of discharge shall not release a bankrupt "from any debt or liability incurred by means of any fraud or breach of trust," and by section 125, sub-section 10, this provision is made applicable to an order of discharge in liquidation pro-ceedings. Section 15 of the Debtors Act provides that "where a debtor makes any arrangement or composition with his creditors under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, he shall remain liable for the unpaid balance of any debt which he incurred or increased, or whereof, before the date of the arrangement or composition, he obtained forbearance, by any fraud; provided that the defrauded creditor has not assented to the arrangement or composition otherwise than by proving his debt and accepting dividends." It was argued that a creditor, in respect of a debt incurred by means of a fraud, was, by virtue of section 15, limited, as regarded his right of action, to the unpaid balance of his debt, and that, consequently, he must wait until the close of the liquidation in order that that balance might be ascertained, and this view was adopted by Mr. Registrar Murray, who restrained the creditor from prosecuting an action, which he had commenced against the debtor for the whole amount of his debt, pending the liquidation proceedings. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and THESIGER, L.JJ.), who held that the creditor was entitled to go on with his action. THESIGER, L.J., who delivered the considered judgment of the court, said that in Cobham v. Dalton (23 W. R. 865, L. R. 10 Ch. 655) the Court of Appeal (James and Mellish, L.JJ.) expressed a very clear opinion that such a creditor would have a right to sue the debtor as soon as be had obtained his discharge. In that case, however, the decision was only that a creditor who, before the order of discharge is obtained, takes proceedings against the person or property of the debtor, in respect of a debt or liability incurred by means of fraud, ought to be restrained from proceeding. It was decided in Ebbs v. Boulnois (23 W. R. 820, L. R. 10 Ch. 479) that property acquired by a liquidating debtor after his discharge does not vest in his trustee, although the liquidation be not closed-in other words, that, after the discharge, the debtor is in the same position as if the creditors who are barred by the discharge had actually released him, and his future property is his <own. It followed that the time when the order of discharge became effective was the time when the excepted creditors' rights accrued. And, independently of authority, this appeared to be the reasonable interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act. What could be more reasonable than that the debtor, when he obtained the benefit of section 49 in respect of debts from which he was discharged, should at the same time feel the burden of those to which be was left liable? Why, on the other hand, should the trust or fraud creditor be remitted to the close of the Jiquidation for a remedy attaching to assets which were freed from the liquidation, and which, if he was delayed in asserting his rights, might be squandered by the debtor, or be seized by fresh creditors, asserting and enforcing subsequently acquired claims? With regard to the argument founded upon section 15 of the Debtors Act, there were manifest objections to that reading of the section. In the first place, the section did not deal at all with debts or liabilities incurred by means of a breach of trust, and yet they were, by section 49 of the Bankruptcy Act, put in the same category with debts or liabilities incurred by meang of fraud. And, secondly, gection 15 left even debts or liabilities incurred by means of fraud untouched in the case of a bankruptcy, as opposed to a liquidation by arrangement or composition. No reason had been suggested why this distinction should be made. And, on the other hand, it had been pointed out that -section 15 might be construed as applying, not to liquidations by arrangement under section 125 of the Bankruptcy Act, but only to arrangements under section 28 and compositions under section 126 of that Act. It was not, however, necessary to decide whether that was the true construction of section 15. It was sufficient to say that its terms were not such as to require the court to hold that it qualified or limited-in the case of a liquidation by arrangement, and in respect of a debt incurred by means of a fraud-rights which, in the case of a bankruptcy, in respect of such a debt, and, in the cases both of bankruptcy and liquidation by arrangement, in the case of a debt incurred by means of a breach of trust, the Bankruptcy Act most clearly gave. If the creditor had accepted dividends, the debtor would only remain liable

for the unpaid balance of the debt; if no dividends had been paid, the creditor might sue for the whole of the debt. But the debtor would be entitled to have set apart, in the names of his trust or fraud creditors, pari passu with the ordinary creditors, dividends under the liquidation, and, if he had paid any one of those creditors in full, he would be entitled to stand in his shoes and receive the dividends set apart for him. In the result he would pay out of assets freed from the liquidation no more than the balance of the debt, and, at the same time, the rights of the general body of the creditors, would be in no way interfered with.

