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explanation, inasmuch as it is with them that the suggestion of borrowing money and making a bill of sale originates, and it is by them that the transaction is carried out.

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In Ex parte Carter, In Re Threappelton (27 W. R. 953), Bacon, C. J., held that it was not necessary that the affidavit should state in terms that before the execution of the bill of sale its effect had been explained to the grantor by the attesting solicitor. Probably, however, few practitioners will omit to add this statement, considering that the statute requires the affidavit to be "of the due . . attestation" of the bill of sale. A few words may be added as to the question whether the attesting solicitor of the bill of sale may be the solicitor of the grantor. An impression has gained ground, so far as we know unsupported by any reported case, but understood to have been sanctioned by judicial opinion, that the solicitor of the grantor must not be the attesting solicitor. So far as this view is founded on the Warrant of Attorney Acts we think it is a mistake, for under those Acts the attorney is not merely required to attest, but to have been expressly named by the defendant and to be attending at his request. As Alderson, B., pointed out in Mason v. Kiddle (5 M. & W. 573), the original rule under the Acts was "that the cognovit must be executed in the presence of an attorney. Under that rule it was held sufficient if it was executed in the presence of the plaintiff's attorney. This was found to lead to inconvenience and fraud, and it was therefore added to the rule that the attorney should be expressly named by the defendant and attending on his behalf. That clearly means an attorney other than the plaintiff's. The Act of Parliament has now embodied these rules, and made them the law of the land." It will be seen that so long as the Acts were in pari materia with the provision in section 10 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, it was held that the attorney of the person executing the warrant might properly act as the attorney who was to inform him of its nature and effect; and it was only when words were added which are not to be found in the Bills

of Sale Act, that the courts held that the plaintiff's attorney could not act for this purpose. But we need hardly say that, as matters stand at present, prudence will dictate the employment of another solicitor to explain the effect of the bill of sale to the grantor.

Reviews.

STATUTORY LAW.

THE CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF STATUTORY LAW, WITH AN APPENDIX. BY HENRY HARDCASTLE, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. London : Stevens &

Haynes.

It has recently been said that law books may be divided into two divisions-viz., those which treat of the theory of a subject, and those which contain positive rules in force. It is to the latter of the two classes that the present treatise belongs, and its object is twofold. It aims at settingforth in a methodical way (1) the legal rules for the interpretation of British statutes, and (2), having ascertained how statutes are to be interpreted, to explain their effect and operation. For a work of such a character the author's plan of arranging the subject-matter in a series of distinct propositions, each of which, when mastered, may be readily applied to different sets of facts, and form a definite basis for legal arguments, is well adapted, and Mr. Hardcastle has, we think, done his work well. As a compilation-and the book claims to be nothing more-it appears to be accurate, complete, and clear. The volume concludes with a useful appendix, containing a list of words and expressions used in statutės that have received judicial or statutory construction.

General Carrespondence.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.-A.Z., Next week.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE EFFECTS OF A DECEASED SOCIETY.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I see it is stated that the Legal Practitioners' Society is now no more except for the purpose of disposing of the funds in hand. Allow me to suggest through your paper that the said fands, whatever their amount, should be divided equally between the Solicitors' and Barristers' Benevolent Associations. A SUBSCRIBER.

Cases of the Week.

