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future more onerous. Reference is made in the circular to the jurisdiction of the director to entertain applicacations for authority to incur certain special costs in prosecutions of importance or difficulty, and to the desirability of communications being made to the director in cases where compounding a prosecution is suspected, but we find no reference to the function formerly stated to be intended to be exercised by the director of "advising clerks to justices and other persons concerned in any criminal proceeding."

WHY IS IT that the learned Master of the Rolls alone among the chancery judges of first instance has a separate list for witness causes ? One would suppose that the advantages of such a list, when combined with the setting apart of certain days for taking the cases in the witness list, are obvious. It enables practitioners to calculate more nearly the time at which their witnesses will be required to be in attendance, while the alternation of days for non-witness causes prevents inconvenient delay in hearing those causes. The days at present fixed for witness causes at the Rolls are not, perhaps, the most convenient that might be adopted, but the separate list is an undoubted boon to those who have cases in that court. Such a list might well be adopted by all the other chancery judges. One consequence of the want of such a list is to encourage practitioners to apply to the judge to fix a special day for any witness cause which is expected to be heavy; and the court of Vice-Chancellor Bacon is an instance of the difficulties connected with this fixing of days for hearing particular causes. To the court paper for Wednesday last there was appended a supplementary list of twelve witness causes, all of which had been fixed for hearing by the Vice-Chancellor on days long since passed, and which the Vice-Chancellor has now to hear consecutively in priority to all the other causes in the list.

Lax and another v. Mayor and Corporation of Darlington (App.).. 221 Long v. Crossley (Ch.Div. Fry, J.)

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Newbiggin-by-the-Sea Gas Company v. Armstrong (App.)......
Queen, The, v. Martin (C.C.R)..
Thompson v. Marshall (App.)

Tucker, Ex parte. In re Tucker (App.) ........................ 219
Webb v. East (ex.Div.)

Wilkins v. Jodrell (Ch.Div. V.C.H.).

CURRENT TOPICS.

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THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS has not yet been provided with an office, but he has obtained an assistant, Mr. Ernest Algernon Sparks-a choice, we believe, regarded by the profession with considerably less satisfaction than that of the director. The circular just issued by the Home Secretary exactly carries out that which we have always indicated as being the intention of the framers of the Act. The present system of conducting prosecutions remains in outward appearmost untouched. If the director decides to take up a osecution, he will conduct it by the Treasury Solicitor, or his local agent, "or by some other person appointed by the director." The Treasury Solicitor will become, however, the mere agent of the director, and the local agents, who have hitherto worked on the halfcosts system, will probably find their duties for the

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THERE WILL BE FOUND in this week's issue of the WEEKLY REPORTER a case (Camberwell Benefit Building Society v. Holloway) in which the learned Master of the Roils (overruling the opinion of a conveyancing counsel to the court) has decided that the description in particulars of sale of an underlease as a lease is not necessarily a misdescription. He says: "The word 'lease' in law is a well-known legal term of well-defined import. No lawyer has ever suggested that the title of the' lessor makes any difference in the description of freeholder, or by a copyholder with the licence of the the instrument, whether the lease is granted by a lord, or by a man who himself is a leaseholder. It being well granted for a term of years is called a lease. is quite true that where the grantor of the lease holds for a term, the second instrument is called either an underlease or a derivative lease, but it is still a lease, and consequently when a man sells a thing by its known and proper legal description, it does not appear to me that he can be charged with misrepresentation. he says, 'I sell you a house held under a lease for a term of twenty-one years," every word of that is true, although the lessor may hold under a lease Per se, calling a thing a lease which is a lease is not necessarily a misdescription." And then the learned judge hunts about the conditions for indications that the thing to be sold was an underlease and not a lease; and finds such indications in the lease itself, which under the conditions was to be produced at ' the time of sale and might in the meantime be inspected. 66 Superior landlords" were spoken of in the lease. Then again, in one condition it was stated that "no objection whatever shall be made that there is an outstanding term of three days vested in the mortgagor." This the Master of the Rolls triumphantly seized upon as a distinct statement that what was sold was an underlcase.