LIQUIDATION Petition-REGISTRATION OF RESOLUTIONS— INSUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION OF DEBTOR-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 125-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, RR. 252, 257, 295-BANKRUPTCY FORMS, 1870, Nos. 106, 111.-In a case of Ex parte Ewen, before the Court of Appeal on the 27th ult., the question was whether the registration of resolutions passed by creditors under a liquidation petition had been properly refused, on the ground that the debtor had not given a sufficient description of himself in his petition. He was, in fact, a barrister, but he had been carrying on the business of a restaurant keeper. He had discontinued the business shortly before he filed the petition, and had gone to In his petition he described himself as a live in lodgings. barrister and gave his address at his lodgings, but did not give the address where he had carried on the business. Most of his debts had been incurred in connection with the business. The court (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) held that the description was insufficient, inasmuch as it would not inform the business creditors who it was who was petitioning, and that the registration of the resolutions had been rightly refused. The case, they said, was really governed_by_the principle of Ex parte Jerningham (27 W. R. 157, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 466). And, there being other grounds on which the registrar had refused the registration, their lordships declined to give leave to summon a fresh first meeting of the creditors, leaving the application to be made to the registrar.

DEBTOR'S SUMMONS-DISPuted Debt-SOLVENT DEBTORSTAYING PROCEEDINGS ON SUMMONS SECURITY-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 7-Ord. 3, R. 6-SPECIALLY INDORSED WRIT-ORD. 14, RR. 1, 4.—In a case of Ex parte Sewell, before the Court of Appeal on the 27th ult., an application by a summoned debtor to dismiss the summons had been refused by the registrar. In the opinion of the Court of Appeal there was a bona fide dispute as to the debt, and there was no reason to doubt the solvency of the debtor. The court (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) ordered the proceedings under the summons to be stayed, pending the the trial of an action to determine the debt, on the terms of the debtor paying the amount claimed into court. JAMES, L.J., said that a debtor's summons was always a more or less vexatious proceeding against a solvent person. If the debtor had really no defence, judgment could be obtained very cheaply under order 14, and that was the course which the creditor ought to adopt in such a case. THESIGER, L.J., said that, bat for previous decisions, that when the balance of the evidence was in favour of the creditor, security ought to be required, he should have thought that the proceedings under the summons ought to be stayed unconditionally. The proceeding by way of debtor's summons was not intended to apply to a case where the debtor was solvent and had a bona fide defence to the claim; it was not intended to be used for the purpose of putting the screw on debtors. The Act gave the right to issue a debtor's summons in respect of any debt above £50, but the process was intended to be used when the circumstances were such as would probably result in bankruptcy. It was not intended to make the Court of Bankruptcy a court for trying ordinary actions of debt.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCEVOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT OF LAND-GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY BY SETTLOR TO SELL REAL ESTATE-SALE OF SETTLED ESTATE BY ATTORNEY-SUIT ΤΟ EXECUTE TRUSTS OF SETTLEMENT-CONSENT ORDER TO CONFIRM SALE. On the 1st inst. the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and THESIGER, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of Bacon, V.C., in a case of The General Meat Supply Association v. Bouffler. In 1873 one Bell executed a voluntary

