one else is similarly exempted. No such provision was contained in the repealed Act, although litigation to which the bank was a party was excepted from its operation. The bankers have now not only included their own cases, but withdrawn themselves and their servants from the witness box.

The clause which to some degree qualifies the effect of these stringent provisions is section 7, which enables a party to a legal proceeding to obtain a judge's order (which may be made ex parte) to inspect and take copies of any entries in a banker's book for the purposes of such proceedings, which order (subject to special directions of the judge) must be served on the bank three clear days before it is to be obeyed. This provision, no doubt, may be of great service. It materially differs from the corresponding section of the repealed Act (section 6), for by that section an application for inspection could only be made by a party who had received the notice (which, under that Act, was necessary) of his opponent's intention to adduce copies of the bank books in evidence. No such notice is now required, and, on the other hand, it is open to a party at any stage, and without any preliminary condition, to apply for an order to inspect any banking entries which may be material to the case, and if the bank has interposed unreasonable delays or difficulties it may be made to pay the costs of the application (section 8). That a special order may be made on a banker or bank officer to produce the books or to give evidence (section 6) has been already pointed out; the section stands in place of the 7th section of the repealed Act, which authorized an order excluding copies from being put in evidence.

Upon the whole this Act is a great improvement on its slovenly and cumbrous predecessor; its provisions are more business-like, and they are expressed in much clearer and terser language; it is only to be regretted that they are not so complete as to give us confidence that we have yet seen the end of this legislation, and that they are so wide as to give us an uneasy sense of what bankers can do for themselves when they pull together.

UNSATISFACTORY WITNESSES.

Ir must have frequently occurred to those who have had occasion to frequent courts of justice that the majority of persons do not make good witnesses. The behaviour of many witnesses is positively exasperating to those who may have to examine them or to record their testimony. And very few indeed come up to the standard of what we should call a good witness. There are various causes for this. The nervousness which naturally results from the situation is one of them. The over-eagerness which is very closely connected with nervousness is another. Conceit and the tendency to partizanship inherent in human nature have likewise their share in the matter. Positive dishonesty lies somewhat apart from the scope of the remarks we are now making, because it would not be unsatisfactory that a positively dishonest witness should make a bad witness. The unsatisfactory circumstance is that so many witnesses who are not positively dishonest should be bad witnesses. If only positively dishonest witnesses were bad witnesses, it would not be so difficult to judge where the truth lies as it often is. But short of positive dishonestyby which we mean in other words perjury or intention to keep back the truth-there is a certain amount of dishonesty which frequently very much diminishes the effect of testimony which in the main is honest. A man has come to speak the truth, but he has to soine extent become a partizan, or his pugnacity has been aroused, and the consequence is that he shuffles or fights with the cross-examining counsel, and thus succeeds in throwing some discredit on the testimony which he has truthfully given.

It is rarely that a judge can safely say much

by way of admonition to a witness except in cases where he suspects positive perjury, because remarks by a judge to a witness may have an unfair effect with the jury; but we should think, from the hints that judges sometimes let fall, that they must often feel sorely tempted to give a witness what would be popularly termed a good blowing up. It is a favourite topic among persons who are not of the legal profession to insist upon the browbeating and badgering tendencies of counsel and judges, but we wish some non-professional writer, in whose judgment the public would have confidence, and of impartial temperament, could carefully watch the demeanour of a fairly-selected, average lot of witnesses, and then give the public the result of his observations. We think that his verdict would be that witnesses, to a very large extent, had only themselves to blame for their troubles. In the case of the merely nervous witness, we think the public might, perhaps, make out their case to some extent. Neither judges nor counsel are altogether without blame in respect of this class of witnesses, but their humanity is not perfect, more especially in the hurry of business and under the pressure of extremely anxious responsibilities, and nervous witnesses are sometimes particularly irritating. It is extremely painful for counsel and judge when a witness cannot be got to speak above a whisper, notwithstanding repeated entreaties. And, in truth, nervousness is frequently complicated with the other causes we have mentioned which do not entitle the witness to the same consideration.

