conception of humiliation seems to be confined to concessions which might interfere with a campaign of Schrecklichkeit.

Yet the fact that the United States has not issued execution on the judgment confessed by Germany does not estop it from pressing a claim against Austria, for a like grievance. And that is what it is now doing. The Ancona, an unarmed Italian merchant vessel, was sunk by an Austrian submarine on November 9, and the lives of American passengers on board were destroyed. Our State Department promptly demanded a report from Austria as to the occurrence. As this was unreasonably delayed, our government proceeded to investigate upon its own accord. Though, as might be expected, there is some dispute as to the details, there is no dispute as to the essential facts, which are there: the Ancona had stopped, in compliance with orders and was not offering resistance, but was loading its passengers into the lifeboats to get them to a place of safety and that before this work was completed it was torpedoed and sent to the bottom. This much appears from the official report transmitted through the Austrian Charge d'Affaires. Whether the escaping passengers and crew were fired upon by the submarine, is not essential. Its significance is moral rather than legal.

Neither the sinking of the Ancona, the nationality of the submarine which sunk it, nor the fact that the sinking was done in obedience to official orders, is denied by the Austrian Admiralty. In attempting to justify the act, the admiralty report says: "There was danger of the Ancona escaping, which, according to his instructions, was to be prevented in all circumstances. Hence the conduct of the commander, much as the loss of innocent lives must be regretted and deplored, cannot be disapproved."

This brazen defiance of international law by the Austrian Admiralty is an evidence of the demoralizing effect of Germany's policy of Schrecklichkeit upon her oldest ally and a prophecy of the effect it may have upon the Turk. Among civilized states, it is a well-recognized rule of law that when a warship is confronted with the alternative of either. allowing a merchant vessel to escape or sacrificing innocent lives, it is under imperative legal obligation to choose the former. The mental and moral development which has brought this rule into existence and made possible an almost universal adherence to it, is one of the evidences of the superiority of civilization over savagery. The contention of the Austrian Admiralty rests fundamentally upon the proposition that as against military expediency, no human rights have any claim to recognition. Such reasoning or instinct, however, persistently adhered to by a Bengal tiger might be excusable, but can reflect no credit upon states claiming full fellowship among the family of nations.

The ruthless disregard of the lives of American citizens was properly denominated by our State Department as "wanton slaughter" and amply warranted vigorous intervention by our government in behalf of its citiIts reasons for action and the redress demanded are thus stated: "As the good relations of the two countries rest upon a common regard for law and humanity, the Government of the United States cannot

zens.

be expected to do otherwise than to demand that the Imperial and Royal Government denounce the sinking of the Ancona as an illegal and indefensible act; that the officer who perpetrated the deed be punished, and that reparation by payment of an indemnity be made for the citizens of the United States who were killed or injured by the attack on the vessel. The Government of the United States expects that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating the gravity of the case, will accede to its demand promptly, and it rests this expectation on the belief that the Austro-Hungarian Government will not sanction or defend an act which is condemned by the world as inhumane and barbarous, which is abhorrent to all civilized nations, and which has caused the death of innocent American citizens."

The Austrian foreign office claimed that the note was not clear. If it was sincere in this the fault must rest upon the translator, for no one having any knowledge of English could fail to understand its meaning. Count Burian's difficulty consisted not in a failure to understand what was demanded or why, but arose from the fact that his government had no legitimate defense against the claim, and was also unwilling at present to recognize its validity. He therefore did what a lawyer does when he has no case he sparred for time. Though his reply was characterized by the German press as "delicious" and "clever," it was unsatisfactory to our State Department and little time was lost in so informing him. The suggestion by Lammasch, the Austrian authority on international law, that the case be submitted to an international commission of inquiry as was done in the Dogger Bank affair, is a mere subterfuge unless accompanied by a guarantee that Austria will require her warships to conform to the law of nations. That she is unwilling to do this is shown by more recent occurrences of a like criminal nature.

There is no apparent reason why the negotiations should drag on indefinitely. The issue is simple and elementary. Austria says by her acts that the lives of law-abiding American citizens are of less consequence to it than the trifling advantage to be gained by sinking an enemy merchant vessel. The United States has a right to know whether or not Austria intends to persist in this attitude. It owes it to its citizens to find out without unreasonable delay. If Austria's answer is in the affirmative, real friendship between the two states becomes impossible and the farce of nominal friendship with a confirmed outlaw ought not to be prolonged. This is equally true whether Austria is acting upon its own initiative or merely carrying out orders from Berlin.