In

settlement of land in favour of his wife and children. In 1875 the trustees of the settlement filed a bill against Bell and his wife and infant children, to have the trusts of the settlement carried into execution under the direction of the Court of Chancery, and, in July, 1875, a decree for the execution of the trusts was made by Hall, V.C. September, 1875, the settlor, who was then going abroad, executed a power of attorney to one Edmands, empowering Edmands to sell any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, of which the settlor then was, or at any time thereafter should become, seised or entitied, or of which he then had, or at any time thereafter should have, power to dispose. In May, 1876, Edmands, purporting to act under the power of attorney, contracted to sell to the defendant Bouffler part of the settled property, and an agreement for the sale was entered into in the name of Bell, and by it the vendor purported to agree to apply to Hall, V.C., to sanction the agreement, which was made subject to the sanction of the court. The day after this agreement Bouffler entered into another agreement to sell the land, which he had agreed to purchase, to the plaintiff company. Soon afterwards, upon the application of the plaintiffs, an order was made by Hall, V.C., in the suit to execute the trusts, that the conditional contract between Bell and Bouffler should be carried into effect, and that the deposit which had been paid by Bouffler should be paid into court to the credit of the suit. This order was expressed to be made by the consent of the parties to the suit. Afterwards the company gave notice to rescind their contract with Bouffler, and brought the action against him for a return of the deposit which they had paid. Bacon, V.C., held that the power of attorney did not authorize a sale of the settled land; that the consent order in the trustees' suit did not bind the company who were not parties to it; and that, as Bouffler had no title to the property when he contracted to sell it to the company, he could not perfect a title by a subsequent conveyance to him from the settlor. Judgment was accordingly given for the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision simply on the ground that, the trustees' suit being a suit for the execution of the trusts of the settlement, there was no jurisdiction in it to make an order to confirm a sale in derogation of those trusts. Consequently, Bouffler had no title to the property.

-

CLUB- EXPULSION OF MEMBER CONSTRUCTION OF RULE-LENGTH OF NOTICE-MAJORITY OF THOSE "PRESENT."-In the case of Labouchere v. Wharncliffe, before the Master of the Rolls on the 28th ult., a question arose as to the construction of the following rule of a London club:-"In case the conduct of any member either in or out of the club shall, in the opinion of the committee, after inquiry, be injurious to the welfare and interest of the club, the committee shall call upon him to resign, and in the event of his refusal to do so shall call a general meeting, at which it shall be competent to expel such member." By another rule the committee were required to give a fortnight's notice of any general meeting. A general meeting had voted for the plaintiff's expulsion, and he now moved for an injunction to restrain them from acting on such vote. The committee had not held any proper inquiry according to the rule, and had not called the plaintiff before them or given him any opportunity of explaining his conduct. They had, in fact, considered a letter written to the committee by the plaintiff, and also a letter published by him in a newspaper; and at a subsequent meeting the plaintiff was called upon to resign, and on his refusal a general meeting was called for his expulsion. The committee meeting, when the general meeting was decided upon, was held on the evening of the 31st of October, and continued sitting until the morning of the 1st of November, the notices convening the general meeting being posted up in the club-room, and sent to the members on the morning of the 1st of November. The notices were dated as of the 31st of October, and convened the meeting for the 14th of November. At the meeting 117 members were present, and 115 voted, 77 for the expulsion and 37 against. The chairman, before the voting began, said that those who voted for the committee would vote aye, and those who voted for the plaintiff would vote nay. He then put the formal resolution that the plaintiff should be expelled. On the ground of no "inquiry," that no proper notice of the meeting had been given, and that there was not the required majority of two-thirds, the

plaintiff contended that the expulsion was invalid. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the words in the rule, "after inquiry," meant after inquiry into the facts alleged against the member, and after giving him notice to attend and, if possible, explain his conduct. In his opinion there had been no proper inquiry, and the committee should really have taken evidence and been satisfied of the truth of the facts. As to the validity of the notice, he was of opinion that a fortnight was a legal term, and a notice given on the 1st for a meeting on the 14th would not be sufficient. The secretary of the club seemed to think that the club day went into the next morning, but that could not alter the legal construction of the rule. The objection as to the required majority was also good. It had been argued that members "present" meant those present and voting. In his opinion persons present" applied to those present during the discussion and who either voted or abstained from voting, and therefore the required majority of two-thirds of the 117 members had not been obtained. Then the chairman should not have put the resolution as if it were a personal matter between the committee and himself, but should have put the resolution in the very words of the rule, and should have asked whether the plaintiff's conduct had been detrimental to the interests of the club. He said on the above grounds he should grant an injunction, with costs.

