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THE LAW AS TO BIGAMY.

IN the recent case of Reg. v. Griffin, (4 Ir. L. R. 497) the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved in Ireland discussed some important questions in connection with the law relating to bigamy. The prisoner's first marriage (which was solemnized in Ireland in 1871) was duly proved, but as regards the second marriage, the evidence was that the ceremony was performed by Roman Catholic priests in a Roman Catholic church at a town in Illinois, in the United States, both parties being British subjects and Roman Catholics. Previous publication of the banns was proved, as well as subsequent cohabitation, but there was no evidence as to the marriage law of the State of Illinois. The prisoner was convicted, but Mr. Justice Fitzgerald reserved the case, the following being the principal points urged by the counsel for the prisoner:-1. The marriage law of the State of Illinois, or of the United States, ought to have been proved by the prosecution, and there was no evidence that the ceremony was in the form prescribed by either of those laws. 2. The offence, if any, was committed against the law of the State of Illinois, and was only punishable there, and the words, "whether the second marriage shall have taken place in England or Ireland, or elsewhere," in the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57, only refer to the dominions of the Queen.

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The court were divided in opinion. The Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench (with whom Mr. Justice O'Brien concurred) held that the validity of the marriage must depend upon the law of the country where it was celebrated, and that therefore the marriage law of the State of Illinois ought to have been proved as a question of fact. He declined to make any presumption in favour of the validity of the marriage. On the other hand, the Lord Chief Baron, Mr. Baron Fitgzerald, and Justices Barry and Lawson upheld the conviction, holding, first, that the words or elsewhere" rendered every subject of the Crown who might commit bigamy in any part of the world amenable to the law if at any time he came within the Queen's dominions; and, secondly (on the authority of Rex v. Inhabitants of Brampton, 10 East. 282), that a marriage between British subjects performed abroad, and having all the essence of a contract of marriage, will be presumed to be valid according to the law of the country where it was celebrated, and that therefore it was unnecessary for the prosecution to prove that there was no provision of that law which would invalidate the marriage.

The case of Reg. v. Allen (20 W. R. 756, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 367), which had the effect of overruling the decision of the Irish judges in Reg. v. Fanning (17 Ir. C. L. 289), was much discussed during the argument. Mr. Baron Fitzgerald held that the case had no application, but Mr. Justice Lawson accepted it as an authority. He quoted the following language of the Lord Chief Justice of England:-"Where a person already bound by an existing marriage goes through a form of marriage known to and recognized by the law as capable of producing a valid marriage, for the purpose of a pretended and fictitious marriage, the case is not less within the statute by reason of any special circumstances which, independently of the bigamous character of the marriage, may constitute a legal disability in the particular parties, or make the form of marriage resorted to specially inapplicable to their individual case"; and he drew from it the inference that "if two British subjects contract a marriage which would be valid if celebrated in their own country, it is immaterial whether that marriage takes place in a country whose laws do not at all recognize that form of marriage as valid, so far as the crime of bigamy is concerned." This point seems really to dispose of the whole case, so far as regarded the evidence of the American marriage.

Reviews.

SECURITIES FOR MONEY.

THE LAW OF MONEY SECURITIES. By C. CAVANAGH, B.A., LL.B. (Lond.), of the Middle Temple, Barrister-atLaw. London: Stevens & Sons.