The present declared intention to sink without warning any enemy merchant vessels bearing arms, whether for offensive or defensive purposes, and without regard to whether they are carrying neutral passengers or not, makes it abundantly clear that the real point at issue between the United States and the Central Powers is as far from setlement as ever. The real point at issue all along has been whether or not those powers would, in matters affecting the United States, recognize the fact that the law of nations is binding upon them and that the United States has a right to expect them to conform to it. International law

permits merchant vessels to carry defensive armanent without placing themselves in the class of warships and being subjected to the risks of the latter. If this law needs changing, the proper way to change it is by a conference of nations in which neutrals as well as belligerents are represented, rather than by a pronunciamento from Berlin that as the law does not suit the purposes of the Central Powers, it will not be regarded as binding by them and that neutrals as well as non-combatant enemies must either sacrifice their legal rights on the high seas or have their lives sacrificed by German and Austrian submarines.

Whether or not American prestige demands that our government defend the rights of American citizens on the high seas, American honor does. The duty of a state to insist upon a decent respect for the rights of its citizens is a duty which no state can afford to shirk. Its performance is essential to a maintenance of its self-respect. The duty is more fundamental than that of maintaining nominally friendly relations with those who insist upon putting themselves in the outlaw class.

EDWIN MAXEY.

Professor of International Law, University of Nebrasaka.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS-ANSWERS BY THE NEW YORK LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION.

SOLICITATION FOR A CHARITY BY A JUDGE AS SUCH.-On the official letterhead of his court, on which he is designated as a judge thereof, he has addressed a circular letter to members of the Bar commending to their favorable attention a very worthy charity of which the judge is president, and enclosing to the member of the Bar a number of tickets for an entertainment of such charity. The charity is in every way commendable. The ticket refers to the judge by his official title as president. The communication sent by him requests the member of the Bar to contribute to the charity in one of several ways, one of which is by accpeting the enclosed tickets and making checks payable to the charitable institution. The letter is one which might properly be sent as a letter of solicitation to any member of the Bar by the president of any charitable institution. Is it improper for the president of the institution, while occupying judicial position, to address circular letters to members of the Bar upon the letter-head of his court, and enclosing tickets urging assistance to the charity? Answer.-Solicitation of subscriptions to a charity from members of the Bar by a Judge, in the manner indicated in the question, should be disapproved as of questionable propriety.

EMPLOYMENT OF ATTORNEY BY CORPORATION TO GIVE LEGAL ADVICE TO ITS MEMBERS. A group of business men form a membership corporation for the purpose, amongst many other things, of employing an attorney under an annual retainer to supply them (a) with reports upon the state of the law applicable to any given state of facts of interest in connection with the business of any of the members, and (b) to furnish legal advice to the members in connection with any of their business affairs. The cor

poration does not advertise that it furnishes advice, nor does it receive inquiries, but it directs any member applynig for advice, to communicate directly with the attorney and to receive the advice directly from him. The attorney is not in any way under the control of the association in connection with advice so given and he exercises his own discretion and independent judgment with respect to all applications for advice. In the letters sent out to its members, the corporation makes the following statement: "All inquiries as to legal matters should be addressed directly to the general counsel of the association, John Doe, at this office, who will reply direct. He will make no charge for information as to the state of the law applicable to any state of facts, except where unusual or extended reseach is required, when he will, before proceeding, notify the inquirer as to the exact cost."

The service which the attorney renders to the individual members directly, does not include any legal service of any character, other than the reporting upon the state of the law and the giving of advice in connection with the questions submitted. The members pay annual dues, out of which the lawyer is compensated. Is his position unethical or illegal in this connection? Answer. The practice referred to comes within the condemnation of Section 280 Penal Law, as construed in Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y., 479; Matter of National Jewelers Board of Trade, New York Law Journal, March 2nd, 1916; Meisel v. National Jewelers Board of Trade, 90 Misc. Rep. 19, and is therefore prohibited to members of the New York Bar.