But for the fact that, after all, it is but a small minority of persons who are ever called upon to be witnesses, we should think it well worthy of consideration whether the proper mode of giving testimony ought not to be made a branch of education. We doubt, after all, whether the mental training involved would not be useful even in the case of persons who might never be called upon to give testimony in a court of justice. There are many cases in ordinary life in which the habit of mind produced by such an education would be invaluable. The first thing that anyone attending a court of justice must have noticed is the difficulty that is found in getting witnesses in cross-examination to answer categorically the questions asked. Of course, in cases where the witness is really seeking to avoid answering, the reason is obvious, and every cross-examining counsel naturally suggests that this is the reason; but anyone familiar with courts knows that in many cases the reason is not that the witness is desirous of concealing the truth. Witnesses frequently do not listen carefully to the question or attempt to weigh its terms accurately. Again, they think they can answer more clearly than by a direct answer, and in a manner that will advance the truth better. If a class of pupils were to be instructed in the proper mode of giving testimony-of course, we are assuming that our proposed branch of education would only be in the art of giving truthful evidence-the first and most cardinal rule that ought to be drummed in the ears of the pupils, usque ad nauseam, would be that in cross-examination the question should always be directly answered in the terms in which it was put. The witness ought not to be over-anxious about the effect of the answer. Explanations can be offered after the question is answered, and there is a re-examining counsel whose business it is to put the matter straight if the question is unfair. Witnesses constantly try, instead of answering the questions directly, to state something which would qualify the effect of an answer favourable to the questioner.

Again, another precept that ought to be emphatically inculcated would be that a witness who loses his temper and allows himself to be provoked by a cross-examining counsel is, in most cases, making a fool of himself. It is the very thing that the cross-examiner desires, and most people, one would have thought, would have the sense to see that; and yet again and again one sees that witnesses, both of high and low degree, lose their temper almost

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directly. Conceit and natural pugnacity, as we have said, are the cause of the downfall of many a witness. witness who goes into the box prepared to pit himself against counsel in an encounter of wits, unless he is a man of peculiar ability (but then, unfortunately, many witnesses think too highly of themselves), is generally preparing his own confusion, because a counsel, from the nature of the situation, has a great advantage over a witness in that frame of mind. There is no frame of mind in which a cross-examining counsel would more desire to have a witness.

These matters are, perhaps, truisms, but it is perfectly amazing, obvious as they are, how seldom witnesses act upon them. It is not the persons among whom one would naturally look for a fair amount of intelligence, coolness, and judgment that always make the best witnesses. Take, for the sake of example, a country doctor. He is too often over-eager, and we will not say conceited (something less than this does the mischief), but only over-conscious of technical knowledge that the lawyers do not possess. He drags in technical terms when there is no occasion-says, for instance, that a leg is cedematous instead of swollen, and talks of contusions. instead of bruises, and so on. He will try to show what the truth of the case is in his professional opinion without attending strictly to the questions asked of him. He wants to dogmatize as he would do to a class of pupils on the symptoms, gets a little angry or confused under hostile treatment, and in the end is broken down and hopelessly discredited with the greatest ease by a very moderate cross-examiner, though his testimony is really the truth. There is, no doubt, great difficulty involved in the position of such a witness, for which considerable allowance ought to be made. He has to give testimony of a scientific nature to an ignorant tribunal, and one neces-sarily easily taken advantage of by a clever advocate who can twist the witness's expressions about in a plausible way; but, notwithstanding all this, he is often chiefly to blame for the result himself. Had there been less fussiness and eagerness to justify an opinion once pronounced; less readiness to assume that the questions of the judge and the counsel are nonsense, because they are not experts; less tendency to go beyond the function of witness, and usurp that of judge of the facts, all would have been well. People continually destroy the effect of their own testimony by the things which they do with a view to enhancing it. We give the case of the country doctor by way of example, as one class of witnesses who are too often unsatisfactory. There are, of course, other classes of witnesses who have their peculiar faults, such, for instance, as policemen, but we have not space for discussion in detail.

