by way of proviso to the former part, being introduced by the word "but," which seems to import that it is a qualification merely of what has gone before.

Such a contention was putting rather a heavy burthen upon a little word. The improper use of the conjunction “but”—as, for instance, where it is used to couple ideas or statements which do not involve any opposition-is a common grammatical error. In the Bible version of the Proverbs of Solomon, the word "but " is in many cases quaintly, but according to strict grammatical propriety hardly appropriately, used to couple together sayings which do not in any way contradict or qualify one another. At the same time there is no doubt that, prima facie, the use of the word "but" does rather indicate at first sight that the latter part of the section is meant as a qualification of, or exception to, what has gone before. A possible meaning of the whole would be that, whereas by reason of the words " not negotiable" upon a cheque, any person receiving payment of it, however bona fide, without a good title, might be made to account for the amount of it to the true owner, protection was intended to be given to a banker who might merely collect it for a customer in the ordinary way of business by excepting him from the effect of this provision. It is to be

observed, however, that if this construction were to be given to the enactment, it would entail the reading into the latter part of the section the words "bearing the words 'not negotiable,'" which would be a far greater stretch of language than any slight violence done to the word "but" by the larger construction.

We think it will appear on consideration that the construction contended for by the plaintiffs, though grammatically possible, would, in substance, involve an absurdity. It involves that a banker who has collected a cheque marked “not negotiable" for a customer who had not a good title to the cheque should be in a better position than if he had collected a cheque not marked 'not negotiable" for a customer who had no title to the cheque. This seems absurd, though this ground does not appear to have occurred to the Common Pleas Division. The second is an à fortiori case. The addition

66

of the words "not negotiable was intended to give protection to the party really entitled to the proceeds of the cheque by restricting its negotiability and preserving his rights against any other person receiving such proceeds. It would be absurd that a banker should have protection in the case of a cheque marked "not negotiable" which he would not have in the case of a cheque not so marked. It was held in the case of Ogden v. Benas (22 W. R. 805, L. R. 9 C. P. 513) that the collecting banker had no protection in the case of a forged indorsement under the then existing state of the law, inasmuch as the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 59, s. 19, only applied to the banker upon whom the cheque was drawn. This decision was followed in the case of Arnold v. Cheque Bank (24 W. R. 759, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 578). The Common Pleas Division seems to have thought that the latter part of the 12th section of the Crossed Cheques Act, 1876, was intended to alter the law as laid down in those decisions, and to give the same protection to the collecting banker as to the banker upon whom the cheque was drawn against forged indorsements. We think that this was the only possible construction of the section, looking to the reason of the thing, though the use of the word "but" so far affects us as to make us doubt whether in fact the framer of the section had this general intention.

Lord Justice James was prevented by indisposition from sitting on Thursday last.

Mr. Arthur Charles, Q.C., and Mr. William Willis, Q.C., have been elected benchers of the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple, in the places of the late Right Hon. Mr. Roebuck, Q.C., and the late Mr. Kingdon, Q.C.

Reviews.

VENDORS AND PURCHASERS.

A CONCISE MANUAL OF THE LAW RELATING TO VENDORS AND PURCHASERS OF REAL PROPERTY. By HENRY SEABORNE, Solicitor. Second Edition. Butterworths.

Mr. Seaborne has added to his useful manual notices of the numerous Acts which have been passed, and of the many important conveyancing cases which have been decided

since the publication of the first edition. We have little fault to find with the accuracy with which the effect of these statutes and cases has been given. It would have been as well, however, to have given the rules in section 3 of the Vendor and Purchaser Act in full in section

15, under the head of "Powers Conferred by the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874," in addition to noticing them under the heads to which they relate. And at p. 87, the very confident statement that " a recital of seisin of a particular person in a deed twenty years old, in the absence of proof to the contrary, would be evidence thereof;" should have been, but is not, supported by a reference to Bolton v. School Board for London (26 W. R. 549, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 766); and that strong decision has not yet stood long enough to be safely cited, even in an elementary book (as it We observe, with some surprise, the omission in the chapter is at p. 194 of this work) without a caution.