COMPENSATION FOR TESTIMONY-WITHDRAWAL FROM TRIAL BECAUSE OF CLIENT'S REFUSAL TO COMPENSATE WITNESS FOR TESTIMONY.-A lawyer has a contingent arrangement for the prosecution of an action, in which there is but one witness with knowledge of the substantial facts; this witness declines to testify unless compensated for his time and attendance at a rate in excess of the legal fees. The client refuses to accede to the demand of the witnss. (a) Can the attorney properly advise his client to pay the witness the amount of his demand? (b) Believing that it will be fruitless to rely upon eliciting the truth from the witness unless his demand is granted, can the lawyer properly refuse to proceed with the trial upon the client's refusal to acede? Answer. 'The first question (a) should be answered in the negative. A lawyer should not advise his client to pay money to unseal the lips of a witness. We call attention in this connection to the following judicial decisions: "The payment of a sum of money to a witness 'to tell the truth' is as clearly subversive of the proper administration of justice as to pay him to testify to what is not true." (Matter of Robinson, 151 A. D. 589).) It has been held that a contract to pay a witness who resides within the State, and is amenable to process therein, an amount in excess of the legal fees for attending as a witness and testifying only as to the facts within his knowledge, is contrary to public policy and void. Supp. 478; see also Cowles v. Rochester Neece v. Joseph, 30 L. R. A. N. S. 278.) of the actual expenses and a reasonable

(Clifford v. Hughes, 124 N. Y. Folding Box Co., 81 A. D. 414; But it seems that the payment compensation for time lost to

persons in impoverished circumstances (Matter of Schapiro, 144 A. D., 1, 9), and perhaps to others (Matter of Robinson, 151 A. D. 589, 600), is not necessarily improper when there is no attempt to influence the testimony of the witness. Such payment should be disclosed to the jury as bearing on the credibility of the witness. (Green v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 60 A. D. 317.)

(The payment of expert witnesses, being permitted by law, is not considered as involved in the question.) (b) This should also be answered in the negative. An attorney may not withdraw from a litigation without just cause. The service which he undertakes to render is entire. He should advise his client fully respecting the situation, and, if his client insists, should subpoena the witness and proceed to trial. He need not assume that the witness will not tell the truth.

LAWYER'S RECEIPT FROM AUCTIONEER CONDUCTING PARTITION SALE, OF PART OF HIS COMMISSION DISAPPROVED.-A, an attorney, represents an estate, a portion of which is real estate. In partition proceedings an order of sale is made, and A, representing substantially all parties and particularly the plaintiff in the partition proceedings, puts the matter into the hands of an auctioneer. The property is sold at a satisfactory price, and the auctioneer makes the usual charge. After the transaction is completed, the auctioneer, who has previously said nothing about the matter, asks A to accept a check for one-half of his commission, stating that he does so in appreciation of A's bringing the business to him. (a) Does A's duty to his clients prevent him from accepting the check? (b) If so, would the objection be removed if A inquired of his clients whether they had any objection, and they answered that they had not? (c) If he has no duty to his clients, is there any other consideration which should prevent him from accepting? Answer.-The lawyer's duty prevents him from accepting the check without the knowledge and consent of his clients; but irrespective of his duty to his clients, the sharing of the auctioneer's fees is beneath the proper professional dignity.

DIVISION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WITH INFORMANT-COMPENSATION OF LAYMAN FOR INFORMATION FACILITATING COLLECTION OF JUDGMENT.-Some years ago I obtained a judgment for a client, but was never able to collect it, and thereafter lost track of the judgment debtor. Recently a firm of laymen gave to my client information as to the present location of the judgment debtor and as to property out of which the judgment could be made good. I, thereupon, acting under this information, issued an execution to the sheriff and collected the money. The informants now claim that they are entitled to be paid for the work performed by them, and for the information given which resulted in the collection of the judgment; and I am of the opinion that they are entitled to a fair compensation. Would it be proper for me to pay these people a fair compensation for their services, or would this be considered splitting a fee with a layman? I might add that my client signed an agreement authorizing these laymen to bring an action to collect the judgment for a contingent fee of 50 per cent, but this was before I was instructed to proceed. Answer. Any subterfuge to deprive an informant of just com