TRADE-MARK - INJUNCTION-ONUS OF PROOF-DECEP. TION OF ULTIMATE PURCHASERS-EXTENT OF INJUNCTION.On the 20th inst. the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of Fry, J., in the case of Orr Ewing & Co. v. Johnston (27 W. R. 575, 23 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 406). The action was brought to restrain an alleged infringemeat of the plaintiff's' trade-mark. The plaintiffs and the defendants were both manufacturers of Turkey red yarn, which was exported to Bombay, and other The plaintiff's had, for many years, places in the East. affixed to the packets in which their yarn was made up, a ticket, upon which were embossed a crown, between two elephants, and under the crown a banner. On the banner was printed, in Guzerathi characters, the name of the plaintiffs' firm. The defendants had recently adopted a ticket of similar shape and colour. On it also were embossed two elephants, but between them was, instead of a crown, the figure of a Hindoo idol. The elephants were in a different position from those on the plaintiffs' ticket, and each had on its back a howdah with a native in it, whereas the plaintiffs' elephants had nothing on their backs. Under the idol fendants' firm, in English letters. was a banner, on which was printed the name of the deThe defendants had only recently introduced their goods into the Bombay market, and previously to their doing so, they had used a ticket on which was embossed the figure of the idol alone. The evidence showed that the plaintiffs' yarn had been known in the Bombay market as "Bhe Hathi " (i.e., two-elephant) yarn, and that no other yarn was known there by that name. It was asked for and sold under that name. There was no evidence of any actual deception of purchasers by means of the defendants' ticket, but there was evidence that, though the dealers in Bombay would not be deceived, it was probable that the ultimate purchasers of the yarn-i.e., the native weavers, who lived up the country-would be deceived. Fry, J., held that the defendants had taken a material and substantial part of the plaintiffs' ticket-viz., the two elephants, which had given the name to their goods in the Bombay market, and that it was the duty of the defendants to use such precautions that all reasonable probability of error and deception would be avoided, and that the onus was on the defendants to show that that the defendants had not discharged, and he granted an they had used those precautions. This onus, his lordship held injunction to restrain the defendants from using the ticket which they had adopted, or otherwise imitating the plaintiff's ticket. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.), were of opinion that the defendants' ticket was clearly calculated to deceive, and that it had been used by the defendants under circumstances of suspicion, and, this being so, they agreed with Fry, J., that the onus was on the defendants to prove that their ticket had not been adopted improperly. And the court held that the injunction had been rightly granted. It was objected, on behalf of the defendants, that the injunction ought not to be a general one, but that it ought to extend only to the use of the defendants' ticket in those markets in which the deception had taken place, and ought not to prevent the defendants from using it in any other places. The court, however, said that as the defendants had not used their ticket in any other places, and had not alleged that they intended to do so, there was no reason for limiting the generality of the injunction.

ADJUDICATION OF BANKRUPTCY-ANNULLING WITH CONSENT OF PETITIONING CREDITOR.-On the 15th inst. an application was made to the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.) to annul an adjudication of bankruptcy (an appeal from which had been previously dismissed), with the consent of the petitioning creditor. The act of bankruptcy was the non-compliance with a debtor's summons issued by the petitioning creditor. The adjudication had not been advertised, and the order of the Court of Appeal had not been drawn up. The court at first felt some difficulty in acceding to the application, on the ground that an adjudication, when once made, enured for the benefit of all the bankrupt's creditors, and that there was no proof that the other creditors had been paid, or that they consented to the annulling of the adjudication. Bat, ultimately, under the special circumstances of the case, the court said that they would treat the application as a continuation of the hearing of the appeal, and would anual the adjudication. JAMES, L.J., added that the debt established by the petitioning creditor was only a little above £50, and there had been a very nice question of account between the parties.

BANKRUPTCY PETITION WITHDRAWAL BY DEBTOR OF NOTICE TO DISPUTE PETITIONING CREDITOR'S DEBT-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 8, 9-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, R. 36.-In a case of Ex parte Learoyd, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., the question arose whether a debtor, against whom a bankruptcy petition had been presented, and who had withdrawn a notice which he had given, under rule 36, of his intention to dispute the petitioning creditor's debt, was entitled afterwards on the hearing of the petition to dispute the amount of the debt. The petition was presented on the 6th of August, and it alleged a debt of £70. On the 22nd of August the debtor gave notice of his intention to dispute the debt. The hearing of the petition was from time to time adjourned by consent, and on the 19th of September the debtor withdrew his notice. The petition came on for hearing on the 11th of December. The debtor had not given any fresh notice of his intention to dispute the debt, but he tthen proposed to prove that less than £50 was due, and the registrar allowed him to give evidence that he had paid

he creditor since the withdrawal of the notice a sum which reduced the amount due below £50. The petitioning creditor was not himself present, and the registrar rofused an application on his behalf for an adjournment to enable him to come and give evidence to contradict that of the debtor, and the petition was dismissed. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the debtor was not precluded from disputing the debt, but that the petitioning creditor ought to have had an opportunity of being heard, and they remitted the case to the registrar for that purpose.