Leaving the subject of the unsatisfactory mode in which testimony in the main honest is often given, let us turn for a moment to the subject of downright dishonest witnesses. It is something horrifying to any one not rendered callous by custom to think of the amount. of perjury that must be committed in courts of justice. Every one familiar with an assize court knows how often it happens that case after case is tried in which there is such a conflict of evidence that the witnesses, on one side at least, must be committing perjury. We remember one of the present Lords Justices of Appeal, at an assize town in the country, expressing his thankfulness, with almost a sigh of relief, at coming to a case involving a pure point of law, after several days of hard-swearing cases. We remember, too, though much longer ago, an apparently honest-looking farmer getting into a railway carriage in a northern county-they swear hard in the North, as any one who has been at a Yorkshire assize knows-and, in the course of a few remarks, casually explaining to his fellow travellers that he had just been up to the assizes to "do a bit of swearing" in the interests of a son who was engaged in some law matterwhether civil or criminal we forget. Of course, he did not use the word "perjury," but it was implied. made the statement in a partly apologetic manner, but

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indicated that he thought that any little difficulty he might feel with his own conscience was a sacrifice demanded imperatively of any decent father by the ties of paternal affection. We are afraid that a great many persons do not realize the guilt of perjury, and tend in their secret hearts towards sentiments more or less in sympathy with those of our friend the farmer. Prosecutions for perjury are, unfortunately, very apt to fail, though the defendant is presumably guilty.

Mistake, forgetfulness, and such like matters may often be plausibly suggested by way of defence, and where there is conflict of testimony, as there must often be in perjury cases, it is very difficult to obtain a conviction. At the same time we know of no legislative measure that could tend to reduce this evil, which is one of very considerable dimensions.

SOLICITORS' CASES OF THE YEAR.

II.

THERE have been some important decisions during the year as to charging orders. Lloyd v. Jones (27 W. R. 655), was a partition action, and a decree had been made by which the plaintiffs were declared entitled to one undivided third part of the hereditaments, and to an account and payment by the defendants of one-third of the rents and profits, and the premises were ordered to be sold, the plaintiff's costs up to and including the hearing to be costs in the action. While the accounts were being proceeded with, and before sale, the plaintiffs threatened to change their solicitors, and to compromise the action, without providing for payment of their costs, which amounted to a sum in excess of the value of the plaintiffs' interest in the property. The plaintiffs' solicitors, who had acted throughout the partition proceedings, thereupon presented a petition asking for a declaration that they were entitled to a charge in respect of their costs (under 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 28) upon the whole of the property. Fry, J., held that, since there had been no order for payment of the costs out of the proceeds of the sale, he could not by anticipa tion give the solicitors a charge upon the whole property, but could only treat them as having a lien upon the third part which had been recovered, and he therefore declared the petitioners entitled to a charge for their costs upon the plaintiffs' one-third share in the hereditaments and rents and profits, and restrained the plaintiffs from receiving money in the action, by way of compromise or otherwise, without notice to the solicitors.

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Hamer v. Giles (27 W. R. 834, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 942) was a partnership action in which the defendant's solici tors had obtained on summons a charging order for their costs upon all sums coming to the defendant on taking the partnership accounts. Jessel, M.R., held that, since the solicitors would have a lien upon the money recovered, independently of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, the defendant could create no charge which would take priority of their claim. Some objections taken to the form of the order, but the Master of the Rolls held that there was nothing in the statute to render it necessary that the order should be entitled in the matter of the Act as well as in the action; and he also held that the order could be made either on petition or on summons. In the more recent case of Brown v. Trotman (41 L. J. N. S. 179) Fry, J., described a petition as the proper and usual practice in such cases, and also decided that an application for a charging order upon the defendant's interest in a fund ought not to be served upon the plaintiff.

There have been several cases relating to the taxation of costs. In Corticene Floor Covering Company v. Tull (27 W. R. 373) the Court of Appeal held that the discretionary authority given to a judge by ord. 6, r. 3, of the rules of the Supreme Court (Costs), as to allowing costs upon the higher or the lower scale, must be exercised by himself, and cannot be delegated by him to the

master. Baines v. Wormsley (27 W. R. 36) turned upon the construction of ord. 6, r. 18 of the same rules; and Jessel, M.R., held that the taxing master is bound, without any special direction, to exercise the jurisdiction given to him by that rule of inquiring whether any of the costs have been improperly incurred, and that he is none the less bound to do so in an action where an order has been made for a stay of proceedings upon payment of costs. "The Papa de Rossie" (27 W. R. 367, L. R. 3 P. D. 163) was an admiralty action, and Sir R. Phillimore held that ord. 6, r. 26, does not apply to taxation of costs between solicitor and client, and that, therefore, it is not competent for the registrar upon such a taxation to consider whether any charges ought to be disallowed on the ground that they have been incurred through the solicitor's negligence.