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Therefore, he says, "the purchas er could not have relied on the word 'lease' in the particulars to show that what he was buying was an original lease." With great deference we think that the question is not whether the word "lease" is a general word which may not inappropriately be applied alike to an under-lease and an original lease; the question is whether the description "lease" in the particulars would convey to an intending purchaser a correct idea as to the nature of the property to be sold. We should say unhesitatingly that it would not; it would convey to the ordinary purchaser the notion that there was no third person between him and the freeholder capable of committing a breach of eovenant which might bring the proviso for re-entry into effect. If the description in the particulars was likely to mislead the purchaser, the case of Torrance v. Bolton (21 W. R. 134, L. R. 8 Ch. 118) shows that the burden of proof is cast on the vendor to show that the purchaser was not, in fact, misled by what he had read in the particulars; and an ambiguous explanation of the meaning in the conditions will not do. "It was not sufficient," said Lord Justice James, "to read in the midst of a long paper of condiwhich merely told him that the property was subject to several mortgages, as to which it might very well happen, as in this case it did happen, that it failed to convey to the purchaser's mind this information, which ought to have been conveyed to him." We respectfully submit that it is unreasonable to expect a purchaser to scan the conditions of sale with the eyes of a practised lawyer in order to correct his notions acquired from the particulars.

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A DECISION recently pronounced by a French court, and reported in a French legal periodical, protecting from photographic infringement the copyright in a statue which the sculptor had presented to a church, may serve to draw attention to a defect in one branch of our law of artistic copyright. As the law stands at present in this country, it does not appear that a sculptor whose work is photographed for profit by another has any remedy under the Sculpture Copyright Act. While the law of literary and dramatic copyright has been improved from time to time, that of sculpture copyright is still regulated by the 54 Geo. 3, c. 56. By that Act an exclusive right for fourteen years is conferred on persons who make, or cause to be made, any new and original sculpture, or model, or copy, or cast of the human figure, or other subjects as set out in the Act, provided that the proprietor's name and the date are put on the sculpture, model, copy, or cast, before the same is put forth or published. But the 3rd section of the Act, by which persons who pirate the copyright work are made liable for the infringement, only speaks of a pirated copy or pirated cast of the work, and makes no mention of reproductions by painting, engraving, or photographing. Sculptures may, no doubt, by the effect of the 6th section of the Copyright of Designs Act of 1850, be registered under that Act and the other Designs Acts at present in force-i.e., 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100; 6 & 7 Vict. c. 65; 13 & 14 Vict. c. 104; 21 & 22 Vict. c. 70; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 73, and 38 & 39 Vict. c. 93; but it does not appear that advantage is often taken of this provision, and indeed the remarkable dearth of reported cases on the subject of sculpture copyright proves clearly enough that sculptors in this country do not find it worth their while to protect their rights, but prefer to make their profit

once for all on the sale of their works.

WE REGRET to learn that Vice-Chancellor Hall, who has been absent from the bench since the commencement of the present sittings, has been suffering from a severe attack of sciatica. It is hoped that his lordship may be able to resume his judicial duties next week.

TONTINES AND THE LOTTERY ACTS.

THE pending promotion of the National Opera Company by means of a tontine, "the nominated lives not to be less than sixty years of age," has caused the question to be raised whether a tontine is illegal under the Lottery Acts, and it has been stated on behalf of the infant company that the opinion of eminent counsel has been taken, and that that opinion was to the effect that the proposed tontine was not illegal under those Acts. Looking to the confident dictum of Jessel, M.R., in Sykes v. Beadon (27 W. R. 464, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 170), to which we will presently refer more at length, that "Government Securities Trust" was illegal under the Acts, we are by no means surprised that the question should have been raised, and considering its importance as bearing upon other speculations more common than tontines (which are all but extinct), we propose to examine briefly the history and scope of the Lottery Acts.

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These Acts are nine in number, the earliest being 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17 (10 Will. 3, c. 23, in the Revised Statutes), "An Act for Suppressing of Lotteries," and the latest being 8 & 9 Vict. c. 74, which provides that penalties for advertising lotteries are to go to the Crown, and be sued for in the name of the AttorneyGeneral only.