The

PROOF IN BANKRUPTCY-SOLICITOR'S BILL OF COSTSTAXATION-6 & 7 VICT. c. 73, s. 37.-In a case of In re Woods, before the Court of Appeal, on the 15th inst., the question arose whether a solicitor who had tendered a proof in a bankruptcy in respect of a bill of costs which be alleged to be due to him from the bankrupts, was entitled to insist upon having the bill taxed by the taxing master of the court. The proof tendered was for £574; the trustee had admitted it to the extent of £400. bankrupts had carried on a proprietary club, which they had before their bankruptcy attempted to make over to a joint stock company, and for that purpose a prospectus and circulars had been sent to all the members of the club. In the solicitor's bill a charge was made for drawing the prospectus and the circulars, and also a charge (at the rate of 23. per copy) for "copies of the prospectus and circulars, addressing, postages, &c." As there were 900 copies of each, this charge amounted to more than £200. No signed bill had been delivered to the bankrupts. The solicitor applied to the court to reverse the trustee's decision. Evidence was given by a printer that his charge for setting up the prospectus in type and printing 1,000 copies would have been £3 15s., and that his charge for lithographing the circulars and printing 1,000 copies would have been £2 28. for each. During the hearing the registrar consulted the taxing master as to what would have been allowed

on each copy of the prospectus and circulars on taxation, and he said that 3d. would have been allowed on each copy to cover postages, &c. The solicitor insisted that he had a right to have his bill referred to the taxing master for taxation in the ordinary way, but the registrar declined to refer it, and affirmed the decision of the trustee. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the registrar had taken the right course, and affirmed his decision. JAMES, L.J., said that, though a solicitor had a right, under section 37 of the above Act, to apply for a reference to taxation after the expiration of a month from the delivery of a signed bill, he had no absolute right to have the amount due to him determined by taxation alone. When a proof was tendered in bankruptcy for a bill of costs the registrar had a right to deal with it, taking proper assistance if necessary. And that was what the registrar had actually done in this case. The delivery of a signed bill was not made by the Act a condition precedent to proof by the solicitor in the bankruptcy of the client. COTTON, L.J., said that taxation was not the only way in which a client was entitled to protect himself. If an action was brought by a solicitor for his costs, no doubt in an ordinary case the judge and the jury would not go through the items of te bill, which could be much better dealt with in the taxing master's office. But in the present case the items in question all involved the same principle, and, as the solicitor had not any statutory right to have the proper amount of his charges ascertained in one way only, the registrar was perfectly entitled to deal with the case as he did. And the court expressed an opinion that the charges made for the prospectus and circulars were improper, and said that a solicitor had no right to make a profit on the printing, addressing, and posting of documents for his client, which was not professional work at all.

LIQUIDATION-REGISTRATION OF RESOLUTIONS-VOTING OF CREDITORS AT MEETING-BLANK PROXY-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 80, SUB-SECTION 8-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, R. 85-BANRRUPTCY FORMS, 1870, No. 32.-In a case of Ex parte Duce, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., the question arose whether the solicitor of a debtor who had filed a liquidation petition, to whom one of blank, was entitled, without any express instructions so to the creditors had sent a proof of debt with a proxy signed in do, to fill up the blank with his own name, and to vote on behalf of the creditor in favour of accepting a composition offered by the debtor. The solicitor of one of the creditors wrote to the debtor's solicitor asking him to send him a form of proof of debt, as the one which had been sent to his client had been mislaid. In answer to this request, the debtor's solicitor sent a form of proof, asking, at the same time, that it might be sent back to him by return of post, as the second meeting of the creditors was fixed to be held in a few days. The creditor filled up the form of proof thus sent to him, and made the affidavit, and he also signed the form of proxy at the foot of the proof, but did not fill in the name of any person as his proxy. He then handed the proof and proxy to his solicitor, who returned it to the debtor's solicitor, without giving him any express directions as to the use of the proxy. The debtor's solicitor filled in the blank with his own name, and voted at the meeting in the name of the creditor in favour of a composition offered by the debtor. The creditor afterwards opposed the registration of the resolations accepting the composition, but was met by the objection that he had himself voted in favour of them. He then applied to the court to take his proxy off the file of the proceedings, and to erase his vote. He deposed that he intended the blank to be filled up with the name of his own solicitor or his clerk, and that he never intended to appoint the debtor's solicitor his proxy. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of the Chief Judge, refusing the application. They held that, under the circumstances, the sending of the blank proxy to the debtor's solicitor implied an authority to him to insert his own name as the proxy, and to vote on the creditor's behelf.