PRACTICE-MOTION TO COMMIT-RIGHT TO SEE AND ANSWER AFFIDAVIT IN REPLY.-In a case of Dodge v. Brown, also before the Master of the Rolls, on the 28th ult., a question was raised whether on a motion to commit, the respondent was entitled to see or answer an affidavit in reply until it was read on the hearing of the motion. It was stated that the practice at law was not to allow the respondent to see the affidavit until it was read in court. JESSEL, M.R., said that such had never been the practice in chancery, and that on a motion to commit the respondents were entitled to see the affidavit in reply, and, in fact, the parties generally exhausted their affidavits before the motion was actually heard.

PRACTICE-JUDGMENT INQUIRIES-INFANTS INTERESTED -AFFIDAVIT VERIFYING CLAIM.-In a case of In re Bright, before the Master of the Rolls on the 29th ult., a question arose whether in an action where the plaintiff only desired to have judgment for certain preliminary inquiries, it was necessary to have an affidavit verifying generally the statements in the claim inasmuch as infants were interested in the property. Reference was made to Senior v. Hereford (L. R. 4 Ch. D. 494), where Hall, V.C., said that such an affidavit was necessary. JESSEL, M.R., said that his practice was not to require such an affidavit, even where infants were interested, if only preliminary accounts and inquiries were directed. The produc tion of the probate was generally sufficient.

LEASE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT-COVENANT NOT TO USE HOUSE FOR ANY "ART, OCCUPATION, OR CALLING "-AssoCIATION TO PROVIDE HOSPITAL ACCOMMODATION ON PAYMENT. In the case of Putman v. Home Hospitals' Associa tion, before the Master of the Rolls on the 1st inst., a question arose whether the defendant society had committed a breach of a covenant "not to use the premises or permit them to be used in the exercise or carrying on of any art, trade, or business, occupation, or calling whatsoever." The defendants were incorporated under section 23 of the Companies Act, 1867, in accordance with a licence of the Board of Trade, and according to their memorandum of association their objects were "to provide accommodation for the treatment of all patients, whether such from disease or accident, who are able and willing to pay for the same according to their respective requirements." In effect, what the defendants intended to do was to establish hospitals for the middle classes on payment. By their articles, any person subscribing £20 became a member, and entitled to nominate one patient during the year. The defendants did not contemplate carrying on their hospital at a profit, and did not intend taking any infectious cases. They had recently acquired the underlease of certain premises, of which the plaintiff was ground landlord, and intended to convert them into a home hospital for about thirty patients. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the defendants must be said to intend carrying on the "art" of

healing at the premises in question. The accidental u e by a physician of a patient's house for the purpose of exercising his art could not be said to be within this covenant, but where, as here, it was intended to have some thirty patients in one house, and to call in the physicians to attend them, that was a user of the house for the very purpose of the physician exercising there his "art." H. thought the use the defendants proposed to put the house to must be said to constitute their "occupation or calling.' They were constituted for the very purpose of this hospital, and if that were not their occupation or calling," it would be difficult to say what was. He did not think that the acquisition of profit or gain was necessary to constitute an occupation." A person might, for instance, do the printing for some large charity, and out of motives of charity, and it could not be said but that such person had an "occupation." He certainly thought the defendants would be committing a breach also of that part of the Covenant. He therefore granted the injunction claimed, with costs.