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In Watson v. Rodwell (27 W. R. 265, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 150) a question arose as to the taxation of a bill of costs more than twelve months after its delivery, and the Court of Appeal (affirming the decision of Malins, V.C., 26 W. R. 524, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 625) held that exorbitant charges form special circumstances," within 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 37, which may justify the court in referring a bill of costs to taxation, even where more than twelve months have elapsed since its delivery and payment; also that allegations of undue influence and the absence of proper independent advice, would be taken into account in considering whether the solicitor's bill should be taxed after payment, and the accounts reopened.

In re Leadbitter and Harvey (27 W. R. 267, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 388), was a case where property mortgaged by a person who subsequently became bankrupt bad been sold, the mortgagees being parties to the conveyance, and the trustee in the bankruptcy had paid the costs of the mortgagees' solicitors out of the purchase-money. The bankrupt, having obtained his discharge, applied for an order, under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 39, upon the mortgagees' solicitors for the delivery for taxation of a bill of the costs paid to them by his trustee, but the Court of Appeal (affirming the decision of Bacon, V.C., 26 W. R. 267) refused the application, holding that the trustee in bankruptcy was not a "trustee" within the section, and was not "chargeable" with the costs, and also that the bankrupt was not, until all his debts were paid, "a party interested in the property" out of which the costs were paid, within the section.

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Other cases involved questions as to the parties perIn Ex parte Gush, sonally liable for payment of costs. In re Pratt (27 W. R. 712), a solicitor who had been appointed at a meeting of creditors to register a resolution for a composition applied for an order directing that his costs incident to the registration should be taxed, and paid by the debtor. The county court judge refused the application, and Bacon, C.J., affirmed his decision, saying that there was no jurisdiction to make such an order, and that payment of the costs should have been provided for either by the resolutions or the deed of covenant executed by the debtor.

The supplement to the London Gazette, dated March 1, 1877 (21 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 358), containing a list of over 2,000 causes, &c., to the credit of which funds were standing at the Chancery Pay Office on the 1st of September, 1875, the greater part of which are still unclaimed, has been republished.

The Western Jurist says that Mr. Bradford, of Pueblo, some time ago, was defending a case before a judge whom he took a dislike to. In the course of his remarks, in referring to the judge, he said he reminded him "of an ass trying to munch hay." The court called the attorney to order and fined him 5dols, for contempt, but remarked at the same time that it would remit the fine provided the attorney would apologize. Mr. Bradford went carefully through his pockets, and finding but half the amount required, said: "Ahem! ahem! I'll take down the hay but will copper the ass. Here are 2.50dols. judge."

Reviews.

DOMICIL.

THE LAW OF DOMICIL, AS A BRANCH OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND, STATED IN THE FORM OF RULES. By A. V. DICEY, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Sons.

Mr. Dicey's work is a contribution of considerable value to what is commonly known as private international law. It is not limited, as might be surmised from the title, to the nature of domicil and the rules for ascertaining it. The larger half of the work is devoted to what the author calls the legal effects of domicil-i.e., the extent to which a person's domicil influences the choice of the law to be applied to transactions in which he is concerned. It thus embraces a very large proportion of the questions dealt with in treatises on private international law, such as Story's Conflict of Laws, and Mr. Westlake's and Mr. Foote's treatises.

The form of the work is a series of rules, each accompanied by a commentary, in which the rule is explained, and the authorities bearing upon it discussed. Mr. Dicey expresses himself well, and he is acute in analyzing decided cases, and suggesting new points to be considered. On the whole his rules seem to us to represent, with as much accuracy as could be expected, the law as at present received by English courts, but there are some parts of his subject, particularly that relating to the status of infants and married women, upon which the English authorities are very limited in number, and accordingly some of the rules rest on a single case or even on a single dictum-e.g., Rules 26, 27, 31.

Mr. Dicey, in his preface, says that he has treated his subject solely as a branch of the law of England, and disclaims any attempt to ascertain whether the rules administered by English courts are the same as those administered by foreign tribunals. He has, fortunately, not followed this up by citing only English decisions. He recognizes that the decisions of English courts are in fact influenced by foreign authorities, such as Story and Savigny, and the judgments of foreign tribunals; and accordingly he cites them to a limited extent. But, apparently, he fails to see that this is only what English courts ought to be encouraged to do; that it is desirable that the rules administered by English courts, on a question, say, of domicil, should, as far as possible, agree with those which a foreign tribunal would apply to the same question, and that, therefore, English text-writers on domicil, and other legal subjects of an international character, ought to furnish advocates and judges with information as to the rules which foreign courts would apply to such subjects.