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This is an interesting treatise upon the important branch of law with which it purports to deal. In its design and scope the work is, we think, novel, and it will serve, therefore, to fill a place that has been hitherto empty on the shelves of our law libraries. The title, as the author himself suggests, is open to remark "" money securities" has an and criticism. The phrase unfamiliar ring about it, and needs to be explained and defined. The author tells us that he has been led to coin a new phrase from a feeling that the expressions commonly in use to denote securities of a monetary nature are unsatisfactory, as being used in a sense too narrow or else too broad. Lawyers talk of "securities for money," laymen of "securities simply, and neither one nor the other have, in the author's opinion, any very clear and definite idea of the object they mean to express. There is, no doubt, some truth in this statement. What is or is not technically a security for money is only to be learnt by wandering through "a wilderness of single instances," and it must be confessed that it is not easy to understand the principle underlying the decisions. It has been considered that an I.O.U. does not pass under a bequest of “ money and securities for money" (see Re Mason's Will, 13 W. R. 799, 34 Beav. 499); and the same has been held with regard to bank stock and canal shares (Ogle v. Knipe, 17 W. R. 1090, L. R. 8 Eq. 434); while under a bequest of "all my moneys' a balance due on a banker's deposit account, and secured by deposit notes bearing interest, is held to be included. These decisions, and others of a like nature, go to establish technical refinements which it would perhaps be difficult to classify by reference to any known principle. On the other hand, if the legal interpretation of securities for money errs on the side of narrowness, the popular use of the word "security" errs still more on the score of vagueness. In the work before us, the term is limited to securities of a strictly monetary nature, such, e.g., as life assurance policies, guarantees, mortgages, bills of exchange, &c., as distinguished, on the one hand, from securities for property, such as fire insurance policies, and the like; and, on the other hand, from title-deeds and other documents establishing the right to property, which, strictly speaking, are not securities at all.

"

The brief opening chapter treats of the I.O.U. as being a money security of the simplest form, while other chapters relate to the subjects of lien and mortgage. The chapter on Bills of Sale discusses the various changes in the law effected by the Bills of Sale Act of the present year. Locke King's Act and the two amending Acts are fully dealt with, and some useful suggestions made as to various points in connection with them. The different Statutes of Limitation are given in their chronological order, followed by a lucid summary of the changes in that branch of the law introduced by the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874. A useful and interesting chapter, containing a detailed account of the Stock Exchange, its constitution, and the rules by which it is governed, concludes the volume. The author has the glft of a pleasant style; there are abundant and correct references to decisions of a recent date; and, in the matter of newly-enacted statutes, attempts are made, and, as we think, not without success, to grapple with points of practice and interpretation which as yet remain judicially unsolved. An appendix, in which is embodied the full text of several important statutes, adds to the utility of the work as a book of reference; and there is a good index.

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"On the remand there were over a dozen solicitors present who had been swindled by the prisoners, and there is no doubt that they had been living for a long time on the proceeds of these frauds.

"My solicitor, Mr. Warde, who prosecuted for me, informs me that the prisoners are committed for trial, and that the bench expressed an opinion that it was such a wholesale fraud on the legal profession generally that the Law Institution ought to be communicated with, with a view to taking up the prosecution.

"I shall be glad to furnish you with any further information you may require.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,

"Your obedient servant,
"F. MORESBY-WHITE.

"To E. W. Williamson, Esq., Law Institution." It appeared that the prisoners had been carrying on their frauds for some time, and had swindled a great number of solicitors, no less than five cases having been proved against them.

Under these circumstances, therefore, one would think that it was a case for the Incorporated Law Society to interfere, but, knowing their dilatory movements, I thought it best to communicate at the same time with the Home Secretary, which I did, and within three days from that date the Treasury took up the prosecution. The prisoners were committed for trial, and sentenced at the last sessions at the Central Criminal Court to a year and eighteen months' imprisonment respectively, and it was not until the 2nd of December (some time after they were tried and sentenced) that I received the following letter from the secretary to the Incorporated Law Society :

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Incorporated Law Society, "Chancery-lane, London, W.C., "1st of December, 1879. "Sir, I am directed by the Council of the Incorporated Law Society to acknowledge the receipt of your

letter of the 9th of October last.

"The council desire me to inform you that they cannot assume the conduct of the prosecution referred to.

"I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

"(Signed) E. W. WILLIAMSON, Secretary. "F. Moresby-White, Esq., 24, Chancery-lane, W.C." It is hardly necessary to draw attention to the fact that it took the society from the 9th of October till the 1st of December to answer a letter which the Home Secretary answered within three days. Also, that the Incorporated Law Society did not think fit to conduct a prosecution on behalf of the legal profession which

the Treasury considered important enough to be taken up by Government. F. MORESBY-WHITE.

24, Chancery-lane, Dec. 10.