on the Statute of Frauds of any reference to Warner v. Willington (3 Drew 525). An elementary work must necessarily omit much matter of minor importance, but

the doctrine laid down in the case we have mentioned is too important to be left out of sight. Mr. Seaborne referring, at p. 284, to the written request signed by the vendor for payment of the purchase money to his solicitor, says: According to a very prevalent opinion, the Stamp Act of 1870 makes it necessary, when in the form of a request to the purchaser to pay to the vendor's solicitor, that the request should be stamped with a penny stamp, the contention being that it is in the nature of an order for payment of money; but if in the form of an authority to the vendor's solicitor to receive the purchase money, it is contended that it is in the nature of a power of attorney, and should consequently be stamped with a 10s. stamp."

DIVORCE.

A TREATISE OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: WITH THE PRAC TICE AND PROCEDURE IN DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CAUSES, &C. By W. ERNST, Judge of District Courts, Jamaica. William Ridgway; Stevens & Haynes.

Mr. Ernst's book is practical in character. He does not offer much in the way of original speculation or suggestion. Thus he dismisses the question in Sottomayor v. De Barros (26 W. R. 455, L. R. 3 P. D. 1) with the observation that "this decision rests upon the principle laid down in Brook v. Brook, and is to be distinguished from Simonin v. Mallac, inasmuch as in that case the forms only, and in this the essentials of the marriage law, were violated." No doubt, however, Mr. Ernst had not before him the subsequent judgment of Sir James Hannen (27 W. R. 917). Mr. Ernst's book will, however, we think, be useful to the practitioner. It is constructed on the plan of first stating the proposition to be supported, and then giving a more or less elaborate digest of the cases, with occasional extracts from the judgments, selected, so far as we have observed, with considerable discretion. The scope of the book covers the whole subject of the marriage laws of England, the practice in suits for dissolution, judicial separation, and restitution of conjugal rights; provision for the wife, settlements and custody of children, new trials and

appeals, and the procedure under the Legitimacy Declaration Act. An appendix gives the statutes, rules, forms, and table of fees, in full.

General Correspondence.

THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Cross to acquaint you of an error which has been pointed out to him in the printing of the loose forms 17 and 18, under the Summary Jurisdiction Act.

In the last line but six and the last line but five, the words "defendants" and "defendant," should be "informants" and "informant"; and I am to inform you that the printers have been instructed to correct these errors accordingly. Whitehall, Jan. 27.

GODFREY LUSHINGTON.

THE PROVISO FOR RE-ENTRY.
[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, With reference to your article on this subject, in last week's SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, you may perhaps be unaware that the suggestion in the concluding part of it, as to the qualification of the right of re-entry, has been already adopted in some of the London building leases.

I have now before me two building leases of property at the West End, in each of which the proviso for re-entry, upon breach of covenant other than the covenant for payment of rent, comes into force only if the "act or omission constituting such breach, &c., shall be persevered in for the space of twenty-one days after notice in writing."

I am very glad you have taken up the subject, which is, I think, one well worthy of discussion in your columns. ERNEST E. Lake.

Jan. 26.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Having read your interesting article in last Week's JOURNAL, entitled, "Should the Proviso for Re-entry be Qualified?" I send at foot a form of Proviso with a clause qualifying the effect of it, which is extracted from a lease granted by the trustees of a charity owning considerable house property in London. It appears to be pretty nearly the form of clause recommended in the last sentence of your article, except that it contains no alternative for making compensation to the lessor for any breach which cannot otherwise be made good.