LIQUIDATION PETITION-GENERAL MEETING OF CREDITORS -REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE-VOTING-CREDITOR PRESENT BUT NOT DESIRING TO VOTE-PROXY-SALE OF DEBTS-BONA FIDES BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 16, 80-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, RR. 85, 269, 271, 273, 293, 305, 307.—

In a case of Ex parte Evans, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., a question arose as to the applicability of the rule laid down by the Court of Appeal in Ex parte Orde (19 W. R. 1103, L. R. 6 Ch. 881). In that case it was held that every creditor who has handed in his proof of debt at the first meeting under a liquidation petition must, unless he withdraws his proof as provided by rule 273, be taken to be present at the meeting, and to have dissented from the resolutions proposed, unless he has signed them as voting in their favour. If he desires not to be considered as present, he must withdraw his proof under rule 273. In Ex parte Evans a debtor had filed a liquidation petition, and the creditors had resolved on a liquidation by arrangement, and bad appointed a trustee. Two years after some of the creditors, professing to be one-fourth in value of those who had proved their debts, summoned a general meeting of the creditors for the purpose of removing the trustee. The meeting was held, and a resolution to remove the trustee was proposed, and it purported to have been passed by the proper majority in value of the creditors personally present, or represented by proxy, at the meeting. The registration of the resolution was opposed by some of the dissentient creditors, on the ground (inter alia) that a creditor, named Scrivener, who was actually present at the meeting, was not inserted in the list of those who were present. He was a creditor in his own right for £105, and he also held a proxy for a Mrs. Simpson, who was a creditor for £5,473. His proof, and that of Mrs. Simpson, were on the file of proceedings, as was also the proxy. At the meeting he stated that he had no intention of voting upon the resolution. It was objected, on the authority of Ex parte Orde, that, as the proofs had not been withdrawr, both he and Mrs. Simpson ought to have been counted as present at the meeting. His own debt would have made no difference, but the result of counting Mrs. Simpson as present would have been that the resolution would not have been carried by the proper majority in value. Mr. Registrar Murray overruled the objection, and the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and COTTON, L.JJ.) affirmed his decision. They said that the principle of Ex parte Orde did not apply to the case of a creditor who was entitled to be present both in his own right and as proxy for another creditor. A proxy only conferred an authority to represeut the principal; it did not of necessity make the person ap. pointed proxy the representative of the principal on every subsequent occasion. The proxy could not be taken to represent the principal unless he had done some act to show that he was present on his behalf on the particular occasion. The proxy might have been revoked, or the principal might have told the proxy not to appear for him on the particular occasion. The persons present ought to be asked for whom they appeared, and their names should be inserted in the list of creditors accordingly. Of course, if a person was not entitled to be present in his own right, but could only appear as proxy for some one else, it would be a different thing. Their lordships reserved their opinion on the question whether Ex parte Orde applied at all to meetings subsequent to the registration of liquidation or composition resolutions, when proofs could not be withdrawn without an application to the court. Arother objection to the registration of the resolutions was that some of the creditors who had signed the notice summoning the meeting, and had voted for the resolution, had previously sold their debts to another creditor, against whom the trustee had instituted proceedings in relation to the debtor's estate. Their votes were, therefore, it was said, really the vote of the creditor who had an interest in the removal of the trustee, and this tainted the whole proceeding. The court held that there was no force in this objection, because the voting creditors stood in no fiduciary position to the other creditors, it not being a case where the rights of a minority were to be affected by the votes of a majority.

RECEIVER-APPLICATION BY MORTGAGOR IN POSSESSION -ACTION FOR FORECLOSURE BY EQUITABLE MORTGAGEEDISPUTED MORTGAGE.-In a case of Tafft v. Whinney, before the Master of the Rolls on the 16th inst., the action was one by an equitable mortgagee for foreclosure, and a motion was made by the defendant, the mortgagor in possession, for a receiver. The grounds of the application were that the property was unlet, that the plaintiff's mortgage was disputed,

and that no person could deal with the property except under the authority of the court. The defendant asked for the appointment of himself as receiver without salary, and without security, and eventually the MASTER OF THE ROLLS made the order for a receiver in that form. He also gave leave to either party to tender for a sale of the property.