THE LADY CANDIDATE.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-My attention has been called to a paragraph which has appeared in print to the effect that a young lady had applied to be examined at the Preliminary Examination for Solicitors, and which paragraph proceeds to state that "we understand that the young lady will present herself for examination in February next."

As there is a slight misapprehension in this statement, I should be obliged if you would permit me to correct it. The Council of the Incorporated Law Society have expressed their inability to accede to that young lady's application, and I believe that she has no intention whatever of presenting herself for examination in the face of their refusal to accept her notice.

The Council of the Incorporated Law Society have definitely said that they do not feel themselves at liberty to accept the notice of any woman, and here the matter will in all probability rest until it shall be thought advisable, by those interested in seeing women enabled to take part in any suitable branch of the legal profession, to test the question by taking steps to obtain judicial opinion.

I may add that an association was formed last year, of which I am the secretary, with the twofold object of promoting the legal education of women, and of assisting them to take part in any suitable branch of the legal profession. And I shall be very glad to receive, from any of your readers, any suggestion or criticism in reference to the work of the association. R. LICHFIELD King. 10, Sussex-place, Regent's Park, Dec. 17. [But what is the "suitable branch ?"-ED. S. J.]

Cases of the Week.

WILL-TRUSTees-SpeculatIVE SECURITIES - DISCRE TION TO POSTPONE CONVERSION.-In a case of In re Norrington, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., a testator, by his will, gave his trustees a limited power of investment of the trust funds. The life interest in the funds was given to his widow, with remainder absolutely to his daughter. Until conversion the net income of the property was to be

applied as the income after conversion. The will expressly empowered the trustees "to postpone, for such period as they, in their free discretion, shall think fit, the sale and conversion into money of all or any part of my real and personal estate," and directed that the trustees were not to be responsible for any loss, risk, or damage that might be occasioned by or result from such postponement. The testator died in 1870. At the time of his death his estate consisted, in part, of four Egyptian bonds, and of some shares in an unlimited banking company. At the time of the testator's death, the bonds were worth £80 a piece. One of them was afterwards paid off at par, and the other three were sold in 1876 at £53 a piece. After the sale the price fell still further. The bank was in very good repute until in 1878 it stopped payment, and further calls were afterwards made on the shareholders.

The daughter sought to make the trustees responsible for the loss which had resulted by their not having converted the bonds and the bank shares within a year from the testator's death. Bacon, V.C., held that the trustees were protected by the discretionary power given to them by the will, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JAMEs, Baggallay, and THESIGER, L.JJ.). JAMES, L.J., said that if the court were to hold that the trustees were not to have the benefit of the provision contained in the will, it would be making a will for the testator, not construing the will which he had made. THESIGER, L.J., said that the words which the testator had used gave the trustees an absolutely unfettered discretion. He thought that the courts had gone quite far

enough, if not too far, in making artificial rules for the construction of wills. Such rules tended to the construing of wills according to the view which had been taken at some remote time of the way in which testators ought to dispose of their property. JAMES, L.J., expressed his concurrence in the observations of Thesiger, L.J.

MINE-COLLIERY LEASE "WIN."-On the 16th inst. the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and THESIGER, L.JJ.), affirmed the decision of Fry, J., in a case of Lord Rokeby v. Elliot (27 W. R. 58, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 685). The question was as to the meaning of the word "win" in a lease of a coal mine. The plaintiff was the owner of the mine; the defendant was the lessee, and he was also the owner of an adjoining colliery. The lease gave the defendant power, by such ways and means as he should think fit, to win and work the plaintiff's coal, and in the first place to reimburse himself all such costs, charges, damages, and expenses whatsoever, which he should bear, pay, sustain, expend, or be put unto "in and about the winning thereof,' by, with, and out of the profits to arise by sale of the coals which should be brought or gotten out of the plaintiff's mine, and, after payment of the costs, &c., of winning the coal, a royalty was to be paid to the plaintiff. The defendant had worked the plaintiff's coal by means of a driftway from the adjoining colliery, and he commenced the working on the 15th of July, 1864. The action was brought for an account and payment of royalties. And the main question was when the defendant could be said to have "won" the coal, and what deductions he was entitled to make in respect of the costs of "winning.' Fry, J., held that the coal was won on the 15th of July, 1864, when the defendant first worked it for the purpose of sale. The winning was a single act, and it was not because there was capital expenditure for the subsequent purposes of the colliery that coal could be said not to be won. The defendant was, therefore, entitled to be allowed his expenditure in making the driftway up to the 15th of July, 1864, but not the expense of sinking a shaft which he sank in the year 1867 for the purpose of better ventilation. JAMES, L.J. (who delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal), said that their lordships thought that the definition of "winning contained in Lewis v. Fothergill (L. R. 5 Ch. 105), was as accurate as any definition could be. In that case James, V.C., said that "the coal was won when it was reached so as effectually to be worked." And Lord Hatherley, C., said he conceived that "the coal is won when it is put in a state in which continuous working can go forward in the ordinary way.' JAMES, L.J., added that the coal was won when full practicable available access was given to the coal hewers so that they might enter on the practical work of getting the coal.