"Provided always, and it is hereby agreed and declared, that if and whenever any part of the rent hereby reserved shall be in arrear for twenty-eight days, whether the same shall have been legally demanded or not, or if and whenever the lessee shall assign the premises hereby demised or any part thereof without such licence as aforesaid, or if and whenever there shall be a breach of any of the covenants by the lessee herein contained, the lessors may re-enter upon any part of the premises in the name of the whole, and thereupon the said term shall absolutely determine. Provided, nevertheless, that except for non-payment of rent within twenty-eight days as aforesaid, or for assignment of the premises, or any part thereof, without such licence as aforesaid, or for a breach of covenant committed or suffered after notice in writing of an intention to re-enter for the same, as hereinafter Amentioned, the power of re-entry herein before contained

shall not be exercised unless and until the lessors or their agents or surveyor shall have given to the lessee, or left on some part of the premises, a notice in writing of the intention to re-enter and of the specific breach or breaches of covenant in respect of which the re-entry is intended to be made, and default shall have been made by the lessee for three calendar months after the giving or leaving of such notice in repairing every such breach and in performing and observing every covenant referred to in such notice."

[The qualification we suggested is adopted in many leases and is to be found in at least one collection of

precedents. The only original point in our suggestion was that it should be annexed by Act of Parliament to all leases containing provisoes for re-entry.-ED. S. J.]

Cases of the Week.

LAND DRAINAGE ACT, 1861-NOTICE AS TO DRAINAGE WORKS APPLICATION TO JUSTICES INJUNCTION-PROHIBITION-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 25, SUB-SECTION 8.-In the case of Hedley v. Bates before the Master of the Rolls, on the 23rd inst., a question arose as to the construction of the Land Drainage Act, 1861, and as to the power of the court to restrain the justices in petty sessions from proceeding under it. By the above Act, if a landowner desires to drain his land, or execute other improvements, he may apply to the adjoining landowner for leave to make such drains or improvements; such application must be by notice in writing to be served in due course, stating the nature of the drains or improvements, and accompanied by a map delineating the proposed drains, and must state the compensation the applicant proposes to pay. If the adjoining landowner does not express his assent within a month, the landowner may apply to justices in petty sessions, and the justices may decide whether any injury will be caused by the proposed drains, and whether such injury is capable of being compensated for by money. If the justices decide any injury will be done capable of compensation, they may assess the compensation, and on payment thereof the applicant may proceed to make the drains. The defendant had given the plaintiffs a notice under the Act that he proposed to do the drainage works specified in the notice, shown on the accompanying plan, and that he proposed to pay the plaintiffs compensation according to the provisions of the Act. The plaintiffs on receipt of the notice moved to restrain the defendant from proceeding under his notice, on the ground that the notice was bad On the part of the defendant it was submitted that the court had no jurisdiction to interfere, inasmuch as 8 competent tribunal was pointed out in the Act, having jurisdiction in the matter. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the notice was not in accordance with the Act. Amongst other objections, it was not an application for leave to make the drains, and the accompanying map did not sufficiently delineate the length, width, and depth of the drains. As to the question whether he ought to interfere by injunction, he said that, as there was a question as to trespass also raised in the case, and as the object of the Judicature Act was to allow one court to decide all matters in dispute between the same parties relating to the same subject-matter, he considered, if he could properly decide the point as to the validity of the notice in this action, he ought to do so. Although the justices had jurisdiction in the matter, they had not an exclusive jurisdiction; and, being an inferior tribunal, any person might apply to a superior court for a prohibition, and, since the Judicature Act, every court had Low the power to grant a prohibition. The writ of prohibition remedy as an injunction, which acted as between the being only directed to the court was not such an effective parties. He thought this a case in which it would, within the meaning of section 25 of the Judicature Act, be "just and convenient" to grant an injunction. He was not, by any means, prepared to say that the justices would have jurisdiction to decide as to the validity of the notice. Most difficult questions might arise as to the meaning of the word "owner," as to service of the notice, and in fact they might be called upon to decide disputed ques

