persons who purpose traveling along a distinct route chosen by the operator. Operators of taxicabs have not the temptation or necessity, we may assume, of choosing the most traveled streets, since those less traveled afford them better opportunities to serve the object their owners have in view. It may be that a larger invstment is ordinarily required to enter the taxicab business than the other, and that the conveyances would be less in number on this account, as well as because of the greater fare charged, not to mention other differences to be drawn from the above summary. In New York an ordinance regulating the conduct of the business of public hackmen has been held not to be discriminatory, because it applies only to those engaged in transporting passengers for hire who solicit business on the street, or because tax meters are required to be attached to motor driven vehicles only. The Taxicab Cases, 143 N. Y. S. 279; 144 L. 297.

"The same court upheld a classification of vehicles (in respect of their respective owners' rights to use the streets) by which advertising wagons or busses were excluded, while ordinary business wagons, when engaged in the usual business of the owner, and not used merely or mainly for advertising, were permitted to use the streets while exhibiting business notices. Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 709, 55 L. Ed. 816, affirming 194 N. Y. 19, 86 N. E. 824, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 744, 16 Ann. Cas. 695. See, also, Provident Institution v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660, 31 Sup. Ct. 661, 55 L. Ed. 899, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1129."

The Appellate Court gave the following definition:

"The word 'jitney' we think may be defined to be a self-propelled vehicle, other than a street car, traversing the public streets between certain definite points or termini, and as a common carrier conveying passengers at a fiye-cent or some small fare, between such termini and intermediate points, and so held out, advertised, or announced.'' 24

RIGHTS OF ALIEN ENEMIES IN AMERICAN COURTS.-Two cases in which the rights and disabilities of belligerents in the great war are concerned have recently come before two American Courts and have had very different results. In one case in the Federal Court in New York an English corporation sued an Austrian corporation; in the other, in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, a French corporation sued a German corporation. In the first case the Court ruled that the action could not be entertained," while in the second it was declared that it would be an unneutral act not to entertain it.26 The facts in the last case were these:

A French company and a German company entered into a contract before the beginning of hostilities between their respective governments, whereby the German company conveyed certain wireless telegraph patent rights, undertook to construct a wireless station in New Jersey, and, on failure to meet the prescribed conditions as to its operation, agreed to repurchase it. After the beginning

24 Ex parte Cardinal, 150 P. 348. 25 Watts Co. v. Unione Austriaca, 224 F. 188.

26 Companie Universelle v. U. S. Service Corp., 95 A. 187.

of hostilities, a law and ordinance of the French Republic forbade French citizens from performing existing contracts for the benefit of alien enemies, a statute of the German Empire forbade all German subjects from carrying on any business with French citizens, and a special military decree forbade the German company to render any assistance to the French company or to initiate any action against it. The German Penal Code enacts that a German doing anything to assist a hostile power shall be punished for high treason. The New Jersey statutes give aliens the same rights to acquire, hold and dispose of lands as citizens, and declare that a decree for a conveyance, etc., not complied with by the party against whom it passes, shall be as effective as if executed conformably to the decree, nothwithstanding any disability of such party. On a bill by the French company for specific performance of the contract to repurchase. the New Jersey Court holds that a plea that it would be unlawful for the parties to perform a decree was not good, that neither the French ordinance nor the German statute or decree expressly forbade the institution of a suit or its defense, that the ground of aid to an alien enemy failed, that comity required that a neutral court be open to litigation by either party to the contract, and that if compliance with the decree was refused the chancery act would enforce it. The Court says:

"In times of peace, the courts take jurisdiction, as a matter of course, for the benefit of denizens and aliens alike. If foreign nations are at war among themselves, this nation does not cease to be friendly. Its courts remain open to their subjects. Certainly a French citizen may still sue an American citizen. Why should he not sue a German subject? No law - of France prohibits it. On the contrary, he may sue even in France, if to his advantage and not to the advantage of his enemy. Why may he not sue in this court? If he may not, it can only be on the ground that this court will give some effect to German legislation enacted as a war measure as a means of crippling its enemy. As I have already shown, there is nothing in this legislation, disclosed at least by the plea, that prohibits the German subject from defending against a French claim. But suppose there were. If this court gave effect to it, it would, in a measure, be enforcing German law, which on well-settled principles can have no extraterritorial operation, to the detriment of the French citizen asking to be heard. This, it seems to me, would be an unneutral act."