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AGREEMENT TO REFER TO ARBITRATION-EXTENT OF ARBITRATOR'S POWERS.-In a case of Piercy v. Young, before the Court of Appeal on the 17th inst., the question was whether certain matters in dispute between the parties to the action were included in an agreement which they had entered into to refer to arbitration. The case of Willesford v. Watson (21 W. R. 350, L. R. 8 Ch. 473) was cited to show that, under such an agreement, it is for the arbitrator to determine whether the particular dispute is or is not comprised in the agreement. JESSEL, M.R., said that no such proposition was laid down by that case, but that it is only a decision that, upon the construction of the agreement there in question, power was given to the arbitrator to decide whether any particular dispute came within the agreement.

FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP MOTION TO COMMIT- No MEANS TO PAY-DEBTORS ACT, 1869, s. 4-DEBTORS ACT, 1878, s. 1.-In a case of Manis v. Ingram, before the Master of the Rolls on the 12th inst., a question arose whether the court would exercise the discretionary power given to it under section 1 of the Debtors Act, 1878, of refusing to send a debtor to prison. The defendant had acted as agent to his father of a farm, and had sold the farming stock, and had misappropriated the proceeds of sale, and an order had been made in the action directing him to pay £1,000 into court. Upon disobedience to the order a motion was now made to commit him for his contempt. In his affidavit in answer to the motion he claimed a large set-off against the sum due, for his services, and also alleged that he had no means to pay the

amount, as he was only earning £1 a week. It was argued, on the authority of Barrett v. Hammond (L. R. 10 Ch. D. 285), that the object of the imprisonment under the Debtors Acts was not punishment, but merely to get payment of the debt, and further that the defendant was not in a fiduciary capacity under the 4th section of the Debtors Act, 1869. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the defendant was a person in a fiduciary capacity within the meaning of the 4th section of the Debtors Act, 1869, and that this was an extremely bad case, and one that deserved pauishment. He dissented entirely from the notion that the Act of 1869 was not intended to be vindictive, and that the power of committal was not intended as a punishment. The object of the old Act had not been altered by the Act of 1878, and that Act was only intended to give the court the power in a very hard case -such as he had had before him before the present Act was passed, when a poor man was dying in prison, and he had had no power to help him-of releasing a prisoner, or of refusing to send him to prison. The want of means he certainly did not look upon as a case for the exercise of that discretionary power, and in the present case he was by no means sure the defendant had not the means to pay, and might not even now have the money he had misappropriated under his power or control. He looked upon the present defendant as certainly most deserving of punishment, and he should make the order asked for for his committal.

LANDS CLAUSES ACT, 8. 70-" REAL SECURITIES "-INVESTMENT IN CORPORATION BONDS.-In a case of Re Levick's Trusts, before the Master of the Rolls on the 16th inst., a question arose whether, under the 70th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, a sum of money, paid into court for the purchase-money of certain land taken by a corporation, could be laid out in the bonds of the corporation as constituting an investment in "real securities." The corporation were authorized to borrow a large sum, at four per cent., secured by mortgage of their borough rates. It was stated that a similar order had been made in another branch of the court. JESSEL, M.R., considered that "real securities meant mortgages of freehold or copyhold property. The borough rates could not be said to be real property. He certainly should not follow the order that was referred to, unless he saw the reasons for the judgment and found them satisfactory. He also refused to allow the petition to stand over to produce some other authority for the order now asked, as the object "real" could only be to show that borough rates were property, which he could not hold. The petition must be amended, and the money invested according to the Act.

