IT IS probable that Lincoln tried more cases between 1849 and 1860 than any other man on the Eighth Circuit. He was the acknowledged leader of the local bar, whose services were constantly in demand, and the one man who could be relied upon to take a case in any of the counties comprising the circuit, for he alone covered the entire route. It is misleading to belittle the value of this daily experience on the ground that most of the litigations were of no great monetary importance. Every lawyer familiar with trial work knows that small cases often raise more difficult questions of law and demand nicer knowledge of legal principles than causes on which millions depend; and it should also be remembered that many of the small suits were, in effect, test cases which settled the law for the new State. Of course, no one could have practiced before the court and juries day after day and year after year in this way without learning something, and Lincoln's legal development was marked with every year of his practice. In 1853 the Illinois Central Railroad retained him as its counsel, and not long afterward he appeared for the Rock Island Road and many other important representative interests, and his record of appeal cases in the Supreme Court was equaled by but few members of the Illinois bar.

MR. HILL relates many interesting stories concerning the great President. On one occasion a lawyer challenged a juror because of his personal acquaintance with Mr. Lincoln, who appeared for the other side. Such an objection was regarded more or less as a reflection upon the honor of an attorney in those days, and Judge Davis, who was presiding at the time, promptly overruled the challenge; but when Lincoln rose to examine the jury he gravely followed his adversary's lead and began to ask the talesmen whether they were acquainted with his opponent. After two or three had answered in the affirmative, however, his Honor interfered. "Now, Mr. Lincoln," he observed severely, "you are wasting time. The mere fact that a juror knows your opponent does not disqualify him.' "No, your Honor," responded Lincoln, dryly. "But I am afraid some of the gentlemen may not know him, which would place me at a disadvantage." To interest the jurors and make them understand is, of course, the chief endeavor of every jury advocate, and Lincoln constantly employed his great gifts as a story-teller to illustrate, simplify and reinforce his arguments, which is another proof that he did not waste this valuable ammunition on tavern loiterers. Stories are more interesting than logic and far more effective with the average audience, and Lincoln's juries usually heard something from him in the way of an apt comparison or illustration which impressed his point upon their minds. On one occasion when he was defending a case 50

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of assault and battery it was proved that the plaintiff had been the aggressor, but the opposing counsel argued that the defendant might have protected himself without inflicting injuries on his assailant. "That reminds me of the man who was attacked by a farmer's dog, which he killed with a pitchfork," commented Lincoln. "What made you kill my dog?' demanded the farmer. 'What made him try to bite me?' retorted the offender. 'But why didn't you go at him with the other end of your pitchfork?' persisted the farmer. 'Well, why didn't he come at me with his other end?' was the retort." Lincoln not only made effective use of stories with the jury, but frequently employed them in arguing to the court, and he once completely refuted a contention that custom makes law with an anecdote drawn from his own experience. "Old Squire Bagby, from Menard," he began, "once came into my office and said, 'Lincoln, I want your advice as a lawyer. Has a man what's been elected a justice of the peace a right to issue a marriage license?' I told him he had not. 'Lincoln, I thought you was a lawyer,' he retorted. 'Bob Thomas and me had a bet on this thing, and we agreed to let you decide it, but if thet is your opinion, I don't want it, for I know a thunderin' sight better. I've been Squire now eight years, and I've done it all the time!'"' "I once heard Mr. Lincoln defend a man in Bloomington against a charge of passing counterfeit money," Více-President Stevenson told the author. "There was a pretty clear case against the accused, but when the chief witness for the people took the stand, he stated that his name was J. Parker Green, and Lincoln reverted to this the moment he rose to cross-examine. Why J. Parker Green? . . . What did the J. stand for? . . . John? . . Well, why didn't the witness call himself John P. Green? . . .That was his name, wasn't it? . . . Well, what was the reason he did not wish to be known by his right name? . . . Did J. Parker Green have anything to conceal; 'and if not, why did J. Parker Green part his name in that way? and so on. Of course, the whole examination was farcical," Mr. Stevenson continued, "but there was something irresistibly funny in the varying tones and inflections of Mr. Lincoln's voice as he rang the changes upon the man's name; and at the recess the very boys in the street took it up as a slogan and shouted 'J. Parker Green!' all over the town. Moreover, there was something in Lincoln's way of intoning his questions which made me suspicious of the witness, and to this day I have never been able to rid my mind of the absurd impression that there was something not quite right about J. Parker Green. It was all nonsense, of course, but the jury must have been affected as I was, for Green was discredited and the defendant went free.'

LINCOLN was not considered a formidable opponent in the criminal courts, however, unless he thoroughly believed in the justice

of his cause. Mr. Whitney reports that on one occasion when he was defending a man charged with manslaughter, the testimony demonstrated that his client ought to have been indicted for murder, in the first degree, whereupon Lincoln instantly lost all interest in the case. He did not actually abandon the defense, but he could not co-operate effectively with his associates, who were endeavoring to acquit the defendant, and one of them states that when Lincoln addressed the jurors he disparaged the effort that had been made to work upon their feelings and confined himself to a strictly professional argument along conventional lines, with the result that the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. This fairly disgusted Mr. Whitney, who was anxious to have the murderer acquitted, and he does not hesitate to characterize Mr. Lincoln's conduct as "atrocious." But Lincoln was guilty of many other "atrocities" of the same character. It is well known that he virtually abandoned his client in another capital case when he discovered that he was defending a guilty man. "You speak to the jury," he said to Leonard Swett, his associate counsel. "If I say word, they will see from my face that the man is guilty and convict him." On another occasion when it developed that his client had indulged in fraudulent practices, he walked out of the court room and refused to continue the case. The judge sent a messenger directing him to return, but he positively declined. "Tell the judge that my hands are dirty, and I've gone away to wash them," was his disgusted response. This conduct in the court room was in entire keeping with his office practice, where he declined time and again to undertake doubtful causes, discouraged litigation, and discountenanced sharp practices. "Yes," Mr. Herndon reports him as advising a client, "We can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set a whole neighborhood at loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and her six fatherless children, and thereby get for you six hundred dollars to which you seem to have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs, it appears to me, as much to the woman and her children as it does to you. You must remember, however, that some things legally right are not morally right. We shall not take your case, but we will give you a little advice for which we will charge you nothing. You seem to be a sprightly, energetic man. We would advise you to try your hand at making six hundred dollars in some other way."