66

PRACTICE-ADMINISTRATION ACTION-PROOF OF DEBTDISPUTE-TRIAL ON AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE.-In a case of In re Shirreff (deceased), Keighley v. Shirreff, before the Master of the Rolls on the 1st inst., a question arose whether the Master of the Rolls would try a disputed question of a debt upon affidavit evidence. The plaintiff alleged that he had lent the deceased, Shirreff, a sum of £500, such sum having been borrowed through the agency of his partner. An action at law had been brought for the debt, when Shirreff was alive, the defence being that the money had been advanced by the plaintiff as a joint adventure with the defendant in a colliery speculation. The jury were unable to agree, and were discharged. This action had, subsequently to the death of Shirreff, been commenced for the administration of his estate against Shirreff's administratrix, with the will annexed. The debt was disputed, and the parties agreed to try by affidavit evidence. The plaintiff's evidence consisted of his own and partner's oaths, and the only evidence to the contrary was the affidavit of Shirreff's solicitor, whe stated bis belief that the money was advanced as a joint speculation. Shirr ff's evidence in the former trial had not been made evidence in this action. Having agreed to the fact of the former trial, and that Shirreff was now dead, JESSEL, M.R., said that he would not under the circumstances require the plaintiff to commence an action, and to try the fact of the debt on oral evidence, but would determine the issue himself. He took into consideration, also, the fact that it was alleged that Shirreff's estate was insolvent, and the additional costs the plaintiff would be put to by sending him again to a jury, and that, even if the debt were well established, an administration action would still be necessary to obtain payment. His lordship then went into the evidence and decided in favour of the plaintiff, and made the usual decree for administration. The plaintiff desired to have a declaration that his debt was established, so as to avoid the necessity of proving the same again in chambers, but his lordship stated that he could not make any such declaration, and that formal proof would still be required to be made in chambers, as some creditor might then come in and object to the proof.

BILLS OF SALE ACT, 1878 (41 & 42 VICT. C. 31), ss. 8, 10ATTESTATION BY SOLICITOR-REGISTRATION. —An important question under the above Act was raised in the case of Davies T. Goodman, which was an appeal from a decision of the judge of the Dudley County Court. The respondent (the plaintiff in the court below), sued the appellant for the Wrongful conversion of his (plaintiff's) goods. The appellant pleaded that he had seized the goods under a bill of sale given to him by the repondent. It was admitted that the bill of sale in question was neither attested by a solicitor, nor registered, and it was therefore contended that the bill of sale was void under the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, the 10th section of which, sub-section 1, enacts that, "the execution of every bill of sale shall be attested by a solicitor of the Supreme Court, and the attestation shall state that before the execution of the bill of sale the effect thereof has been explained to the grantor by the attesting solicitor." The county court judge held that, as the provisions of this section had not been complied with, the bill of sale

in question was void as between grantor and grantee, and this decision was appealed from. For the appellant, it was argued that the 8th section of the Act, by specifying particular classes of creditors, proved that the 10th section did not make an unattested and unregistered bill of sale void as against the grantee. For the respondent it was contended that the Act was passed to protect unlearned grantors, and that the decision below was right. The court (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., and LINDLEY, J.) upheld the decision of the county court judge. They said that the new Act contained a provision not to be found in the old one (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36). The new Act did not say (in section 8) that every bill of sale should be "duly attested and registered," but that every bill of sale should be duly attested and should be registered. The phrase "shall be duly attested" was mandatory, and the next phrase "shall be registered" governed the conditions which followed, under which the bill of sale would be void. The 10th section of the new Act was mandatory, and it was framed for the express purpose of affording protection to the grantor and of shielding him from imposition. Their lordships gave judgment for the respondent, with costs.

PRACTICE-ORDER BY CONSENT TO REFER TO ARBITRATION-AWARD OF ARBITRATOR-AWARD MADE A RULE OF COURT-APPLICATION ON AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE.-In a case of Jones v. Jones, before Hall, V.C., on the 27th ult., a motion was made upon affidavit of service to make the award of an arbitrator a rule of court. The matters in dispute in the action had, under an order taken by consent of counsel for both plaintiff and defendant, been referred to Mr. Kekewich, Q.C., as arbitrator. The learned arbitrator having made his award, the application in question was made, on the authority of a case of Cudlip v. Smedley (12 W. R. 200), and of the form of notice of motion given in the latest (3rd) edition of Daniell's Chancery Forms (No. 1,944), and the form of order given in the latest (4th) edition of Seton on Decrees, vol. 1, p. 403. It was, however, brought to the notice of the court that in a very recent case-In re Oglesby's Arbitration (W. N., Aug. 2, 1879, p. 151)-the Master of the Rolls had considered that in the case of an arbitration by agreement, the proper course was to apply that the submission, not the award, should be made a rule of court. In the present case HALL, V.C., decided that, as the arbitration itself was held under an order of the court, although by consent, the award itself, and not the submission, would properly be made a rule of court, and made the order accordingly.