FAILURE OF ONE ABOUT TO MARRY TO DISCLOSE HIS MENTAL CONDITION.-In New Jersey a wife asked an annulment of the marriage on the ground that at the time it was entered into, the husband knew and concealed from her the fact that he was afflicted with a taint of hereditary insanity. Defendant was now insane and he appeared by his guardian. It was proved that two years after the marriage the husband told his wife that he had inherited insanity and for that reason he refused to have any children, but he continued to practice his profession four years longer, when the

disease developed and he was placed in an asylum. The Court dismissed the bill, saying:

"It must be accepted as a fact that at the time of his marriage he believed that he was afflicted with hereditary insanity, and concealed his belief because of the fear that its disclosure would have defeated his purpose. Nor is there any doubt that six years after his marriage he became violently insane and has since remained in that condition. But, aside from the husband's manifest belief that he had inherted insanity and that the unfortunate inheritance would have fallen to his offspring, there is little evidence to establish the fact. In considering what misrepresentations can be deemed to affect an essential of the marriage relation, the learned Chancellor, at page 26 of 62 N. J. Eq., page 736 of 49 Atl., in the reported case, says: 'Misrepresentation as to freedom from disease in general or concealment of the existence of a disease, although one in common apprehension communicable and transmissible to offspring, cannot, in my judgment, be so regarded. They fall within the line of false representations-as to family, fortune, or external condition, declared by Mr. Justice Bedle (in Carris v. Carris, supra) to be insufficient to justify the annulment of marriage as to such and like matters the parties take each other for better or for worse. 1 Bishop, Mar., D. & S., 457.' From the above quotation it is obvious that in the opinion of that learned Chancellor the ground upon which the bill in the present case seeks a decree is insufficient. The adjudicated cases in other states afford little aid. In a recent case in the Supreme Court of New York (Sobol v. Sobol, 88 Misc. Rep. 277, 150 N. Y. Supp. 248) tuberculosis, concealed at marriage, was held to afford ground for annulment. While the opinion in that case refers to the effect of the disease upon offspring, the primary ground of the decision appears to be that the danger of infection from tuberculosis, like syphilis, renders contact dangerous, and accordingly effects an essential of the marriage relation. A somewhat extended review of earlier cases will be found in Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366, 82 N. E. 850, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996, 12 Ann. Cas. 25. I think it will be found that, in the absence of statutes specifically authorizing a decree of annulment, or declaring the marriage unlawful at the time it was contracted, no satisfactory authority exists to support the view that a marriage contract voidable only, can be annulled by a court of equity for fraudulent concealment by a party touching his or her physical condition, except in the extreme instances already referred to of disease of either party of a nature to render contact seriously dangerous to the other or pregnancy of the wife. The importance of healthful offspring cannot be overestimated, but that consideration appropriately belongs to the Legislature."28

WHAT IS GENUINE MACARONI?-In the Federal Court in Pennsylvania it is laid down that the purpose of the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, providing that an article shall be deemed misbranded, if labeled or branded so as to deceive or mislead the purchaser, or to purport to be a foreign product when it is not so, is to protect the public from deception, and the intent of one charged with misbranding is immaterial.

Therefore, where macaroni manufactured in the United States bore a label containing Italian words, including the name of a town in Italy where macaroni is extensively manufactured, and 28 Allen v. Allen, 95 A. 363.

the general purchaser, looking at the label, would conclude that it represented an Italian product, the macaroni was "misbranded," within the Food and Drugs Act, though the letters "Mfg. U. S. A." appeared in small type within less than an inch of space on a very narrow white margin on the lower edge of the label.

"Turning to the label itself, we find from its appearance that it is very distinctly Italian. The label proper is of the dimensions of 81⁄2 inches by 64 inches, bearing pictorial representations of three persons, a dining scene, etc., with a very narrow white margin, from one-eighth to onesixteenth of an inch in width. The name of the manufacturer and the place where the macaroni is made do not appear. Nearly all of the wording on the label proper is in the Italian language. The exceptions are in the use of the words 'Vitello Brand' and 'Italy Method.' Between the words 'Vitello' and 'Brand' is the picture of a cow or calf. The testimony shows that the word 'Vitello' is the Italian word for calf. The words "Torre Annunziata' are the name of a city in Italy where it appears macaroni is extensively manufactured. There is no doubt that the general purchaser, looking at that label, with its distinctly Italian caste and written in the Italian language, with nothing whatever thereon to indicate that it was of American manufacture, would at once conclude that it represented a foreign, and, in this case, an Italian product. It is claimed that the letters 'Mfg. U. S. A.' in small type within less than an inch of space, on the very narrow white margin on the lower edge of the label, would be notice to the purchaser of the fact that the product was manufactured in America. It seems clear to the court that the makers did not intend bona fide to convey such notice to the purchaser by the use of these letters, but rather that they were endeavoring to protect themselves from the charge of violating the act of Congress. If it was intended that the purchaser should be informed as to where the food product was manufactured, certainly some words sufficiently conspicuous would be placed upon the label to strike the eye of the purchaser and convey the desired information. I do not think that the letters on the margin which I have quoted save the label or brand from the charge that it deceives and misleads the purchaser and purports to be a foreign product when not so."29