Point

"DISCOURAGE LITIGATION," was his advice to lawyers. "Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. out to them how the nominal winner is often the real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of becoming a good man. There will always be enough business. Never stir up litigation. A worse man

can scarcely be found than one who does this. Who can be more nearly a fiend than he who habitually overhauls the register of deeds in search of defects in titles, whereon to stir up strife and put money in his pocket? A moral tone ought to be infused into the profession, which should drive such men out of it."

WHILE our government has refused to protest against the violation of treaties or of the rules of The Hague Conferences, to which it was a party; the sack of Belgium, the destruction of historic cathedrals and monuments, the shelling and dropping of bombs upon unfortified towns and the murder of women and children, our newspapers and our citizens are not all of the same mind, and the American Rights League, a body of influential men whose effort is the upholding the duty of the republic in international relations, is making itself heard throughout the land. In a circular calling attention to the execution of Captain Fryatt, it points out that, although the Fryatt case is not more shocking than many other acts of the German Government, it is a clear reminder that Germany still defies our ideals of law and righteousness. It comes to us, bringing not the dazed surprise caused by the invasion of Belgium, but a sort of familiar horror. Ellery C. Stowell, Associate Professor of International Law at Columbia University, sums up the Fryatt case in a few words: "The execution of Captain Fryatt under circumstances reported in the press is an intentional taking of human life without justification in law. I do not mean to deny that the German Government was perfectly satisfied of the justice of its action, but international law cannot be made to wait upon the peculiar views or passions of any one nation. According to the reports in the press, Captain Fryatt, in command of a British merchant vessel, was tried by officials of the German Government and executed, because when summoned to surrender he turned his vessel toward the German submarine in an attempt to ram her. By diving, the submarine avoided the danger, but later Captain Fryatt was captured by the Germans, tried and executed without delay. The practice of international law and the preponderance of impartial opinion as hitherto expressed, has recognized the right of a merchant vessel to resist capture. This right also comprehends the supplementary right to prevent, if possible, the approach of a vessel with the intent of capture. Hence, under international law, Captain Fryatt was perfectly within his legal rights in attempting to destroy the_vessel the moment it had signaled him to surrender. Captured on the high seas, Captain Fryatt was a prisoner of war. His treatment was subject to the protection accorded by the law of nations to prisoners. Nevertheless, the German authorities tried him, under a regulation which they had enacted in violation of the law of nations. Neither did they allow a reasonable publicity to the pro

ceedings, such as is due out of respect to the opinion of mankind, that they may make felt their influence against abuses of bureaucratic action. An effort even seems to have been made to conduct the trial without the knowledge of the American Ambassador, in such a way that he was unable to provide for Captain Fryatt's defense. Furthermore, in violation of a hardly less important idea of justice, they executed him without permitting a reasonable delay."

IN ACCORD With Professor Stowell is Dr. Munroe Smith, Professor of Jurisprudence in Columbia University, who says: "In executing the captain of a British merchant vessel for an alleged attempt to ram a German submarine, and in seeking to justify this execution, the German authorities assume: (1) That submarines may legitimately be used to visit, search and capture merchant vessels; and (2) That a merchant vessel menaced with capture by a war vessel has no right to defend itself. Neither of these assumptions is justified by the rules of existing international law. (1) For the use of submarines against merchant vessels, whether to prevent carriage of contraband goods or blockaderunning by neutral vessels, or to capture enemy vessels, there was at the outbreak of the present world war no precedent. This is frankly recognized by German diplomacy. In a memorandum submitted to our Department of State by the German Ambassador at Washington, March 8, 1916, it is said that the submarine was 'a new weapon, the use of which had not been regulated by international law.' From this premise, Count Bernstorff draws the amazing conclusion that in choosing this weapon to prey upon the enemy's commerce, Germany 'could not and did not violate any existing rule.' As a matter of fact, in using this new weapon against merchant vessels, Germany has continuously disregarded established usage and violated existing rules. Leaving out of account its claim that its submarines were entitled to sink enemy merchantmen without warning,-a claim which was based in part on the risk which the submarine must run in giving warning, but mainly on the right of reprisal,-it has violated international usage and law in every case in which a German submarine has captured an enemy merchantman. According to established international practice, a captured vessel is to be put in charge of a prize crew, and is to be taken into one of the captor's home ports, there to be condemned or released by a prize court. Exceptionally, indeed, where this procedure is impossible, the captor is entitled to destroy the captured vessel, but in such case he is bound to make adequate provision for the safety of its crew and of any passengers. In using the submarine for the capture of merchantmen, the exception, which formerly confirmed the rule, displaces it and becomes the rule. Because of its small size and its extreme