COSTS-TAXATION-DIRECTION TO TAXING MASTER-WITNESSES NOT CALLED.-In a case of Webster v. Chatterton, before Fry, J., on the 29th ult., the action was brought to defendant, on the ground of fraud. After some witnesses set aside a lease which the plaintiff had granted to the had been examined on behalf of the plaintiff, his counsel defendant, with costs. abandoned the case, and judgment was given for the His counsel then stated that the defendant was prepared with witnesses to rebut the charge of fraud, and asked for a direction to the taxing master to allow the costs of those witnesses in the taxation of the defendant's costs. FRY, J., said that he did not think any direction was necessary, but that the taxing master would have power to allow the proper costs of the witnesses without it. needed, there could not be a more proper case for giving it. His lordship added that if a special direction was

The foregoing scales are to include all charges for pro. curation and negotiation, but are not to include counsel's fees, stamps, plans, travelling expenses, or other disbursements, or time expended on journeys beyond 200 miles or out of England; nor are they to include any business of a contentious character, such as proceedings to enforce performance of a contract, nor any proceedings in any court, such as an application for a vesting order or payment of money into or out of court on a chancery sale; nor are they to include charges for searching and registering in register counties, nor acknowledgments by married women, nor extra work occasioned by changes occurring in the course of the business, such as the death or insolvency of a party to the transaction.

Fractions of £100 are throughout to be reckoned as £100 in the case of sales, purchases, and mortgages. As to leases at rack rent, fractions of £10 are to be reckoned as £10, and as to conveyances reserving rent, and building or repairing leases, fractions of £5 as £5.

COPY RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMittee of the InCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY OF LIVERPOOL,

1. That this society acknowledges the pains and care which the council of the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom have bestowed upon the question of a scale of ad valorem charges in conveyancing matters, and trusts that the council will continue their efforts to prepare such a scale as shall be suited for the whole profession and to obtain legal sanction to it.

2. That this society does not consider the same scale for vendors' and mortgagors' as for purchasers' and mortgagees' solicitors either feasible or desirable.

3. That this society is of opinion that there should be a scale of charges by commission for negotiations for sales, purchases, and loans (where the same are conducted by the olicitor and not by an estate agent) in addition to the charge for the legal work.

4. That this society considers the scale of charges proposed in 1876 by the council of the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom for rack rent, leases, and building leases to be very fair ones, except as regards the commission payable to the lessee's solicitor, which this society considers should be one-half as much as the commission payable to the lessee's solicitor, and with such an alteration they would be glad to see the scales proposed adopted.

5. That in the opinion of this society charges by commission should be based upon the three following essential principles:

(1) A consistent graduate percentage; large transactions being charged a less percentage than small ones.

(2) The recognition of extra charges for negotiations and Luctions.

(3) The allowance to solicitors of purchasers and mortgagees of a higher percentage than that allowed to solicitors of vendors and mortgagora.

6. That in the opinion of this society the report of the House of Commons' Committee on Land Transfer to the effect that it is desirable that solicitors should be paid by a percentage commission affords a good opportunity for pressing for the adoption of a scale framed upon the principles set forth in the 5th paragraph. And that if it be found that any such scale is in some respects too high to permit any hopes of its being sanctioned by authority, the remedy is to be sought in a reduction of the rate of percentage rather than in an abandonment of the principles upon which the scale is framed.

7.-That in the opinion of this society the scale of commission charges recommended by this society, in conjunction with the law societies of Manchester, Birmingham, Newcastle-on-Tyne, and Worcester in 1871, is in several respects preferable to that adopted by the council of the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom in 1876, and is deserving of careful re-consideration by the council previous to the adoption of any other scale.