It is clear from the perusal of these Acts, that, notwithstanding their preambles (see, e.g., 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, s. 1) protesting against the "great impoverishment and utter ruin, &c., of families" by lotteries, their main object was not so much to prevent "private" lotteries, as to protect the State lotteries which were established from time to time, from about the year 1710, when £1,500,000 was raised by 9 Anne, c. 6, "by way of a lottery for the public service" to 1824, after which year (see 4 Geo. 4, c. 60, s. 19) they were finally discontinued. The practice appears to have been for private persons to keep what they called "insurance offices," or "little goes" (see 42 Geo. 3, c. 119, s. 2), at which the holder of a ticket in the Government lottery insured his chance of a success; and the legalisation of the Government "great goe," along with the prohibition of the private "little goe caused much difficulty in drafting, and much obscurity in the law. But although the amount of the penalty remains obscure, the nature of the offence appears pretty clear from 12 Geo. 2, c. 28. This statute enacts (section 1):—

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"If any person shall erect any office, or place under the denomination of a sale of houses, land, advowsons, presentations to livings, plate, jewels, ships, goods, or other things, by way of lottery, or by lots, tickets, numbers, or figures; .. or shall expose to sale any houses, &c., or by any game, method, or device whatsoever, depending upon, or to be determined upon or by any lot or drawing, whether it be out of a box, or wheel, or by cards or dice, or by any machine, engine, or device of chance of any kind whatsohe shall forfeit and lose the sum of two hundred pounds."

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It may be well to add that by 8 Geo. 1, c. 2, s. 36, it had already been enacted that "every person who shall erect, &c., any office or place under the denomination of sales of houses, &c., for the improvement of small sums of money, or shall sell, or expose to sale any houses, &c., by way of lottery, or by lots, tickets, numbers, or figures, or shall make, print, &c., proposals, &c. ; or shall deliver out tickets, &c., or shall make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published, any proposal or scheme of the like nature, under any denomination, name, or title whatsoever," shall on conviction "over and above any former penalties inflicted by any former Act or Acts of Parliament made against any private or unlawful lotteries, forfeit the sum of five hundred pounds," &c. ; and by section 37 of the same Act, that "every person contributing unto any such sales, lotteries, proposals, or schemes aforesaid, shall forfeit double the sum" contributed.

The statute 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, goes on to provide for the application of the penalty-one-third to the informer and two-thirds to the poor, except in the city of Bath, where the two-thirds are directed to " go and be applied to and for the use and benefit of the poor residing within the hospital or infirmary lately established for the use and benefit of poor persons resorting to the said city for the benefit of the mineral waters." By 46 Geo. 3, c. 148, s. 59, it was directed that "all pecuniary penalties for any offence against any law touching or concerning lotteries shall go to the use of his Majesty," &c., and be sued for in the name of the Attorney-General only. But section 4 of 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, enacts that "every such sale" by any game, lottery, machine, engine, or other device whatsoever, depending upon or to be determined by chance or lot, shall be void, and that all such houses, &c., so sold "shall be forfeited to such person who shall sue for the same," and this right of the common informer to the goods, &c., offered for sale by lot does not appear to be extinguished by 46 Geo. 3, c. 148, s. 59. It may be added that 4 Geo. 4, c. 60, s. 67, directs notices to commit offenders for rogues and vagabonds, and authorizes a private whipping to be inflicted.

If, therefore, the contention that tontines are illegal under the Acts be correct, the whole property of the National Opera Company appears to be forfeited to "any person who will sue for the same,' and double the sub. scription of each shareholder in the same manner (with or without whipping for a second offence, in accordance with 4 Geo. 4, c. 60), unless the scheme be protected by section 11 of 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, which contains a saving for any 66 hereditaments whatsoever, which shall or may at any time or times hereafter be, according to the laws now in being, legally allotted to or held by or by means of any allotment or partition by lots." We cannot discover a similar saving in any of the later statutes, and therefore presume that it has reference to such lotteries as the Royal Oak Lottery and the Greenwich Hospital Lottery, which are saved by 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 17, sections 4 and 5. At any rate, we can find no unrepealed statute in being at the time of the passing of 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, which authorizes any allotment of the kind. The statute 9 & 10 Vict. c. 48, under which art unions are legalized with the consent of the Privy Council, might perhaps be resorted to independently by the promoter of an otherwise illegal scheme, but it clearly does not come within the terms of the saving.