PRACTICE-EXAMINATION BEFORE EXAMINER--REFUSAL TO SIGN DEPOSITIONS-FORM OF ORDER.-In a case of Stein v. Stephen, te'ore the Master of the Rolls on the 16th inst., it appeared that a party who had been crossexamined before the examiner refused to attend to complete his re-examination, or to sign the depositions. A motion was made that he might be ordered to attend and complete his re-examination and sign the depositions. The respondent did not appear, and the MASTER OF THE ROLLS said that it was unnecessary to require the person to attend and be reexamined, which was for his own benefit, and the order be should make would simply be for the examiner to file the depositions without their being signed.

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BURIAL ACTS-CLOSING OF CEMETERY-PRESENT INTER. MENTS ORDERS IN COUNCIL INTERFERENCE WITH OWNER IN FEE-ULTRA VIRES-PRACTICE-INQUIRY AS TO DAMAGES DIRECTED BEFORE OFFICIAL REFEREE.In the case of Jacobson v. St. Pancras Vestry, before the Master of the Rolls on the 19th inst., a question was raised as to the right of a vestry to interfere with the owner in fee of a piece of ground formerly used as a burial-ground. It appeared there had been no burials since 1850, and that in the year 1853 the ground was by an Order in Council, under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 85, formally closed for the purposes of burial. The Act, however, reserves the rights of particular persons to bury in a closed burial-ground provided the previous sanction of the Secretary of State is obtained. In 1857 the ground was in the possession of mortgagees who had begun to deface the tomb-stones, and the owners of the graves filed a bill, and the mortgagees were restrained by injunction from doing any act to prevent future interments in the event of such interments being permitted by the Secretary of State. The case is reported sub nom. Merland v. Richardson (24 Beav. 33). In 1862 the ground was sold in building lots by the Court of Chancery, and the present plaintiff purchased the land in question, but subject to the rights, if any, of the owners of private graves, as defined by Merland v. Richardson. In 1864 and 1865 Orders in Council were made under the supposed authority of the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 81, s. 20, as amended by 22 Vict. c. 1, s. 1, but they were not acted upon, and the land continued waste land. In 1879 complaints were made to the vestry of the condition of the ground, and they proceeded to lay it out as a garden, whereupon the plaintiff commenced this action. The plaintiff relied on Foster v. Dodds (L. R. 3 Q. B. 67), as showing that the Orders in Council were invalid as not having been made in reference to a place then used for burials. The defendants, however, contended that the decision in Merland v. Richardson was sufficient to distinguish the case. The MASTER OF THE ROLLS was of opinion that the case was in effect covered by Foster v. Dodds, and he accordingly granted an injunction to restrain the vestry from interfering with the plaintiff's freehold, and gave him leave to take an inquiry as to damages before the official referee. He said that where an inquiry involved the taking of viva voce evidence, he always directed the same before the official referees instead of his chief clerks.

PRACTICE-ORDER OF COURSE FOR TAXATION-WHERE OBTAINABLE-NEW RULES OF COURT.-During a case of In re Argles and Rawlins, before the Master of the Rolls on the 20th inst.-a case for a review of taxation-his LORDSHIP took occasion to remark on the number of taxation matters that come before him. He said that under the new rules of court his sccretary became an officer of the High Court, and, therefore, the power to issue orders of course was not now limited to his secretary, but such orders could now be issued by the judges of the other branches of the court, and by their chief clerks.

PRACTICE-PREPARATION OF BRIEF ON SUMMONS-COSTS -DISALLOWANCE.-In a case of Lacey y. Hill, before the Master of the Rolls on the 20th inst., an application wa

made for a review of the master's taxation in reference to the costs of preparation of a brief on the summons, which were very heavy, and upon which the whole question, involving a sum of about £600,000, had been decided. The case had eventually gone to the House of Lords. The taxation was as between solicitor and client, but the taxing master had disallowed all costs for preparation of the brief on the hearing of the summons. JESSEL, M.R., said that the practice in the case of briefs on summonses was not to allow anything for preparation of the brief. The question that the matter was very heavy made no difference; besides, the applicants had already had sufficient allowed them for costs, and he should make no order on the application.