Upon a copy of the scale being sent to the committee by the secretary of the Associated Provincial Law Societies, with an intimation that in the opinion of the conference the scale for mortgagees' solicitors was too high, the committee passed the following further resolutions :

That so far from the scale jointly proposed by the Associated Law Societies of the United Kingdom and the Associated Provincial Law Societies for mortgagees' solicitors being too high, it is lower than mortgagors are willing to pay; but that the proposed scale for purchasers' solicitors is

too high, except in the comparatively few cases where the purchaser's solicitor not only does the legal work of conveying the property, but also negotiates the purchase. That there should be an additional allowance to vendors' solicitors in cases where they negotiate the sale; and that the allowance to mortgagors' solicitors is much too high in proportion to that to the mortgagees' solicitors. That no scale will be satisfactory which does not provide for different rates when the solicitor does or does not negotiate a sale, purchase, or loan.

Obituary.

THE RIGHT HON. JOHN ARTHUR ROEBUCK, Q.C., M.P.

The Right Hon. John Arthur Roebuck, Q.C., M.P., died at his residence, 19, Ashley-place, Westminster, on the 30th ult., after a short illness, at the age of seventy-seven. He was the son of Mr. Edward Roebuck, of Madras, where he was born in 1802. Having spent the early part of his life in Canada, in Hilary Term, 1831, he was called to the bar at the Inner Temple. He joined the Northern Circuit, and in 1843 received a silk gown from Lord Lyndhurst. At one time he practised before the Privy Council, but his attention was subsequently almost entirely absorbed by political life. In 1832, immediately after the passing of the Reform Bill, he was elected M.P. for the city of Bath in the Liberal interest. He was for several years agent for the House of Assembly of Lower Canada in its dispute with the Executive Government, and he actively supported the interests of that assembly in many discussions in Parliament. He lost his seat for Bath in 1837, but regained it in 1841. In 1847 he was again unsuccessful, but two years later he was returned for Sheffield. In 1868 he lost his seat at Sheffield, but at the election of 1874 he was returned at the head of the poll. Mr. Roebuck supported the present Government during the discussions upon the Eastern Question, and in August, 1878, he was raised to the rank of a Privy Councillor. He dined in the hall at the Inner Temple on Tuesday, the 25th alt., but caught cold on the following day, and he ruptured a bloodvessel while coughing. He was married to the daughter of the Rev. Thomas Falconer, of Leighton Hall, Cheshire, and he leaves one daughter.

SIR ARCHIBALD PAULL BURT.

Sir Archibald Paull Burt, Knight, Chief Justice of the colony of Western Australia, died at Perth, West Australia, on the 21st ult., at the age of sixty-nine. Sir A. Burt was the son of Mr. George Henry Burt, Speaker of the House of Assembly of the Island of St. Christopher, where he was born in 1810. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1845, and practised for several years in his native island. He was for several years Speaker of the flouse of Assembly, and from 1849 till 1860 he was Attorney-General of St. Christopher, and a member of the Legislative Council and Administrative Committee. He also acted for several months as Chief Justice. On leaving St. Christopher for Australia he was presented with a handsome piece of plate, as a testimonial, subscribed for by all classes in the island, and a statute was passed, granting him the sum of £500 from the public revenue in consideration of his valuable public services. He was appointed civil commissioner and chairman of quarter sessions in Western Australia in 1860, and in the following year he was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the colony, and he occupied that post until his death. In 1873 he received the honour of knighthood. Sir A. Burt was married to the daughter of the late Dr. John Bryan, but he became a widower in 1870.

MR. JOHN DICKONSON HOLMES. Mr. John Dickonson Holmes, solicitor, died at Barnard Castle, on the 16th ult. Mr. Holmes was born in 1819, and was admitted a soliciter in 1841. A few years later he commenced to practise at Barnard Castle, where he continued in business until his death. He had a good private practice, and held several important appointments. He was