The authorities on the point are neither numerous nor satisfactory. In O'Connor v. Bradshaw (5 Ex. 882) the Court of Exchequer inclined to think that a company formed for the purpose of receiving subscriptions in small sums for the purpose of buying land to be distributed by lot amongst a minority of the subscribers only, was not illegal under the Acts, but there the scheme was held to contravene the Bank Charter Act; whereas, in Sykes v. Beadon (27 W. R. 464, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 170), Jessel, M.R., expressed an opinion that a combination of persons formed on the principle of investing their subscriptions and dividing the capital and profits amongst themselves by means of certificates convertible by annual drawings by lot into preference dividend bonds, &c., was "illegal under the Lottery Acts," but there the combination was held illegal under the Companies Act, 1862. In both cases, therefore, we have "obiter dicta" only; and it must be observed that in Sykes v. Beadon, the learned Master of the Rolls volunteered an opinion without reference to O'Connor v. Bradshaw, and without any argument by counsel. Smith v. Anderson, decided on Wednesday last, in which the "Submarine Cables Trusts" was ordered to be wound up on the ground of illegality, was clearly undistinguishable from Sykes v. Beadon, and we observe that the Master of the Rolls, while repeating his dictum, "was glad that it was intended to take the case to the Court of Appeal."

It may indeed be fairly argued that, looking to the mischief intended to be avoided by the Acts

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the prohibition of competition by private lotteries with State lotteries-a scheme which merely provides for the distribution of property by the subscribers amongst themselves, is not illegal. No office is kept for selling and nothing is sold. Against this contention Allport v. Nutt (1 C. B. 989)-that "sweeps on horse races are illegal under the Acts-may no doubt be cited, but we think that the cases are distinguishable on the ground that in a "sweep" nothing is acquired for distribution. In "trusts" and schemes of that kind, there is a bonâ fide acquisition of property by the subscribers before the distribution by lot, which is incidental, not essential, to the scheme, takes place. We are not sure, however, whether the same argument would hold good of those numerous loans, home or foreign, to which capitalists were invited to subscribe by the temptation of being repaid by drawings at a premium.

But is a tontine within the Acts? A tontine is a scheme by which out of a number of persons the survivor, or nominator of the longest liver, takes the whole of a certain property which has been bought by the subscriptions of all. The chance of human life, not the chance of the lot, determines who is to be the fortunate person. Upon the best consideration we can give to the Lottery Acts, we come to the conclusion that a tontine is not within them. Unless there be some mechanism or contrivance, whether of the most simple or complex kind, brought into play, the Lottery Acts do not seem to apply. Nor do we think, though this is not quite so clear, that a tontine amounts to a wagering contract within 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18, which section enacts that "all contracts or agreements, whether by parol or in writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void." Allport v. Nutt (1 C. B. 989), in which a sweepstakes was held illegal, was decided in the year in which the statute was passed; and no case decided after the statute throws any light upon the question. But in Johnson v. Lumley (12 C. B. 468), a wager is defined as a contract by which two or more persons agree to deliver to each other something according as some uncertain event shall happen or not. In a tontine pure and simple, where the subscribers are themselves the cestuis que vie, there is no such contract. a tontine where the subscribers nominate other lives, the case is by no means so clear, and we think, upon the whole, that it is within the section. As to the tontine properly so called, if that be void for wagering, are not all joint tenancies created by the act of the joint tenants void also? However this may be, no tontine of any kind appears to be within the Lottery Acts, and pecuniary penaltics, or suffering the whippings private, the subscribers thereto run no risk of incurring the or, in certain events, public, imposed by 4 Geo. 4, c. 60, or of forfeiting double their subscriptions to the common informer, under 8 Geo. 1, c. 2, s. 37.

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At Bow-street Police Court on Monday, Mr. Vincent, the Director of Criminal Investigations, applied to Sir J. Ingham to indorse a Sheffield warrant, and took the opportunity of expressing his opinion that the new facilities afforded by the Summary Jurisdiction Act would prove of great importance and value to the public. Under the old law it was compulsory that some person should attend and make oath of his personal knowledge of the handwriting of the justice who e signature is appended to the document. This always proved a serious barrier to the administration of justice, by raising obstacles which delayed, or altogether prevented, the end sought to be attained. But under the new Act a signature could be attested in the local district, and forwarded by post if need be; and it was upon the declaration which he now held, as to the authenticity of the signature of a Sheffield magistrate, that he applied to diate execution.-Sir James Ingham said the new rule would the court to indorse the warrant, and so admit of its immeno doubt save an enormous amount of trouble and experse, and he should have no hesitation in complying with the request made to him, as justified by the new Act.-The warrant was accordingly indoreed.