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT SUBJECT TO CONTINGENCY. -In a case of Blight v. Hartnoll, before Fry, J., on the 17th inst., a question arose on the construction of a will, whether a contingency, which was attached to a particular gift, affected the subsequent limitations. A testatrix gave to her sister, during her life, an annuity of £50, charged on the rental of a wharf, and, after her death, the testatrix directed that the annuity should be paid to her daughter S., during her life. And, after her death, she directed her executors to pay the annuity to L., the daughter of S, during her life, and if L., after having commenced to receive the annuity, should die before the expiration of the term of years under which the wharf was let, the testatrix directed her executors to continue to pay the annuity out of the rental to the then surviving children of L. in equal shares, and, in the event of there being then or at any future time no such surviving children of L., then the testatrix directed her executors to pay the annuity out of the rental to the surviving children of her daughter S. in equal shares. The testatrix died in 1854. L. died unmarried in 1870. S. died in 1875, and the sister of the testatrix died in 1877. The result was that L. had not died "after having commenced to receive the annuity," and the question was whether, under such circumstances, the subsequent limitations to the surviving children of her mother could have any operation; and whether the children of S. took the annuity or it was undisposed of and fell into the residue. FRY, J., said that this depended upon whether the gift to the surviving children of S. was an independent and substantive gift, or whether it was one of a series of gifts all of which depended upon L.'s commencing to receive the annuity. His lordship held that the gift was an independent one. The testatrix had dealt with two contingencies-the death of L. after having commenced to receive the annuity, and there being no surviving children of L.-and following each of them there was a separate direction to pay the annuity. This led to the conclusion that the gifts were intended to be independent. The gift, therefore, to the surviving children of S. was not affected by the prior contingency, and the annuity would go to the children of S. who survived at the death of the sister of the testatrix.

The Daily Chronicle says, it is stated that the hall of Serjeant's Inn, Chancery-lane, which, with the other blocks of buildings forming the inn, was some time ago purchased by the late Mr. Serjeant Cox, is about to undergo a conversion into offices, now that it is no longer required for its original purpose, in consequence of the serjeants, as a body, having ceased to exist. On Wednesday the furniture and effects belonging to the hall were sold by auction in the dining-room of the hall, and consisted of upwards of 60 lots, including the large dining table, at which many eminent judges and serjeants have in past times feasted. The antique dinner service, containing 144 pieces, each piece bearing the arms of Serjeant's Inn, also formed one of the lots. Nominal prices only were realised, and the memorials of the ancient Inn of the serjeants have now in many instances passed into the hands of the Wardourstreet brokers and other dealers in antiquated relics. The dinner service, which for so many years past had been utilised for the entertainment of some of our brightest legal luminaries, was sold for the nominal sum of £1 5s., although in excellent condition. It is said that in the contemplated alterations the external features of the west frontage of the hall will not be disturbed. An inscription beneath the pediment records that the hall was erected more than 200 years ago, namely in 1678,

Societies.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. The usual monthly meeting of the Board of Directors of this association was held at the Law Institution, Chancerylane, London, on Wednesday, January 14; Mr. S. Smith in the chair; the other directors present being Messrs. Asker (Norwich), Brook, Gregory, M.P., Hedger, Kays, Paterson, Pennington, Rickman, Roscoe, Rose, Styan, and Woolbert (Mr. Eiffe, secretary). A sum of £135 was distributed in grants of relief, nine gentlemen were admitted as members of the association, and other general business was transacted.

Obituary.

MR. THOMAS MORGAN.

Mr. Thomas Morgan, solicitor, of Cardigan, died at his residence at that place, on the 28th ult., after a few days' illness. Mr. Morgan was born in 1802, and was admitted a solicitor in 1833, and soon afterwards went into partnership with the lato Mr. Lewis Evans, town clerk of Cardigan, and clerk to the borough magistrates. Mr. Morgan was himself for several years town clerk of the borough and clerk to the Cardigan Urban Sanitary Authority, but about five years ago he retired from office on account of failing health. He had been for the last few years in partnership with Mr. Charles Evans Richardson. Morgan had a good private practice.

Mr.