RIGHT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ALIMONY.-The Court of Appeals of New York decide that a cause of action for arrears of alimony which accrued to a divorced wife prior to death may be enforced by her representative, alimony not being a personal claim. The Court say:

"In other states where the question has come under consideration, it has been held that the arrears of alimony due a divorced wife at the time of her death may be collected by her executor or administrator. Miller v. Clark, 23 Ind. 370; Dinet v. Eigenmann, 80 Ill. 274; Coffman v. Finney, 65 Ohio St. 61, 61 N. E. 155, 55 L. R. A. 794; Gerrein v. Michie, 122 Ky. 250, 91 S. W. 252. The analogous proposition that the wife may hold the husband's estate for alimony due and unpaid at the time of his death has also been sustained. McIlroy v. McIlroy, 208 Mass. 458, 464, 94 N. E. 696, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 934; Martin v. Thison, 153 Mich. 516, 116 N. W. 1013, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 257, 126 Am. St. Rep. 537. Only one case has 29 U. S. v. 267 Boxes of Macaroni, 225 F. 79.

been called to our attention in opposition to the motion, and that is Faversham v. Faversham, 161 App. Div. 521, 146 N. Y. Supp. 569.

"In Faversham v. Faversham the court said that the alimony in arrears does not survive to the representatives of the wife, because it is a personal obligation in her favor. That decision rests to a large extent on the case of Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y. 566, 575, 29 N. E. 826, 14 L. R. A. 712, 26 Am. St. Rep. 544, which held that a wife's alimony cannot be taken by a creditor in discharge of a debt incurred by her prior to the date of the decree, because the alimony is a special fund provided for a specific purpose. It is 'a species of property of peculiar and specific character, created and existing for one purpose only, and whose express limitations take it out of the general rule.' For a like reason, it has been held that a judgment for alimony is not affected by a discharge of the husband in bankruptcy. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 25 Sup. Ct. 172, 49 L. Ed. 390, 2 Ann. Cas. 265. These and similar decisions have all been rendered in an effort of the courts to protect alimony and prevent it from being perverted even by the wife from the purposes for which it was intended.

"But alimony is not a personal claim in the same sense that a cause of action for slander or assault is personal. It is personal in a sense that it is a provision made by the court in favor of the wife for her maintenance and support, and cannot be diverted from that purpose. It takes the place of the husband's liability which ended with the divorce. If there had been no divorce, the husband's liability would have continued while the marital relation existed, and liability on the judgment should continue to the same extent. Therefore, the alimony sued for in this action, which accrued prior to the death of the wife, was not a personal claim that died with her, but a right which survived in favor of her personal representatives. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the object of the law and seriously impair the value of the decree in the wife's favor by depriving her of the credit which she would have to obtain means of support." "80

36

INJURY THROUGH SUCTION BY RAILROAD TRAINS.-In Davis v. Southern R'y Co., in the Supreme Court of North Carolina, it was laid down that plaintiff's injury, if occurring as the result of suction created by a rapidly moving train, was an unusual occurrence, such as the engineer could not have reasonably expected would result, and hence the operation of the train did not constitute negligence. The same conclusion was reached in two earlier cases in Missouri and Kentucky.37 In the Kentucky case the Court said:

"Every day hundreds of trains are run at the rate of 25 or 35 miles an hour. These trains pass hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of persons standing within five or six feet of the track. If the suction from trains were great enough to draw persons under the trains there would have been innumerable accidents of the kind under consideration. Notwithstanding this fact, several railroad men who certainly had an opportunity to speak from long experience, say that they never heard of a live object, capable of resisting, being sucked under a train. Where in a case like this it is contended that the accident was the re

30 Van Ness v. Ransom, 109 N. E. 593.

36 87 S. E. 745.

37 Graney v. R. Co., 157 Mo. 666; R. R. Co. v. Lawson, 161 Ky. 139.