COSTS SINCE THE JUDICATURE ACTS. A VARIETY of puzzling questions with regard to costs have cropped up since the Judicature Acts. In some of the earlier cases the question was how far the old enactments as to costs were repealed by the new legislation. The case of Garnett v. Bradley (25 W. R. 653, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 944) has settled this class of questions. Lately a great many questions have come before the courts concerning the right to costs where the event of the action has been partly in one party's favour and partly in the other's favour, as, for instance, where there has been a counter-claim, which the defendant has succeeded in establishing, and also with regard to the effect of the County Court Acts in such cases. It may be useful to notice some of these decisions.

In Staples v. Young (25 W. R. 304, L. R. 2 Ex. D. 324) it was held that where the balance recovered by the plaintiff, above the amount of a counter-claim on which the defendant succeeded, was less than £20 in an action of contract, the County Court Act, 1867, deprived the plaintiff of costs, because the plaintiff could only be said to recover the balance within the meaning of that Act. It was urged that a counter-claim was a crossaction really, and not like a set-off for this purpose, and that the plaintiff recovered the amount of his claim within the meaning of the County Court Act; but this argument did not prevail. It must be noticed that in this case the plaintiff's original claim was under £50, so that it was a case in which the county court had jurisdiction. In the cases of Potter v. Chambers ( 27 W. R. 414, L. R. 4 C. P. D. 457) and Neale v. Clarke, L. R. 4 Ex. D. 206), which we shall notice presently, the claim was over £50. In Blake v. Appleyard (26 W. R. 592, L. R. 3 Ex. D. 195) it was held that the County Court Act, 1867, s. 5, did not apply to counter-claims, and so when the defendant proved a counter-claim of £10, he was entitled to the costs of the issues so far as they related to the counter. claim. This is plain enough. Setting up a counterclaim in answer to an action in the superior court is quite a different thing from suing in the superior court, when the action ought to have been brought in the county court. The defendant does not choose the tribunal.

The question in Staples v. Young was comparatively simple, but there is considerable difficulty when the claim being above the limit of the county court jurisdiction, the balance recovered above the counter-claim is below £20 in contract or £10 in tort, as the case may be. In Potter v. Chambers, the plaintiff claimed over £50, and established his claim; but that amount was reduced by the counter-claim on which the defendant succeeded to £4 2s., for which amount judgment was given. It is clear that since the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 67, the provisions of the County Court Act, 1867, s. 5, only apply when the relief sought by the plaintiff could have been given in the county court. And if, therefore, the plaintiff could not have obtained relief in the county court, he cannot be deprived of costs, though he recover less than the amount mentioned in the County Court Act. The point which hardly seems to have been sufficiently considered in Potter v. Chambers is the question when the plaintiff cannot, within the meaning of the Judicature Act, obtain relief in the county court. Cockburn C.J., says, “The Legislature never intended to give the county courts jurisdiction to deal with cases when the sums claimed on either side were considerable, though the difference actually due might be small." But it cannot be that the sum claimed is the test, because otherwise, by claiming enough, the plaintiff could always elude the provisions of the County Court Act. The question of the counter-claim is immaterial in this point of view. The plaintiff may claim £1,000, and recover £2 quite apart from a counter-claim. Under the County Court Act, 1867, the sum recovered is made the test, independently of whether the action could have been brought in

the county court, and so until the Judicature Act this difficulty did not rise.