MR. ROBERT BAYLEY FOLLETT. Mr. Robert Bayley Follett, many years one of the taxing masters of the Chancery Division, died on the 11th inst. Mr. Follett was the son of the late Mr. Benjamin Follett, solicitor, of 2, Paper-buildings, and was a brother of the late Sir William Follett, and of Mr. Brent Spencer Follett, Q.C., the registrar of the Land Registry Office. He was born in 1804, and was admitted a solicitor in 1827, and soon afterwards succeeded to his father's practice. In 1842, he received from Lord Lyndhurst the appointment of taxing master of the Court of Chancery, and discharged the duties of that office for over thirty years. A few years ago he retired on a pension. Mr. Follett was a director of the Legal and General Life Assurance Society.

MR. JOHN NEWBOULD.

Mr. John Newbould, solicitor (of the firm of Newbould & Gould), died at Sharrow Bank, Sheffield, on the 20th inst., after a few days' illness. Mr. Newbould was the second son of Mr. Henry Newbould, of Sheffield, and was born in 1823. He served his articles with Messrs. Rickards & Walker, of Lincolu's-inn-fields, and was admitted a solicitor in 1848. He had practised for over thirty years at Sheffield, and during the last twelve years had been in partnership with Mr. Thomas Gould. His private practice was very large. He took an active part in local business, and was a constant supporter of religious and educational projects. For several years he was church warden of St. Andrew's, Sharrow, and he was local treasurer to the National Society. He was a member of the Sheffield School Board, and a governor of the Sheffield General Infirmary and of the Sheffield and Hallamshire Savings Bank. He was an active member of of the local Conservative party. Mr. Newbould's funeral will take place to-day at Eccleshall.

Appointments, Etc.

Mr. WALTER MAY BARTON, solicitor, of East Derehar, has been slected Clerk to the Magistrates for the Division of Mitford and Launditch, Clerk to the Mitford und Laundicth Board of Guardians, Royal Sanitary Authority, and Assesment Committee, Superintendent Registrar, and Clerk to the Commissioners of Taxes for Mitford and

Launditch, on the resignation of his partner, Mr. Charles Wright. Mr. Barton was admitted a solicitor in 1870, and was a prizeman of the Incorporated Law Society. He is also deputy-coroner for the Liberty of the Duchy of Lancaster, and for the Liberty of the Duke of Norfolk, and clerk to the Dereham Burial Board.

Mr. HENRY J. L. GRAHAM, who has filled the office of Principal Secretary to the Lord Chancellor since 1874, has been appointed by the Lord Chancellor to succeed Mr. Barlow as Master in Lunacy, which office Mr. Barlow has resigned.

Mr. JOHN HANDS, of 60, Queen Victoria-street, E.C., solicitor, has been appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario, Canada, a Commissioner for taking Affidavits for all Courts in that Province.

Mr. HENRY SNAITH, solicitor, of Boston, has been elected Clerk to the Holland Fen Highway Board, and Clerk to the Swine'shead School Board. Mr. Smith was admitted a solicitor in 1875.

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP.

JOHN TAYLOR and FRANCIS JAMES TAYLOR, solicitors, Bakewell (John & F. Taylor). January 1. (Gazette, January 16.

Companies.

WINDING-UP NOTICES. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

ROCHDALE PROPERTY AND GENERAL FINANCE COMPANY, LIMITED.By an order made by V.C. Bacon dated Jan 5, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Clarke and Co, Lncoln's inn fields, 80licitors for the petitioner

[Gazette, Jan. 16.] JEFFRESTON ANTHRACITE COAL COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented Jan 15, directed to be heard before the M.R. on Jan 31. Norris and Co, Bedford row, solicitors for the petitioners STANSFIELD PRINTING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Creditors are required, on or before Feb 18, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts and claims, to William Eckersley Guest, 42, George st, Manchester. Feb 26, at 12, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims

W. AND J GARFORTH, LIMITED.-V.C. Hall has, by an order dated Jan 9, appointed Robert Joseph Fletcher, Ashton-under-Lyne, to be official liquidator.

[Gazette, Jan 20.]

UNLIMITED IN CHANCERY. LONDON AND EASTERN BANKING CORPORATION.-V.C. Bacon will, at his chambers, 11, New sq, Lincoln's inn, on Feb 3, at 12, appoint a sole official manager in the place of John Ball, deceased [Gazette, Jan 16.1

STANNARIES OF CORNWALL. NORTH TRESKERBY MINING COMPANY.-By an order by Vice-Warden, dated Jan 14, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Hodge and Co, Truro, solicitors for the petitioners

[Gazette, Jan 20.]