NATION OF QUESTION BETWEEN THIRD-PARTY AND ORIGINAL DEFENDANT-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 24, SUB-SECTION 3-ORD. 16, RR. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.-In a case of The Cartsburn, before the Court of Appeal on the 26th inst., a question arose as to the effect of a third party notice, and the power of the court to determine a question between the third party and the original defendant. A ship called The Slaria was run into and damaged by another ship called The Cartsburn, which was then being towed by a tug called The Leader. The action was brought by the owners of The Slavia against the owners of The Cartsburn. The plaintiffs alleged that the collision was occasioned by the neglect of The Cartsburn and The Leader, or one of them, and claimed damages from the owners of The Cartsburn. The statement of claim was delivered on the 14th of June, and on the 18th of June the defendants, in pursuance of leave previously given by the judge, served a third-party notice on the owner of The Leader, with a copy of the plaintiffs' statement of claim. This notice stated the nature of the action, and that "the defendants claim to be indemnified by you against liability in respect of the said alleged damage, on the ground that the liability of The Cartsburn, in respect of the alleged damage, if any, arises from the negligence and improper navigation of the master and crew of the tug Leader, in tow of which The Cartsburn was. And take notice that, if you wish to dispute the plaintiffs' claim in this action as against The Cartsburn or the defendants, you must cause an appearance to be entered for you within eight days after service of this notice. In default of your so appearing, you will not be entitled in any future proceeding between the defendants and yourself to dispute the validity of the judgment in this action, whether obtained by consent or otherwise." On the 25th of June the owners of The Leader entered an appearance, and on the 28th of June the owners of The Cartsburn applied to Sir R. Phillimore to give directions as to the mode of having the question in the action determined, and the following order was then made:"The judge, having heard counsel for the plaintiffs and the defendants, owners of The Cartsburn, ordered that Andrew Bain, owner of the steam-tug Leader, be at liberty to appear and defend, being bound as between him and the said defendants by any decision the court may come to in this action as to the cause of the collision." On the 19th of July, the owner of The Leader delivered to the plaintiffs a statement of defence, by which he alleged that The Cartsburn, though previously directed to do so, neglected to follow The Leader round the stern of a barque anchored near The Slavia, and ultimately came into collision with The Slavia, notwithstanding that those on board The Leader did all they could to bring The Cartsburn round, and that the collision was not caused by any default on the part of The Leader, but by the neglect or default of those on board The Slavia. On the 30th of July, the plaintiffs gave notice of trial to the owners of The Cartsburn and the owner of The Leader. The action was tried on the 6th of August. The owners of The Cartsburn did not appear. Witnesses were examined, and the following judgment was given :-" The judge, having heard counsel for the plaintiffs and for the owner of The Leader, pronounced the collision in question in this action to have been occasioned solely by the fault or default of the master and crew of the vessel Cartsburn, and for the damage proceeded for, and condemned the Owners of The Cartsburn and their bail in the damages and in costs. The judge further pronounced that the defendants, the owners of The Cartsburn, were not entitled to any contribution or indemnity against the owner of The Leader in respect of the said damages or costs, and he condemned the said defendants and their bail in the costs incurred by the co-defendant." Afterwards, the owners of The Cartsburn applied to the judge, by motion, that so much of the judgment in the action as declared that the owners of The Cartsburn were not entitled to any contribution or indemnity against the owner of The Leader, or decided anything as between them and the owner of The Leader, or gave