In Neale v. Clarke, the plaintiff's claim amounted to £1,029 15s. 6d., and there being a counter-claim, the balance due to the plaintiff was ultimately found to be £11 10s. 3d. Kelly, C.B., held that the plaintiffs and defendants were respectively entitled to the costs of the issues on which they had succeeded. But Hawkins, J., dissented. The ground of the Chief Baron's decision was that the issues in the case involved the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to £1,029 15s. 6d., a question which the county court had no right to try. Hawkins, J., distinguished between a counter-claim in the nature of a set-off, and one in the nature of a cross-action for unliquidated damages, expressing an opinion that in a case where a claim was established exceeding the limit of the jurisdiction of the county court, but was reduced by a counter-claim of the latter description below £20 in contract, and £10 in tort, the plaintiff was not deprived of costs, because there the relief sought by the plaintiff could not be obtained in the county court, the plaintiff being unable, in the nature of things, to give credit for unliquidated damages. In the case of a counter-claim in the nature of a set-off, he relied on the old decisions on the County Court Acts, to show that when the plaintiff's liquidated claim was reduced by a set-off of a liquidated amount below the county court limit, he was not entitled to costs. The learned judge pointed out that, by the present county court rules, a plaintiff can give credit for an admitted set-off. He then proceeded to discuss the meaning of " relief sought" in the 67th section of the Judicature Act. He says, "It cannot be determined by the amount indorsed on the writ, or the claim in the statement of claim. So to construe the words would, in effect, put it in the power of the plaintiff in all cases to evade the operation of the County Court Act. Neither can those words mean the sum to which the plaintiff bona fide believes himself to be entitled. Some limitation must be put upon these words, and after much con. sideration, it seems to me that the 'relief sought' may most reasonably be interpreted to mean that amount or balance which is really due and which the plaintiff is entitled to sue for, and recover without foregoing any portion of his just demand."

The matter is one of considerable difficulty when one looks to the substance of the thing. There are various considerations involved. The county courts are intended to be tribunals for the recovery of small, or comparatively small, claims, in a less expensive and elaborate manner, and the idea is that a plaintiff, who only recovers a small amount, ought to have availed himself of their jurisdiction. What the plaintiff actually recovers by the judgment is, in most cases, the proper test whether the action was one for the county court. It may be said that if the plaintiff on the balance of accounts is only entitled to £4, the time of the superior court ought not to have been taken up, and great expense incurred; but, on the other hand, it is obvious that where there is a very large claim on the one side and set-off on the other, the questions involved and the nature of the action are not such as are appropriate to the county court, which is intended for the speedy disposal of comparatively small matters. It is often impossible in important and complicated matters for the plaintiff to know beforehand that the claim he ultimately may succeed in establishing will be such a small one. The power of admitting the set-off does not seem to us very material. A plaintiff is claiming, we will say, £10,000. The question whether he is entitled to £6,000 of that may depend on a nice question of law or fact quite proper to be determined by a superior court. The defendant claims £3,999 and establishes his claim. The court decides against the plaintiff's claim of £6,000, consequently the plaintiff recovers £1. Can it be said that this was a fit action for a county court? It does not seem to 29

that what the plaintiff may recover on the balance of account is always the proper test; yet it undoubtedly is the test which the County Court Act applied. On the other hand, what the plaintiff may have claimed is not the test, for the reason given by Hawkins, J. The County Court Act reserved, it should be remembered, a power to the judge to certify for costs in a case where less than the required amount was recovered. We do not know that there is any better way out of the difficulty than to make the amount recovered the test, trusting to the discretion of the judge to deal with those cases where it would work unfairly, subject to appeal to the court.

In Chatfield v. Sedgwick (27 W. R. 790, L. R. 4 C. P. D. 450), the Court of Appeal held that the amount claimed on the writ could not be the test whether the relief sought could be obtained in the county court. There the plaintiff claimed to an amount exceeding £50, and the defendant counter-claimed for £24. The plaintiff established a claim for £16, and the defendant for £23, and consequently the defendant recovered £7. It was held that the defendant was entitled to his costs. It was argued that the plaintiff was entitled to his costs of the claim, on the ground that he had claimed more than £50, but the court decided against him. Jessel, M.R., said that, in his opinion, the Judicature Act, s. 67, means relief is sought of a kind that can be given in the county court, and not where relief is sought only of such an amount as could be given by a county court." If this view is right, the decision in Potter v. Chambers would seem to be wrong; but there is no conflict between the two decisions, because in Chatfield v. Sedgwick, as in Staples v. Young, the plaintiff did not establish his claim to £50 or even £20.

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as the decision of the Master of the Rolls, I have always used the condition which I enclose, and which is, I think, sufficient to prevent any claim, in all ordinary cases, after conveyance.

