session for any cause theretofore existing, but that such decree should leave intact his right of entry for any breach which might afterward exist. Ruthland Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339. § 699. Patent to Quarter-section Containing Lode.-Perpetual injunction granted to restrain defendant holding a patent of the United States upon a quarter-section entered and patented as agricultural land upon which in fact a lode location, under the mining act of 1866, existed at the time of the entry and patent, from asserting any title to the lode, and from in any manner interfering with the plaintiff in working the same, upon the assumption that such patent conveyed no title against the mining locator. Gold Hill Q. M. Co. v. Ish, 5 Or. 104. Rights between Partners.-Injunction granted ex parte to restrain the negotiation of a bill of exchange, accepted by a partner in a colliery in the firm name for his private debt. Hood v. Aston, 1 Russ. 412. Dissolution of Injunction-Legal Construction.-Complainants were the undisputed owners of all the franklinite and iron ores upon a certain tract when they were found separate from the zinc, and claimed to own all such ores, whether separate from the zinc or not. Defendants were the undisputed owners of all the zinc and ores other than franklinite or iron, and claimed to own the franklinite and iron ores when they did not exist separate and distinct from zinc ores. It appeared that the ores or minerals were so combined as to render it often difficult to decide which metal preponderated in quantity or value in a given specimen, and so as to render it difficult if not impossible to mine either one without at the same time taking the other. Upon motion to dissolve injunction, held: 1. That the dispute was not about facts, but was a question of legal construction, and of the proper interpretation of the grants of the mining rights; 2. That the matters in controversy were not of such a nature that a denial by the answer would entitle the defendants to a dissolution of the injunction as a matter of course. Boston Franklinite Co. v. N. J. Zinc Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 216. Possession.-In the matter of restraining threatened irreparable injury by mining, it is a matter of indifference whether the plaintiff is in or out of possession. Moore v. Massini, 32 Cal. 590; Chapman v. Toy Long, 4 Saw. 33. An injunction will be allowed to restrain the working of a placer claim located by the complainants under the United States mining acts, although prior to such location, and at the time of the commencement of the suit, the premises were, and continued in the possession of other parties, those parties being aliens (Chinese), who have no right since the passage of the mining acts to appropriate the public domain. Chapman v. Toy Long, 4 Saw. 35. Possession need not be recovered in an action at law prior to the granting of an injunction to restrain the removal of the gold from a placer claim. An injunction is not allowed in all cases of trespass upon mines, upon the ground that they are or may be an irreparable damage to this species of property. Chapman v. Toy Long, 4 Saw. 35. Patented Premises.-When premises containing gold are held under patent from the United States, an injunction lies to prevent miners from excavating ditches, digging up the soil, and flooding a portion of the premises for the purpose of extracting the gold. Henshaw v. Clark, 14 Cal. 160. Such injuries are calculated to destroy the entire value of the land for all useful purposes; they are irreparable. Henshaw v. Clark, 14 Cal. 160. Waste and Trespass.-The technical distinction between waste and a mere trespass has been long disregarded by courts of equity, and the rule now is, that wherever a trespass is attended with irreparable mischief or a multiplicity of suits or vexatious litigation, an injunction will be allowed the same as if it were a case of waste. Chapman v. Toy Long, 4 Saw. 28. Technical, Distinguished from Destructive, Trespass.-The construction of a ditch across rocky, barren, and uncultivated land is not an irreparable injury. The distinction between technical trespass and trespass going to the extent of irreparable injury is the foundation of the jurisdiction of equity in the latter class of cases, and trespass in the former class of cases will not be enjoined although the plaintiff's legal right to the land may not be denied, the defendants being solvent and able to respond in damages. Thorn v. Sweeney, 12 Nev. 251. $700. Mineral Springs-Trade-mark.-The owner of a peculiar product of nature, like natural mineral water, who has applied to it a conventional name, by which it has become generally known, is entitled to be protected in the exclusive use of such name as his trade-mark in the sale of the article. Congress & Empire Spring Co. v. High Rock Spring Co., 45 N. Y. 291; A defendant owning a mineral spring alleged to have exactly the same properties as the mineral spring of the plaintiff, twelve hundred feet distant, enjoined from the use of term "Bethesda mineral water," or using the trade-mark "Bethesda," under which name, duly entered in the United States patent-office, and used as a brand on the barrels of plaintiff, plaintiff had introduced the water from her spring into the market, and thereby acquired a reputation, giving commercial value to the waters. of the spring owned by her. Dunbar v. Glenn, 43 Wis. 118. Where the plaintiffs are purchasers of the spring, and all the interests of the original proprietors who invented and used the word "Congress as a trade-mark, they are entitled to relief by injunction against sellers of mineral waters attempting to appropriate such words as descriptive of the water sold by them. Congress & Empire Spring Co. v. High Rock Congress Spring Co., 45 N. Y. 291. Making Brick.