directions consequential upon such declaration or decision, might be struck out. On the 18th of November, the Judge refused this application. The plaintiffs did not appear on the hearing of the motion, notice of it having been given only to the owner of The Leader. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that so much of the judgment as pronounced that the owners of The Cartsburn were not entitled to any contribution or indemnity against the owner of The Leader must be struck out, as being a question not properly before the court for determination. JAMES, L.J., who delivered the judgment of the court, said that no litis contestatio had been established, no issue had been joined, and no trial had been had between the owners of The Cartsburn and the owner of the tug, and, therefore, any adjudication as between them was erroneous-was in truth coram non judice. The notice served on the owner of the tug evidently pointed at some future proceeding which might be taken by the owners of The Cartsburn against him, on the ground that, if the plaintiffs succeeded in the action, their success would be due to some fault on the part of the tug. But there was nothing in the notice amounting to a claim against the owner of the tug by virtue of which the owners of The Cartsburn could have obtained a judgment against him in the action. There was nothing equivalent to an action by the owners of The Cartsburn against the owner of the tug, and nothing which could have entitled the court to give a judgment in favour of the owners of The Cartsburn against the owner of the tug. And, if they could not have obtained a judgment against him, it seemed to follow that he could not obtain a judgment against them. So the matter stood upon the notice alone. Then came the order of the 28th of June, which was probably intended to put the matter in train for investigation, not only as between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but as between the two defendants themselves. But that order did not do that which it was quite competent for the court to have done-viz., direct the owners of The Cartsburn to bring in a claim by virtue of which, after the case had been disposed of as between the plaintiff and the defendants, any question arising between the defendants might have been put in train for decision. The plaintiffs were, of course, entitled to have their case decided before any question between the defendants was dealt with. Therefore, so much of the judgment as decided that the owners of The Cartsburn were not entitled to any contribution or indemnity against the owner of the tug must be struck out. It had been contended that the court ought to strike out also that part of the judgment which decided that the collision had been occasioned solely by the fault or default of the master and crew of The Cartsburn. Their lordships, however, thought that they were not now in a condition to interfere with that part of the judgment. It was alfinding as between the plaintiff's and the defendants, and was the finding upon which the judgment against The Cartsburn was based, the finding in consequence of which the plaintiffs were entitled to recover against The Cartsburn. Any interference with it in the absence of the plaintiffs would be a proceeding coram non judice. If the finding as to the cause of the collision were struck out, there would be nothing to bind the owner of The Leader at all, for that was the only thing by which he was to be bound. There might have been some difficulty in dealing with the case in the absence of any regular notice of appeal from the judgment, but the parties had not desired to raise this objection. His lordship added that it was very desirable that the order made in such cases should be so framed as to put the matter in proper train for decision as between the defendants and the third party; and BAGGALLAY, L. J., said that as at present advised, he was of opinion that the court had full jurisdiction to decide the question between the defendants and the owner of the tug, either by directing the pleadings to be amended, or by giving directions for the trial of the question after the trial of the question between the plaintiffs and the defendants. This observation seems in some degree to conflict with what was said by Mellish, L.J., in Treleaven v. Bray (24 W. R. 198, 20 SOLICITORS JOURNAL, 112.)

tions, on the ground that they were based on a fraudulent and misleading statement of the debtor's affairs. The debtor had filed a liquidation petition on the 24th of July, and the statement subsequently produced by him to the first meeting of his creditors purported to be a statement of his affairs on the 24th of July. It showed that his debts were £2,643, and that his assets were £461. He proposed to pay a composition of 4s. in the pound, in addition to the costs of the proceedings, and this offer was accepted by the proper majority of the creditors. The resolutions were confirmed at the second meeting, and were registered. Afterwards a dissentient creditor applied to the court to vacate the registration on the ground of fraud. Among the assets mentioned in the debtor's statement was "cash in hand, £120." This purported to be the balance standing to his credit at his bankers. The evidence showed that the statement had been drawn up on the 23rd of July, and that the £120 had been arrived at by adding to the balance shown by the banker's pass-book, when last made up, sums subsequently paid in, and deducting from that balance cheques which had been subsequently drawn. During the 23rd of July payments to the amount of £233 were made to the credit of the account with the bankers, but no mention was made of the £233 in the statement of affairs. Moreover, of the cheques, the amount of which had been deducted in arriving at the £120, one for £70 had been cashed by the debtor himself, and had been used for the purposes of his business, and another for £50 had been deposited with his solicitor to provide for the costs of the liquidation proceedings. Moreover, the debtor had omitted from his statement a debt of over £135, which was due to him for goods supplied, though it was not immediately payable, and had set down another debt as bad, in respect of which the person who owed it had agreed to pay a composition of 10s. in the pound, which payment was afterwards made. Mr. Registrar Brougham was of opinion that no fraudulent intent had been proved, and refused to cancel the registration; but the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that there had been a fraud within the meaning of section 127, and that the resolutions could not stand. They said that one of the conditions imposed by section 126 upon the Dower of the majority of the creditors to bind the dissenHentminority, was that the debtor should produce to the meetings a statement showing the whole of his assets and debts, and this must be a full, fair, and honest statement. The utmost good faith must be observed, and if this condition was not complied with, even a single dissentient creditor had a right to insist that he was not bound by the resolutions. In the present case the debtor had omitted a material part of his assets. COTTON, L.J., said that, even if the statement of affairs had been misleading, but the debtor had given a full explanation at the meeting, it would have been a serious question whether it could have been said that there had been a fraud. But no such explanation had been given in this case.