PRACTICE-ADMINISTRATION ACTION-INFANT DEFEND ANT-HEARING AS SHORT CAUSE-GUARDIAN AD LITEM NOT APPOINTED UNTIL AFTER THE HEARING.-In a case of Re Goodwin (deceased), Harris v. George, before Hall, V.C., on the 13th inst., which was an action for administration of the real and personal estate of a testator, it was mentioned to the court that, as one of the defendants was an infant, and no guardian ad litem had yet been appointed, the con sent of that defendant could not be obtained to the cause being heard "short." HALL, V. C., said that the order appointing the guardian ad litem might be produced to the registrar, and the judgment dated as of a day subsequent to the date of that order.

PRACTICE EVIDENCE TAKEN DE BENE ESSE-SUIT TO ESTABLISH RIGHTS OF CUSTOMARY TENANTS-LAPSE OF SIXTY-FIVE YEARS-PUBLICATION OF DEPOSITIONS-FORM OF ORDER.-An application was made, upon motion, to Hall, V.C., on the 11th inst., on behalf of the plaintiffs in a suit of Phillips v. Llanover, that certain depositions of witnesses, who had been examined de bene esse in the year 1814 in a suit of Moggridge v. Hall, might be published and used as evidence, saving all just exceptions and all objec tions as to their admissibility. The circumstances, briefly stated, were as follows:-The suit of Moggridge v. Hall was brought by the plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and others, the customary tenants of the manor of Abercarne, to obtain a declaration of title to the mines and minerals of the manor. In the year 1814 the evidence of twelve aged persons was, by order, taken de bene esse on commission.

This commission and the depositions were duly filed in the Record Office. In June, 1870, Lady Llanover and her trustees commenced a suit, Llanover v. Humphrey, praying a declaration that they were entitled to the mines and minerals as lords of the same manor. In April, 1871, Hall being then dead, J. and P. Phillips, two of the defendants in the last-mentioned suit, commenced a suit, Phillips v. Llanover, against Lady Llanover and her trustees, and the trustees of the deceased defendant in the first suit, praying, by amended and re-amended bill of complaint, that the plaintiffs, as customary tenants of the same manor, might be declared to be entitled to the mines and minerals of the same manor, and for other relief relating to the same subjectmatter, and that the suit might be deemed to be a supplemental suit to Moggridge v. Hall, and to have the benefit thereof, and, if necessary, be as a cross-suit to Llanover v. Humphrey. None of the suits had ever been brought to a hearing. The present application was made in the three suits, and, as above stated, on behalf of the plaintiffs in Phillips v. Llanover, in reliance upon the order of Lord Hardwicke in Duke of Hamilton v. Meynel (2 Ves. Sen. 496), and of the Court of Appeal in Vane v. Vane (24 W. R. 565). The motion was strenously opposed by Lady Llanover and her trustees, but HALL, V.C., held that upon the authorities, as they stood, he could not refuse an order for publication, but that the order must be without prejudice to any exceptions as to the admissibility of the depositions in evidence. The costs of the motion to be costs in the suit of Phillips v. Llanover.