-Lessee for years, without impeachment of waste, enjoined from converting the soil into brick, at the suit of a remainderman, upon the ground of its being a destruction of the inheritance, but allowed to carry off the brick already made. Bishop of London v. Webb, 1 P. Wms. 527. § 701. Equity Jurisdiction.-Defendants' well having struck oil before the hearing, which, from its situation, decreased the flow of complainants' well, an accounting was had, based upon the yield of the respective wells: held, that the jurisdiction of the court extended beyond the writ of injunction, and a decree for the damages was ordered. Allison & Evans' Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 221. A court of equity will decree an account of waste at the same time with an injunction, and make such decree as will settle the entire controversy. Allison & Evans' Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 221. Inequitable Motives not Aided.-Where a party bought lands on the bank of a stream with the sole purpose of forcing their repurchase at a great advance by the proprietor of a costly quartz-mill above, a necessary consequence of the operations of such mill being that large quantities of mill-tailings were continually deposited by the stream on the lands below, so purchased by complainant: held, that the complainant's motive in purchasing might be inquired into, and that instead of granting an injunction to restrain such injury, which would sacrifice valuable property, the court would leave complainant to his remedy in damages. Edwards v. Allonez M. Co., 6 Central Law J. 189, Dillon, J., Sup. Ct. Non-resident Defendant.-The residence of one of several tortfeasors, without the jurisdiction of the court, can not be alleged to prevent the exercise of the authority of the court upon the property; and his name may be dropped by amendment (he not appearing and not being served), without prejudice to a motion for injunction. Cole S. M. Co. v. Virginia W. Co., 1 Saw. 470, 686. In an action to restrain the diversion of water by tort-feasors, one of the tort-feasors who resides out of the jurisdiction of the court may be omitted, and (not having been served) the court will not allow an amendment by dropping his name, without prejudice to a motion for injunction. Cole S. M. Co. v. Virginia W. Co., 1 Saw. 470, 686. Non-residents owners or claimants out of the jurisdiction of the court, working a mine by their agents, held not necessary parties defendant to a bill for injunction. United States v. Parrott, 1 McAll. 271. § 702. Temporary Injunction to Prevent Inundation.-On a bill for an injunction to protect the plaintiffs' coal mines from injury by the water flowing to them from the defendants' colliery, the court, on motion, granted an injunction restraining the defendants from working their coal mines in any places which might injure or endanger the plaintiffs' mines, until answer or further order, but gave no directions for the trial of the right in a court of law. The parties went into evidence, and the cause was brought to a hearing, when the court refused, until the plaintiff's had established their right at law, to make the injunction perpetual, but retained the bill for a year, giving the plaintiffs liberty to bring such action as they might be advised, continuing the injunction in the mean time. The defendants' mine overlaid that of plaintiff, and danger of inundation was alleged. The temporary writ was allowed on the facts of the particular case, in the discretion of the chancellor, without deciding any point of law or fact. Duke of Beaufort v. Morris, 6 Hare, 340. Temporary Writ Pending Question of Jurisdiction.—Where proper averments are made in a bill as to jurisdiction, they impart a prima facie jurisdiction to the court, and enable it to do justice between the parties in case of irremediable mischief (the working of a gold mine), by the issue of a temporary injunction until the plea to the jurisdiction is disposed of; the plea does not oust the jurisdiction, but it ought to be disposed of speedily. Fremont v. Merced M. Co., 1 McAll. 267. Requisite for Bill-Case for Interlocutory Writ Pending Ejectment. Where a bill was brought alleging a continuing trespass by mining copper ore, showing that the complainants had been disseised, and praying an injunction pending an action for forcible entry and detainer, and for an account of mineral exsected, and for decree that defendants surrender possession and that the complainants be quieted in their title; and it appeared that the defendants were in possession under claim of right: held, that the bill did not state a case entitling them to relief; that ejectment was the proper remedy with a preliminary injunction on a proper bill showing the pendency of such action to try title, and that after recovery therein the plaintiffs could obtain satisfaction by an action for mesne profits. Bracken v. Preston, 1 Pinn. 584. $703. Interlocutory, at Chambers-Appeal.-The order of a district judge at chambers, granting an injunction ex parte, is virtually the act of the court, and may be enforced in the same way, or may be appealed from without preceding such appeal by a motion to dissolve. Sullivan v. Triunfo G. & S. M. Co., 33 Cal. 385. Not granted before answer or default. Sullivan v. Triunfo G. & S. M. Co., 33 Cal. 385. § 704. Mandatory.-Tenant of a coal mine who had worked the same contrary to his covenants, and opened a communication with another mine, enjoined from "draining any other mines, |