PARTNERS-BANKRUPTCY-JOINT AND SEPARATE ESTATEDEATH OF PARTNER-CONTINUATION OF BUSINESS-ALTERATION OF ESTATE. On the 22nd inst. the Court of Appeal (JAMES BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.), affirmed the decision of Bacon, C.J., in the case of In re Mellor (28 W. R. 186, L.R. 12 Ch. D. 917). A father and son had carried on business in partnership together. In November, 1875, the father died. By his will he appointed his widow, his son, and his son-in-law executors; and he devised and bequeathed to them as his trustees all his estate, real and personal, upon certain trusts, and he directed his trustees, at their discretion, either to wind up and dispose of, or to continue, either alone or in conjunction with any person or persons, any business in which he might be engaged at his death. And he empowered his trustees, at their discretion, to employ the capital employed in any business which they might continue to carry on in carrying on such business, and to employ in such business any money part of his general estate. All the three executors proved the will. Soon after the death of the testator, the widow and the son agreed verbally to carry on the business as before, subject to the provisions of the will; and they carried it on in the name of the old firm until November, 1877, when they filed a liquidation petition. The son-in-law (who was the third executor) took no part

in carrying on the business, though he was aware of its being continued. In the liquidation, the question arose whether the unpaid creditors of the old partnership were entitled to some assets of that partnership which still remained in specie. The judge of the County Court decided that these assets belonged to the creditors of the new partnership. The Chief Judge reversed this decision, and held that the assets in question belonged to the credi tors of the old partnership; and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, on the ground that the business had been carried on in a way which was not authorized by the testator's will. He had authorized his trustees to carry it on, whereas it had been carried on by only two of them. If any bargain had been made that the assets of the old partnership should become assets of the new one, it was an ineffectual bargain, because it had been entered into by persons who were not authorized to make it. The case was really governed by Ex parte Morley (21 W. R. 940, L. R. 8 Ch. 1026). Another point raised was this, that as the creditors of the old partnership knew of the carrying on of the business by the new partnership, the assets in question must be taken to have been in the order and disposition of the new partnership, with the consent of their true owners, the old creditors; reliance being placed for this purpose on the decision of Vice-Chancellor Malins in Kitchen v. Ibbetson (22 W. R. 68, L. R. 17 Eq. 46). The court, however, held that there was no foundation for this argument, and said that, if there had been anything in the point, it would have been raised in Ex parte Morley.

PRACTICE-EFFECT OF DISCONTINUANCE OF ACTION AFTER NOTICE OF APPEAL-COSTS-ORDER 23.-In a case of Conybeare v. Lewis, before the Court of Appeal on the 28th inst., the plaintiff had served notice of appeal from the refusal of Malins, V.C., to grant an interlocutory injunction. After the appeal had been set down, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that he had discontinued the action. The appeal was not removed from the list, and it came into the paper for hearing in its turn. When it was called on, the defendants insisted that they were entitled to have the costs of the appeal disposed of. JESSEL, M.R., said that the discontinuance of the action amounted to a withdrawal of the appeal, and the court could make no order upon it. The costs must be dealt with by the taxing master.