SUMMARY CONVICTIONS.

PALEY'S LAW AND PRACTICE OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS. SIXTH EDITION. By WALTER H. MACNAMARA, Esq. London: H. Sweet; Stevens & Sons; W. Maxwell & Sons; Butterworths. 1879.

This work, of which the third edition appeared so far back as 1838, has long held a high position. The fourth and fifth editions were brought out by the late Mr. Macnamara before his appointment to the post of Railway Commissioner, and the present edition, which, as we are told in the preface, was intended to be the work of the editor of the last two editions and his son, "had been proceeded with to a considerable extent when Mr. Macnamara's illness and subsequent death occurred." With regard to the book itself, it will be found to deal, in a remarkably scientific and elaborate manner, with the jurisdiction of justices in general, with the general effect of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, and in detail with the enactments of that statute as to laying an information, issuing a summons, examination of witnesses, &c.; "with the qualities of convictions in general," with the form of a conviction, with procedure on warrant of

distress, with appeal to quarter sessions, with removal by certiorari, with the statement of case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, and with actions against justices; the Summary Jurisdiction Acts and other leading statutes being given in an appendix, which also contains a valuable collection of forms alphabetically arranged. The cases are gone into with great-perhaps too great-fulness, and it sometimes happens that the statutes under which they were decided have been, and are stated to be, repealed (see, for instance, R. v. Martyr, decided on the repealed Bastardy Act 49 Geo. 3, c. 68). The cases are, however, well put together, and the style is as easy and flowing as is compatible with the nature of the subject, except in the cases where Mr. Paley's great learning betrayed him (see, for instance, page 224, and the note thereto) into something like pedantry.

With regard to the manner in which the present edition has been executed, it is open to question whether the Rules under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, ought not to have been waited for. To have waited for them, however, would have delayed the work for many months, and the statute itself is not only printed in the appendix, but incorporated in the text wherever it is applicable. Subject to this criticism, we gladly welcome this good edition of a good book.

SETON ON DECREES.

FORMS OF DECREES, JUDGMENTS, AND ORDERS IN THE HIGH COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL, HAVING ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE CHANCERY DIVISION. WITH PRACTICAL NOTES. By the late Hon. Sir H. W. SETON. FOURTH EDITION, by R. H. LEACH, Esq., Senior Registrar of the Chancery Division, F. G. A. WILLIAMS, Esq., and JAMES EASTWICK, Esq., Barristersat-Law. Vol. 2, part 2. Stevens & Sons.

We have here the completion of this work, containing the much wished for general index. Referring first of all to this, we may remark that the index is very full, The references under some of the covering 278 pages. headings are necessarily long, but they are alphabetically arranged, and we confess to a preference for this simple mode of construction over that adopted by certain ingenious gentlemen who have of late devoted their energies to index making, and who have introduced a practice of not only multiplying absurdly the leading headings, but arranging the references under numerous sub-headings. Unless this is done with care and judgment the result is embarrassing. There are, of course, sub-headings in this index, but they are sparingly introduced.

The present volume comprises parts 5, 6, and 7. Part 5 is devoted to the statutory jurisdiction of the Chancery Division so far as it has not been dealt with in the previous volumes, except the jurisdiction as to winding up under the Companies Acts, which has been omitted on the ground that the forms of orders can occasion no difficulty to the practitioner, and that the law has been fully dealt with by text-writers of eminence. Part 6 deals with "rectifying and completing proceedings," and part 7 contains "orders relating to procedure." The notes in this volume are many of them models of accurate conciseness; we may instance as specially excellent in this respect the notes on the Lands Clauses Act. The notes on the Settled Estates Act are also very terse, practical, and complete. Of the whole work we may say that the editors appear to have kept steadily before them the original design, and we think no one who has used the book will doubt that of all the editions of Seton this is the best.

BILLS OF COSTS.

PRECEDENTS OF BILLS OF COSTS. BY WILLIAM FRANK SUMMERHAYS, Solicitor, and THORNTON TOOGOOD. Third Edition. Stevens & Sons.

In the present edition the authors have supplied a deficiency, to which we drew attention in our notice of

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