MINE-TRESPASS-ACCOUNT-ALLOWANCES-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-In a case of Trotter v. Maclean, before Fry, J., on the 3rd inst., the action was brought in respect of a trespass consisting in an unauthorized working and removal of coal belonging to the plaintiffs by the defendant, who was the owner of anadjoining colliery, and the plaintiffs claimed an account and payment of the value of the coal which had been taken. The principal questions were whether the defendant was to be treated as having taken the coal fraudulently, and whether the Statute of Limitations applied, so as to restrict the account to a period of six years before the issue of the writ in the action. The plaintiffs were the trustees of a will, and had, in fact, no power to let or sell the coal. But under some misapprehensions as to their powers, negotiations had taken place in October, 1871, between the defendant and one of the then trustees, who was a solicitor, and acted as solicitor to the trustees, for a lease of the coal to the defendant, and after an interview between the solicitor and the defendant's manager, the latter wrote to the solicitor that he had instructed the person in charge of the defendant's colliery at once to commence working the trustees' coal. The working was accordingly commenced in November, 1871. In July, 1872, the trustees',solicitor wrote to the defendant's manager that he had discovered that the trustees had no power to lease their coal, and that, consequently, it was impossible for him to enter into any terms for the lease. After this the working was continued by the defendant up to October, 1872. The action was commenced in April, 1878.

The solicitor trustee had died in 1875, and the

plaintiffs did not, in fact, know of the defendant's working until January, 1877. FRY, J., held that all the trustees must be taken to have had notice, through their solicitor, that the defendant was about to work their coal, and that, inasmuch as the defendant acted in the first instance in the bond fide belief that he would obtain a good title to the coal, he could not, in respect of the coal which had been worked by him down to July, 1872, when he received distinct notice that the trustees could not give him a title, be treated as having worked the coal fraudulently. After that notice, however, his working must be treated as fraudulent. The Statute of Limitations, therefore, applied to the working before that notice was given, and the account would only extend to April, 1872, but it would lie on the defendant to prove that the coal which he had taken had been taken before April, 1872. In respect of the coal taken before July, 1872, the defendant would be allowed the cost of severance, as well as the cost of bringing it to bank; in respect of the coal taken after July, 1872, he would be allowed only the cost of bringing it to bank.

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VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-NOTICE TO MAKE TIME OF ESSENCE OF CONTRACT-REASONABLENESS - PRACTICE PLEADING SPECIFIC DENIAL-EVIDENCE-COUNTER-CLAIM-REPLY-AMENDMENT ORD. 19, RR. 3, 17, 20, 22-Ord. 27, R. 1.-In a case of Green v. Sevin, before Fry, J., on the 13th inst., a question arose as to the validity and reasonableness of a notice given by a vendor to rescind his contract for sale, if the purchaser did not complete it by a specified day. There was also a question as to the effect of a reply to a counter-claim, and a further question as to the right of the plaintiff to call witnesses in answer to the counter-claim. The plaintiff, who was the lessee of a factory, granted an underlease of it to the defendant. The underlease contained a proviso that the defendant should have the option, at any time during the first seven years of the term thereby created, of purchasing the demised premises and the original lease for £5,000. On the 15th of March, 1877, the defendant gave the plaintiff notice of his intention to exercise the option of purchase. On the 20th of March an abstract of the plaintiff's title was sent to the defendant's solicitor, and on the 29th of March he sent to the plaintiff's solicitora draft assignment of the original lease to the defendant. The plaintiff had previously mortgaged the original lease, and a dispute had arisen between him and his mortgagee as to the amount due on the mortgage. To settle this dispute an action was brought in the Chancery Division, and this led to great delay in the completion of the purchase. The draft assignment was retained by the vendor's solicitor until the 25th of March, 1879, when he returned it to the purchaser's solicitor considerably altered, and not then finally settled so that it could be engrossed. There was also sent with it a supplemental abstract of a further charge on the property, which had been created by the vendor since the purchaser had given notice of his intention to exercise his option. On the 3rd of April, 1879, the vendor's solicitor gave notice to the purchaser's solicitor that, if the purchase was not completed before the 22nd of April, the vendor would put an end to the contract. The purchase was not completed on that day, and on the 23rd of April the vendor commenced the action, claiming a declaration that the contract for sale had been duly determined. The purchaser delivered a defence and counter-claim. The defence made some admissions, and contained various statements of facts on which the defendant relied. And the counter-claim was as follows:"And, by way of counter-claim, this defendant repeats the several matters herein before stated and admitted, and claims as follows." The claim was for the specific performance of the contract of sale. By his reply the plaintiff admitted some of the particulars of the defence, and joined issue " upon the several defences, save as aforesaid, and save in so far as the same do not admit the statement of claim." And then, "in reply to the statements alleged by way of counter-claim by the defendant, the plaintiff repeats the several matters stated in the statement of claim and the admissions hereinbefore made, and says that, save as stated in the statement of claim or herein before