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-SPECIFIC BEQUEST SUBJECT TO PAYMENT OF DEBTS-LIABILITY TO COVENANTS IN LEASE COMPRISED IN RESIDUARY GIFT.-In a case of Hawkins v. Hawkins, before the Court of Appeal, on the 28th inst., testator had made a specific bequest of money and stock, after payment thereout of his lawful debts. And he gave the residue of his property to another person. The residue included a leasehold house, and the question arose whether the testator's liability at the time of his death in respect of dilapidations of the house and his liability in respect of future rent were debts which must be paid out of the specifically bequeathed property, or whether the residuary legatee took the lease cum onere. Malins, V.C., held that those liabilities must be discharged out of the specifically bequeathed property. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and COTTON, L.JJ.), held that the residuary legatee must take the lease cum onere, and that he was only entitled to have the rent accrued due up to the time of the testator's death discharged out of the specifically bequeathed property. JESSEL, M.R., said that in some cases the word debt" had been held to include a liability, but it had never been so held as between a specific and a residuary legatee.

GUARANTEE-CONSTRUCTION

- DETERMINATION DEATH OF GUARANTOR-CONTRACT FOR BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTYRIGHT TO SUE-MEASURE OF DAMAGES-FIDUCIARY RELATION. In a case of Lloyds v. Harper, before Fry, J., on the 24th inst., a question arose upon the construction of a guarantee. There was also a question whether the guarantee had been determined by the death of the guarantor, and a further question as to the right of the plaintiffs to maintain the action, on the ground that one of them had sustained only nominal damages, and the other signed the following letter, addressed to the committee of was a stranger to the contract. In the year 1863 a father the voluntary association, known as Lloyd's:-"My son R.

being a candidate for admission to Lloyd's as an underwriting member, I beg to tender my guarantee on his behalf, and to hereby hold myself responsible for all his engagements in that capacity." The committee accepted this guarantee, and admitted the son as an underwriting member. He continued to underwrite policies in that character until the year 1878, when he stopped payment, and thereupon, under the provisions of the rules, ceased to be a member. The father died in 1876. In 1871 the voluntary association was incorporated by Act of Parliament, under the name of Lloyd's, and all the rights of the committee were vested in the corporation. In 1879 the corporation brought the action against the executors of the father, to enforce the guarantee against his estate, joining with themselves, as co-plaintiffs, a firm of insurance brokers, not members of Lloyd's, to whom the son was, at the time of his stoppage, indebted on a balance of account in respect of policies underwritten by him since his father's death. The plaintiffs claimed payment out of the father's estate of the sum due to the brokers, and also that the persons entitled to the benefit of the guarantee and the amounts due to them respectively might be ascertained, and that the defendants might be ordered to pay out of, the testator's estate the sums so found due. Oa behalf of the defendants, it was urged that the guarantee did not extend to engagements contracted by the son on policies entered into with persons who were not members of Lloyd's, and that the guarantee was determined by the testator's death, or, at any rate, from the time when notice of his death was given to Lloyd's-that is to say, that from the time of his death, or, at any rate, from the time of the notice, his estate could not be made liable on the guarantee in respect of any policies underwritten by the son after the father's death. It was also urged that the corporation could not recover more than nominal damages, inasmuch as they were not liable upon any of the policies underwritten by the son, and that the co-plaintiff's were not entitled to maintain the action because they were strangers to the contract. FRY, J., held that the guarantee extended to all the engagements of the son as a member of Lloyd's, whether entered into with members of Lloyd's or with outsiders, and that it was not determined by the father's death, but continued in operation so long as the son continued to enter into engagements as a member of Lloyd's. His lordship also held that the committee of Lloyd's had received the guarantee for the benefit of all the persons with whom the son should enter into engage ments as a member of Lloyd's. The committee therefore, and the corporation their as successors, were quasi-trustees for all those persons; and in that character the corporation were entitled to maintain the action. His lordship accordingly gave judgment for the plaintiffs in substance according to their claim. But he added that on the last point he desired to look further into the authorities, and that he would mention the case again if he saw any reason to change his view.