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED. CHEADLE CATHOLIC FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Cheadle, Stafford, Jan 14 [Gazette, Jan 20.]

Solicitors' Cases.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, IRELAND.
CHANCERY DIVISION.

(Before the LORD CHANCELLOR of Ireland.)
Jan. 19.-In re Davidson.

An application was made in the course of last Michaelmas Sittings that Mr. Davidson be allowed to present himself at the final examination which was to take place during the present sittings, notwithstanding that he had only served four years under the indentures. The ground of the application was that the applicant had attended a three years' course of law lectures in the Queen's University, Belfast, and had passed the prescribed examination in the Law School, and during his term of apprenticeship had obtained two law scholarships. Mr. Davidson had also passed the necessary sessional examination in the lectures delivered by the professor of the Incorporated Society,

and had served two years and a half under articles to a writer (solicitor) in Glasgow, previous to his being bound in this country.

The motion was opposed on the ground that the Master of the Rolls had, after conference with the other judges, including Mr. Justice Lawson (then one of the Lords Commissioners having custody of the Great Seal), decided that such attendance at lectures and passing of examination during the term of apprenticeship had not the effect under the 9th section of the 19 & 20 Vict. of entitling him to be admitted at the expiration of four years.

The LORD CHANCELLOR was of opinion that this young gentleman's knowledge of Scotch law, which he had no doubt acquired in Scotland, might not be of any use at all here, because the principles were so different. With regard to precedent, his lordship was unable to find any whatever for the granting of this application, and he thought that if a precedent were now made it would be the means of opening the door to great irregularities in future and similar cases. He must, therefore, refuse the motion, with costs.

County Courts.

HUDDERSfield.

(Before J. W. DE LONGUEVILLE GIFFARD, Esq., Judge.) Drake v. Holmes.

Debtor's summons.

This was a debtor's summons issued by Mr. Thomas Drake, of Huddersfield, solicitor, against Mr. W. C. Holmes, of Huddersfield and London, gas engineer, to recover the sum of £748 9s. 10d., for a solicitor's bill of costs, and the application was on behalf of W. C. Holmes to dismiss the debtor's summons.

Learoyd, solicitor, appeared for Mr. Holmes.
Shaw, barrister, appeared for Mr. Drake.

Learoyd applied that the summons should be dismissed with costs, on the ground that it was an abuse of the process of the court. He stated that an action was brought on the 17th of December, 1879, by Mr. Drake to recover the amount of his bill; that the defendant disputed his liability on the ground that the charges were excessive, and that Drake had been guilty of negligence; but as to the latter allegation, Mr. Holmes had been advised to assert it in a crossaction which had been brought and which was now pending; and as to the former complaint he was advised to obtain an order for the taxation of the plaintiff's bill. On the 24th of December, 1879, an order for taxation was obtained which provided that the pending action should be restrained, and the carriage of the order was given to Mr. Drake. No order had upon the summons been made for security or for payment of any part of the claim into court. No move had been made by Mr. Drake to bring on the taxation, he had retained the order in his possession, and on the 31st of December, 1879, he issued the debtor's summons. It was contended, first, that, as a matter of discretion in the court, the summons could not be sustained; the object of a debtor's summons was to make an insolvent man bankrupt; that was an extremely harsh and severe process, never intended against a man of means, and certainly never as a process to enable a solicitor to evade the taxation of his bill. The case of Ex parte Sewell (Weekly Notes, December 6, 1879, p. 186) was referred to. It was also contended that even in a case where there was an admitted act of bankruptcy, and an admitted debt, the court was not bound to adjudicate if the process taken was inequitable. The caseof In re Davis, Ex parte King (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 461), was relied upon. Next, it was contended that the debtor's summons could not be sustained, for in order to support it there must be a debt then capable of being enforced, and according to section 6, sub-sections 6 and 7, there must be a debt due and payable; that in this case there was no liquidated or ascertained debt; that it was referred to a legal tribunal, but now pending; and that the debt for work and labour had been transferred into a liability under the order when ascertained; that the order admitting the retainer and allocatur should be enforced at

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