admitted, each of such allegations is untrue." Upon the merits FRY, J., held that, at the time when the vendor gave the notice to make time of the essence of the contract, there had been no default or delay on the part of the purchaser. And he said that in all the cases in which it had been held that one party to a contract, by which time was not originally made of the essence, was entitled to give a notice making time of the essence, it was so held because the other party had been guilty of some default or unreasonable delay. Indeed, it was clear upon principle that that must be so, for one party to a contract could not be allowed of his simple volition to alter the terms of the contract. And, in the present case, even if the vendor was entitled to give the notice, yet the time fixed by it for the completion of the contract was, ander the circumstances, unreasonably short. The great delay which had taken place on the part of the vendor would justify the purchaser in investing his purchase-money in such a mode that he could not obtain it in so short a time as less than three weeks. Moreover, the supplemental abstract had to be verified, and the draft assignment had to be finally settled and engrossed. The vendor was not justified in limiting so short a time On both for completion after his own great delay. grounds, therefore, the notice was invalid, and the original

action must be dismissed, with costs. It followed that the defendant was entitled on the counter-claim to judgment for specific performance of the contract, with costs. The vendor's title being admitted, there would be a reference to chambers to settle the assignment, in case the parties should differ; and, subject to the claim of the mortgagee, whose security was created before the contract, the defendant would retain his costs out of the purchase-money.

The question as to pleading was this. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff's reply amounted to an admission of all the facts alleged by way of counter-claim. And FRY, J., held that this was so, inasmuch as there was not a specific denial of each fact. He said that the object of the rules was that the exact point of the denial should be shown by the pleading, and it was not enough to deny a proposition in general terms. But his lordship gave leave to amend the reply. There was, he said, no surprise, and moreover the counter-claim had been drawn in a way which put a very unnecessary difficulty in the way of the plaintiff. It might or might not be an admissible mode of pleading, but it pitchforked into the counter-claim all the statements contained in the defence, and threw upon the plaintiff the obligation of a very detailed pleading in reply, which might possibly be very unnecessary. His lordship said that when he decided Tildesley v. Harper (26 W. R. 263, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 403) he thought that, if a party chose to come to trial with such admissions on the pleadings, the opposite party was entitled to have the benefit of the admissions. The Court of Appeal, however, took a different view (27 W. R. 249, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 393), and held that the practice should be the same as that which had existed in chambers with regard to the amendment of pleadings.

The question as to evidence arose thus. After the plaintiff's case had been closed, the defence andcounterclaim were opened, and evidence was called in support of them. When the plaintiff's counsel came to reply he insisted that he was entitled to call further evidence in opposition to the counter-claim, urging especially that, though he might not be able to succeed in obtaining a declaration that the contract had been rescinded, yet he might be able to show that the defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the contract. FRY, J., however, without laying down any general rule, refused to admit any further evidence, on the ground that in the particular case the issues of fact on the claim and on the counter-claim were identical.

Obituary.

MR. JOHN UNTHANK.

Mr. John Unthank, barrister, many years a master of the Queen's Bench Division, died at his residence, 59, Westbourne-terrace, on the 3rd inst., in his eighty-second year. Mr. Unthank was the son of Mr. William Unthank, solicitor, of Norwich, where he was born in 1798, and he was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he graduated B.A. in 1822. He practised for many years as a special pleader, and was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Hilary Term, 1843. He was formerly a member of the Northern Circuit. In 1859 he was appointed by Lord Campbell to a mastership in the Court of Queen's Bench, and he discharged his official duties with great ability and success, being highly respected by both branches of the profession for the patience and courtesy which he always displayed. About two years ago, after nearly nineteen years service, he was compelled by ill-health to retire upon a pension. Mr. Unthank was married to the daughter of the late Colonel Monier Williams, H.E.I.C.S., and sister of Professor Monier Williams.

MR. ARTHUR DAINTREE.