I venture to trouble you with it, because the matter does not seem to have attracted much notice; for though Bos v. Helsham is at least ten years old, I do not find that any condition framed to meet the difficulty is generally adopted.

The effect of the Master of the Rolls' decision may easily be guarded against; but, unless it be so, any of us who conduct sales for trustees may happen to find our clients in a very unpleasant position if a purchaser be discontented with his bargain; and I strongly suspect the Master of the Rolls would tell us that we ought to have protected them by a proper condition. J. A.

[The following is the suggested condition alluded to by our correspondent:-" If any error or omission shall, before the execution of the assurance to the purchaser, be discovered in the particulars or conditions of sale with reference to the description of, or any matter affecting, the property, compensation shall in such, but in no other, case be given or taken, as the case may require; and in case of dispute shall be settled by two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party, or the umpire of such arbitrators, appointed by them before proceeding on such reference; and such reference shall be subject to the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, relating to a reference to two arbitrators."]

General Correspondence.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.-All letters intended for publication in the "Solicitors' Journal" must be authenticated by the name of the writer. The Editor cannot undertake to return MSS. forwarded to him.

RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AFTER CONVEYANCE.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-The effect of the recent decision of the Master of the Rolls in Re Turner and Skelton (L. R. 13 Ch. D. 131), demands, I think, the attention of the profession.

Until that decision be reversed, we must, I presume, take the law to be now settled that, under the usual condition of sale providing for compensation in case of misdescription, a purchaser may, after conveyance, make a claim at any time within six years from the date of the contract.

Such claims have, I believe, been of rare occurrence; which may be partly accounted for by the general impression that, unless under special circumstances, they could not be sustained.

It appears, however, from the Master of the Rolls' decision that, even in the simple case of a misdescription of the number of acres of an estate, the claim may be enforced; and it is possible, therefore, that similar demands may become more numerous.

Claims for compensation after four years would be annoying enough to ordinary vendors, but how much more important to vendors who were merely trustees or not beneficial owners; and who might have divided the proceeds of sale and have no funds with which either to contest the claim or make compensation.

It would also probably follow from the decision that similar claims might, under the crdinary condition, be made, after completion, by vendors against purchasers.

Since the common law case of Bos v. Helsham (15 W. R. 259, L. R. 2 Ex. 72), which was to the same effect

Cases of the Week.

DEBTORS ACT, 1869, s. 5-INABILITY TO PAY-COMMITTAL -FORM OF ORDER-DISCRETION OF JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE-RIGHT OF APPEAL.—In a case of Esdaile v. Visser, before the Court of Appeal on the 13th inst., a question arose as to the proper form of an order for committal under section 5 of the Debtors Act, 1869, and there was a further question as to the right of appeal from such an order. Section 5 of the Act provides that, "subject to the provisions herein mentioned, and to the prescribed rules, any court may commit to prison for a term not exceeding six weeks, or until payment of the sum due, any person who makes default in payment of any debt or instalment of any debt due from him in pursuance of any order or judgment of that or any other competent court: provided (inter alia) :-(2.) That such jurisdiction shall only be exercised when it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the person making default either has, or has had since the date of the order or judgment, the means to pay the sum in respect of which he has made default, and has refused or neglected, or refuses or neglects, to pay the same.' And in the schedule of forms to the Rules under the Act, the form given of an order of committal states that the debtor is to "be committed to prison for the term of six weeks from the date of his arrest, unless he shall sooner pay "the debt. One of the defendants to the action having made default in paying some instalments of a sum for costs which he had been ordered to pay to the plaintiff by monthly instalments, the plaintiff moved for an order for his committal for six weeks, or until he should pay the arrears of the instalments (following the form given in the schedule to the Rules), and Hall, V.C., being satisfied on the evidence that the defendant had the means to pay the sum, made an order according to the notice of motion. When the order came to be settled by the registrar in the presence of both parties, he drew it up as an order "that an attachment be issued against the defendant for his contempt in not having paid" the instalment, saying that that was the form usually adopted in the Chancery Division, and that the writ of ca. sa. to be issued under the order would limit the term of imprisonment to six weeks. The defendant appealed from the order thus drawn up, and two objections were taken on his behalf-(1) that since the passing of the Debtors Act a money demand could not be enforced by attachment; (2) that rule 2 of order 44 had not

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