PRACTICE-APPEAL-FINAL OR INTERLOCUTORY LIST.-In

a case of The Attorney-General v. Tomline, bofore the Court of Appeal on the 28th inst., the appeal was from an order of Fry, J., refusing to vary the chief clerk's certificate as to the amount of the damages to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. The action was brought to restrain the defendant from digging for coprolites in some land which was vested in the Secretary of State for War for military purposes. Fry, J., at the trial granted an injunction, and directed an inquiry as to damages. The defendant took out a summons to vary the chief clerk's certificate. JESSEL, M.R., said that this was really an appeal from a final order, and it ought not to have been set down in the interlocutory list.

Societies.

WOLVERHAMPTON LAW ASSOCIATION. The annual meeting of the Wolverhampton Law Association was held on Monday week, in the large_room of the Law Library, Darlington-street, Mr. HORATIO BREVITT, the president for the past year, in the chair. Among those present were Messrs. H. H. Fowler, E. H. Thorne, John Riley, C. B. Smith, Thomas Walker, J. W. Stirk, H. C. Owen, George W. Walker, S. W. Page, &c.

A report of the last year's proceedings was presented by the committee, together with the balance-sheet of the treasurer, and these documents showed that during the past year the association had done good work, and was now in a flourishing condition.

Mr. J. W. Stirk was elected president, and Mr. H. C. Owen vice-president, for the ensuing year; and Messrs. C. B. Smith and S. W. Page were re-elected secretary and treasurer respectively.

A committee having been appointed, the usual complimentary votes were passed to the officers for the past year, and the proceedings terminated.

In the evening, the annual dinner took place at the Star and Garter Hotel, under the presidency of Mr. J. W. Stirk, the newly-elected president, Mr. Herbert C. Owen being in the vice-chair. Mr. W. D. Griffith (county court judge) was also present, and letters were read from Mr. J. J. Powell, Q.C. (recorder), Mr. R. A. Kettle, and Mr. Haden Corser (deputy stipendiary), regretting their inability to attend. "The Queen" was the only toast proposed.

Law Student's Journal.

COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION.
EASTER EXAMINATION, 1880.

Examination of Candidates for Pass Certificates. The attention of students is requested to the following rules:

No student admitted after the 31st of December, 1872, shall receive from the council the certificate of fitness for call to the bar required by the four Inns of Court unless he shall have passed a satisfactory examination in the of real and personal property; (3) Common law; and (4) following subjects-viz., (1) Roman law; (2) The law Equity.

No student admitted after the 31st of December, 1872, shall be examined for call to the bar until he shall have kept nine terms; except that students admitted after that day shall have the option of passing the examination in Roman law at any time after having kept four terms.

An examination will be held in March next, to which a student of any of the Inns of Court, who is desirous of becoming a candidate for a certificate of fitness for being called to the bar, will be admissible.

Each student proposing to submit himself for examination will be required to enter his name, personally or by letter, at the treasurer's or steward's office of the Inn of Court to which he belongs, on or before Monday, the 1st day of March next; and he will further be required to state in writing whether his object in offering himself for examination is to obtain a certificate preliminary to a call to the bar; or whether he is merely desirous of passing the examination in Roman law under the above-stated rule.

The examination will commence on Tuesday, the 16th day of March next, and will be continued on the Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday following.

It will take place in the hall of Lincoln's-inn; and the doors will be closed ten minutes after the time appointed for the commencement of the examination.

The examination by printed questions will be conducted in the following order:-Tuesday morning, March 16, at ten until one, on the law of real and personal property; Wednesday morning, March 17, at ten until one, on common law; Thursday morning, March 18, at ten until one, on equity; Friday morning, March 19, at ten until one, on Roman law; Friday afternoon March 19, at two until five, on constitutional law and legal history.

The oral examination will be conducted in the same. order, and on the same subjects, as above appointed for the examination by printed questions.

NOTE.-Only students admitted prior to January 1, 1873, and who are candidates for a pass certificate, have an option of passing in constitutional law and legal history, or Roman law; common law or equity; and real and personal property law.

The examiner in the law of real and personal property will examine in the following subjects:-The creation, devolution, and disposition inter vivos, and by will, of estates, and interests in and powers over real and personal property, including estates and interests, by way of statu