Mr. Arthur Daintree, solicitor, died at Petworth on the 1st inst. Mr. Daintree was the son of Mr. George Daintree, solicitor, of Petworth, and was born in 1803. He was admitted a solicitor in 1834, and soon afterwards succeeded to his father's practice. He was a commissioner to administer oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature, and a perpetual commissioner for Sussex, and he held several important public appointments. He was clerk to the trustees of the Petworth and Five Oaks Turnpike Roads, to the Petworth

Savings Bank, and to the Police Committee for West Sussex. He was also solicitor to the Petworth Association for the Prosecution of Felons, steward of the Manor and Honor of Petworth, and of other large Sussex manors, and superintendent registrar for the district. He was for many years clerk to the Petworth Board of Guardians, Assessment Committee, and Rural Sanitary Authority, but recently resigned in favour of his son and partner, Mr. Charles James Daintree, who was admitted a solicitor in 1875. His health had long been delicate, but his death was caused by the bursting of a blood vessel upon his brain. Mr. Daintree was buried at Petworth on the 6th inst.

MR. WILLIAM MOORE.

Mr. William Moore, solicitor, died at his residence, Herrington Hall, Sunderland, on the 24th ult. Mr. Moore was admitted a solicitor in 1843, and had practised for thirty-six years at Sunderland. He was formerly associated in partnership with his brother, the late Mr. Anthony John Moore (who was steward of the Manor of the ancient borough of Sunderland), and, subsequently, with his nephew, Mr. Anthony John Moore, jan., but more recently he had practised alone. He had a good commercial practice, and was for many years solicitor to the Sunderland Gas Company and to the Sunderland and South Shields Water Company. He actively supported the Liberal party, and his firm were formerly solicitors to the Sunderland Reform Association. His death has caused great regret in Sunderland and the neighbourhood,

MR. WILLIAM HAYES.

Mr. William Hayes, solicitor, of Halesowen, died at that place on the 20th alt. Mr. Hayes was the son of Mr. William Steel Hayes, of Halesowen, where he was born in 1807. He was admitted a solicitor in 1832, and in the first instance practised at West Bromwich. He afterwards returned to Halesowen and went into partnership with his father. He was next associated with Mr. Arthur Wright, the firm having branch offices at West Bromwich and Oldbury, and more recently he was joined by Mr. Arthur George Hayes, who was admitted a solicitor in 1874. He had been clerk to the county magistrates for the Halesowen Division for forty years, and to the county magistrates for the Rowley Regis Division ever since its formation. Mr. Hayes was a perpetual commissioner for Worcestershire, Staffordshire, and Warwickshire, and clerk to the Halesowen Burial Board, and he was formerly one of the deputy-coroners for the county.

MR. EDWARD NEWMAN.

Mr. Edward Newman, solicitor, died at Barnsley on the 5th inst. Mr. Newman was born in 1799, and was admitted a solicitor in 1821, and about two years later commenced to practise at Barnsley. He was formerly in partnership with Mr. William Newman, but more recently he was associated with his sons, Messrs. Charles Newman and Thomas James Newman. He was a perpetual commissioner for the West Riding, and had been registrar of the Rotherham County Court (Circuit No. 13), ever since the passing of the first County Courts Act, jointly with Mr. William Fretwell Hoyle, of Rotherham. He was also clerk to the Brampton Bierlow and Hooton Roberts Turnpike Trust, to the commissioners under the Barnsley Church Acts, and to the trustees of the Hemsworth Hospital, and the Hemsworth Grammar School. Mr. Newman, about twelve years age, relinquished his practice in favour of his sons, but retained the county court registrarship. Soon after his retirement he was appointed a magistrate for the West Riding of Yorkshire. Mr. Newman's funeral took place at St. George's Church, Barnsley, on the 9th inst., a large number of his friends being present.

MR. RALPH PARK PHILIPSON.

Mr. Ralph Park Philipson, solicitor, died at Newcastleupon-Tyne, on the 16th inst. Mr. Philipson was born in 1798. He was admitted a solicitor in 1819, and had practised for nearly sixty years at Newcastle. He was for many years in partnership with the late Mr. John Trotter

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